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ABSTRACT 
Extending recent advances in attribution theory, this 
thesis aims to develop and apply an analytic framework 
within which the social constitution of explanations 
might be better accommodated. To this end, Part I draws on 
three theoretical trends: generative social psychology; 
critical theory: and Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
Respectively, these provide: the rationale for the 
critique of and the alternatives to orthodox social 
psychology, critical reflection on the social field, and 
the means to locate and analyze ordinary explanations. It 
is shown how: conventional cognitivist analyses tend to 
ignore the social contingency of explanations; 
intergroup theory cannot adequately deal with the 
influence of role; script theory does not address 
explanations 9 mediation of power. By contrast, the present 
thesis analyzes explanations in the context of numerous 
intertwined factors, including role, intergroup and power 
relations, and institutional, representational and 
material influences. 
In this, 9 role 9 , constituted in a network of discourses 
and practices, is the principal conceptual tool. Packaged 
with a repertoire of explanations, cogn~tions, identities 
and functions. role interacts with situational factors to 
shape explanations. It is suggested that, through their 
mediation of power, explanations serve to reproduce the 
explainer 0 s role and related roles and structures. 
Part II applies this approach to the explanation of rape. 
Detailed analysis of gender stereotypes. rape myths, the 
the professional, polemical and lay explanation of rape 
produced three ideal types: the dimensional, typological 
and schismatic. These served to tie particular explanatory 
forms to their corresponding frameworks of 
discourse/practice and to role. The function of such rape 
explanations was further explored with respect to 
0 traditional' and 0 anti-sexist 0 male roles, and to the 
role of policeman. In the latter case, it was shown that 
explanations tended to distance rape from 0 normal 9 
sexuality, thereby recursively conditioning the police 
role and its legal, o~ganizational and cultural 
delineants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Preamble. 
As this thesis began to take shape it became apparent 
that there would not be a conventional introduction - a 
delineation of research field. an outline of the problems 
that bedevil it and an overview of the proposed solutions. 
This was partly because the areas concerned are too broad; 
an introduction in each chapter will serve this purpose. 
Further. 
adopted. 
Chapter 5. in addition to expounding the methods 
makes explicit certain connections between 
preceding chapters that it would be premature to outline 
at this early stage. prior to the critigues contained in 
those chapters. Indeed. the interwovenness of these 
chapters has somewhat hampered attempts at a neat 
exposition the tendency towards restatement (but 
hopefully not redundancy) and the almost interminable 
cross-referencing through the text amply attests to this. 
Had I been more courageous. or rather more talented. I 
would have made positive use of this problem and written 
(for want of a better expression). 
In this. a bald statement of the thesis (with little or no 
effort to explain terminology or method) is followed by an 
examination of that thesis from a variety of vantage 
points; despite the initial agonies of incomprehension and 
given sufficient time and stamina. things eventually vfall 
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into 19lace 9 • Instead, I will remain eaitheul to my 
Anglo-Saxon heritage and share the blame for the turgidity 
and stuffiness oe this text with it. 
It had originally been my intention to go into some 
detail over the doing and writing of a PhD, but, over and 
above the self-indulgence of such an exercise (though it 
is important to reflect on some of the material 
antecedents of 19ostgraduate research), S19a.ce militated 
against an in-del9th consideration. I will restrict my 
remarks to the following: In writing a PhD one is 19laced 
under a variety of constraints from the intellectual to 
the financial that lead to a series of interlocking 
choices through which one must fumble and com19romise. This 
state of affairs is 19articularly acute for a thesis in 
which a number of disparate 19ers19ectives are brought to 
bear on social psychological 19henomena. This very 
dis19arateness can lead to the charge of dilettantism. I 
am not es19ecially concerned to rebut this (though I 
SUI9190Se I could call it eclecticism), other than, perhaps 
immodestly, point to the fact that some of the more 
influential thinkers have been accused of, and openly 
lauded, their dilettantism. Thus Feyerabend notes that 
Einstein ..• regarded themselves as dilettantes and 
often said so 00 p40,1978). Similarly Mannheim (1936) 19oints 
to a tradition of synthesists who in drawing on a 
range of theories produce partial rather than absolute 
solutions. That is all I claim here: formally, this 
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tenuousness is embodied in the research strategy of 
constructing an idea1-type ana1ysis of rape exp1anations. 
More s1ighting is the charge that my research is an 
examp1e of opportunism: I have jumped onto, and within 
socia1 psycho1ogy maybe given an additional nudge to, the 
New Wave Fr~nch Bandwagon. Once again this charge is not 
unfounded. 'though I think I have approached the 
cri.tica11y. Anyway. opportunism is inevitab1e 1atter 
given that: even the most orthodox research can be 
construed a~ conservative1y opportunistic. Important1y, 
both my di1e~ts.ntism and my opportunism have been guided 
by exp1icit po1itics.1 and generative interests (see be1ow; 
Ch. 5). 
This brings m~ on to the next compromise. th.at between 
(intel1ectua1/inc1inationa1) honesty and expedience. If I 
had fo11owed my hunches more fu11y this thesis might we11 
have been about the re1ation between Hegelianism. De1euze 
and Guattari~s schizoana1ysis. mascu1inity and Eastern 
re1igions. such pretensions wou1d have set me even further 
beyond the bounds of socia1 psycho1ogica1 orthodoxy. The 
point is that I have had to 1imit my interests for the 
sake of 9 mana~eabi1ity 9 : this again marks the essentia1ly 
provisional nature of this work. 
In sum then. ·.it is important to be mindfu1 of the 
background factors that condition research. Of course, 
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their existence does not undermine the validit¥ or 
usefulness of a theor¥. However, such factors can serve to 
impart a 9 truth 9 or power to a given theory. In this sense 
it is impo~tant to trace out the uses to which such 
power/truth can be turned. As I argue, man¥ theories have, 
at present, conservative implications; I hope that 
this thesis 9 contribution is emancipatory. 
2. Genesis and History. 
In the next few pages I will briefly describe the 
development .of this thesis. Though I dare say an element 
of autobiagraphica1 backslapping has crept in, my main 
aim is to shqw how this work is still animated b¥ the 
specific concerns of generative social psycholog¥ 
(Gergen,1.978. 1.982). Foucauldian 9 discourse theor¥ 9 
(Foucau1t,1.979a; Poster,1.98ll; Henriques et a1,1.98ll), 
Critical theory (He1d,1.980; Geuss,1.982). Needless to sa¥ 
this summary, can barely do full justice to the 
confusion, dead-ends and misguided enthusiasms I have led 
ncy'self into, ·nor to the uninformed rubbish that I have 
produced and continue to produce. 
A naive inter~st in attribution theor¥. and particu1ar1¥ 
actor/observer differences (cf Ch.l.), and some elementar¥ 
reading in th¢ories of ideology suggested to me that a 
connection cou+d be forged between the two which placed 
explanations in a more social context than I had at that 
I 
point encountered. 
I 
Fortuna tel¥ initial research 
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proposal was pre-empted by the work of Furnham (cf Ch.4). 
An interest in generative social psychology led to a 
survey of what might have been generative methodologies in 
which alternative behaviours and theories of behaviours 
are articulated. Gergen(1982) has outlined four heuristics 
which he supposes will spearhead the generative thrust: 
the articulation of minority response, extension of theory 
to the borders of absurdity, the production of 
antithetical theses. and the production of alternative 
metaphors. I attempted to concretize these suggestions 
into specifiq methods that illustrated. and thereby gave 
substance to. the alternatives generated by theory (this 
was as 
strategy). 
much a pragmatic/propaganda as an analytic 
Of the various methodologies I considered. 
those concerned with evoking alternative responses and 
extending behavioural repetoires suffered the typical 
problem facing Quasi-therapies. namely that of follow-up 
(Gergen. personal communication). Eventually. I settled 
for a version of the articulation of minority response. 
Balking at the condescension implicit in this strategy. I 
decided to adopt a minority response against which to 
contrast mainstream response. The response I looked at was 
the explanation of rape. A pilot study was carried out in 
which the explanations of 9 orthodox 9 subjects were to have 
been compared with radical feminist and socialist or 
libertarian feminist explanations. Unfortunately. one of 
the main subject groups refused to co-operate (because I 
was a man and therefore suspect). In abandoning this 
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project I had, however, garnered the materials ~or the 
thesis as it now stands (or ~alls): the role o~ ideology 
on explanations; the role of groups (~n the pilot study 
one of the hypotheses was that the radical feminist group, 
partly driven by intergroup processes would go beyond 
system blame to man/rapist blame. In a sense they 
~ul~illed 
imagined); 
this expectation more pro~oundly than I 
the importance o~ roles in the shaping o~ 
explanations. 
Gergen(1982) proposed that a number o~ paradigms could be 
subsumed under 9 generative social psychology 9 • These 
included ethogenics and critical theory. The latter 
appealed to me particularly because o~ its explicit 
political and sociological sensibilities. This led to an 
analysis 0~ ideology ~rom a critical theoretical 
critique o~ perspective (cf Ch.4); and likewise a 
cognitive social psychology that entailed the production 
of antithetical theses (cf Ch.2) and which placed 
cognitive processes in the context of wider social 
phenomena such as immediate situation, normative 
expectations and the economic infrastructure. My reading 
of Foucault 9 s later works (1979a.1981; cf Ch.l) suggested 
that explanations could be treated in the same way as 
discourses, embedded in practical/discursive networks 
which gave them practical substance. Also, it dawned on me 
that Foucault 9 s work could be placed under the rubric of 
critical theory. a view subseQuently supported by various 
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commentator~ {cf Ch.U). This coincided with the interest 
in the explanation of rape which. under the appropriate 
circumstances {in the right discursive/practical 
matrix). represented an exercises of power par excellence 
(cf Ch.7). It was now a question of tracing out that 
matrix in sqme detail. in exploring the uses to which such 
explanations and power could be put. This entailed placing 
these explanations in a tangible context. specifically 
explanations produced by policemen. Of major concern would 
be the ways in which conventional rape explanations, as 
modes of sexism. serviced the masculine role {or that of 
policeman) and. thereby. police and patriarchal/capitalist 
institutions (cf Ch.8). Correspondingly. to undercut any 
potentially suffocating decline into functionalism {a 
charge. that has been levelled at FoucauLt 9 s work), it was 
necessary to set this against the struggle over the 
definition and explanation of rape that is being 
systematically waged by feminists and spontaneously by 
some victims and their relatives {cf Chs.6,7). 
(1982) use of Giddens 9 (1976.1979) theory of 
structuration. in showing how {discursive) practices serve 
to re/constitute the individual subject, seemed to me to 
be a promising means of linking explanations {discursive 
practice) to the actor (role despite Giddens 9 aversion 
to it) and structure. The pay-off, from the opposite 
direction as it were, would be, given the dialectical 
relations of these elements. an analysis of the way that 
psychological factors were shaped in a discrete social 
Page 8 
context. In effect. this was a means of concretel¥ 
questioning the (im~licitl¥) assumed causal ~riorit¥ of 
cognitive processes. 
This. then. is the (too neatl¥) reconstituted histor¥ of 
thi.s thesis. It has culminated in an anal¥sis of ordinar¥ 
ex~lanations that. in its sensitivit¥ to context. aims to 
access the social bases of the form. ~rocess and content 
of ex~lan~tions and. in ~articular. the use of 
explanations in the mediation of ~ower. 
3. Cha~ters 1 8: An Overview. 
This thesis falls into two parts. Part I is comprised of 
critiques of several areas within social psychology and 
their relation to lay explanations. The aim is to derive 
an alternative theoretical framework within which to 
anal¥ze explanations. Part II is concerned with a case 
study of the lay ex~lanation of ra~e. particularly those 
of policemen. It is an attempt to put the findings of Part 
I into practice. Thus ra~e explanations are considered 
from a socio-historical perspective with particular 
emphasis on the way they these mediate power. As a result 
it is possible to see how social psychological accounts of 
such explana'tions that do not consider this implication 
can serve to support it. 
Chapter 1 ex~ines t.radi tional attribution theory. Via a 
critique of Ke1le¥ 9 S Covariation model enters into the 
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social embeddedness and practical potency of explanations. 
Through a consideration of praxis. explanations are 
conceived as a .part of a practical/discursive matrix. In 
addition I consider the emerging use of script theory in 
t.he lay explanation research. I suggest that. for this to 
be useful. it has to be related to the role position of 
actors where that role encompasses the social and 
ideological functions of scripts/explanations. Finally. I 
consider the underlying role of control and power in 
social psychological accounts of explanation. 
Chapter 2 is a critique of cognitive social psychological 
approaches to explanations. It is argued that these 
approaches do not take into proper account 
socio-historical conditions as they relate to cognitive 
processes themselves (eg theory perseverance). Chapter 3 
takes up the theme of the relation of explanations to 
role. This is developed in the light of recent advances in 
intergroup theory. The main purpose is to moderate the 
latter 9 s reliance on the pivotal status of cognitive 
factors. Recasting intergroup processes in terms of role. 
a 9 group member 9 is conceived as a particular type of role 
in its own specific milieu. Chapter 4 explores some of the 
debates surrounding the theoretical status of ideology and 
rationality. In typical critical theoretical fashion. I 
opt for a h~story-laden version of these concepts in 
which their ascription to behaviour is heavily contingent 
upon (perceptions of) historical conditions and 
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domination. 
Chapter 5 is meant to bridge Parts I and II. It 
brings together some of the links between chapters 1 - 4, 
and presents an outline of the approach used in Part II. 
As regards the latter, given the breadth (perhaps spread 
would be a more appropriate term) of the thesis, our 
project is consigned to the more speculative end of 
research. This is accommodated by theoretically 
structuring Part II around the Weberian notion of the 
ideal type. There are three ideal types developed in Part 
II; they link role (p;>oliceman, man), 
(patriarchY c. p;>olice institution, group 
ideology, etc) and the explanation of rape. 
environment 
antagonism, 
Part II is a detailed study of the exp;>lanation of rape. 
In a sense this entails a reversal of the usual procedure 
employed in the study of lay explanations. ConventionallY. 
the explanation is the dependent variable - the result 
that the researcher captures, measures and characterizes. 
Here, however, I effectively take the explanation as a 
starting point and -trace out its 9 corre1ates 9 in their. 
complex interrelations thus the distinction between 
independent and dependent variable blurs. Chapter 6 looks 
into the material and discursive bases of rape and rape 
explanations at the broadest level. That is, the 
perceptions and interactions of men and women are 
considered from a general feminist perspective. On the 
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basis of tne study of the abnorma1 psycho1ogy 1iterature, 
rape mytho1ogy. 1ega1 definitions and perceptions of rape. 
and interviews with men~ Chapter 7 deve1ops and app1ied 
three idea1 types of rape exp1anation. The dimensiona1 is 
re1ated to feminist-sympathetic consciousness and is 
evidenced in feminist writings and 9 anti-sexist 9 men's 
ta1k; it is concerned to estab1ish the continuity between 
rape and norma1ity. The typo1ogica1, by comparison, aims 
to set out and dep1oy the criteria by which to distinguish 
rape from norma1ity. Whi1e the 1atter passes no comment on 
continuity, the schismatic type is geared towards its 
denia1. The shift from typo1ogica1 to schismatic is a very 
subt1e and context-bound phenomenon - it is considered in 
interview and c1inica1 materia1. It is argued that the 
dimensiona1, in this context, has generative/critica1 
status. In Chapter 8 these types are exp1ored in re1ation 
to po1iceme~ 9 s exp1anation of rape; they are viewed in 
1ight of the comp1ex1y defined demands of that ro1e. 
Fina11y, p~1icemen 9 s exp1anations are ana1yzed from the 
standpoint of their supposed cognitive constituents. In 
the conc1ui:Jion, the findings of Parts I and II are 
summarized and severa1 of the practica1 ramifications for 
mascu1inity, gender re1ations and the po1ice treatment of 
rape victims are fo11owed through. Fina11y. the perceived 
weaknesses of the thesis are out1ined (eg the neg1ect of 
memory). 
reviewed. 
and some imp1ications for future research are 
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PART I 
CHAPTER ONE 
ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND LAY EXPLANATIONS. 
Introduction •. 
In this cha&ter I hope to analyze the limitations of 
Attribution Theory. This critique will address itself both 
to the major early formulation. namely that of Kelley, and 
to some of the more recent models, in particular those 
making use of the concept of cognitive scripts. My central 
aim is to sAow how these approaches fundamentally ignore 
the element of power that explanations incorporate and 
the relation of this to behaviour. In the process of 
this analysis. it will be suggested that explanations (and 
accounts generally) are more closely related to behaviour 
than is usually allowed for. The purpose of giving 
explanations this material edge is to better understand 
their role as mediators of power. 
We will carry out this analysis in the following way: 
Firstly we will examine Kelley 9 s ANOVA model showing that 
its apparent exclusive concern with process in fact 
covertly relies on content-laden consensus information. 
Thus it emerges that attribution and lay explanations 
generally. which involve the internal/external dichotomy 
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of causal locus, make an implicit appeal to concrete 
social knowledge. It is suggested that, rather than seeing 
explanations as simple statements of the causes of (or 
reasons behind) events, they should be considered as 
types of acts, dynamically interacting with the explainer, 
the object of the explanation, and their social 
environment. In other words, explanations can be conceived 
as glosses on perceived points of intervention (ie in 
apprehending an event one also apprehends one 9 s power 
relation to it - how one might influence, control, ignore, 
avoid, etc that event - and identifies the elements 
one must engage in order to achieve those things. An 
explanation is a gloss insofar as it, more or less 
explicitly, addresses those elements or points of 
intervention)~ This is illustrated in a brief 
consideration of that range of explanations we call social 
psychological theories of Attribution and Lay Explanation. 
This is further explored with respect to the cause-reason 
debate. It is suggested that many explanations specify 
their point of intervention only implicitly. To discover 
what this might be, it is necessary to analyze 
explanations in a matrix of other connected explanations 
(both proximal and distal), mpre or less related lay 
theories, behaviours, roles and power. Following this, the 
links between explanation and practice are considered with 
particular reference to the Marxian concept of Praxis and 
the Foucauldian couplet of discourse/practice. Thus 
explanations are seen as complex expressions of complex 
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webs of discourses and practices. In discussing this, we 
will remark on the recent applications of schema theory to 
the study o,f lay explanations suggesting that schemas (or 
discourses or myths) are not universal but can be attached 
to particul~r roles and ideological interests. 
l.. A Critique of Kelley 9 s Covariation Model. 
Attribution Theory (AT) has its roots in Heider 9 s 1958 
seminal text. The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour. 
Of the three models that sprang from that work (Jones and 
Davis.1965; Ke11ey.1967.72a.72b.73o Weiner et a1.1972) we 
shall be primarily concerned with Kelley 9 s ANOVA theory 
and the various theoretical and empirical outcrops that it 
has engender.ed. 
Following Lalljee (1981) we can characterize AT by: (i) 
its focus on the causal concerns of lay explanations; (ii) 
its internal/external dichotomy through which attributions 
are made either to the individual actor (or some aspect 
thereof) or to the environment or situation (or to some 
aspect thereof). 
Kruglanski.1975.9; 
Numerous authors (eg 
Locke and Pend1eton.1982: 
Buss.1978; 
Winer and 
Kelley.1982; McC1ure.198ll.) have noted that causality is 
not the sole generative motor of events that subjects 
appeal to. Firstly. causality is not a unitary concept in 
that it can be conceptualized in a number a ways 
(Bunge.1959). Moreover a cause can be decomposed along at 
least two dimensions: the temporal. every cause is also an 
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effect (Brickman et al.1975): and a dimension concerned 
with the causal weight that is attached to a ~otential 
cause (in Gergen and Gergen°s (1982) terms a distinction 
needs to be drawn between the enabling and empowering 
:force of a cause or causal locus). In addition there is 
the uncertain causal status of reasons (see below). 
The internal/external dichotomy can also be criticized 
for its relative crudeness. Firstly. there is accumulating 
evidence that actors do not always deploy it in a 
clear-cut way. ~referring to use a combination of 
internal and external factors (eg Furnham.Jas~ers & 
Fincham.1983; Monson.1983; Antaki.1985). This latter ~oint 
fits in with the multi-dimensional notion of cause. More 
im~ortant however are intrusive conce~tual ~roblems with 
this dichotomy. These problems have been derived from the 
idea of In essence. susce~tibility 
refers to the rece~tivity of the actor to external 
factors. (As a tantalizing aside. it can be mentioned 
that this analysis can be linked to the Gibsonian 
(Gibson.1979) 
associations 
peo~le are 
conce~t of affordance. though such 
will not be developed here. ) Now, if 
aware of susceptibilities. they will be 
sensitive to the orderliness of social behavior. This 
leads us on to an analysis of ex~lanations in terms of 
scripts (eg Eiser.1983: Lalljee and Abelson,1983i 
Turnbull,in ~ress) within which the internal/external 
dichotomy is shown to be unsound (see below). 
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I now wish to explore the problematic status of 
interna1/e:x;terna1 dichotom~ with res!;>ect to Ke11e~ 9 s 
covariational parameters. It will be shown that 
distinctiveness and consistenc~ are not content-free 
parameters but covertl~ connected to the consensus 
information S!;>ecific to the behaviour that is being 
explained. 
Distinctiveness is the degree to which a given behaviour 
is stimulus/circumstance bound. When Jim compliments 
Mike 9 s ess~. the question distinctiveness asks is: does 
Jim compliment all ess~s or onl~ Mike 9 s? If the latter, 
then Jim 9 s res!;>onse is distinctive to Mike 9 s ess~ and 
therefore it is something in Mike 9 s ess~ that prompted 
Jim 9 s response. In other words an external attribution is 
made. Now. if we deplo~ the notion of susceptibilit~ •. for 
Jim to com!;>liment Mike 9 s ess~. he must first be 
susceptible to it (the ess~ must 9 afford 9 Jim something -
pleasure. intellectual stimulation. or whatever). 
Logica11~. on this evidence alone. we can no longer assign 
causal !;>rimacv either to the actor (Jim) or the stimulus 
(Mike 9 s ess~). Causalit~ seems to reverberate between the 
two. What. we must ask. gives distinctiveness its 
explanator~ power? It is suggested that it is the 
consensus information im~»licit in distinctiveness. If 
d~stinctiveness can logical!~ reflect on either stimulus 
or actor. it becomes necessar~ to look at the nature of 
Page 17 
the stimulus (the essa.v). Thus we ere forced out of the 
decontextua1ized, content-emr;>ty realm of Kelley an 
Attribution. If the essay can be said to be 'good', then 
Jim 9 s distinctive, favourable resr;>onse to it can be said 
to be a res~onse to the stimulus; 
res~»onse reflects on his oddness. However. the terms 'bad' 
and 'good' are in fact shorthand for consensus 
information. Thus a 'good' 
people respond favourably; 
essay is one to which most 
conversely when Jim responds 
essay he is acting against the 
consensus. Of course, things are not as simple as we have 
presented them. As Intergroup and Conflict Theorists (eg 
Marx and Engels,1967; Tajfel.1981) point out. society is 
fractured into numerous grou~»s of varying ascendancies. 
When we s~»eek of '~»eople generally' we are referring in 
this case 'to academics of a 19articular and hegemonic 
persuasion. (Malcolm Bradbury's novel 'The History Man' 
contains a neat illustration of the relative nature of 
'good' and 'bad' essays. ) In empirical studies where 
distinctiveness information has been shown to be used by 
subjects 
s19eculate 
'paleness' 
(though by no means spontaneously), we might 
that 
of 
subjects have compensated for the 
the subject-matter assigning a 
consensus-value to the situation, the circumstance and the 
response. The internal-external problematic is thus 
resolved in exr;>lanations of this type through an imr;>licit 
reference to consensus information which covertly infuses 
distinctiveness with a social content. 
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There is a parallel process at work in the consistency 
parameter. When an actor acts in the same way over time 
and modality. the consistency parameter directs that we 
should infer that the observed behaviour is a 
manifestation of a trait appropriate to that behaviour. 
That is. we make an internal attribution. Let us take 
another example: S consistently behaves in an unfriendly 
manner across time and in different ways (verbally. 
physically. etc). Under these. admittedly simplistic, 
circumstances we infer that S is an unfriendly person. In 
addition to the fact that the ANOVA formulation tends 
to ignore antecedents in svs biography. it seems to assume 
that behaviour occurs in a vacuum or only in time. But 
behaviour is necessarily context-related: consistent 
behaviour does not occur simply over time. it must occur 
from situation to situation. Consistency as an attribution 
parameter is an abstraction from various instances of the 
target behaviour occurring in specific situations. 
Moreover these situations must differ sufficiently from 
each other to warrant a judgement of consistency: the 
more disparate the situations in which the target 
behaviour occurs. the more importance that .must be 
attached to consistency information. Let us assume that in 
each of these situations there is an element which the 
actor responds to (ie is susceptible to) and which in some 
way triggers his/her unfriendly behaviour. It will be 
apparent that we have re-cast consistency in terms of 
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distinctiveness our actor is responding distinctively 
to a particular element in the environment. The 
counter-argume,nt. that there is no such common stimulus 
across disparate situations, is in fact a statement of 
consensus information: most people do not perceive that 
stimulus and therefore fail to respond consistently across 
those dispar~te situations. The target actor's 'active 
susceptibility' is judged eccentric and draws an internal 
attribution because 'most others' do not exhibit the same 
susceptibilit~. Once again we find the operation of . a 
co~ert normative consensus giving substance this time to 
consistency information. Here the internal/external 
problematic is resolved in the internal direction because 
of the implicit anti-consensual nature of the target 
actor's behaviour. 
The importance of normative consensus. in this context. 
lies in the fact that, despite its underpinning role 
within distitictiveness and consistency, it is itself open 
to the same .critique. As an attributional parameter it 
cannot logically distinguish between internal and external 
causal loci. ~f an individual deviates from the popular 
behavioural norm, this does not automatically guarantee an 
internal attribution. Firstly, the population from which 
the actor is drawn can also be judged in terms of its 
deviance fr~m what the observer considers to be 
'normal' behavior. Thus attribution to a deviant 
' 
population sulch a Nazi Germany. might invoke an internal 
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attribution for that ~o~u1ation 1 s a~prehension of a Jewish 
conspiracy. This is where the Intergroup work on 
attribution (eg Hewstone and Jas~ers,1982a; Ch 3) has the 
advantage in that it takes this into account .by 
p1ura1izing attributiona1 vantage points. Converse1y, the 
individua1 who conforms to the consensua1 response pattern 
to a given stimu1us does so because of interna1 factors 
such as the need for the positive socia1 identity (eg 
Turner, 1982), that his/her in-group satisfies (however, 
cf Ch.J). In orthodox individua1 attribution research, 
when an actor deviates from the consensus the interna1 
attribution that they are supposed to receive is set 
against an abso1ute consensus. If the consensus is broken 
up, if the target actor is seen to be a member of a group, 
then any attributiona1 judgement must take into account 
the consensus that pertains within that group (its 
baserate properties). Subsequent1y, that consensus is 
judged against a broader consensus or norma1ity, one which 
is most 1ike1y to be drawn from, or is acceptab1e to, the 
observer 0 s in-group. In a11 this, there is necessari1y 
recourse to concrete background know1edge. This cannot be 
escaped however supposed1y the 
attribution research might c1aim to be 
Sch1eifer,1983). 
materia1s of 
(cf Shu1tz and 
The question now becomes: what inf1uences the form of an 
attribution if it is not consensus, consistency, or 
distinctiven~ss {or any combination of these) per se? 
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Phrasing this slightly differently: what sort of content 
as regards consensus. consistency and distinctiveness will 
effect attributions? 
I will begin with a &rovisional outline of the conce&tion 
of attribution and lay ex&lanation that will be employed 
in this thesis. Essentially. explanations are conceived as 
glosses on perceived points of intervention in which 
they. explicitly or im&licitly demarcate what needs to be 
done to what in order to solve a problem or answer a 
question (this is irres&ective of whether actual 
intervention is carried out or not• &assivity is 
considered an authentic outcome of an ex&lanation. as is 
contradictory behaviour). When an internal attribution is 
made. the individual is the &oint of intervention. This is 
t.he case for AT and &sychology generally (es&eciallv in 
their more cognitivistic guises) when considered as 
explanatory edifices. Good examples of this are the 
de biasing techniques for individual limitations in 
statistical processing that have been developed by various 
researchers (eg Anderson.1982o cf Ch.2). If explanations 
are glosses on points of intervention. they both announce 
and entail the exercise .of &ower. As a result ex&lanations 
must be considered in terms of their power-constitution. 
For the moment it will suffice to say that such &ower is 
multi-faceted and multi-directional. Explanations exert 
power not only over the object of explanation but also 
over the explainer him/herself and his/her social 
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surroundings; that is. explanations are repercussive. The 
resemblance between this reformulation of explanations and 
the Foucauldian notion of discourse is not accidental. 
This reconception of explanations can be applied to 
social ps~chological theories themselves. In particular, I 
will consider a number of the models of the 
attributer/explainer currently available in the light of 
their implicit internal interventionism. 
2. Models. 
Models within AT are used. as in most sciences 
(Harre.1972). to generate hypotheses. in this case as 
regards what sort of information is required and how it is 
used in the construction of explanations. These models 
are primarily concerned with process. OriginallY 
Heider(1958) provided us with 9 man as naive psychologist 9 
(in those days there were only men. nowadays there are 
mostly men). Kelley (eg 1967) has generalized this to 9 man 
the lay or intuitive scientist 9 • However his scientist was 
limited to (covariational) inference; the attributer as 
scientist has now been modernized to take into account 
hypothesis-testing procedures (eg Snyder and 
Gangestad.1979; Lalljee et al.1984). In addition to the 
lay scientist. we have the amateur scientist (Moscovici 
and Hewstone. 1983) into whom has diffused the ethic of 
science via the medium of social representations. In 
related fields we have the attributer as historian 
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(Fischoff.1976.81)~ as ~awyer (Hami~ton,1980: Fincham and 
Jaspers.1980; L~oydd-Bostock.1983); as actor 
(Harre.1981a,b): as interpreter (Shotter,1981). 
It hard~y needs spe~~ing out that these mode~s are a~~ 
drawn from the professions~ midd~e-c~asses. As far as I am 
aware there are no a~ternative mode~s derived from the 
ski~~ed manus~ or unski~~ed c~asses: we do not find mode~s 
of the attr~buter as p~umber or housewife. (This 9 bias 9 is 
bound to any psycho~ogy that does not ground cognition in 
the routine of historica~~Y concrete behaviour). Indeed we 
have a para~~e~ here with the midd~e-c~ass preoccupation 
that Israe~ (1979) has detected in cognitive dissonance 
research. But in this case these mode~s ref~ect. at the 
~eve~ of theory. the socia~ division of manus~ and menta~ 
~abour. In the same way that this division be~ies the 
essentia~ practica~ (or rather praxica~) nature of theory. 
so too these mode~s of the attributer neg~ect the fact 
that an ~xp~anation embodies both practica~ and 
theoretic&~ Qomponents. 
Less persona~ized than the preceding mode~s are those of 
the attributer as a ~imited information processor (eg 
Ross.1977; Nisbett and Ross.1980)o as a defensive egoist 
(eg Shaver.1970; Lerner and Mi~~er.1978). Ostensib~y ~ess 
individua~istic than these ~atter models are those that 
cast the attributer as group member or seeker of positive 
socia~ identity (eg Hews tone and Jaspers.1982, 
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1983: Deschamps,1983: Mann and Tay~or,1974). 
Various points can be made about this variety of mode~s. 
First~y. things are more comp~icated: severa~ of these 
mode~s over~ap and some attempt to address different 
types of exp~anation. However, this fragmentation seems 
to me to indicate the rehabi~itation of content over 
process. At the concrete ~eve~. this is evident in the 
way that mode~s derived from actua~ exp~anations are a 
combination of these forma~ mode~s. The precise 
configuration of mode~s wou~d be specified by the type 
(content) of exp~anation that is studied and the context 
in which it is produced. At a more abstract ~evel, content 
re-estab~ishes itse~f through the fact that these models 
have a tendency to merge into one another. Thus ~awyers 
are reknowned for their histrionic expertise: their 
arguments and exp~anations are shaped by the reQuirements 
of their particu~ar audience, name~y judge, jury and the 
Lega~ estab~ishment (Toner, 1982). Scientists are also 
defensive egoists and opportunists (Lemaine,1984). It 
wou~d seem that. rather than start off from a mode~ from 
which are derived, 
explanation types. 
more 
deviation 
or ~ess exp~icit~y. idea~ 
from which is labelled 
9 bias 9 , ~t is preferable to study explanations in vivo, 
deriving a model or an ideal-type from these. Naturally, 
in vivo refers to the broad socia~ and historical context 
of these explanations and thus necessitates some degree of 
social analysis. This the project undertaken in the 
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second part of this thesis. Under such a theoretica1 
9 unreasonab1e 9 exp1anation for a 
rape event does not indicate that he is a bad intuitive 
scientist or a poor 1awyer. 
po1iceman. 
but that he is a 9 good 9 
Another re1ated set of points deals with the fact that 
these individualistic mode1s filter out the socia1 
components in the structure of exp1anations. As Hallway 
(1982) notes. an interest in content necessarily feeds off 
and into the social: as a result the distinction common1y 
drawn between individua1 and society. and internal and 
external. becomes problematic. These models presuppose a 
neat division: they are by and large directed at internal 
processes reified as cognitive structures. We do not deny 
that there are internal structures but insist that these 
must be properly examined; their existence needs to be 
traced beyond the cognitive and biological to the social 
and historical (Chs.2 and 3). 
The internalist impetus of these models persists despite 
the avowed intentions of researchers who overtly endorse 
an external style of attribution. This is neat1y brought 
out by Billig (1982) who shows how Nisbett. a major 
proponent of both ~ognitive bias and the generically 
superior accuracy of external attributions. is caught in a 
contradiction. simultaneously exhorting us to external 
attributions while himself. as a professional observer. 
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indu1ging in extreme interna1 attribution .. As noted above. 
this ref1.ects the fact that. for psycho1ogy. the 
individua1 constitutes the point of intervention. and this 
intervention very often takes the form of a techno1ogy. 
Debiasing techniQues are just such a techno1ogy; dressed 
up as training. they are a means towards correcting a 
fau1ty mechanism that is safe1y and secure1y 1ocked up 
within the individua1 (cf Shotter.1975). For writers such 
as Shotter (Gau1d and Shotter.1976: Harre and Secord.1972: 
"' Harre.1979: Buss.1978.1979a). it is the reason and agency 
of actors that socia1 psycho1ogica1 theory must account 
for and 'which 1ay exp1ainers regu1ar1y if not 
predominantly appea1 to in their exp1anations. However, as 
it wi11 be contended in the next section. even these 
approaches resort to a simi1ar form of individua1ism. 
3. Reasons. Causes and the Individua1. 
The debate regarding the attribution of causes and 
reasons. prompted by Buss (1978) and deve1oped by 
Buss ( 1979a. ; Krug1anski.1979; Locke and Pend1eton,1982; 
McC1ure. 198U} , has addr.essed the re1ative merits and 
importance of cause- versus reason-exp1anations and the 
possib1e re1ationship between the two. Here I wi11 dea1 
only with McC1ure 9 s contribution as a way of high1ighting 
the persisting individuaristic conception of the 
attributer in this 9 a1ternative' mode of research. 
McC1ure provides some te11ing criticisms of the recent 
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cause-reason controvers¥. but his central concern is to 
divest these terms of their presuppositional baggage b¥ 
defining them operationa11¥. Thus: 
~Reasons express a motive or rationale for an 
action and can be operationa11¥ defined as the 
(t¥Pe of) response. if one is given. to such 
questions as 9 Wh¥ are (or were. will) ¥OU (or 
they) performing this action? 9 
~causes comprise a mechanical explanation of a 
behaviour and can operationally be defined as 
the (type of) response. if one is given. to 
such q~estions as 9 What is (or was/will) making 
you (or they) do this? 9 in reference to an act 
or behaviour. 99 
(McC1ure.1984.p131-132) 
The immediate point to make is that any such 
characterization of an explanation must be drawn up in 
vivo. with specific reference to the implications that it 
has for the behaviour of the explainer. If. for the 
moment. we follow Heider. Kelley. Wortman (1976). Fors¥th 
(1980) and ~ains (1983) in assuming that prediction and 
control are the overriding motives behind the production 
of explanati,on (this will be heavily qualified in the 
following sections). we must judge the t¥Pe of explanation 
in terms of its implications for control/prediction (ie 
the implicit point of intervention). It is these 
implications that must be talten into account when 
characterizing an explanation. That is. the classification 
of an explanation into a cause- or reason- explanation 
should depend on how that explanation is used. Let us 
suppose that reason explanations make direct reference to 
the rationale of the actor and thus locate the point of 
intervention' in the actor. then they also specif¥ the 
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nature of that intervention. name1y communication of some 
sort. persuasion or whatever. In other words. reason 
exp1anations point towards an intersubjective form of 
intervention. In contrast. cause exp1anations refer to a 
mechanica1 mode of intervention. This is the case whatever 
the actua1 form the exp1anation takes. whether it is in 
reponse to or a question of the type 
suggested by McC1ure. 
Such a 'use-definition' (Wittgenstein.1958) of cause- and 
reason-exp1anations has the partia1 advantage of. at 
1east. giving exp1anations a function. of potentia11y 
p1acing them in a proper1y socia1 context rather than 
iso1ating them in some a priori haven. However. to 
.re-emphasize. as our ana1ysis stands it is sti11 on1y a 
qua1ified improvement: what is gained in functiona1ity is 
1ost in c1arity. C1arity wi11 on1y be estab1ished in 
concrete ana1yses of exp1anations appropriate1y 
contextua1ized. Moreover such a contextua1ization must 
make use of a de-individua1ized notion of contro1. 
Our. a1beit superficia1. discussion of the re1ation of 
contro1 to the point of intervention contained by an 
exp1anation. has 1arge1y ignored the mu1ti-facetted nature 
of these contro1 needs. 1 Contro1' does not simp1y concern 
the object of the exp1anation but a1so other 'objects' 
that surround the actor. In particu1ar. actors are 
interested in contro11ing their socia1 wor1d; that is. 
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moving through it as favourably as possible. They 
control themselves. Also, we must be sensitive to 
subtleties in these modes of control. For a start, very 
often in the literature on the control functions of 
explanations (and this includes intergroup research), the 
type of control (need) that is handled is a very active, 
directed form, both individualistic and masculine. There 
are many cases where control/prediction may be achieved 
more 9 passively 9 or collectively. Helplessness or 
dependency in women in certain social and practical 
spheres (men have their own versions of these. in areas of 
expression or emotionality. cf Seidler.1985). reflected in 
women 9 s denigration of their own performance (eg 
Deaux. 1976). invites control/predictive competence to be 
experienced vicariously through the explanations and 
actions of men. This point. itself a reflection of gender 
bias/blindness in much social psychological research, will 
be developed throughout the thesis in particular with 
reference to the propensity towards intergroup processes 
that the genders manifest {Chs 3.6). 
Further. it is important to counter the accent on 
individual control needs. whether that be individually or 
collectively attained. in order to analyze the ways that 
explanations. or more precisesly the discourses of which 
they are a part. exert control over the individual or 
collective explainer. Within science. this can be seen in 
the way that a paradigm {Kuhn.1970) constrains what a 
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scientist is both able to do and think. Thus some 
discourses yiel:d explanations that direct intersubjective 
intervention (eg the Liberal emphasis on education per se 
a mode of social change), while others p-roject mechanical 
intervention (eg the vulgar Marxist focus on the economic 
base as the prime mover of history and thus the primary 
point of intervention). 
To restate ou~ case: any cause (as defined by McClure) 
located either internally or externally, can in the 
appropriate context be re-interpreted as a reason. This 
can be illust~ated with reference to the Just World 
Hypothesis (Lerner,l970) in which accidents, which should 
entail external causal factors only, are transmuted, for 
the purposes of explanation and equanimity, to structural 
reasons: that is, accidental events are perceived as 
teleologically driven, shaped by a reason. Conversely, 
given the always already presence of history, ie the 
preceding social conditions of any behaviour (Berger and 
Luckmann,l967~ Althusser,l971) any reason can be traced 
back to its causal antecedents. We cannot simply assume 
that when-people talk of reasons or causes they are not in 
fact referring back to prior or parallel causes and 
reasons. The ~eanings that attach to their. explanations 
should be judged according to their. locations within a 
discursive net~ork and the control/prediction that such a 
network permitst In other words, we can understand an 
explanation in ~erms of the discourses which have yielded 
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it through their action on the actor. 
Another exam~1e: Furnham.1982b. has outlined explanations 
for unemployment that refer either to the ~revailing 
economic conditions or to the willfu~ indolence of the 
unemployed; the former is a cause explanation. the latter 
a reason explanation. The latter can easily be rephrased 
as a cause explanation: willful indolence readily 
translates into the state or trait (which. as McClure 
points out. is somewhere between a cause and a reason} of 
1aziness. which in turn can take on full causal status by 
being interpreted as a genetic/genotypic substrate that is 
behavioural1Y/9henotypical1Y manifested as unemployment or 
scrounging. Mo~e interesting is the way that a cause can 
incorporate a reason. In Marxist analysis of capitalist 
crisis. unemployment is the outcome of a downward economic 
spira1 triggered by over-accumulation (Armstrong et 
a1.1984). over-capacity (Mandel.1978} induced by a boom. 
or some complex mixture of factors (Sutcliffe.1983}. which 
cut profits. wh~ch leads to lay-offs. This explanation is 
set in . purely mechanistic terms; as Marx(1970} insisted. 
there is no recburse to the reasons of capitalists in this 
framework. However. this discourse can be infused with 
others which make reference to the reasons of individual 
caJPitalists (or corporations or the bourgeousie). Thus 
unemployment can be traced to reasons of capitalists - say 
the 0 over-caution of investors 0 or 0 greed - multinationals 
can procure bigger profits from production in the Third 
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World 9 • 
This example should demonstrate that there is a 9arallel 
between reason and cause explanations; each contains the 
kernel .af the other. Reasons. as productions of a 
consciousness are also distal 9roductions of the social 
conditions 
Hollway,l982; 
that shaped 
Henriques et 
that consciousness (eg 
al,l984; Foucault,l979; 
Giddens,l976.19793 Poster,1978). Likewise causes are 
mediated by reasons. The question: 99.How are we to 
determine on which side of the cause/reason divide a 
particular explanation has fallen~~ in a sense becomes 
meaningless. What is important is how this explanation, 
whatever its outward appearance, is used. As mentioned 
above. this is a complex function of its location within a 
discursive/practical matrix and its immanent point of 
intervention. The immanent point of intervention is that 
which is directly, that is, !ogically, implied by an 
explanation and is usually directed at the object of 
explanation. However, as we have pointed out, there are 
other points of intervention which might or might not bear 
a relation to that object. An explanation can be wielded 
in a variety of ways and aimed at a variety of objects. 
This is a point tnat has come more and more to the fore in 
research on attribution and lay explanations, though it 
remains 
between 
under~eveloped. In particular, the relation 
explanation and behaviour remains largely 
unexplored. We will treat this in a relatively novel way 
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by considering the relation between consciousness and 
practical social activity accessed through the conce~t of 
Praxis. 
4. Explanations, Behaviour, and Praxis. 
One of the main ~rob1ems with the conce~t of Praxis is its 
slipperiness. Different authors wi11 use it to mean 
different things (cf Bernstein.l.983). The clearest 
definition I have come across is Jounousek 1 s(l.972): 
19The concept of Praxis in Marxism refers to the 
activity of man which aims at transforming the 
world as we11 as aiding his own self-development. 
Man is not a passive product of external. 
influences. but instead participates. through his 
own practical. activity. in changing the 
conditions of his existence. It is through these 
conditions •... that his personality is formed. The 
transformed environment does not lose its 
determining influence on Man. Thus, practical. 
.transformation of the world includes shaping as 
we~1 as changing the human mind and 
consciousness 99 
(Janousek.P279.l.972) 
The relation between consciousness and practice can be 
considered at various 1eve1s. At the political. 1eve1. the 
recent fragmentation of political. resistance into numerous 
9 pressure groups 9 has resulted in a mood of resignation 
toward the decoup1ing of political theory and practice, 
the latter. always being subject to material exigency which 
theory cannot foresee. Thus theory may pinpoint a 
particular point of intervention and yet be unable to 
approach it in practice. The sim~1e point being made here 
is that, at this 1eve1. an explanation need not have any 
direct im~11cations for behaviour where that behaviour is 
constrained by circumstance. However. where that theory 
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turns into a means of prec1uding intervention. then theory 
(or exp1anation) has had a behavioura1 effect by virtue of 
ensuring an absence of behaviour. or passivity. Here. 
theory can take on an ideo1ogica1 ro1e. We sha11 examine 
this in considerab1e detai1 in Chapter 4. 
In this section. the re1ation between theory and 
practice. and particu1ar1y exp1anation and behaviour. is 
of a more phi1osophical nature. Specifical_ly. we are 
concerned with the ways in which theory and practice are 
fused. in the sense that every theory is embedded within 
and partia11y incorporates a matrix of practice and vice 
versa. What I wi11 therefore do is first1y out1ine a 
recent examination of the re1ation .between explanation and 
behaviour. then critcize it through the concept of praxis. 
in the process of which I wi11 elaborate on the 1atter. 
Figure One 
Two Mode1s of Attribution 
Ke1ley and M±chela (1980) 
Antecedents Attributions 
Information Perceived 
Be1iefs -----------> causes 
Motivation 
Attribution theories 
Eiser (1983) 
Attributions 
/ " 
/ " 
Consequences 
Behavior 
--------> Affect 
Expectancy 
Attributional theories 
Antecedents- - - - Consequences~ 
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Eiser (1983) has ana~yzed the re~ation between 
exp~ane.tion and behaviour. echoing Ke~~ey and Miche~a 9 s 
(1980) concern with the ~ack of investigation into the 
ro~e of exp~anations in the production of behaviour (as 
well as affect and expectancy). However. Eiser also goes 
on to make the point that given that in the real wor~d 
~behaviour can produce cognitive changes that are as much 
antecedents as consequences of attributions 99 then 99 The 
distinction between 9 information. belief and motivation 9 
on the one hand and 9 behavior. affect and expectancy 9 on 
the other becomes harder and harder to draw .••. In short. 
the division that Kelley and Michele. (1980) propose 
between attribution research and attributional research 
.has become less and less helpful and less and less 
defensible 99 ( p167) (see Figure 1). Thus 99 a more broadly 
attributional approach which looks specifica~ly at the 
interaction between social cognition and behaviour99 {p169) 
is essential. Of course I agree with Eiser 9 s suggestion 
but would like to differentiate between Eiser 9 s 
development of the Kelley and Michela schema and the 
notion of 9 point of intervention 9 • In merging 9 behaviour. 
affect and ex19ectancy 9 with 9 information. belief and 
motivation v, it seems that Eiser has turned Kelley and 
Michela 9 s modeA ~rom a linear to circular mo~l. We 
propose a web of interactions; in this we are making 
explicit what is iml9licit in Eiser 9 s treatment. More 
fundamentally. we observe that attribution is more closely 
aligned with behaviour than even Eiser recognizes. 
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Various authors have argued that the distinction between 
theory and ~ractice is a false one. For exam~le. 
Feyerabend mai~tains that: 
99What is called v reason 9 and 9 ~ractice v are 
therefore two different ty~es of practice the 
difference being that the one clearly 
exhibits ~ome sim~le and easily ~reducible formal 
aspects thus making us forget the complex and 
hardly understood properties that guarantee the 
simplicity and produci.bility. while the other 
drowns the formal aspects under a great variety 
of accidental pro~erties.~ 
(Feyerabend.1978.~26) 
Similarly. Poster (1984) in reviewing Foucault 9 s later 
work remarks that he has brought theory and ~ractice ever 
closer by coining the co~plets discourse/practice and 
power/knowledge (see below). 
According to Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach the 
human condition is characterized by the fact that peo~le 
engage in sensuous human activity incorporating both 
theory or consciousness and practice. ie Praxis. In 
Bernstein 9 s(1971). as with Janousek 9 s. ex~osition we are 
presented with a view of consciousness as something 
intrinsically practical. having been infused with and 
shaped by the social activity of agents responding to 
objective conditions which have themselves been partially 
determined by the activity of agents. Immediately. the 
importance of history comes to the fore; as Janousek 
stresses. historically concrete study is vital.(This is 
what Part II addresses.) so. for Bernstein consciousness 
is not something other than sensuous human activity or 
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praxis: it is an aspect or moment of ~raxis itself and at 
the same time embodies within it ~ractical elements. When 
Eiser ~oints out that explanations do not simply yield 
behaviour. etc but also attitudes. etc. he does not 
address this ~roperty. This is because Eiser seems to hold 
to an individualist version of the attributer as 
cognitive 19rocessor: information impinges on a cognitive 
mechanism which processes it to yield an ex~lanation 
which. in turn. might or might not effect behaviour. In 
contrast. the notion of praxis implies that this mechanism 
is. within broad limits. not absolute and ahistorical. 
but constituted through human action and objective forces 
acting upon humans. Eiser 9 s talk of the 99 interaction 
between social. coa:ni tion and behaviour99 does not seem to 
include the potential of these two elements to constitute 
one another. That is. the objective circumstances which 
constrain behaviour also serve to shape. through social 
activity. the form and function of cognition. Moreover the 
specificity of those circumstances needs to be considered. 
Janousek examined the possible influence of the conditions 
of production and exchange; we will look at the ~ossible 
effect of commodification (Ch.2.3.c). Whereas explanations 
are seen by social psychology as individual or personal 
solutions. 
solutions. 
for praxis they are also practico-social 
This is exemplified by Gidden 9 s idea (1979) of 
the recu:r:>sive effects of action: behaviour and 
explanations can work back on the agent (as well as 
others) to consolidate his/he:r:> identity/role and thereby 
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the institutions and social structures in which these are 
embedded and which are constitued by them. In other words. 
exr;;>lana.tions are a form of rehearsal with r;;>r.ofound effects 
for the explainer and the system of which s/he is a part. 
However. as we have said. they have wider ramifications. 
Not only wil~ they affect the exr;;>lainer. they will also 
influence other more or less proximal agents; they can 
also shape the identities of others. A stereotype does not 
simp~y construct the image of the other. it can also serve 
to the self-perception and ultimately the 
constitution of the other. The likelihood of this 
happening is pror;;>ortional to the power invested in that 
exr;;>l.anation. or rather the complex array of institutions 
and discourses that are the conditions of emergence for 
that exr;;>lanation. Foucault (1982) has outl.ined how this 
r;;>ower can only be historically and concretel.y traced. We 
will il.lustrate this in the latter half of this thesis 
with resr;;>e~t to the power of rar;;>e mythologies. This 
concrete analysis must trace the multir;;>licity of 
connections that tie an explanation to the world. ranging 
from the co~nit~ve {eg processes of categorization) to the 
historical (Chs.6.798). 
5. Discourses and Explanations. 
MY attempt to characterize both explanations and the 
study of e~r;;>lanations has leaned on a number of factors. 
FirstlY there is the notion of 9 r;;>oints of interventionv 
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that an exp1anation is supposed to embody whether 
exp1icit1y ~r imp1icit1y. In attempting to unrave1 these. 
it is necfi1ssary :to 1ocate the exp1anation in a 
discursive/practica1 matrix. 
Now. at 1ast. we can turn to a consideration of 
discourse/pr~ctice. Discourse Theory (1oose1y ca11ed) has 
been deve1oped since the ear1y seventies by Miche1 
Foucaul.t i,n his historica1 studies of knowl.edges 
{particu1ar1y those human sciences concerned with 
discip1ine and sexual.ity). and their dep1oyment in the 
construction of peop1e as objects (sets of 
characteristics). These know1edges have been devel.oped by 
and app1ied through a variety of agencies inc1uding the 
po1ice. prisons. social. work. hospita1s (eg Foucau1t. 
1979a.1981o Donze1ot.1979). 
Drawing on Henriques et a1 (1984). we can provide the 
fo1l.owing description of discourse: Discourses are what 
peop1e say and are thus content-oriented. though al.so 
sensitive to the interp1ay between content and process. 
Discourses are conceived as systematic and regul.ated. 
governed by ru1es of combination and difference with other 
discourses. Thus tradi tional.l.y there is l.i ttl.e cros.sover 
between science and l.iteratureo or a discourse on the 
fundamental.. irrationality of women is regu1ated. 
systematiz~d and grounded by drawing on Quasi-scientific 
discourses 'such as psychoanal.ysis and sexology (cf Ch.7). 
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and distinguishing i tse1:f :f.rom :feministic discourses. 
These rules demarcate what is sayable therefore. Moreover 
discourses are not sim~1y comprised of ideas: they emerge 
in and through ~rocesses of ~roduction which are material 
(say. in the way that men ~hysica11y treat women) and 
discursive (say. in the re~roduction of sexist ideas 
through macho talk. p.ornogra.~hy. advertising). Every 
discourse is thus ~art of a complex; it is locked into an 
intricate web of ~ractices and discourses. Discourses 
gain their currency by claiming to embody truth: one 
way of att~ining this status is through the exercise of 
~ower (eg the institutional ~ower of the ex~ert; or of 
academic :fashion - the rise of discourse theory must also 
be ~laced in the context of critical reflection. 
especially s:iven its somewhat ~essimistic ~o1itica1 
implications.). 
The si~i1arities between our notion of the ~oints of 
intervention and the ~ractica1 as~ects of discourses 
should be clear. For example. discourse theory excels at 
conceptualizing the mu1ti~1icity of points of intervention 
through ~1acins: a discourse (or ex~1anation) 
web of discourses and 
interventio~ take various 
practices. Distal 
:forms: :from the 
in a com~1ex 
points of 
expressive 
(se1f-~resentationa1) interventions that an ex~1anation 
allows to s~rategic ~oints of intervention of which the 
ex~1ainer is not necessarily consciously aware (though 
s/he might. have a practica1 consciousness of it. 
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Giddens.1979). To illustrate: masculinity. linked as it is 
to rationality has an ex~ressive edge which is itself 
practical - not only does it serve to express masculine 
status. it also practically consolidates the supposed 
irrationality or 9 otherness 9 of women 
undermining/denigrating the common activities of women 
(eg through sex discrimination at work). The historic&! 
dynamic that .propels this process is so . embedded in 
consciousness that only recently has it been recognized by 
its practitionersg at the same time. without this 
constant repetition of masculinity. there is a 
possibility t~at this dynamic would dissipate. Certain 
explanations are part of that repetition. and hence are 
involved in the oppression of women. and the disabling of 
men. Discourse theory. by its complex concern with 
multiplicity and detail. seems particularly suited to 
pinpointing this broader social role of explanations. 
Using such an approach is not possible to abstract in the 
same way that a cognitivist analysis would do. Rather. we 
have to look at the minutae of each explanation. tracing 
it historically. in its dis.cursive and r;;>ractical 
manifestations. unravelling the threads that it draws upon 
and which constitute it and its prowess. In this way we 
can compose .a historical and social. as well as a 
cognitive and personal. picture of the function and 
constitution df explanations. Moreover. we can consider 
the ways that these factors shape one another. 
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Expl.anations are thus not seen as the property of the 
individual. •. but of a given system which has interactivel.y 
constituted that individual.. 
6. Expl.anations. Discourses and Scripts. 
If expl.anations are seen to be compl.ex expressions of 
compl.ex webs of discourses and practices. how are we to 
usefu11y enter into this compl.exity? I want to answer this 
question by 1ooking at a recent deve1opment within AT. 
name1y the appl.ication of script theory (Schank and 
Abe1son. 1977). and 
functional.ist anal.ysis 
its 
of 
re1ation to the (weak) 
expl.anation suggested by 
Jaspars.Hewstone and Fincham (1983) and Hewstone (1983). 
By doing this I hope to show that the theoretica1 
indeterminacy of what script is app1icab1e to what events 
is sol.ved bv assessing the functional.ity of that script 
for the ro1e .in which the expl.ainer is situtated. 
The introduction of Schank and Abe1son's(1977) script 
theory into the study of how and why peop1e construct 
exp1anations needs to be distinguished from the causa1 
schemas origina11y outl.ined by Ke1l.ey (1971) (eg 
mul.tipl.e sufficient causes) and further devel.oped in his 
1983 paper. Whil.e there are some simil.arities. Kel.l.ey's 
specific interest in causal. inference processes pl.aces him 
at some distance from the more content-oriented 
formul.ations of Schank and Abel.son and those who have 
fol.l.owed them. Here I wil.l. not be dea1ing with Kel.l.ey's 
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work. Suffice it to say that, whi1e cognitive structures 
sensitive to the causa1 configuration of events may be 
discernib1e, they wi11 most 1ike1y be tight1y bound to 
particu1ar contents, circumstances and ex~1anatory ro1es. 
Furthermore, where these structures or ~rocesses 
genera1ize across scri~ts (or conditions), they must sti11 
be historica11y 1ocated (eg the ascendancy of th.e notion 
of 1inear causa1ity has to be considered against 
dia1ectica1 causa1ity). In sum: the greater genera1ity of 
Abel.sonian. scri~ts (they are not 1imited to causa1 
structures) means that any criticism we app1y to them wi11 
gener1ize to Ke11eyian schemas. 
The particu1ar ap~1ications of script theory to AT that I 
am interested in are those of Eiser(1983). La11jee and 
Abe1son ( 1983) .and Turnbu11 (in press) • 
1. Eiser(1983) has Questioned whether attribution is as 
wides~read as AT wou1d have us be1ieve. That is whether 
peop1e rea11¥ infer or diagnose causes or antecedents from 
a given event or behaviour. Peop1e don 9 t often answer 
Questions such as 9 what kind of person wou1d ~roduce this 
kind of behaviour? 9 ~ rather ~eop1e find it easier to make 
forward-1ooking inferences of the form: 9 how wou1d someone 
1ike this behave? 9 • In doing this, they use causa1 
schemata (Schank and Abe1son,1977) which Eiser conceives 
as know1edge of·the way that one event fo11ows on from 
another. of a s~quence or script of events. These schemata 
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are app1ied in an automatic fashion; the stop and think 
format of AT is on1y resorted to when something odd or 
nove1 happens. 
2. La11jee and Abe1son {1983) out1ine a simi1ar theory. 
They make the point that AT has little to say as regards 
what needs to be ex19lained.. They 19rOI90Se that it is 
deviation from a script that prompts explanation. They 
describe two broad ways in which this might 19roceed. There 
are constru~tive processes in which the to-b~-explained 
behaviour· is hooked up to 19lans. or goals to actions. This 
effectively locates the target behaviour/event in a new 
schema. A1ternatively. there are contrastive explanations 
which compare the actual behaviour to what would be 
considered normal under the circumstances. Clearly. in 
both these cases recourse to context and content is vital. 
3. Another c1ear statement of the automatic and 
reflective use of scripts has come from Turnbull {in 
press). Like Eiser he notes the simi1arity between the 
automatic application of scripts and categorization. and 
conceives of the reflective application of scripts as a 
process of Question-and-answer. Real-world knowledge forms 
the background against which events appear puzzling. In 
producing an explanation. the individual resolves that 
puzz1e. The con~tructive and contrastive processes resolve 
puzzles therefore. As should be clear by now. all three 
models are high~Y concerned with the content of schemata. 
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In Antaki and Fielding 0 s (1981) overview of the psycho1o~y 
of ordinary exp1anations, they presented a 2 x 3 
typo1ogica1 schema (2 types of psycho1ogica1 or conceptua1 
approaches; .3 t.ypes of ex191anation). As we can see from 
Tab1e 1, Script theory is p1aced in the 
Descri19tive-Representationa1 category of their typo1ogy. 
0 Descriptive 0 denotes research that is primari1y aimed at 
those ex191anations that dea1 with the meaning of events 
(as opposed to exp1anations attempting to ascertain the 
causes of an event, or the mora1 status of agents invo1ved 
in the generation of that event); 
refers to the theoretical concern with content. and the 
19ersona1, int~r19ersona1 and cu1tura1 use of exp1anations 
(as opposed to information 19rocessing). 
Tab1e One 
Research into Lay Exp1ations. 
Exp1anation Psycho1ogies 
Representationa1 
• I 
------------------~1-----------------------------
1. Descri!9tive 
2. Agency 
3. Mora1ity 
l 
I 
I 
Script Theory 
Ethogenics 
Piaget, Koh1ber~ 
----'----------·· ---------------------
Info. Processing 
Newtson 9 s Work 
Attribution Theory 
Just Wor1d Hyp. 
However we woU1d dispute this characterization. Indeed, 
we can detect a contradiction at work in the cou191in~ of a 
mode of ana1ysis (eg representationa1) 
exp1anation (eg descri!9tive). If the representationa1 mode 
is concerned with the use of exp1anations and accepts that 
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such use demarcates their meaning (whether the¥ are 
descriptive. moral.. or causal.). then to couple a 
representational. analysis with a descriptive explanation 
presupposes the meaning of the explanation. Because an 
explanation does not overtly express moralit¥. this does 
not mean that it does not contain implicit moral. 
judgements. An explanation is a text and its 
interpretation is manifold. In the case of scripts. these 
are presupposed to be descriptive whereas it is the use to 
which they are put which will determine their 
explanatory form or t¥pe. 
Also. it is important to bear in mind that there are a 
variety of schemas available. Some schemas might be 
exclusively used in a descriptive fashion. to answer the 
question: "What is going on here?". but implicit in them 
are assumptions regarding (the reasons behind) why 
people behave as they do within the script being applied. 
and judgements of the normative status of the 
characters and plot within that script. (On a different 
l.evel. of ana~ysis. the possibility that affective and 
cognitive systems operate separately .• that is. that 
affective responses (is it good?) might precede cognitive 
responses (what is happening?) suggests that the 9 what is 
going on? 0 aspect of the application of a script might in 
fact be conditioned by the it good? 9 element. 
Zajonc.1980; Zajonc.Pietromuano. & Bargh.1982). In sum. 
then. dependin~ on what scripts are deployed and the 
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fashion in which the~ are used. the~ can im~~icate or 
~roject different ~oints and t~~es of intervention which 
necessari~¥ !ncor~orate a normative and causa~/agentia~ 
dimension (this wi~~ become more a&&arent in our exam~~e 
be~ow). So un~ike Antaki and Fie~ding we do not c~assif~ 
scri~ts as descri~tive at outset. 
In what fo~~ows. I wi~~ re~ate this brief out~ine of 
scri&t theory to the attributions.~ :functiona~ism that has 
been ~ro~osed b~ Hewstone (1983). Hewstone has inter~reted 
attributions in terms af their function for the subject. 
Drawing on Fors~th(1980). he out~ines three ~rimar~ 
functions of attrib~tion: a) The need for contro~ over the 
~h~sica~ and socia~ world. or ~redictabilitYo b) 
Self-esteem& c) self-~resentation where ex~~anations 
are des:Ls:ned to gain ~ublic a~~roval. His weak 
functiona~ist mode~ suggests that any ana~~sis of 
attributions has to be conducted in ~ight of these 
functions. This is in fact what Antaki and Fie~ding have 
c~assified as the Re~resentationa~ method. of research into 
ordinar~ ex~~anations. However. there are a number of 
~rob~ems with Forsyth 9 s account of the functions of lay 
ex~~anations. Most fundaments.~ is the fact that his 
account stops short of a comprehensively social account of 
their function (though he does brief~y mention socia~ 
functions he. does not e~oborate. at least in this paper, 
on what these might be). In particular. he fai~s to see 
how explanati~ns serve to sustain and reinforce related 
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discourses and practices. which themselves work back on 
the of that explanation. At a concrete 
level this mi.ght refer to the way that sexist explanations 
go towards sustaining a sexist hegemon¥ which undergirds 
particular control. self-esteem and self-presentational 
needs. At a more abstract level. such explanations serve 
to consolidate the way that causalit¥ is itself perceived. 
especiall¥ as it relates to judgements of responsibilit¥. 
It is also important to lay the se~aration of self-esteem 
and self-presentational needs open to question. If we 
assume that the self is a social construction 
(Hollwa¥.1982.4; Mead.1932). it follows that these two 
functions are more intertwined than this distinction 
allows for. Thus an¥ generation of self-esteem is 
necessaril¥ derived in the process of some form of 
self-presentation. whether an audience is Ph¥sica11¥ 
present or not (ie we are part actor. part audience). This 
issue is raised in the related debate around the status of 
self-serving attribution biases (Miller and Ross.1975; 
Mi11er.1978; Bradle¥.1978.1979. See Ch.2). 
What I want to do now is link up these four papers 
(Eiser. Lalljee and Abelson. Turnbull. and Hewstone) in 
order to distil a collective model which I will go on to 
criticize. Most events are explained b¥ a simple. 
automatic ,categorization process which places them in 
their appropriate context or schema. Where stop-and-think 
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forms of exp1anation do occur. they are essentia11y 
concerned with reso1ving the uncertainty surrounding an 
unexpected or odd event. that is. deviation from the 
script or background know1edge then in operation. The 
expected script and thus the content and type of 
exp1anation given are derived in part from the context in 
which the event/behaviour occurred and in part from the 
context in which the exp1anation has to be given (this is 
where Hewstone 9 s weak functiona1ism comes into p1ay) which 
takes into account the self-esteem. self-presentational. 
and control needs of the individua1. 
Here. I 9 ve constructed a composite mode1 out of the 
common and compatib1e e1ements of the four separate 
mode1s. Admitted1Y this has been done at the risk of 
vu1garizing the individua1 papers. but in this way. a view 
or approach can be derived and 
ana1yzed. This I wi11 now do. 
1. There seems to be an assumption that the adoption of 
the appropriate script. whether at the automatic or 
reflective 1eve1. is unproblematic. That is. that the 
array of events. the context. wi11 specify which script is 
availab1e. I would. in contrast. suggest that things are 
not so simp1e. or if they are tney are so for a reason. 
Peo19le ar:e more com19lex than these theories a11ow; 
for any ~iven sequence of events they wi11 have 
repertoire of scripts availab1e to them. The question is: 
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what makes certain scri~ts more avai1ab1e than others? 
Provisiona11¥o I wish to ~ro~ose that it is ro1es (in the 
stuctura1 sense. Heiss.1981) in which ex~1ainers are 
p1aced and th~ functions that these ro1es fu1fi1 that 
determines which schemas are avai1ab1e. Thus there is an 
affinit¥ between ro1e and scri~t. (It shou1d be noted that 
the same ~rob1em of 0 se1ection° a~p1ies to the choice of 
ro1e. As we comment be1ow. schemas wi11 inf1uence the WS¥ 
that ro1es are 0 chosen°.) 
Of course. r91es are not sim~1¥ structura1. the¥ are a1so 
interactive!¥ 
contradictions. 
adopts a ro1e: 
mode11ed. and are often fu11 of 
Moreover. I haven~t ana1¥sed how a ~erson 
in other words. the re1ation between 
enterin~ a ro1e and ~erceivin~ the script of which that 
role is a p~rt. In ~assing • I wi11 mere1¥ suggest that 
this might be thou~ht of in at 1east two WS¥S! 
0 Structura11¥ 0 • in which there is a meta-ro1e which 
conducts the movement from one ro1e to another and one 
script to another (this cou1d be something akin to the 
ru1es of inter~ersona1 interaction}; a1ternative1¥. this 
mi~ht be conceived of as a norm of ro1e-contiguit¥ or 
ro1e-set consistenc¥. Second1¥o we cou1d sim&1¥ consider 
ro1e-ado~tion in °biographica1° terms. in the sense that 
ro1e and the wor1d-out-there. which the en-ro1ed actor 
deals with., are in constant interaction the d¥namic of 
which ~ro~els the individua1 from ro1e to ro1e, from 
scri~t to scri~t. We must not forget. however. that this 
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is not necessari1y a ~rocess of wi11fu1 drifting. but 
entai1s externa1 factors that sha~e individua1s into their 
ro1es. 
This whole ~r.oblem has much in common with the debates 
in literary criticism concerning the way that a reader and 
text interact. Does the reader im~ose his/her meaning; on 
the text. or does the text somehow 9 contain 9 meaning which 
the reader then ta~s into (Cul1er.1983~ Eagleton.l98U)? 
Indeed. the same ~rob1em cro~s up again and again. in that 
not only can the actor and socia1 situation/script.be 
considered reader and text res~ective1y. but so too can 
the ex~lainer and the ex~lanation. and the attribution 
theorist (~sycho1ogist) and AT (psycho1ogy). I wi11 not 
attempt such an outright textual deconstruction either of 
AT or exp1anations. scripts or discourses. My interest is 
more in the way that these various factors mediate power 
which goes to shape the cos;nitiive and socia1 functioning 
of individuals. 
2. The fact that there are differing scripts also 
suggests th~t there can be conf1ict between scripts. While 
this is recognized by the authors mentioned. there is no 
consideration of. the resolution of these contradictions 
through the exercise of power. Conceptually. scripts seem 
to presuppose a director who orchestrates the dep1oyment 
of scr~pts through somehow inducing a mutuallY presupposed 
background of belief. There is no guarantee of this. 
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Es~ecia11¥ for more controversial events and scri~ts. 
Often scripts are im~osed. Discourse theory. by being 
fundamentally focused on the relationship of power to 
knowledge can incorporate conflict. resistance and 
resolution in the use of scripts/discourses. 
3. so. whether an event is seen as puzzling de~ends on 
the scri~t that serves to initially categorize it. Many 
events that are NOT seen as problematic can. on the 
a~plication of a different script become in need of close 
ins~ection lilnd explanation. An example: Witness this 
exchange from Susan Brownmi11er 9 s classic 1975 text on 
rape. Against our Will. Visiting her local precinct 
(police station). Brownmi11er found that of the 35 rape 
com~laints only 2 arrests had been made. 
99 Not a very imr;>ressi ve record. 99 I offered. 
99 Don ° t worry about it. 09 the sara:eant assured me. 
99 You know what these com~laints represent? 90 
09What do they represent? 00 I asked. 
~Prostitutes who didn 9 t get their money.~ he said 
firmly closing the book. 
(Brownmi11er.1975.P365) 
The ~;>oint Brownmi11er wants to make is that many 
complainants are dismissed out of hand. Now the 
application of the 9 ~eeved r;>rostitute 9 script serves to 
dismiss the complaint. categorizes it away. Application of 
the or 9 policemen are sexist 
bastards 0 script would reQuire a different sort of 
exr;>lanation for the arrest statistic. 
4. Discourses. like scrir;>ts. emerge historically and some 
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carrv greater weight than others. However, the;v are not 
rational in the sense of being readily or wholl;v 
accessible to the individual who de~loys them in the way 
that sav the ethogenic a~~roach would suggest (cf 
Billig,1977). They encor~orate a multitude of assum~tions, 
beliefs. ~ractices. etq which are o~en to 
challenge/resistance and to which the individual is 
ordinarily blind. In other words subjects and, indeed 
researchers, ~rovide only a limited inter~retation: what 
is reQuired is a critical hermeneutic.method which ~laces 
those inter~r.etations in the context of a history and 
political theory (Habermas,1971; Thom~son,198l.; 
McClure,l.984). To put this another way, ex~lanations have 
functions not only for individuals, they also serve 
functions for larger structures which encom~ass the 
individual and of which the individual is not necessarilv 
aware. Such structures include groups, institutions and 
ideologies. 
Brownmiller 0 s exa.m~le can serve to illustrate. The 
Sargeant's statement in both stvle and content asserts the 
essential rationality or ex~ertise of the ~olice 
institution. Si~ultaneously it re~roduces and consolidates 
a set of discourses in which the 9 ~eeved ~rostitute' myth 
is embedded. The Sargeant 0 s ex~lanation is effectively an 
external attribution as regards the causes for so few 
arrests (ie it has nothing to do with the ~olice 
themselves, but is a result of objective facts, na.melv 
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~eeved ~rostitutes). However, simu1taneous1y, there is an 
attribution to women a:enera11y. The 9 !;>eeved ~rostitute 9 
ex!;>1anation is a version of the Potiphar 9 s wife episode 
(Genesis, ch35). In this Joseph is fa1se1y accused of rape 
by Poti~har 9 s randy and peeved wife, because he wou1dn 9 t 
in fact 1ie with her. As a resu1t he ~eta thrown into ~ao1 
where he is du1y protected by God. This story has two 
facets .. On the one hand it comments on the re1ation of 
power between the Egyptian Potiphar 9 s wife and Jose~h the 
Israe1ite - between oppressor and op~ressed peop1es. On 
the other hand, it evokes the re1ation of !;>ower between 
the sexes. In the 1atter case, it is the woman who has the 
~ower (in this case enhanced by her racia1 status) to 
discredit a man by crying rape. The ideo1ogica1 aspect of 
this story 1ies in its use to ground the suggestion that 
most women have a tendency to cry rape, indeed to 1ie in 
genera1. Hence we find statements such as Judge 
Sutc1iffe 9 s famous: ~It is we11 known that women in 
particu1ar, and sma11 boys, are 1iab1e to be untruthfu1 
and invent stories 09 -(Quoted in Patu11o, 1983). Thus women 
are predis!;>osed to 1yin~: however this is modu1ated by 
other factors such as the res!;)ectabi1ity of the a11eged 
victim. If she 9 s b1ack, poor. on we1fare, divorced etc 
then she is what C1ark and Lewis have ca11ed (1977) an 
that is, -she is u~ for grabs. 
This is ex!;'>resse,d in the &olice 9 s flat dismissal/disbe1ief 
(at least idea1 typica11y) of/in the c1aims of an alleged 
victim fa1ling into this category. This links up with 
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another set Qf discourses 
closeness of women to nature 
centred on the relative 
(cf Ortner.1974) and the 
~eneral ~atriarchal and capitalist (and Marxist too) view 
of nature as somethin~ that is there ~rimarily for 9 man 9 s 9 
use. In terms of grou~ functions. at the risk of seeming 
too conspiratorial. the sargeant 9 s explanation also serves 
a form of out-group denigration. ie the belittling of 
women. (This will be treated in considerably more detail 
in Chs.6.7.8.) 
At this point it is worth considering some of the 
most important theoretical connections between scripts and 
discourses. Scr~pts refer to social situations. However. 
these scripts necessarily have an historical pedigree. The 
obviousness of some of the rape ~ths is now being heavily 
challenged by feminists. The meaning of these situations 
as embodied in the myths/scripts is being thorou~hly 
overhauled by a set of discourses that assert the rights 
of women. 
The same applies to less openly controversial scripts 
such. as Schank and Abelson 9 s famous Restaurant script. In 
contrast to the view that it sim~ly outlines the seQuence 
of meaningful events (about going into a restaurant. 
finding a table. ordering. a meal. paying and leaving. 
including the intermediate steps and some of the possible 
detractions). we can point out that in so doing it 
obfuscates the pelations that exist between the customers 
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and the waiters. chef's. etc. the economic and social 
standing of the various workers within the restaurant. 
etc. Scripts are able to do this because the semantic and 
semiotic muscle they flex have long historical precedents. 
It is thi~ historical (and institutional) embeddedness 
that discourse theory can ta&; by reworking scri&ts as 
discourses. we can anaLvse the way that they have arisen. 
and the range of' historical antecedents that have endowed 
them with their 9 obviousness 9 • that is. their POWER. 
As suggested above. a fruitful way of' entering the 
discursive complex into which scripts are integrated. is 
through the role in which the ex&lainer is situated. The 
role is full¥ considered in Chapter 3. but for immediate 
pur&oses we can note that because it straddles both 
individual and social system. it can serve both the 
individual and $Ocial structure. For the individual. it 
generates expectations. behaviours. etc. but also. it 
structures needs and desires. In-terms of' the self. this 
approach presupposes a non-unitary conception of the self 
in which is recursively conditioned and 
subststantiated in action and interaction. including. of 
course. ex&lanation (Hollwa¥.1982; Henriques et a1.1984). 
The f'li&side to this is that roles. being constituted 
by social demands and traditions (both formal and informal 
roles and institutions have underbellies too). also 
serve to re/19roduce the social structures and 
discourse/practices in which the¥ are embedded. (To 
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reiterate: this is not meant in a global functionalist 
sense: such re/production may be dynamic in that it can 
entail soc',ial and cognitive change). Thus explanations 
also play a part in the re/production of the social, 
and this property of explanations is best apprehended 
through the analysis of role. Such an approach has an 
advantage over intergrougp theory approaches to 
explanation as i·t places these processes in the context of 
wider social dynamics (cf Chs.3,6). 
Our focus is thus upon the relation between the 
explanation and the role which effectively makes that 
explanation possible. The role embodies connected 
discourses and practices. and in so doing sets out the 
range of explanations that are available to the explainer. 
These guises incorporate cognitive processes. intergroup 
processes. and personal and social pay-offs. It is the 
first of these that the next chapter considers. 
6. Power and Control. 
At various points we have discussed the role of power in 
explanation. In this section I will be clarifying our use 
of that concept in relation to a number of phenomena. This 
will entail a brief consideration of several authors 9 
views of power. 
Nisbet(1966). in his survey of sociological 
traditions. diitinguishes two approaches to the analysis 
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oe &ower a~d authority. On the one hand there is the 
emphasis on the need for social cohesion, wrou~ht throu~h 
an authority which is &luralistic and decentralized -
usually loc.ated in such institutions as the family. This 
traditional or conservative view can be marked ofe against 
the radical or centralist view which focuses on &olitical 
&ower, on the rational use of &ower by the state. However 
as we shall &oint out below, these two can no lon~er be so 
easily separated. There have been a variety oe critiques 
of the latter conception. first and foremost by the 
anarchists (Bakunin, Proudhon. Malatesta, etc) and more 
recently those influenced by anarchism as it briefly 
manifested itself in the upheavals in France in May,l.968 
(Cohn-Bendit,l.9683 Poster,l.984; Lash,l.984). At the recent 
academic forefront of this critiQue is Foucault (eg 
1.979b.l.982). This work has been fundamentally interested 
in the way that the state and the multitude of disciplines 
attached to it have exercised their res&ective &ower to 
constitute important areas of the social field, from the 
large-scale (eg distribution of &o&ulation) to the 
individual level (eg the ex&erience of sexuality). In 
these manoeuvres. the integrity of truth-power was 
established; in this. truth serves as a source of power. 
but at the same time power grounds that truth.. These links 
and operations can be gross (as in the plans for the 
panopticon) or subtle (as in the medical demarcation of 
appropriate s~xuality). However. as Oonzelot (1.979) shows 
and Poster(l.984) draws out. these modes of &ower 
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microphysics 6f power as they are sometimes ca11ed - a1so 
move beyond the discip1ines of the socia1 sciences and 
their re1ated app1ications (in c1inics, prisons. 
we1fare, etc) • and impregnate (through both coercive and 
persuasive means) the socia1 body or civi1 society. A 
recent exam&1e we might point to is the infi1tration of 
the panopticon idea into genera1 po1icing. or what has 
been ca11ed community po1icing. in which members of a 
community are encouraged to be a1ert to crime (ie spy on 
one another)~ Orwe11 9 s 9 1984 9 describes just this sort of 
phenomenon; and Aronson(1983) documents its operation at 
the hei~ht of the Sta1inist era in the USSR. 
For Foucau1t: there is an integration of power and 
know1ed~e: this know1edge, by virtue of its acc1aimed 
truth derives a potentia1 power. It shou1d be said. that 
this a simi1ar conception is present around in socia1 
psycho1o~y under the guise of 9 expert power 9 (French and 
Raver1,1959). What Foucau1t has done is specify in 
considerab1e historica1 detai1 the constitution. 
grounding. and the operation of this type of power. 
As regard the
1
1ast of these. he has high1ighted the use of 
techno1ogies such as measurement techniques. tests. 
treatments, mythods of observation and so forth which have 
gone towardf,3 shapin~ and defining (formin~ and 
formu1ating) the individual subject/object. 
! 
But the:~ can 
do this on1v insofar as they are considered 1egitimate. 
(Prior I to this. for particular1v nove1 conceptions. there 
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seems to be a ~eriod of coercion or high-intensity 
propaganda directed at the target groups. For exam~1e. the 
imposition of the nuclear family on the urban working 
classes. Donze1ot.1979.) As with French and Raven's 
formulation. the degree of ex~ertise will define the power 
of. the ex~ert (though of co'urse this will in ~art also 
depend on other factors such as the legitimacy of the 
discourse itself a novel di.scourse. such as 
psycholanalysis or discourse theory might be initially 
rejected irrespective of the expertise of its 
practitioners) so that some self-styled ex~erts will face 
resistance. Nevertheless. the point I wish to make is that 
this expertise disseminates through society. People make 
claims to certain expertises. shift the grounds of 
argument and debate to establish their own terrain/field 
of knowledge .and thus assert power. In other words. we all 
make claims to expertise especially when that is 
grounded ~n our ~ersonal experience. eg on the limited 
subject of ourselves. However. some claimants are more 
adamant than others. especiallY those who are already 
placed in a position of power. or have relatively high 
status (eg policemen. men. the educated and famous. etc). 
So. there is a circularity. in which power and knowledge 
constitute and are constituted by each other. To unravel 
the precise nature of this constitution it is necessary to 
indulge in close historical and contextual analysis. 
By using the term 'expert' instead of the retaining the 
notion of know~eds:e ( savoir). we are not 
individua~izing our ana~ysis of ~ower re~ations. 
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thereby 
As the 
preceding discussion shou~d have made c~ear. expertise is 
itse~f thorough~y embedded in histories~ and socia~ 
~rocesses. As such. we consider this ana~vsis as part of 
the three-dimensiona~ view of ~ower put forward by 
Lukes(1974. with modifications - Giddens.1979). In this. 
power can manifest itseAf not on~y in o~en fashion. but 
also covert~y. through the very formu~ation of a conf~ict 
which very ~ften ~ies at the (re~ative) ~ower-ho~der 9 s 
discretion. This would reQuire a conce~t of ideo~ogy to 
access ~atent conf~ict. The ~rob~em with this. as Lukes 
points out. is that if there is ~atent conf~ict between 
super- and sub-ordinate. (or expert and object/c~ient) 
which neither party is wil~ing. to identify. how do we as 
observers substantiate that conf~ict? This is a ~rob~em 
we touch upon in our discussion of critica~ theory. for 
part of critica~ theory 9 s function to ~in~oint the ways in 
which conf~ict has been denied. rendered ~atent. For 
Lukes. part of. the way of accessing the conf~.ict is 
through a democratic interaction with the op~ressed grou~. 
One prob~em is that there is no reason to assume that the 
group is coherent (eg the working class has many 
conservative factions. as indeed there are amongst women). 
Ng(1980) has reviewed a number of formulations of power. 
Ti~~ now we have considered on~v the negative aspects of 
power which. in its al~iance with truth or ideology. has 
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served ·to o~~ress certain groups and individuals generally 
(where oppression refers in part to the shaping of 
which o~press individuals into particular 
through constraint). However9 Ng makes the point that 
~ower also has a ~ositive com~onent - lack of control can 
be highly damaging. Heider 0 s (1958) notion of power as the 
(as op~osed to the. 'power over') or the 
ca~acity to do things ( 0 can°) can be seen as evoking the 
need for control. prediction and competence. 
At several points in this thesis we touch upon the issue 
of control and control needs. As we have mentioned. 
control as a prime motivator in attribution has remained 
relatively untheorized. Questions such as: what needs to 
be controlled? how have control needs arisen? and when do 
they need to be fulfilled? are left to wallow in the murk¥ 
uns~ecificities of the social ~sychological version of 
society. 
Typically. explicit research on control has centred on 
the individual. In the locus of control literature (eg 
Rotter.1966; Furby.1979) control is conceived as the 
degree to which an individual ~erceives personal control 
over the outcome of his/her behaviour. and is related to 
future responses (eg learning. achievement motivation). As 
Furby notes. the internal locus of control • in line with 
. American individualism. is held up as the norm. 
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In. the learned helplessness literature (eg Seligman.1975: 
Abramson. Seligman and Teasdale.1978o Peterson and 
Se1igman,1981!) the r;>erceived lack of control 
has been attributionall¥ reformulated as high internal 
attribution for failure to stable and global 
characteristics (eg low IQ). It is hvpotheized that this 
attributional pattern is involved in der;>ression. The 
debate continues to rage over whether this formu1ation 9 s 
application to depression is valid: I will not be entering 
into the frav. Of more immediate relevance is the fact 
that locus of control and learned helr;>lessness do not seem 
to map easil¥ onto one another (Peterson. Sushinskv and 
Diemack,1978o Miller and Se1igman.1982). For a start. 
locus of control confounds internalitv with control and 
externalitv with lack of control. In contrast, learned 
helplessness accesses those instances where internalit¥ 
underlies lack .of control. Moreover locus of control does 
not encomr;>ass the dimensions of global/specific and 
stable/unstable. Despite these differences the main r;>oint 
remains intact: lack of control. 
bad thing. 
wherever located, is a 
Within these fields of research we get no sense of too 
much control being a bad thing. For this we must turn to 
the analvsis of r;>ower. Ng(1980) comr;>lains that the 
derogation of r;>ower as a corrur;>ting influence has ignored 
the fact that a little power can be a good thing. 
permitting peop~e the opr;>ortunit¥ to exercise legitimate 
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control over va.rious aspects of their everyday lives. So, 
we have two opposing emphases that set up two norms: too 
much power/co!ntrol is a bad thins;; too little 
power/control is a bad thing. 
simply in the f:ollowing diagram: 
We can represent this 
:Dimension of Power/Control. 
Too little ---------------Just enough------------Too Much 
The normative content of this simple dimension concerns 
0 health 0 and w~th health the focus of attention is the 
individual. Individuals with too little control become 
0 depressed 0 ; those with too much become 0 corrupted 0 • The 
observation I wish to make is that control/power needs 
vary within individuals. across groups. within and across 
circumstances. indeed. with history. What are 
0 appropriate 0 control needs should not be judged against 
some criterion of individual health. For example. 
individuals with high control needs can be expected to 
respond more unfavourably to a given level of failure than 
individuals with lesser needs. Thus. where little 
competence is ascribed to the self. failure and lack 
of control does not necessarily induce distress. It is no 
wonder that women will seek out games of chance (Deaux and 
Ferris.1975) whereas men are more interested in games and 
skill given th~ir respective stereotypical self-images. 
At the broade~t level. men are ascribed a greater general 
competence tha~ are women (cf Ch.6); they have a higher 
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status, and their control needs are greater (which are 
fulfilled through a. number of mechanisms. Wortman •. 1976; 
Bains.1983). 
It would seem then that the difficulty lies in the fact 
that competence or 9 can 9 is variable. What one 'can' do 
will determine. within basic limits. what one's control 
need.s are and vice versa. Moreover that competence is 
conditioned b¥ numerous other factors such as those very 
micro-powers we outlined above. In that those micro-powers 
tend to delimit a role (by setting up norms) the¥ also set 
up the competence. control needs and expectations that 
attach to that role. That is. these powers also effect the 
objective constitution and subjective experience of 
competence and the desire for control (and power). The 
role of expert can afford particularly extreme 
expectations for control/competence. In fact. what from 
within a role is perceived as 'power to'. can from without 
appear as 0 power over 0 • 
T.he circulari tv we have abstracted runs as follows: 
control/competence embodied in the role of (relative) 
expert is partly responsible for competence needs in other 
roles through a process of 0 policing 9 or 9 micropowers 9 • 
These roles act back to consolidate expert roles and 
other roles. and so on across the social field. Much of 
this policing takes the form of what social psychology 
calls interpersonal interaction. Only in the historical 
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s~ecificit;v of given events(ra~e). rol.es (men. women. 
~ol.icemen) and expl.anation can the fl.ux of ~ower and 
truth. com~etence and certaint:v be treated with 
a~pro~riate so~histication. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LAY EXPLANATIONS AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to deve~op a 
theme we touched upon in the precedin~ chapter. name~v the 
wav cognitive processes function in the construction of 
exp~anations. I wi~~ dea~ with aevera~ such processes. 
though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Moreover. cate~orization wi~~ not be treated here. 
but wi~~ considered in the next chapter in the context of 
intergroup behaviour. 
First~y. I wi~~ brief~y overview the re~ation between 
attribution theorv (AT) and cognitive psvcho~ogy and 
se~ective~y review the ~iterature on three co~nitive 
phenomena as they have app~ied to AT. This wi~~ be 
fo~~owed by a discursive critique of cognitive psycho~o~y 
showing that its bio~ogistic momentum is mis~uided. or at 
~east can be counter-ba~anced by exp~anations of behaviour 
that are couched in socio~ogica~ and even economistic 
terms. As an exercise in what Wex~er (1981.1983) has 
ca~~ed positive critique. I wi~~ ana~yze the three 
aforementioned attributions~ phenomena - the fundamenta~ 
attribution error. the neg~ect of consensus and baserate 
information by subjects and the perseverance of theories 
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in the light of disconfirming evidence, recasting them as 
&rimarily social ~henomena. 
1. Cognitive Psychology and Attribution Theory 
To start: I will give an elementary outline of cognitive 
social &sychology in the form of a set of assum&tions 
(Eiser,1980.&8). 1. vvthe individual is an active &rocessor 
of inf'ormationvv g 2. v9 the interl;>retation of a stimulus 
de&ends both on the attributes of the stimulus and on the 
&erceiver 9 s ex&ectations and standards of 
~the individual tries to organize his 
ex&erienceg such organization ty&ically involves selection 
and sim~lificationvv g l!. vvthe function of such organization 
is to &rovide a guide for action and a basis for 
prediction°v. As Eiser states. these assum&tions a&&lY to 
both social and non-social information &rocessing and 
behaviour (though to what degree this a~&lication is 
similar for social and non-social information, and 
whether indeed there can be such a thing as the latter, is 
o&en to <;3Uestion. MacArthur,1982g Tajfel,1981). For 
cognitive &sychology social behaviour is the 19roduct of 
some form of individual decisiont 99The way a 19erson reacts 
to any social stimulus or situation de&ends on how he 
inter&rets and categorizes the information contained in 
that stimulus or situation, on his ~rior ex&ectations and 
standards of com&arison ..• on what he feels is ex&ected of 
him, and on the conse<;3uences he ex19ects to occur as a 
result of his action.~ (Eiser,1980.&8). 
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A more s~ecific account of the re1ationshi~ between AT 
and co~nitive ~sycho1o~y is ~resented by Antaki and 
Fie1ding (1981). They distinguish between the co~nitive or 
information 19rocessing a~~ros.ches from the 
re~resentationa1 tradition of research. The former is 
concerned with how ordinary ex~1a.nations or attributions 
are constructed. 99Research in this tradition is aimed at 
describing ~owerfu1 mode1s of the ways that ~eo~le select. 
combine and integrate socia1 information in arriving at a 
judgement 99 (Antaki & Fie1ding.1981.~28). Antaki and 
Fie1ding see the work of Newtson (eg- 1976; in the 
footste19s of Michotte.l.960} as exem~1ifying 
a~~lication 
descril9tive 
of informstion-~rocessing analysis 
the 
to 
ex~1anations. The inlormation-~rocessing 
a~~roach to agency ex~lanations is s~1it into the 1ess and 
more socia1 use of information. AT 1ies at the more socia1 
end of information use in agency ex~1anations. According 
to Ants.ki and Fie1ding AT a11ows. us to uncover some of the 
9 biases 9 or 1imits of human information ~rocessing in the 
field of ex~1anations. Moreover. while it certainly has 
its deficiencies (eg over-em~hasising cause ex~1ana.tions 
or ignoring the inf1uence of interaction on ex~1ana.tion). 
99 AT (is) ~rimari1y a theory to do with one sort of 
ordinary ex~1anation (agency} which would benefit from a 
&rior sort of ex191anation (descril9tive ex~1anation}" 
(~l!5). For ex191anations Of mora1ity. information 
&rocessing accounts origina1ly grounded in some analysis 
of motivations (eg Wa1ster 9 s 1966 defensive attribution 
theory. or Lerner 0 s 1970 Just Wor1d f1Yl9othesis) 00 have been 
increasing1;y inf1uenced the mainstream socia1 
l9SYcho1ogy tradition of reductive mode1s of cognitive 
ce19acities 00 (1953). This wi11 usually take the form of en 
analysis of how moral and non-mora1 information is 
integrated to 19roduce a judgement (Hami1ton.1978.80; 
Fincham and JaSl9&rSo1980; but also Lloyd-Bostock.1983). 
intention is to now show how s19ecific l9henomena 
that a~19ear in 1&Y ex191anation. when ana1vsed through the 
information 19rocessin~ a1919roach. ere misconstrued in a 
number of ways. Most im19ortantly. too great an accent is 
19laced on the individual organism. The main focus of my 
critica1 attention will be. in Antaki and Fielding 9 s 
scheme of things. cognitive agency ex&lantions. 
TYl9ically this research throws Ul9 the Question Of 
rationality3 that is. whether- &eol91e 0 s cognitive 19rocesses 
are biased or rational. As Eiser(1980) notes. the answer 
to this turns on the meaning of 0 rational 0 • At the leve1 
of examining the the 19rocesses involved in 19roducing 
behaviour. the notion of 0 rational 0 or 9 irrational 0 siml91Y 
does not &l9l91Y. The cognitive l9SYchologist 0 s task is to 
unmask the mechanisms through which a decision is arrived 
at. Only with reference to some norm does a 19rocess become 
0 rational 0 or 0 biased 0 • One of the most freQuently 
ar;>plied norms is a mathematical or logica1 one 
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(Kruglansk~ and Ajzen.1983). However. we should note 
immediately that the. bias as here treated. is internal 
and individual. something which a cognitive a~~roach 
~resu~&oses. Thus the term 
for the ~ur~oses of theoretical analysis~ that analysis 
is. as I ho&e to show. value- {and history-) laden (eg 
Sam&son.1981).ie. it embodies a norm which. 
its hegemony. it renders invisible. 
by virtue of 
To reitere.te: a full discussion of the range of biases 
and heuristics is beyond our sco~e. Instead. three 
exam~les of these wi11 be considered in some detail. The 
Fundamental Atribution Error (FAE). the neglect of 
consensua/baserate information. 
(TP) have been chosen because. 
centr&lity in the literature. 
and Theory Perseverance 
in addition to their 
they are ~urticularly 
relevant to the analysis of men 9 a ex~lanations of ra~e. 
serving to Under&in the sexist treatment of ra~e victims 
and women generally. In this section I will review the 
literature on these ~henomena. Thia will be followed by 
an analysis of the general shortcomings of cognitive 
a~19roaches. Fina11y. I will s~ecul&tively reinter~ret 
these ~henomena in the light of the critical &oints 
develo~ed in the &receding section. 
a. The Fundamental Attribution Error. The original 
findings of Actor{A)/Observer(O) 
formalized by Jones and Nisbett(1972) 
diflferences were 
in the following 
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As reliably attribute their behaviour externally. 
that is. to situational factorsa Os attribute the same 
behaviour relatively internallY. to some facet of the A. 
There was a two-fold explanation of this: on the one hand 
As and Os have differing perspectives on the same fragment 
of behaviour. In other words they nave different 
(perceptual) information available. so that for the o. the 
A 0 s behaviour appears more salient. On the other hand. As 
and Os will process the same piece of information 
differently. according to. say. their relative knowledge 
drawing on Heider 9 s (1958) 
idea of the actor swamping the field. has 
institutionalized this into the FAE. which describes the 
fundamental and pervasive tendency of Os to attribute more 
internally than is warranted. 
To say that this phenomenon and the paradigm to which it 
has given rise have been under attack in recent years 
would be an understatement. Various authors have disputed 
whether the FAE can be sustained by the available 
empirical evidence (Monson and Snyder.1977; Monson.1983; 
Fishbein and Ajzen.1983). Others have pointed out that 
whether an A/0 difference surfaces depends on the nature 
and content of the attributional task (eg Miller and 
Rorer.1982; Bradley.1979z Deaux.1976; Taylor and 
Koivumaki.1976). The role of expectations is particularly 
important in 
attributions. 
mediating 
Expectations 
the relation 
referring 
of A and 0 
to one 0 s own 
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behaviour (and this includes self-~resentational as~ects) 
wi11 effect explanationst it is more im~ortant to a~~ear 
modest, flush with one 9 s self-stereoty~e or rational. 
in-s:roup. than to consistently attribute internally as 
an 0 (though there does seem to be a norm for this too, 
Jellison and Green.1981). On the other hand. expectations 
concerning. the other will also condition explanations (eg 
Jones and Davis.1965; Hansen and Stomer.1978; Deaux and 
Ferris.1977; Hewstone and Jaspars.1982a. etc). Others have 
attcked FAE on the grounds that it is value laden (eg 
Harvey.Town.& Yarkin.1981; Billig.1982; Gergen.1982). or 
that it .conflates descri~tive and evaluative aspects of 
explanation (Van der Pligt,1981). Harre(1981a) and 
Shotter(1981) have both noted that as a paradigm it sorely 
lacks any treatment of the interactional nature of many 
A/0 encounters for Harre the A/Os competetively 
establish themselves as worthy ~eo~le; for Shotter. they 
hermeneutically uncover what is going on. Further. FAE 
being mostly laboratory-bound and experiment-fixated, has 
failed to take into account the variety of explanations 
available to A/Os (Gergen.1982: Ch.l). Farr 
Anderson(1983) have also pointed out that the FAE paradigm 
has operated exclusively in the visual modality and that 
the o and A. in taking over from Heider 9 s ~urely 
relational terms 9 perceiver 9 and 9 other 9 respectively, 
have effectively vulgarized the latter. 
To some degree these ~rob1ems have been tackled by the 
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intergroup attribution paradigm (eg Tay1or and Jaggi.1974; 
Pettigrew.1979; Hewstone and Jaspers.1982b.3.etc). Here. 
there is a sensitivity to the eocia1 embeddednees of the 
A/0 paradigm; various motivationa1 and eocia1 factors 
which serve to 're1ativize' the position of A and o. by 
p1acing them in the context of opposing groupe. are taken 
into account. 
Despite the shortcomings of the FAE paradigm. there does 
seem to be one robust effect which emerges: the inf1uence 
of ea1ience. MY aim is to show how sa1ience (itse1f a 
subcategory of the avai1abi1ity heuristic, Tvereky and 
Kahneman.1973.1974) might be rendered suspect when seen 
1imited to individua1 functioning. This wi11 invo1ve 
c1oee inspection of the concept of avai1abi1ity. in order 
to rework this 'heuristic' as a eocia11y grounded 
phenomenon. 
Rose and Andereon(1982) and Nisbett and Ross(1980) note 
how the FAE can be exp1ained in terms of the avai1abi1ity 
heuristic. For the o. the A is more avai1ab1e by virtue of 
his/her 00 perceptua1 !;>roximi ty" to her/his action. 09 The A 
is dynamic and interesting whi1e the situations are more 
common1y static 
Ross.1980.p122-123). 
attributions are 
and 
(When 
1ikewise 
(Nisbett and 
this is reversed. then 
reversed. MacArthur and 
Post.1977.) Before going on to recount the ways that 
avai1ability might operate within FAE. it is worth noting 
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that it can accommodate many if not all the criticisms 
levelled above. The point that expectations are involved 
in AT can be rephrased in terms of the increased 
availability of certain types of behaviour-attribution 
couplings which have been prompted by the situation of the 
0 (say. as an in-group member. or as 9 ordinary person 9 }. 
It would seem that availability can explain practically 
anything to do with explanation. This is part of its 
strength. as well as its weakness in the sense that. as 
it stands. it cannot map out the specificity and 
historicity of the couplings that constitute any given 
instance of availability: too .often they are reduced to 
the 9 biologica1 individual 9 inevitablY characterized by a 
gross and unexplored need to 9 control 9 and 9 predict 9 • 
There seem to be. roughly in accordance with Jones and 
Nisbett 9 s(1972} original formulation. at least two ways in 
which salience and availabilty function within the A/0 
perceptually. and informationally (not that the 
two are always readily distinguishable}. 
suggests that availability operates in three ways in 
through salience. retrieval. and the 
use of schemas - for the sake of convenience however. we 
have collapsed these into two. 
(i) Perceptual Salience. (cf McArthur.1982. for a 
review). Usually. this means that the perceptual salience 
of the A prompts the 0 to take him/her to be the· prime 
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a;snsrator of his/her behaviour. Sal.ience can be 
mani~ul.ated throu~h the ~hysical. csntral.ity of the A 
(Storms.197l!.); or the rel.ative 9 differsntness 9 of the A 
with res~ect to other As. Tayl.or and Fiske(1975) showed 
how the visual. ~rominence of the A served to induce an 
internal. attribution. Anderson 
and Ruderman (un~ubl.ishsd manuscri~t. cited in Nisbett and 
Ross.1980) showed how race or se~ uni~ueness had a. simil.ar 
effect. Simil.arl.y. the col.our of a shirt which increases 
the sal.ience of the tar~et A. wil.l. al.so increase the 
internal. attributions made to her/him. As Tnyl.or(1982) 
~oints out. it is difficul.t to sse what rel.evance other 
than ~erce~tual the col.our of a shirt woul.d have for an o. 
As mentioned before McArthur and Post (1977) found that a 
brightl.y l.it or moving A l.ed to increased attribution to 
him/her. whil.e a salient environment facil.itated e~ternal 
~ttribution. 
(ii) Informational Avail.abil.ity. This can be mediated in 
a number of ways& Ross and Sicoly(1979) showed 
that a~ents have differential retrieval. being better able 
to recal.l their own behaviour as o~~osed to othsra 9 
(thou~h this was modulated to some e~tent by the nature of 
those behaviours). Al.ternatively. if the different ty~es 
and amounts of information that one has regarding self and 
others is bal.anced. then FAE seems to be abated 
(Eisen.1979). Simil.arl.y Brickman et al (1975). and Rusbult 
end Medlin(1982) have shown that l.onger causal. chains (ie 
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more information) tend to moderate the internal. 
attributions of Os. It woul.d seem then that attributions 
are conditioned according to whether certain ty~es of 
information are avail.abl.e which is itsel.f conditioned by 
the situation ·in which the 0 and A find themselves. 
Informational. avail.abil.ity can be fostered by al.tering 
that situation. without necessarily expl.icitl.y changing 
the amounts of information avail.abl.e to the 0/A. Thus 
getting the 0 to empathise with the A has the effect of 
making avail.abl.e to him/her information that woul.d 
otherwise remain unta~ped - after al.l.. every ex~erimental. 
0 has been a real.-l.ife A (eg Regan and Totten.1975; Gaul.d 
and Sigal.l..1977; however see al.so. Tayl.or.Etcoff & 
Lanter.1979). We might al.so s~ecul.ate over the action of 
empathy in the functioning of in-group attributional. 
favouritism. Most im~ortant of al.J.. it woul.d seem that 
some types of information are more avail.abl.e than others 
by virtue of their vividness and concreteness. 
b.The Negl.ect of Consensus and Baserate Information. 
Kel.l.eyian consensus information refers to the degree to 
which an A 9 s behaviour conforms to other As 9 behaviour 
given the same stimul.us and situation. If there is high 
consensus then it assumed that the situation is the cause. 
As ever. this ~arameter suffers from a variety of 
ai1ments. In addition to the criticisms we made in Chapter 
1 in which we -rel.ativized the status of the consensual. 
popul.ation. we can al.so point to the fact that a minority 
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can define the 9 ~roper 9 (ie consensua1) response if it is 
in a position- to exert minorit¥ inf1uence (cf 
Moscovici.1976; Ng.1980; Mu~nYo1984). Thus in determining 
the re1evance of consensus information we need to uncover 
the source of its power whether it be 1ocated in the 
in-group. or a powerfu1 minority. or in the mists of 
history as with some mascu1ine norms of response. 
However. more direct1y of interest to attribution 
theorists is the fact that it has been shown that 
consensus information is 
McArthur.1972.1976o Gar1and. 
Nisbett and Borgida.1975o 
consistent1y underused (eg 
Hardy 
Nisbett. 
& Stevenson.1975; 
Borgida.Cranda11 & 
Reed.1976o Orvis. Cunningham and Ke11eY.1975). Nisbett and 
Borgida(1975) have suggested that the main reason that 
this information is not used is that it 1acks 
concreteness and vividness - it is too diffuse for common 
cognitive mastication. Some of these findings have been 
criticized because the random (ie norma1) nature of the 
samp1e from which the consensus information was drawn had 
not been made c1ear to subjects (We11s & Harvey.1977; 
Borgida.1978o We11s and Harvey.1978). However. even where 
this was made apparent to subjects. consensus information 
remained underused re1ative to the other informationa1 
19arameters of distinctiveness and consistency. Other 
factors that might be invo1ved in this underuti1ization 
are: size of consensus samp1e size (Kassin.1979o however 
Hami11. Wi1son and Nisbett.1980. have found subjects to 
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be insensitive to sam~le size); successive versus 
simultaneous ~resentation of information (Feldman at 
al.1976s Kassin.1981); the order in which information is 
~resented the later that consensus is given to 
subjects. ie the closer it is to the ~oint of judgement. 
the more likely it is to be used (Ruble and Feldman.1976); 
whether consensus information is causally related to 
the target behaviour (Ajzen.1977); if consensus is 
generated by reference to onevs own behaviour then it is 
more likely to be used (Hansen and Lowe.1976; Hansen and 
Donoghue.19778 also the consensual ~otency of onavs own 
behaviour is illustrated by the false consensus effect. 
Ross.Greene and House.1977). Kassin(1979) distinguishes 
between two ty~es of consensus information. normative and 
sam~le-based or ex~licita it is the latter that has been 
most often (under)used in ANOVA studies. From this it can 
follow that sam~le-based consensual behaviour which is 
aty~ical or extreme. leads subjects to assume that that 
information is drawn from a deviant or unre~resentative 
Thus consensus information is judged against 
normative ex~ectations of what constitutes a~~ro&riate 
behaviour for 0 reasonable ~eo~lev. It would seem then that 
when consensus information is used. it must reflect a 
norm. However. as ~ointed out in Cha~ter 1. in many cases 
a clear norm does not emerge. 
Kaheneman and 
as for exam~le with 
re~resentativeness 
ex~eriments. M~re recently. Borgida and Brekke (1981) have 
suggested that whether consensus is used or not is not a 
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simp1e function of its vividness or of the operation of 
the representativeness heuristic (in which subjects access 
the overt ~imi1arity between the actor (item) and an 
avai1ab1e b~cka:round group (category). and use this 
rather than the actua1 baserates to guide their 
judgements). Rather. they suggest that where the baserate 
and individuating data are equa11y re1evant. they can be 
combined and prioritized. We find para11e1s to this in the 
intergroup 1i~erature (cf Ch.3). 
The main point I wish to draw out here is that the 
Representativeness Heuristic can be said to 1ie at the 
heart of the under-use of consensus information. To 
reiterate the representativeness heuristic: if an item A 
is simi1ar ~o category B. then it is thought to be 
representative of B and this is insensitive to baserates. 
samp1e size. Iaws of chance and va1idity etc (Tversky and 
Kahneman.l.982). The key notion here is 9 simi1arity 1 which 
can inc1ude a variety of ways by which an individua1 item 
is seen as representative of a sample. I wou1d further 
suggest that it is part1y simi1ar~ty that renders an 
object vivid. If simi1arity is one of the factors invo1ved 
in catea:orizationo and categorization is a process whereby 
an item is more unequivocably defined. then this 
definition wii1 serve 
(However. as Billig(l.985) 
to make an item more vivid. 
has 190inted out.. we must not 
forget process~s of 19articu1arization in which an 
defined by virtue of its uniqueness.) In effect 
item is 
then. an 
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item derives its vividness &artly from its similarity to 
wel~-defined and well-known categories. When 
individuating data becomes weako that iso where the 
individual. item lacks vividnesso then recourse to the 
ex&erimental. baserate information (or consensus) becomes 
necessary. Given that the Re~resentativeness Heuristic 
(RH) is a basic ~rocess in the neglect of consensus 
in~ormation. our main objection will revolve around its 
essentiallY individualistic&ers&ective. 
Theory Perseverance (TP) refers 
to the way that &eo&1e in their initiml 
assessments (or e:lt&1anations) to an unwarranted 
degree 00 (Nisbett and Ross.1Q80.&176). TP has recently been 
studied through the use of the debriefin~ &aradi~m in 
which the subjects 0 initial assessment is whollY 
discredited through the introduction of new information. 
Ross 0 Le&~er and Hubbard(l975) found that subjects 0 initial 
beliefs about their own and others 0 ability to distinguish 
between authentic and inauthentic suicide notes &ersevered 
even after a thorough debriefing. The debriefing consisted 
of the revelation that the feedback they had been 
receiving about their &erformance was in fact random 
(ie unrelated to their actual &erformance). This finding 
has been extended in a number of ways. Anderson.Le&&er 
and Ross(l980) found that even where the initial evidence 
was itself highly dubious. as in the relation between 
firef~ghters and the &reference for risk as measured by a. 
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paper and pencil test. the belie~s that derived from that 
information ~ersisted after debriefing. The overall 
evidence suggested that subjects were formulating causal 
scenarios or ex~lanations from which they re~used to shift 
after debriefing. Ross.Lep~er and Lau(cited in Nisbett and 
Ross.~980). re~licated these findings outside a laboratory 
setting. They ~ound that students continued to ascribe 
their performance to ability even a~ter thay had been 
debriefed that their per~ormance depended solely on the 
ty~e of lecture they had received ~rior to attem~ting the 
task. Anderson (1982.1983) has studied the way that this 
9 bias 9 might be counteracted. He ~ound that the more 
concrete the data. the more severe the ~erseverance. That 
is. subjects ~ound it easier to generate causal theories 
or scenarios from individuating data than from abstract 
information. Attem19ting to attenuate subjects 9 
perseverance. Anderson found that counter-ex~lanations 
(~roducing alternative ex~lanations) and innoculation 
(telling subjects about their tendency towards 
perseverance) both led to a decrease in ~erseverance. the 
~ormer by e~fecting theory revision. the latter by 
e~fecting theory formation. These findings of~er su~~ort 
for the theory that causal scenarios have a tendency to 
19ersist. 
However. as Nisbett and Ross(1980) note. ~ersistence is 
aided by the ability of subjects to inter~ret ~otentially 
disconfirming evidence so that it effectively contributes 
to their initial. 
Cantor(1979; Snyder 
theory. 
and 
For examr;>le. 
Gana:estad.1981) 
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Snyder and 
showed that 
subjects are particularly prone to preferentia·lly 
soliciting confirming data. 
Incidentally. another way of viewing these r;>henomena is 
through the notion of 9 anchoring 9 (Tversky and 
Kahneman.1974) which describes the failure of subjects to 
make necessary adjustments to initial judgements. 
However. I will not further develop the connections 
between anchoring and theory perserverance. 
My intention is to speculatively show how TP can be 
reconceived as a social. 9 bias 9 that has some of its roots 
in the 9 objective conditions of capitalism 9 • This is not 
to s.ugg:est that it is not present in other societies. 
merely to point out that its bases in social praxis will 
differ across the spectrum of societies (see below). 
Nisbett and Ross 9 (1980) accent on ~higher epistemic 
s:oals 99 such as importance of beliefs and 
belief-systems 99 or on 99 the real-world constraints on time99 
(p191). is displ.aced in favour of an analysis in terms of 
social conservatism and an impetus towards social and 
sel.f-objectification. 
2. A Critique of Cognitive Social Psychol.ogy. 
a. Preamble. Before I embark on a detail.ed critique of 
this tradition. I would first like to outline some of the 
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reasons for initial reservations concerning the 
cognitivist approac.h. The second part of this thesis is 
concerned with men 9 s. particularly specifically 
policemen 9 s. explanation of rape. Even a superficial look 
at the way that rape myths are deployed and explanations 
constructed will show that availability. 
representativeness and anchoring heuristics are a11 
applicable. However. because these 9 heuristics 9 and 
9 biases 9 ·are located within the individual. that is. are 
seen to be an outcome of faulty cognitive functioning. the 
socia~ 9 biases 9 in the sense of ine~ualities in power. etc 
are bypassed. Rather than grounding these 9 biases 9 in 
concrete situations. entailing particular discourses and 
practices. rather than seeing them as instances of the 
rules of combination and difference that apply to relevant 
discourses and practices. we are presented with a series 
of universal processes. The result is that the site of 
corrective intervention becomes the individual. The gross 
bigotry that we witness in .many explanations of rape is 
due to the biological limitations of our cognitive 
capacities• one corollary of this is the conservative view 
that there can be no change. that such socially 
reprehensible behaviour is inevitable (Billis:.l985). 
Certainly. I am not arguing that the individual need not 
change 0 rather. I am arguing against the exclusive 
technological focus on the individual (as exemplified by 
innoculation and counter-explanation procedures). What is 
required is a complex. dialectical intervention that. in 
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the case of men 9 s ex~1anation of ra~e. wou1d need to take 
into account the historica1 and biogra~hica1 investments 
that have been made in. for examp1e. sexua1 
inequa1ity. and extreme contro1 of se1f and (1ow-status) 
other. 
b. E~istemic Proces§es and Society. The debate 
regarding the rationa1ity of heuristics rages. As we 
remarked abov~. any such judgement entai1s the setting u~ 
; 
of a norm. ~ypica11y. these have been statistica1 or 
logical ones. In contrast. Krug1anski and Ajzen(1983) 
have suggesteq that any such norms must be set against 
interna1 norm~ of e~istemic functioning. What I will now 
do is show that this debate is stil1 1ocked within the 
individualist~c frame of reference outlined above. From 
this will lead a discussion of the general shortcomings of 
a cognitive social ~sychology. 
Nisbett and Ross(1980). while allowing for the 
possibility pf normative demands on inference ~rocesses. 
tem~er this by insisting that the cognitive is ~rimary. 
Thus. it would be 
" •.. a mistake to whitewash our subjects 9 
behaviour. or to ~resume that it can be 
understood whollY in terms of such worthy higher 
order goals. People 9 s confirmation biases and 
their ~pproach to recall and generation of data 
is to~ well documented to justify such 
tolerance. 99 
(Nisbett and Ross.1980.p192} 
Krug1anski and Ajzen suggest that in addition to 
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logical/statis~ical normative models. there are two 
further criteria of validity used in human inference 
research: observation and the ex~erimenter 9 s 
~ers~ective. :Kruglanski and Ajzen also summarize the 
current state of the field in the following way: (1) There 
is a range of biases that are fundamentally different -
this research field and the ~rocesses it addresses are 
thus both essentially pluralistic; (2) Biases are 
motivational or cognitive; (3) There exist reliable 
criteria for· inferential validity. In contrast. these 
authors offer the following alternative characterization: 
(1) The.infer~nce ~rocess is unitary; (2) Biases need not 
result in error; {3) There are no secure criteria of 
validity. They ~refer to characterize knowledge by: (1) 
its contents; and {2) the confidence with which it is 
held. 
For Kruglanski and Ajzen: (1) The e~istemic (knowledge 
~roducing) ~rocess is initiated by a~ e~istemic ~urpose 
(interests). Cognitions (hy~otheses) arise in the stream 
of consciousness; {2) Validation of these cognitions 
involved deductive knowledge and the ~roduction of 
9 if-then 9 linkages. Thus an hy~othesis will be accepted if 
it is deducible from the acce~ted evidence; {3) However 
subjects may generate alternative. equally viable. 
hy~otheses from the same data-base that are inconsistent 
with . the or~ginal hypothesis; (4) It is ~ossible to 
generate an i~finity of 9 if-then 9 linkages. When we sto~ 
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generating we effective1y 'freeze' the inference process. 
Converse1y. we 'unfreeze' when generating a new 
hypothesis. The capacity to generate 1inkages is dependent 
upon various ·factors both interna1 and situationa1. In 
Krua:1anski and Ajzen's view peop1e are subjective1y 
1oa:ica1. Biases are preferences for one inference over 
a1ternatives: errors are subjective1y defined as the kind 
of experience that is induced by an inconsistency between 
a given hypothesis, inference or conc1usion and a firm1y 
he1d be1ief. Presumab1y what is considered inconsistent is 
1ikewise subjective. 
so. for Nisbett and Ross. the subject is objective1y 
biased, or more co11oQuia11y, wrong. For Krug1anski and 
Ajzen the subject simp1y cannot be wrong. This can only be 
sustained by estab1ishing that there are no objective or 
secure criter~a of va1idity, which they manaa:e by adopting 
a 'Pop19er;i.an non-justificationist metaphysic'. 
According1y, any mode1 of em19irica1 rea1ity, even direct 
observation, is a conce19tua1 construction whose degree of 
actua1 correspondence with objective reality is in 
princip1e inestimab1e. , It follows that normative mode1s, 
direct experience and even the experimenter's 19erspective 
cannot provid~ us with infa11ib1e criteria with which we 
might go about our inferring. Nisbett and Ross see biases. 
errors, and heuristics as the imperfections of the 
human coa:ni~ive processor. as systematic hiccups in the 
our inferenti!a1 machinery. This machinery is. moreover, 
Paa;e 88 
1ocated within us. 1ara;e1y inde~endent of the .surrounding 
wor1d: it is natura1. universa1 and ahistorica1. Indeed. 
Nisbett and Ro~s re1&te these cognitive 1imitations to 
rats. In the same way that rats are genetica11y ~rimed to 
~erceive and res~ond to reinforcement contingencies and 
thus to ~ersevere. so we too are .~rimed. 
Krug1anski and Ajzen 9 s infinite variety of 9 if-then' 
1inkas:es sus:geS!ts that the way individua1s freeze and 
unfreeze the e~istemic ~rocess comes down to idyosyncracy. 
Bias is a matter of ~ersona1 taste. The individua1ism has 
not abated; it is sti11 something within the individua1 
that determines the precise content of the epistemic 
process. What conditions the individua1 9 s taste is but 
peremptori1y :addressed. Whereas Nisbett and Ross 9 
individua1ism ~s mechanistic. Krus:1anski and Ajzen 9 s is 
subjective. In both cases the inf1uence of the socia1 
wor1d is minimized. For the former. the socia1 wor1d 
seems to be comprised of technocrats. of socia1 
psycho1ogists who can tinker with the subject; a11 
e1se bare1y effects process. In the 1atter references 
abound to the socia1 environment but it is an exotic 
socia1 
factors 9 
psycho1oa;ica1 wor1d comprised of 9 situationa1 
and the 
decisions quick1y 9 • 
9 physica1 safety 9 • 
9 press of time 9 and the 9 need to reach 
or find 0 effective contro1 9 and 
Society under this sort of socia1 
psycho1ogica1 scrutiny is a mush: there is no specificity 
or systematicitr about it; the focus is exc1usive1y on 
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proximal situational factors long-term material and 
ideological factors are neatly sidestepped. It is by 
virtue of this neglect of the specific and systematic that 
attention comes to devolve on the individual. To confront 
the systematicity and specificity mediated by groups, 
discourses. ideology. social and material practices and so 
forth would force us to consider alternatives to the 
mechanistic and the subjective. 
c. Critical Adventures. Wex1er(l981.1983) has identified 
three critical modes in which social psychology me¥ be 
apprehended. Firstly there are internal. conventional 
critiques. These range from the methodological and 
theoretical to the metatheoretica1 such as Gergen 9 s (1973) 
classic re-appraisal of the social psychology as history. 
Very often the reforms that such critiQues generate are 
geared towards re-emphasising the social aspect of social 
psychology. Usually this takes the form of procedural 
diversification and innovation and an accentuation of the 
normative composition of social behaviour; almost 
invariably this stops short of a full-bodied investigation 
of the re1atio~ of behaviour to socio-economic (and. 
power/knowledge): structures. In contrast. Wexler suggests 
' that what is necessary is a knowledge critiQue which traces 
changes in social psychological theory back to changes in 
Western capita1i~t societies. In particular. attention must 
be paid to the way that social psychology has ideologically 
distorted socia~ phenomena through individualistic and 
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natura1istic categories of ana1ysis. In addition, Wex1er 
suggests a socia1 critiQue which ana1vzes the ways in which 
socia1 psycho1ogy has served to support the capita1ist 
system in ;its mi1itaristic, bureaucratic and 
individua1istic. guises. Com191ementing this 9 negative 9 
critique is a 9 positive 9 one {or what Wex1er a1so ca11s a 
critica1 socia1 psycho1ogy) which tries to situate socia1 
psycho1ogica1 19henomena in the context of the prevai1ing 
socia1 system. Specifica11y, this wou1d entai1 a 
9 socia1psycho1ogic 0 of capita1ism in which the key Marxist 
conceF;>ts of a1ienation, commodification and the 
exp1oitation of ·human 1abour wou1d be used to ~describe 
genera1 interactiona1 processes which provide a matrix for 
understanding socia1 psycho1ogy that is omitted in 
prevai1ing paradigms 99 {Wex1er,1983.p79). To put this 
another way, many of tne phenomena which socia1 psycho1ogy 
addresses may indeed be genuineo not simp1y artefacts of 
the methodo1ogica1 and theoretica1 parameters of socia1 
psycho1ogica1 practice. However, socia1 psycho1ogy, {and 
particu1ar1y, 'that virul.ent strain, cognitive socia1 
psycho1ogy) ac~s to def1ect attention away from the 
possibl.e {capita1ist) socia1 construction of that 
behaviour. 
I wi11 subject the attributiona1 
heuristics described above to the types of critiQues 
out1ined by Wex1er. though I wi11 be deviating 
' 
substantia11Y from his socia1 and socio1ogica1 premisses 
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(though to give him his dues, he does see these as being 
o&en to revision). I will not be attem&ting a detailed 
sociology of sodial &SYchology (Buss,1975). 
d. Internal Critique. Writers engaged in this sort of 
critique have been dismayed by the regression into the 
9 rigourous methodology 9 of a cognitive ~sychology at the 
expense of a sociallY amenable social &SYchology. Thus 
Ta.y1or 9 s (1976) original hopes for a fruitful marriage 
between social and cognitive &sychologies are both 
realized and dashed in a one-sided affair, with cognitive 
psychology the dominant partner (Taylor, 1981). As she 
notes. tem~tatio~ to generalize cognitive phenomena has to 
.be resisted: 99 We need to do a better job of binding our 
phenomena and defining the contextual factors that 
influence the powerfulness of the phenomenon in a given 
domain 99 (p204). 
Another source of internal concern is the fraught 
relationship between cognition and affect. Social cognition 
theorists such as Ross. Nisbett and Borgida have been &rone 
to relegating the affective factors behind cognitive ones 
in the operation of biases. However, others have suggested 
that it is motivational factors that are res&onsible for a 
variety of 9 cognitive biases 9 • Thus Bradley 
(1978.1979) suga;ests that it is self-presentational needs 
that underlie many of these biases. More fundamentally, 
' 
Zajonc (1980g Za~onc,Pietromono & Baugh,1982} has suggested 
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that there is profound dissociation between cognitive and 
affective syste~s. to the extent that. contrary to 
mainstream belief. affect may precede cognition. Tetlock 
and Levi(1982) have suggested that within attribution 
theory. attempts to distinguish methodologically between 
cognitive and affective processes have resolutely failed 
for a variety of reasons such' as the fact that in 
manipulating motives one is also altering informational 
input which might lead to covert changes in cognition (and 
vice versa). 
Following Wexler. we could criticize these critiques for 
never venturing too far from the individual as the 
generative locu~ of social behaviour. 
constraining the generalization of 
Thus for Taylor. 
c.ogni t i ve processes 
may simply make room for the intoduction of other cognitive 
processes. The limited relevance of salience phenomena 
means the greater relevance of anchoring phenomena for a 
given circumstance. Taylor 9 s critique may be read as a 
warning against overzealousness in the cognitivist 
specialist not ,against cognitivist specialization per se. 
Moreover. it is proximal social factors that prime or 
trigger cognitive processes; we get no sense of the way 
that these and lqng-term factors may function to actually 
shape cognitive processes. 
e. Knowledge Critique. The above leads us on to a 
detailed consideration of the various metatheoretical 
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analyses of social and cognitive ~sycholo~ies. Throu$hout 
this cha~ter we have stressed the individualistic nature 
of much aocial ~sychology and have touched upon the wav 
it universalizes the ~henomena it uncovers. This comes in 
a lon~ line of just such critiques. Thus Pepitone(~981) 
identifies these imperatives as deriving from the 
methodologies of a ~sychology conceived as a natural. 
empirical science with its emphasis on r~duction to 
~ (neuro-) physiological substrate and universalism. (Harre 
and Secord.1972g / Harre.1979; Gauld and Shotter.1976g 
Shotter.1975 make similar points). In contrast to this. 
for Pe~itone there are three interdependent and 
contributin~ contexts to social behaviour which need to be 
studied: biology. ~hysical ecology. and soci~culture. 
Without such an a~proach. the intra-psychic focus of 
current ~sychology cannot deal with environmental 
influences as anything other than stimuli or cognitive 
representationsg it cannot account for the social 
conditions under which they become operative on and in 
individuals. S&mPson(1981) in a parallel analysis isolates 
two processes at work in cognitive ~svchology 
subjectivist and individualist reductionisms which grant 
~primacy to the structures and processes of the knowing 
subject ..• (and) to the thinking and reasoning of the 
individual knower ••• ~ respectively (P730). He contrasts 
this with the notion of ideology whose study likewise 
addresses the ideas and thoughts of people. 00 the forms and 
content of their consciousness 00 (~731) but in doing so 
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produces a 99 ver¥ different tre&tment 99 focusing on the 
materia1ist roots of these phenomena. 
»To consider ideo1oa:¥ is to consider matters 
beyond the mere1y subjective and the mere1y 
individua1istic; it is to ground thinking and 
reasoning in ongoing practices. tasks and 
activities of' human co11ectivities. 99 
(Sampson.1981.P731) 
Further to understand cognition requires an ana1ysis in 
terms of both subject and object (see Ch.4). Certain1y 
this has been rea1ized by various workers in the f'ie1d 
who. according to Sampson. admit that 99 Insof'ar as 
cognition is part if a 1arger who1e that affects its 
character. to study the part extirpated from its context 
is entire1y to misunderstand the nature of' that r;>art 99 
(&733). However. few go beyond this thresho1d as that 
wou1d require »a radica1 break not on1y with existing 
tradition in r;>sycho1ogy but a1so with r;>sycho1ogy's 
re1ation to society 99 (p733) 0 Sampson then goes on to 
instance the way that technica1 interests (Habermas.1971) 
in contro11ing the objectified r;>rocesses of' nature serve 
to condition the way that rea1ity is apr;>rehended. This is 
embodied in the methods and theories of' cognitive 
psycho1ogy which. as in the case of judgementa1 
heuristics. serve to demarcate what is 'biased' in 
cognitive processing and socia1 behaviour. 
Gergen (1982) has traced this tendency historica11y to 
basic metatheoretica1 assumptions in psycho1ogy. in 
particu1ar. r;>sycho1ogica1 science's project of' 
constructing 00 genera1 1aws of princi.r;>1es governing the 
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relationship among classes of observable phenomena00 which 
.should be ~consistent with empirical fact~ (p7). These and 
other logical empiricist assumption have. according to 
Ger~en. captured and reinforced the following aspects of 
Western intellectual thought: a. Dualism and the 
in which ~ideally psychological processes provide 
a veridical representation of the empirical world~5 b. 
~the centrality of cognitive processing such as 
abstraction and logic5 c. 00 Affect as interference~ (p115). 
Gergen indeed illustrates these with reference to AT 9 s 
absorption or the cognitivist ethic. For Gergen. then, 
this metatheory forecloses the possibilities for research 
and understanding and. importantly, any challenge to 
prevailing normative assumptions concerning psychological 
functioning. This is mediated through the reliance on the 
experiment. 
This cluster of knowledge critiQues can for my purposes 
be reduced still further to a common focus on the way that 
psychology is intent on uncovering a core biology - that 
is. a human nature that is by definition universal. What I 
will now suggest is that the discipline of psychology does 
not simply formulate that nature. it also. through a 
variety of agencies. contributes to a formation of that 
nature. 0 Nature 0 is here rendered a social and historical 
construct. 
The above analysis has traced cognitive and social 
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psychologies out in the context of a variety of other 
discourses {eg outmoded mechanistic model.s of the 
individual.; empiricist metatheory; social ideologies of 
individual. ism) and practices (eg technical interests. 
experimental methodology. etc). However. in contrast to 
discourse theory proper. there has not been an analysis of 
the way that these cognitivist approaches serve to 
reinforce and sometimes al.ter what people 
(within broad and perhaps unverifiable biological limits) 
and how they come to experience themselves and others. 
The work of Foucault and others on madness. sexual.ity and 
discipline has shown how various theoretical conceptions 
(Knowl.edges or Savoirs). concretized as therapies. 
regimens. means of measurement. modes of testing and so 
forth have served to constitue peopl.e both as subjects and 
objects (though this dichotomy is itsel.f open to guestion. 
cf Ch. 1). For example. Heath(1982) sets out how the 
vsciencev of sexol.ogy (which has the same sort of 
biol.ogistic interest as cognitive psychol.ogy) and even its 
more radical cousins (epitomized by Reich and Cooper) have 
acted to vfixv sexuality. to lay out the various 
parameters and norms around which peopl.e become model.led. 
and through which people come to experience themselves and 
others (cf ~h.7). Clearly. this process is more vpositivev 
than Gergenvs enlightenment effects. In the same way. 
cognitive psychology. with its funnelled vision of the 
individual.. limits the potential of individual. and 
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collective s~lf-definition and action. tying it to a 
conce19tion of the bourgeois individual that is 
historically situated. A counter conce19tion might entail 
the fusion of. subject and object (cf Held.1980). or a 
notion of the collective subject such as is entailed by 
Guattari 0 s (1984) concept of 0 subjectless action°. 
In effect cognitive psychology does not objectivel;y 
a1919rehend real phenomenag it countenances and consolidates 
particular phenomena. One implication of this is an 
extreme reJ,ativism in which social behaviour and 
19SYchological substrates are historically and culturally 
specific. whose potential pliability is held in check by 
the o19eration of such disciplines as cognitive psycholog;y 
as well as more practical factors such as work and family 
ex19eriences. Arguments against this sort of relativism 
also come frQm within the radical camp (see Ch.4 for a 
discussion 9f this relating to ideology). Geras (1983) 
reasserts human nature in the service of the socialist 
project. While many Marxists and socialists have felt 
themselves ~mpelled to resist the notion of a human 
nature. Geras suggests that it has always been at the 
especially where it concerned 
physics~ (food. shelter. etc) and psychological (variet;y 
in one 0 s activities) needs. Unfortunately. when Geras 
applauds human nature he does so only so long as it serves 
the socialist cause. There are plenty of alternative uses 
to which it can be put. Moreover he seems to presuppose 
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that we can directly apprehend this biological substrate 
(reference~ to ob~ective methods 
processes. biological phenomena. 
abound). 
are not 
Cognitive 
directly 
accessed. but investigated under particular experimental 
conditions. The value of these processes is not simply 
biological. that is to say. individual. but also social. 
How such pnocesses mediate and are shaped by social 
factors. which vary across time and Place is what is at 
issue here: they cannot be reduced to their 'survival 
value' which is what Geras 1 view would seem to suggest. 
To summarize: (a) Cognitive psychology by virtue of its 
discursive and practical history is liable to hy!)>ostatise 
unreasonably its finding as actual ahistorical processes 
located in th~ mechanism of the individual. (b) If such 
processes do exist. the way in which they are apprehended 
very much depends on the methodologies and theories 
through w.hich they are approached.- As these methods are 
themselves controversial. permanently open to revision. 
then a modicum of modesty is required when presenting 
findings. Such statements should always be heavily hedged 
with historical. cultural and political provisos. 
NaturallY this ~s something that any naturalism is loathed 
to do (c) A way of relativizing 
these findings .would be to analyse their roots in 
particular theories and methodologies which are themselves 
subjected to critique. This we have done in a very 
superficial wa.~. Alternatively. we can show the 
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1imitations of various cognitive processes by specifying 
the circumstances in which they fai1 to operate. In doing 
this, we can a1so reconceptua1ize such cognitive processes 
as a cognitivist shorthand for ru1es of combination and 
difference for specific (categories of) everyday 
discourses and practices. 
In the next section. I wi11 be criticizing 
representativeness and avai1abi1ity heuristics in order to 
re-think them as specific ru1es of combination/difference 
for particu1ar types of information. and specu1ative1y 
deriving th~ory perseverance from a high1y partia1 view 
of socia1 structure. 
3. Three Cognitive Heuristics. 
In this section. I wi11 be considering avai1abi1ity, 
representativeness and theory perseverance heuristics not 
as actua1 cognitive processes. but as implicit rules for 
the combination of certain types of information within 
certain types,of situation. As mentioned above this is in 
order to rework them as content-specific processes which 
have arisen in specific historica1 and social milieux. 
a. Avai1abi1ity ( Sa1ience). As pointed out above, 
Tay1or has specified three modes of operation of the 
Avai1abi1ity Heuristic (AH): through salience, through 
memory, and th~ough cognitive structures such as schemas. 
First1y, I wi11: abstract a minima1 definition of AH in 
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order to demonstrate how its o~eration is often 
tauto1ogica1. Tversky and Kaheneman (1973) suggest that it 
is the of i11ustrating a given category that 
determines the ~erceived frequency or 1ike1ihood of that 
category m~nifesting itse1f. So. categories that are 
readi1y accessed are seen as being more ~ervasive than is 
actua11Y the case. Thus. the high sa1ience of an object 
resu1ts in the observer ~erceiving that object as more 
vactivev or ~nstrumemta1 in the situation. and hence to a 
heightened interna1 attribution to it. A1ternative1y. ease 
of retrieva1 (eg Ross and Sico1v.1979) and ease of 
assimi1ation to ~re-existing cognitive structures (such 
as those of stereoty~es. eg Hami1ton and Rose.1980) can 
a1so mediate AH. However. on ref1ection it becomes 
a~~arent tha1: the equation between ease of access and 
~erceived ~ervasiveness of the re1evant category must be 
carefu11Y s~~cified. For instance. the sa1ience of the 
ho1oceust for some individue1s ~rom~ts a heightened 
estimation of simi1ar events (cf Aronson.1983): for others 
it might 1ead to a down~1aying (Bi11ig.1978). These two 
contradictory ~xam~1es. can be accommodated when the AH is 
rendered as a ~e1ation between the ease of a~~rehension 
and a ~re-existing cognitive structure (schema). Thus 
mention of the.ho1ocaust accesses different schemas for 
different individua1s. and even for the same individua1. 
C1ear1y situationa1 factors o~erate in determining which 
schemas are accessed in an¥ given instance {see be1ow; 
Ch.l). In other words. a high1y sa1ient item may render 
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the category to which it belongs less ~ervasive. This is 
clearly the case with rape. in which an incident judged as 
a rape can come to support such myths as the 
0 impossibility of rape 0 (see Ch.8). Relatedly. the ease of 
apprehension. whether mediated by salience. retrieval or 
cognitive structure. is necessarily relative in the sense 
that what is easily apprehended is drawn from a context 
and that c,ontext can be extended almost indefinitely 
and interpreted in a multitude of ways. My suggestion is 
that the experimental set-up in which much of this 
research has taken place has limited that context so that 
AH has been affirmed. In the following I will be 
concentrating on salience phenomena insofar as these seem 
to be least likely to be 0 contaminated 0 by social factors. 
Taylor and Fiske(1978) and Macarthur(1982) have reviewed 
the literature on the effect of salience on social 
psychological phenomena such as impression formation and 
AT. For Taylor and. Fiske: 
00 
••• attention within the social environment is 
selective. It is drawn to particular features of 
the environment either as a function of the 
perceiver 0 s own disposition and temporary need 
states ••• As a result of differential attention to 
particular features. information about those 
features is more available to the 
perceiver ••• when the perceiver is asked to make a 
judgement about a particular stimulus. one 
accesses recall to see what kind of information 
is available. The more instances of a particular 
behaviour one can find. the more confident one is 
that the behaviour reflects an attribute of the 
stimulus. :Accordingly. ~ersons. when they are 
seen as salient. 
prominent. : more 
representat~ve of 
are seen as more causallY 
extreme. and possibly more 
the class of which they are a 
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member •.• These &roceses seem to occur 
substantia11y without awareness. and as such. 
they differ ~ualitatively from the intentional. 
conscious. contro1led kind of search •.. 99 
(Taylor and Fiske.l.978.&28l.-3) 
Tay1or.Crocker.Fiske.S&rinzer & Winkler(l.979) have s;one 
on to &rovide su&port for the s;eneralizeability of 
sa1ience effects. showing. for examp1e. that low levels of 
attention better serve sal.ience effects. so that 
distraction tasks fai1 to hamper them. 
It should be apparent from the above statements that high 
salience directs an internal attribution (and this 
applies to both individual and environment). The sorts of 
factors that will effect the salience of an item are 
brightness. movement. unit formation. contrast. novelty, 
etc. - al1 of them re1ational. The problem with this is 
that there will always be something different about the 
object which is internally attributed. Salience can become 
a catch-a11. Moreover. the relational character of these 
parameters leads to two further difficulties. The first 
concerns directionality 
than 9 ; 9 more dynamic 9 versus For 
example. a sins;le still individual in a scene of &anic is 
more .liable to be salient than the surrounding turmoil. 
This example can be re-worked in terms of novelty of 
course~ but then what counts as novel is dependent on the 
perceiver and his/her biography or role). The second 
concerns degree (to what degree must an item differ from 
its surround to become s~lient?). Both these &roblems can 
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be seen to derive from the fact that salience is conceived 
in a &urely synchronic sense - something is salient only 
for a particular setting which the individual &erceives at 
a given moment. There is no temporal dimension to salience 
in the sense that what is salient in the current situation 
is partly conditioned by what has been salient in 
preceding ones. 
Placing these problems in the context of the Tavlor and 
Fiske schema: 
Salience----->Availability------>Internal Attribution. 
we can see that they apply to the first linkage. 
However. biologicallY. even °non-salient 0 information or 
0 salient-along~a-different-dimension° information is 
useful to have at one 0 s diSI90Sal. {This r;>oint 
parallels rehabilitation of 
particularization over categorization.) If we assume that 
.such informatipn is assimilated. salience becomes 
determined only in retrospect. unless the perceiver has in 
some wav been primed. 
If we examine the second linkage in the above chain. we 
find that what a salient feature makes available is not 
siml91Y that feature. but that feature in a causally primal 
role. In other words. one of the categories made available 
by salience is that of internal attribution. However. 
there is no reason to believe that salience should not 
access the category of external attribution for the 
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salient item. Women, in the com~any of men, may 
stereoty~ically be seen as passive; when a woman is 
rendered salient by bein~ the only one in a grou~ of men 
it follows. ~rom her stereoty~ical constitution, that her 
salience should not necessarily induce an internal 
attribution to her. 
In contrast to Taylor and Fiske's schema, we could 
reverse the direction and su~gest that what is made 
available 
(schemas) 
de~ends on what attributional structures 
are available at the time. This of course, is 
somethin~ that Taylor and Fiske themselves do when they 
talk of salience being determined by the ~erceiver's own 
dis~osition or tem~orary need states. However, they fail 
to ex~lici t.lY and concretely relate this to the dynamics 
of social life. Schemas must themselves be rendered 
available, and this occurs through the interaction in 
preceding situations. This can be illustrated by the fact 
that one attributional schema, the overt expression of 
which attribution exr;>eriments deal in~ in salience 
phenomena stron~ly suppress, is that concerned with the 
experimental arrangements themselves. Individuals are 
placed into the role of 0 subject 9 (Si1verman.1977) in which 
they are req~ired to make resr;>onses (usually in a 
particular direction). Subjects are thus sensitized to 
what is exr;>ected. Seeing someone in a bright shirt does 
have relevance, for subjects for they will be sensitive 
to the fact that the exr;>erimenter has r;>urr;>osefully 
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constructed an informationa1 arra¥ that inc1udes someone 
in a bright shirt. That bright shirt is sa1ient because 
subjects have a context-bound reason to see it as sa1ient. 
(Thus the a~tribution effect can 
through retrieva1 or encoding). 
In introducing the term 
be mediated either 
I have im~1icit1¥ 
reintroduced the idea of sa1ience. Subjects must have 
found the ex~erimenter and the ex~erimenta1 situation 
sa1ient. But then. re~eating the above argument. we can 
rebuff with th~ point that the¥ must have had reason to do 
so. Effectively. we are suggesting that the diachronic 
context must be taken into account when assessing what is 
sa1ient. how it came to be so. and what the effects of it 
wi11 be. 
Where Taylor and Fiske separate 0 salience as determined 
by characteristics of the arra¥ 0 from 0 salience as 
determined by cognitive set 0 • we fuse the two in the 
tempora1 and 'spatia1 (and social - at discursive and 
practical leveis) movement of the individual. In doing 
this. we nece~saril¥ imp1¥ that salience and avai1ability 
effects are not set. that is. do not result in ~articular 
t¥pes of respdnse 
content-laden •nd 
(eg interna1 attributions) but are 
need to be studied in their 
specificit¥. Th~ abstraction of the 0 what grabs you' 
(McArthur.1982)' effect in terms of high-order concepts 
such as brightness, unit formation, etc 
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constrains our ab.ili ty to analyze behaviour as it is 
historicallY situated. 
Availability and salience effects where thev are 
authentic - must be seen not as broad cognitive effects 
that generalize across stimuli. circumstances and persons. 
but as discrete. specific events limited and demarcated by 
their content and context. Illusory correlations (Chapman 
and Chapman.~967.1969) are not general phenomena then, but 
relate to particular configurations of information. role 
and circumstance. 9 I11usory corre1ations 9 is Cognitivese 
for the rule that delineates the interaction of these 
elements. To say that the effects tapped by the relevant 
experiments are primarily a property of cognition is to 
detract from their embeddedness in the social world. For 
should be seen as 
referring to specific social. as opposed to general 
psychological. constructions. Where heuristics do appear 
to be in gen~ral use. rather than succumb and attribute 
them to cognitive capacity. we will try to show that they 
have emerged 9ut of broad social processes. This is what 
will be att~mpted on the section on theory perseverance 
below. 
The problem w~th a mode of analysis that deals with the 
diachronic motion of salience. ro1e and circumstance is 
I 
that it can. swiftly degenerate into the study of 
biography. of:the individua1 9 s rolling hermeneutic circle 
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(see Ch.1). This a~~roach is of course im~ortant (eg 
Hollwayo1982o1984). Howevero our interest in the way that 
saliences in the environment ~call u~~ roles which in turn 
shape saliences and so ono focuses on the way that these 
interact to sustain one another recursivelyo to ~roduce 
&articular &ackages of role/environment/behaviour. 
b. Re&resentativeness Heuristic. The RH manifests 
itself in various guises (Kahneman and 
Tversky and Kahnemano1971o1974). 
Tversky and Kahneman(1982) suggest that it is used when: 
(1) M is a class and X a variable defined in M (value and 
distribution); (2) M is a class and X an instance of that 
class (instance and category); (3) M is a class and X a 
subset of that class (population and sample); (4) When M 
is causal system and X a possible conse~uence (cause and 
effect). The perceived re&resentativeness X shows 
regarding M will under certain conditions deviate from 
statistical norms. This occurs when: (1) the evidence is 
fallible (as when X re&resents a small sample and is 
therefore less representative of the population than a 
large sample - regression to the mean); (2) when the 
target event is highly specific (as in the evaluation of 
composite events - see below). 
The arguments against this theory include the following: 
It is too individualistico subjects are kept in isolation. 
Many decisions are taken collectively and this might 
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undermine (though it might a1so compound) deviation from 
statistica1 norms. Second1y. decisions are not made for 
the sake of accuracy a1one but for assisting smooth 
passage through the socia1 and materia1 wor1d. comprised 
as it is of 1ong- and short-term demands. Thus under the 
appropriate conditions (which inc1ude those embodied 
in the experimenta1 situation) we find that even the 
pa11idity of statistica1 information can be overcome by 
subjects. Kassin(1.979) found that subjects were sensitive 
to samp1e size when assessing consensus information; 
Bar-Hi11e1(1.982) 1ikewise showed that subjects were 
capab1e of responding to samp1e size. though not a1wa;ys 
correct1y. Krug1anski.Fried1and and Farkash(1.98h) found 
that subjects were ab1e to use statistica1 information 
when they were assured of its appropriateness. Quattrone 
and Jones (1.980) have shown that app1ication of the 1aw of 
sma11 numbers. in which subjects genera1ize undu1y from 
sma11 samp1es. tended to be conditioned by intergroup 
factors: outgroup members exhibiting out-of-ro1e 
behaviours did not 1ead to genera1izations regarding that 
group - their 9 devi.ant v behaviour cou1d be exp1ained 
through externa1 attributions. Third1y. because of the 
interactiona1 nature of socia1 1ife. the perceived 
representativeness of an item can come to be rea1ized in 
actua1ity. 
perceiver 9 s 
Skrynek and Snyder(1.982) found that a 
gender stereotyped be1iefs about another 
actua11Y fashioned the behaviour of that other. bringing 
it in 1ine with ~he stereotype. As regards rape. a genera1 
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climate that dismisses ra~e. serves to actually effect the 
number of ra~es that are re~orted and, im~ortantly, are 
subjectively ex~erienced by victims (see Chs.7 and 8). 
At any rate, RH highlights the way that similarity 
between item and class makes it a~~ear that the item is 
actuallY a member of that class. The converse of this is 
that ~eople are insensitive to statistical data. We can 
recast this in terms of salience or availability. The ease 
of a~~rehension of concrete. vivid exam~les heightens 
their re~resentativeness to the exclusion of baserates and 
so forth. Baserates are not salient enough to compete. 
Here. the arguments levelled against availability in the 
preceding section come into play. As the above examples 
should have made clear. when subjects are cast into 
a~~ropriate roles, then they have no difficulty in making 
use of statistical information. The ~roblem lies in the 
fact that the roles in which subjects are situated are not 
made s~ecific. Cognitive ~sychology is bent on dealing 
with a generalized subject. This is enca~sulated in the 
notion of 9 st~tistical intuition 9 • Intuition suggests an 
individualized &erce~tion of the world, and yet any such 
perce~tion is conducted through an array of roles and 
discourses. 
On the broadest level. the Question is this: what is it 
that makes ~eo~~e take on RH unreflexively? Is it that 
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they do so because they are sim~1y used to using it (ie 
are these ~rocesses cognitive1y driven)? Or is it because 
of other more social1y and historica11y embedded factors? 
The coro11ary is this: when wou1d individua1s become 
critica1 of their use of RH? The centra1 point I wi11 
make is that RH serves to simp1ify the range or course of 
actions as it re1ates to the vignette. item. c1ass. 
materia1s pres•nted in the ex~eriment. That is. RH acts to 
aid a subject to situate her/himse1f with respect to the 
items in the t~sk: in doing so it maps out the options for 
practice. TverskY and Kahneman°s(1982) account of the 
eva1uation of compound events wi~1 i11ustrate. If subjects 
are asked to rate the 1ike1ihood that a woman who is 
engaged in radica1 po1itics being a feminist. a 
bank-te11er. and a feminist bank-te11er. in descending 
order of ~robabi1ity they wi11 rank them as fo11ows: 
feminist. feminist bank-te11er. and bank-te11er. This 
c1ear1y contravenes the e1ementary statistica1 princip1e 
of the conjunction ru1e. ie that increased specification 
can only reduce probability. For the population of 
activists it is equa11Y or 1ess 1ike1y to find a feminist 
bank-te11er than a bank-tel1er. 
However. what the order feminist. feminist-bankte1ler and 
bankte1ler sets up is an 0 hierarchy 0 of responses and 
power relations. Whether the subject is sympathetic to 
radica1 po~itics or not. s/he can order her/his responses 
to the three groups in the above order of friendliness or 
Page 111 
distate or a~oidance, etc. B¥ p1acing the accent on 
behaviour or practice, as opposed to cognition. we can ask 
under what conditions wi11 such behaviour and cognition 
varv. We suggest that differences in power might affect 
sensitivitv to RH. If the judge is in a position of 
somewhat great~r power, eg an adu1t over chi1dren, then 
RH is 1ess va1uab1e; the judge wi11 have the space to 
ref1ect, or rather to dep1ov the conjunction 
ru1e. Simi1ar1v. where there are potentia11¥ more 
behavioura1 options open. eg as within a group, then again 
it is conceiva~1e that judges wi11 be more 1eisure1y - ie 
ref1ect on what the task is about ie 
statistica1 judgement as opposed to persona1/ro1e position 
and power. Under such circumstaces, and when subjects are 
ob1iged b¥ experimenters to ref1ect, we wou1d expect them 
to readi1v acknow1edge their mistakes. In sum: the 
contingencv of cognitive heuristics such as RH can thus be 
seen as comp1ex1v 1ocated within the web of socia1 
re1ations and practices. 
c. Theorv Perseverance. Here we wi11 be drawing on 
Wex1er (1983) to specu1ate on the possib1e socia1 bases of 
Theory Persever~nce (TP). This wi11 entai1 out1ining what 
Wex1er sees as one of socia1 psvcho1ogv 9 s main functions, 
name1y that of containment. It shou1d be mentioned at 
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outset that though we focus on TP under cap~talism, we do 
not mean to deny its presence in other cultures or a 
common causal root in cognitive processes: we are simply 
examining those possible social roots that are peculiar 
to capitaism. 
Popular methods of containment are those processes that 
occlude identifiable sources of personal conflict and 
suffering. Such processes usually come under the rubric 
of ideology (cf Ch.U). Wexler particularly highlights the 
way in which these various ideological methods deny social 
contradictions (the central one being that between the 
collective nature of production and the private ownership 
of the means of production) by inducing people to avoid 
facing what they believe they cannot change. Specific 
modes of containment that Marxists and others point to are 
religion, patriotism, sexism, ethnocentrism. All these 
obscure class relations, all these divert energy away from 
the processes through which the proletariat would become 
0 for itself 9 • At this point it should be made clear that 
we consider such an analysis simplistic in the light of 
recent developments in social theory (Foucault, Giddens, 
Frankfurt Schoo~). Nevertheless, we are in agreement with 
Poster(198U) when he states that it is legitimate to 
resort to orthodox Marxist analytic categories when we 
feel this is in keeping with the critical spirit. 
For Wexler there are three core processes which permeate 
Page 113 
social bel:laviour: Commodification, Exploitation, and 
Alienation. Social psychology as the study of social 
behaviour directs attention away from these and the 
broader processes which underlie them. By cloaking social 
behaviour in an ahistorical, asocial mist, it blocks from 
view the potential control we have over these social 
psychological and structural processes. 
In re-analysing TP, I will concentrate only on the role 
of commodification. Because of the nature of the 
capitalist ~ode of production, especially the way in which 
it is managed, with the worker having control neither over 
what is produced nor how it is produced, the product of 
labour appears to the worker to be stamped with an 
objective character. It is something outside the worker. 
In fact, according to Marx, the product is, in 
essence, social in character. The worker has control over 
it, not the other way round. It is produced by virtue of 
the relation between workers. In consequence, what is 
actually a social relation begins to appear as a relation 
between things. Relations between objects are no longer 
seen to be the result of human decision, but dependent on 
the objects 9 own intrinsic character which is beyond human 
reach. 
Powerlessness at the point of production means 
people treat: themselves and each other as objects. 
~The o~ientation of energies towards the 
production of profitably exchangeable objects 
that 
This 
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or commodities penetrates the socia1 
organization and the socia1 perceptions of the 
producers themse1ves .... The socia1 character of 
production may be so far obscured that the 
sense of human agency is reversed: the 
products. things are understood as a source, 
rathe~ than an effect, of human actions." 
(Wex1er,1983,P85) 
process 1ies at the heart of much socia1 
interaction~ We treat each other and ourse1ves as things; 
we see ourse1ves as static; we 1ose sight of our own 
socia1 dynamism. 
However. before going on to specu1ate on the re1ation of 
commodification to TP, we must hedge this ana1ysis with a 
number of provisos. We do not maintain that these three 
processes are the on1y factors that effect socia1 
behaviour. To maintain this, we wou1d have to convincing1y 
show that the 1abour process retains an exc1usive 
centrality in socia1 1ife. In Marx 9 s day that was less in 
doubt than it is today (Poster,1978). As we noted above, 
Wex1er does see Marxist ana1ysis as providing on1y an 
initia1 starting point from which to 1aunch a critica1 
socia1 psycho1ogy. We can show the 1imited importance of 
the 1abour process by p1acing it in the context of other 
activities. 
/ Harre(1979) divides the social wor1d into two domains: 
the instrumental and the expressive. In the former, 
behaviour i~ geared toward production of the means of 
1ife; the latter is characterised by the search for honour 
' 
and the avoidance of contempt in the process of social 
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interaction. Gorz(1982) has produced what might be seen as 
an orthogonal dimension. He s~lits the world into the 
sphere of Necessity and the sphere of Autonomy. In the 
former. action. both instrumental and expressive. is 
directed toward the efficient production and distribution 
of material goods. In the latter. production is carried 
out at one 9 s own pace. however inefficient that might be. 
The image of producer as artisan is evoked here. 
Similarly. autonomous expression is not conditioned by 
material. role-rigidified needs but by the idiosyncratic 
needs of individuals. 
We can combine these two schemas to produce a 2 x 2 
typology. The labour process would only enter into one of 
the quadrants. Whether it determines the character of the 
other three has been a point of contention for many years. 
My own feeling is that 9 it depends 9 ; in the period of 
early capitalism. it most probably did. Despite the 
decline of the productive sphere. and the rise of new 
technology and consumption (eg Marcuse.1965). the legacy 
of that period hangs over us both in the nature of much 
existing production and through cultural transmission. 
What then is the relation of all this to social behaviour 
and in particular cognitive processes? Broadly, 
commodification and the objectification to which it leads 
can be seen as one major element underlying these 
processes. As we have alread¥ hinted. other factors also 
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play a part though we shall not be dealing with them 
directl.¥. 
The main c~aracteristics of TP are: (l.) Vivid, concrete 
data such as case histories, ¥ield the most resistant 
theories. (2) Causal theories result in greater 
perseverance. (3) Most of the studies of TP present 
subject matter which refers to people. That is, subjects 
are asked to form judgements either about themselves or 
some other (~g Firemen, patients, suicides). 
I will start with a catechism: l.. (Q) 99Wh¥ are causal 
explanations so potent? 99 (A) ~Because they afford 
control and predictabilit¥~. 2. (Q) ~ But how realistic 
is this control or predictabilit¥ since so few people can 
ever be bothered to test their theories in practice? 99 ; 
(A) ~ The paint is that people are not in fact exerting 
actual control; cognitivel¥ control (that is 
stereotype) the behaviour o~ others. In achieving this, 
subjects are also standardizing (or stereot¥ping) the 
relation between themselves and the object of the 
explanation. To put this another wa¥, they are 
I 
standardizing their own behaviour, the control they 
actuall¥ ex~rt then is over themselves~. 
Current research into TP conceives of the change in 
causal theories (on the presentation of new data or 
I 
discreditin~ information) as simPl¥ a change in the theory 
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per se. According to our reasoning, this 
counter-information would necessitate a change in the 
standardized self-image that has been thrown up by the 
causal explanation. 
Why should it be so difficult to change the self image? 
The answer to this lies in the objectification of the 
self. The self is experienced as an object. (An example 
of this is provided by Reynauld,1981, who argues that 
menQs masculine sense of self comes to be objectified in 
the penis). It is experienced as having an objective 
character that is beyond social relations and volition. 
Impingement, in this case in the form of discrediting 
information, will have minimal effect unless it confronts 
the individual with a sense of his/her own volition. TP 
is, therefore. the outward expression of the perseverance 
of the self as object. 
When does TP break down? Anderson(1982) has found that 
obliging the subject to consider competing theories allays 
TP. In terms of the present theory of 
self-objectification. this works because, in forcing the 
subject to create alternative theories to explain the same 
data. the subject is confronted with choice; s/he is 
alerted to her/his own volition. 
self-objectification. 
They are jogged out of 
Tatlock (1983) has found that when subjects are informed 
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that their judgements wi11 be presented to others, they 
sift data more carefully and manifest less TP. (It would 
appear that it is a11 right to appear an automaton in 
front of an Experimenter but not onevs peers. The image of 
the Experimenter as confessor comes fleetingly to mind.) 
Under thee~ circumstances subjects are once again made 
aware of choice. By being told that their judgements wi11 
be presented to others, Ss are alerted to other points of 
view and the possibility of contradictory theories. Thus 
there is less scope for self-objectification by virtue of 
the subjects being confronted with their own powers of 
choice, their agency. 
There are two main limitations that can be imposed on 
this interpretation. Firstly, as noted above, it is too 
partial. Many other factors are kept out of the reckoning. 
This can be ·seen in the fact that we have located 
objectification in the capitalist mode of production; it 
is quite conceivable that parallel processes occur for 
other modes of production. Generalizing this point, we 
can add that TP occurs in other cultures. However, while 
it may have a common cognitive root across societies, this 
does not mean that within each distinctive society 
peculiar social mechanisms have not arisen which serve to 
reassert TP. That is, flying in the face of parsimony, we 
might suggest that there are a variety of (supplementary) 
causes for the : same cognitive phenomenon (TP) across 
different social: systems. It is important to explore these 
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in order to show how TP contributes to and is affected by 
social as well as individual factors. Another problem with 
our account of TP is that it is too abstract. The process 
of self-objectification has to be specified for 
different social groups. As Deschamps(1982) has pointed 
out, different classes, by virtue of their status, are 
able to objectify (stereotype) themselves to different 
degrees .. This cross-cuts in complicated ways with sex and 
race, and also with the type and circumstances of 
behaviour. 
To conclude: ~n this chapter we have prepared the ground 
for showing how the cognitive heuristics of 
explanation can be reconceived as rules of combination and 
difference be,tween discourse/practices embodied in roles, 
circumstances. and information. Where the use of 
heuristics appears to be widespread, we do not have to 
attribute this to their basis in a cognitive 
infrastructure, but can look for antecedents in the 
specific form qf social life.- In attempting such a gross 
reconceptualization of these processes, the main aim has 
been to get beyond the individualistic and internalistic 
onus that cognitive social psychology has been guilty 
of, and to escape the technicalities with which it 
immobilizes the possibility of social change. Concrete 
illustrations of this type of analysis will be presented 
in Chapter 8 in which the deployment of rape myths, having 
been considered ~n terms of the complex relations between 
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the po1ice ro1e (encorporating mascu1ine, intergroup and 
institutiona1 components) and information (type of victim, 
rape, etc), are reinterpreted in terms of the three 
heuristics we have tack1ed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LAY EXPLANATIONS, GROUPS AND ROLES 
Introduction 
In this chapter I wi11 be exp1oring the re1ationship of 
ro1e and group to exp1anations, and hence the re1ationship 
between ro1e and group. Whi1e some recent work has 
addressed the inf1uence of group-membership on 1ay 
exp1a.nation (see be1ow), 1itt1e research has examined the 
effects of the ro1e of the exp1ainer. Where antecedents 
re1ated to ro1es have been considered they have usua11y 
taken the form of be1iefs (eg re1ated to sex, Deaux,1976; 
or party po1itica1 membership, 
expertise (Cantor and Brown,1981). 
it is not difficu1t 
Furnha.m,1981;) or 
In the case of the 
to trans1ate these first two, 
antecendents into ro1e theory terms. However, as shou1d 
become apparent be1ow, ro1e and intergroup theory have 
many points of co11ision. As a pre1iminary exarnp1e we can 
consider the ro1e of gender in exp1anation. On the one 
hand, gender denotes a ro1e, in the structura1 sense of 
norms demarcating what behaviours and functions are 
permissib1e. On the other, it denotes group-membership, 
in that institutiona1 and cu1tura1 forces serve to disti1 
a.t cognitive and socia1 1eve1s groups based on gender. The 
interaction between these two moments wi11 part1y 
determine how a·~ event is apprehended and exp1ained; the 
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explanation that results may bolster either role or group 
identity or both. In-group favouritism typically involves 
preferentia;t evaluation of in-group members along 
comparison dimensions important to the in-group. In 
contrast. a group is partly comprised of social norms (and 
9 social 9 I have in mind the complex, fragmented world 
of Foucault. not a functionalist system in the mould of a 
Parsons or an Althusser) which may run counter to the 
means of in-group social elevation. Thus a norm of 
self-denigration or modesty in women would hinder the 
expression of in-group favouritism/out-group denigration 
(see below. and Ch. 6). Conversely. because of the 
contradictory nature of many role norms, some of them may 
be flouted o~ exploited to enhance group-related social 
identity. What this all boils down to is that the 
relations of group-identity and role-identity may 
contradict as well as support one another. The relation 
between the two has to be specified in detail for each 
given instance. 
However. at a higher level of abstraction, we can see 
that role has theoretical priority over group insofar as 
9 the group member 9 can be said to comprise a role. We can 
consider intergroup behaviour as reflecting normative 
demands on the individual. This is hinted at by the fact 
that some roles incorporate, formally or informally, an 
intergroup dimension which can be vital to their 
functioning (eg.the policeman role, Ch. 8). Here we part 
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company with Turner's (1982) cognitive reformulation of 
the group. This follows from our contention that the 
cognitive process should be conceived as a specific and 
complex rule that applies to particular configurations of 
role, circumstance and information (Ch.2). 
This chapter will be organized in the following way: 
Firstly we will consider various versions of role theory, 
and then rel~te this to explanations. Secondly, we will 
examine intergroup theory, and analyse its influence on 
the study of lay explanation. In these sections I will 
examine not only the personal but also the social 
functions of roles and groups. That is, I will set out the 
way that explanations, which serve to mediate role and 
group identites, also mediate the part these roles and 
groups play in the wider social system. Further, both 
expressive and instrumental aspects of role and 
group-related behaviour will be considered. Finally, there 
will be a seqtion detailing how these two approaches may 
be profitably merged. 
1. Role Theory and Explanation 
a.Role Theory. Heiss(1981) has noted that role theory 
has traditionally fallen into two camps, the structural 
and the interactional. In the former, the concept of role 
is based on a social position that designates a commonly 
recognized set of persons (Biddle and Thomas,1966; 
Biddle,1979).' The terms physician, teacher, athlete, etc 
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are social positions which when occupied exhibit a 
characteristic role, that is, people will behave in ways 
appropriate to that social position. What is permissible 
within a role is determined by a variety of norms and 
expectations. For Goffman (1959) when one takes up such a 
demarcated role one is stepping into a ready-made self. 
However, interactionist models suggest that roles are 
created in the process of social interaction (J.H.Turner, 
19784 Cicourel,1973). This view sees the notion of 9 norm' 
as open to criticism insofar as norms are constantly being 
reconstructed and verified in the process of interaction 
which, it follows, must be the site of role constitution. 
Thus, the difference between the two approaches is 
the difference between (structuralist) role-taking and 
(interactionist) role-making. However, as Heiss points out 
these differences can to some degree be settled when the 
two perspectives are seen as complementary. Concepts such 
as role-distance (Goffman,1961a) and style (Goffman,1959) 
capture this complementarity in pinpointing the space 
within structural roles to innovate at the instrumental 
level (eg the •urgeon jokes· in order to ease tension and 
thereby to ensure that the operation proceeds as smoothly 
as possible) and the expressive level (the sort of jokes 
a surgeon and his/her subordinates are permitted). 
Various authors have drawn the distinction between 
instrumental and expressive goals (eg Parsons and 
Shils,1951; Habermas,1972; J.H.Turner,1978; R.H.Turner 
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1979/80). As we saw in Chapter 2, Harre(1979) suggests 
that we must distinguish 19 between those aspects of socia1 
activity that are directed to materia1 and bio1ogica1 
ends~~ (p19) ie instrumenta1 behaviour, and ''expressive 
aspects of behaviour~~ (p19) which is directed towards such 
ends as the presentation of the se1f as rationa1 and 
worthy of respect. Harre goes on to admit that it is not 
a1wavs easy 'to distinguish between these two domains. 
These are elements that are incorporated into every role, 
though it could be argued that structura1 conceptions of 
the role focus on the instrumental component, while 
interactionist are more interested in the expressive. 
Roles, and particularly structural roles, tend to be 
conceived in more or less functional terms. Here 
functional refers to an integrated model of the social 
system in which the interaction of the parts function 
toward some end. This 
conflictua1 or consensual. 
functioning might be either 
Though some Marxist socia1 
theory picks out the conflict between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie as ,the driving force of recent history, that 
conflict is still functional for development towards 
socialism. The functiona1ity of a role depends on the 
level of analysis. Deviant communities may be 
'dysfunctional~ for an orthodox functionalist analysis, 
but functional for a conflict model. For example, the 
conflict betweer soccer supporters is dysfunctional at the 
level of social control; however, it is (or was until 
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recently) ~unctional at the level o~ the ~ootba11 
subculture in that it is this con~lict and partisanship 
that goes towards the economic stability o~ ~ootba11 clubs 
(Tay1or,1971). Even those ~ans who go to matches 0 1ooking 
~or a ~ight 0 have to pay to get in. Marginalized roles 
also serve another function: they set the limits o~ 
propriety beyond which lie the realms o~ 0 otherness 0 • The 
/ 
0 nutter 0 (Marsh. Rosser and Harre,1978) demarcates 
the bounds o~ acceptable ~an activity ~or the ~ans 
themselves. Related to this delimiting ~unction. some 
negatively sanctioned roles are the necessary complements 
o~ certain °stabi1izing 0 roles such as the police and 
social/wel~are workers. The role o~ the police 'needs' 
the role of 0 crimina1s 0 ; the role o~ social worker needs 
the poor and downtrodden. Structurally, both police and 
wel~are workers serve to reproduce the conditions in which 
their counter-roles arise. Moreover, construction o~ 
counter-roles can develop into a (almost) conscious 
policy o~ distortion as with the use o~ crime ~igures or 
the policing of predominantly black areas (Kettle and 
Hodges,1982). 
It should be apparent from the above discussion that the 
quality of the functionality of roles is determined by 
the model of th·e social system adopted. In the second part 
of this thesis in which I deal with men°s explanation of 
rape, the gen~ral role of 'man'. and the more situated 
role of policem~n, are placed within a system conceived in 
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the conflictual terms of a socialist and feminist 
analysis. This is done deliberately in order to stress the 
discursive and practical constituents of roles. This will 
necessarily entail historical and sociological detailing 
if we are to properly understand the conflicts and unities 
contained within the considered roles. In a sense, this 
approach contradicts the Foucauldian project which 
studiously avoids any totalization, that is, which by 
focussing on the local specificities of a given 
phenomenon, r~fuses to link these up into a wider (ie 
total) theore~ical system. The reason for this is to avoid 
constructing an intellectual edifice which carries 
authority by virtue of its weight, complexity, etc. And 
yet, as Poster (1984) argues, this latter can amount to 
intellectual dishonesty because one 9 s metatheoretical 
premises are never confronted; moreover the covert 
operation of these can have just as devastating an effect 
in exerting power over the reader as the most explicit 
theoretical models. 
So far we have discussed roles in terms of their 
functions for the social system. At the level of personal 
functions, role can be intimately tied to the concept of 
the self. The role-related activities, both expressive 
and instrumental, that one engages in will shape the self. 
Thus, as we saw in Ch.2, the type of instrumental work 
that one engages in will effect the way in which we treat 
ourselves as objects and agents. We will now consider 
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this relation in more detail. 
Hollway (1982} has suggested that there are essentiall¥ 
two PS¥Chological versions oP the selP: the selP as a 
transcendental subject, as the real kernel onto which 
roles are latched. We see this rePlected in such notions 
as role strain or role-self congruit¥ (Biddle,1979}. Less 
orthodoXl¥, we get the same sort oP anal¥sis from certain 
radical thinkers. From Adorno(1973} we have: 09 the concept 
oP the role sanctions the bad, perverted depersonalization 
of today: ... the hardships of the division oP labour 
h¥postatized as virtues in the concept oP the role ... the 
liberated ego would no longer be condemned to play 
roles ... vv ( P27 8). 99 Roles are the bloodsuckers of the will 
to live. They express the will to lived-experience, ¥et at 
the same time the¥ reiP¥ it. The¥ also oPPer consolation 
to the impoverishment of life b¥ supplying a surrogate, 
neurotic gratification. We have to break free oP roles b¥ 
restoring them to the realm of play 99 (Vaneigem,1983.P99). 
99 
••• peasants do not pla¥ role~ as urban .characters do. 
(This) is simply because the space between what is unknown 
about a person and what is generall¥ known - and this is 
the space for all perPormance is too small vv 
(Berger,1979,p11}. In all oP these quotes there is 
presupposed a 9 real 9 or 9 genuine 0 self somehow hovering 
behind the the Pacade of a role. Hollwa¥ suggests that 
this is even the case for the ostensibl¥ more Pragmented 
versions of th:e selP as developed b¥, for example Harre 
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./ / (Harre and Secord,1972; Harre,1979). Residing behind the 
multiplicity of selves is a homunculus, an inner core 
self that rationally pursues honour. In contrast, Hollway 
posits a non-unitary self that draws on the structuralist 
psycholanlysis of Lacan which incorporates the factor of 
irrationality. However, while ackowledging the partially 
determining function of early life, she sees the self as 
also being recursively constructed in social interaction. 
Thus there are both diachronic (the biography of the self) 
and synchronic (the immediate situation in which the self 
is re/produceci) dimensions that need to be taken into 
account when examining the constitution of the self. 
So, in contradistinction to an 9 essential 9 view of the 
self, there is a notion of the self as an empty vessel 
into which are poured the contents of the role. This is 
partly exemplified by the approach of Foucault 
(1979a,1981) who, in dissecting the various ways in which 
discourse/practices inscribe upon the body of the 
individual certain (often normalizing) characteristics, 
assumes that the body is empty (Lash,198U). Here the body 
refers to the fact that the individual is an object which 
interacts with society and is shaped by it. However, as 
Poster(l98U) and Weeks(1981) have pointed out, the problem 
with this is that Foucault has difficulty accounting for 
subjectivity and therefore resistance. That is, people do 
' 
not always ~eadily accommodate every regime of 
disciplinarity (in which discipline is dispensed both as 
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a means of control, and of shaping the individual); they 
resist and they have reasons for resisting, which suggests 
that they have a core self that takes exception. Their 
subjectivities, grounded in prior traditions and modes of 
existence (both folk and disciplinary), do not 
automatically yield to new disciplinary conditions but 
must be coaxed or bludgeoned into them. Foucault has 
specialized in a range of particularly pungent norms and 
expectations, those that ·have derived from the Human 
Sciences, which, embued with the status of truth and 
concretized as specific methods of treatment, observation, 
measurement, h~ve diffused into commonsense shaping the 
way that people behave and expect themselves to behave. 
Another comparison between Foucault and role theory can 
be found in Hirst and Woolley(1982) who contrast 
Foucault 9 s treatment of the regimens of total institutions 
to that of Goffman. 
99 We have seen that 
total institutions 
Goffman considers that 
break down individual 
identity and reduce the person to an anonymous 
member of an enclosed collectivity. For 
Foucault, on the contrary, disciplinarity 
involves a definite form of 9 individuation'. 
Individuals are actually constituted as such 
through isolation in discipline, surveillance 
separates and distinguishes those subjected to 
it, and the regime of government seeks to 
constitute forms of individuality, to confer 
attributes, power and capacities. 99 
(Hirst and Woolley,1981,p189-90) 
In other words, power is productive, it does not merely 
confine. And ~et, as various studies have shown, 
resistance doe~ exist as does pain (Goffman,1961b; 
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Rosenhan,1973). The question of how potent rules/regimes 
are in shaping the self revolves around the plasticity (or 
malleability) of that self, which is at once an historical 
and a biological question and only answerable in specific 
instances. 
The conflict between the view that 9 there are only 
and th~ view 9 that behind these roles is a real 
self 9 can also be considered as a version of the conflict 
between the object and the subject. In the former the 
individual is treated much as an object, filled and 
emptied with roles as situations arise; in the latter, 
these roles are masks hiding a pervasive subjectivity. 
Hollway has attempted to get beyond this dichotomy by 
rendering problematic the social-individual and 
subject-object divides. For her, situations and roles 
shape the self which, in turn. goes to shape those roles 
and situations. 
I will not attempt to resolve these two positions (in 
the way that say Giddens(1979) does by displacing roles 
and introducing practice as the 9 point of articulation 9 
between actors and structure). Rather, I will reverberate 
between them. This is because I see subject and object, 
self and role, individual and society, as dialectically 
linked. They constitute one another in a complex web of 
discourses and ~ractices. When I analyse the role of 
9 policeman 9 I take into account both the construction of 
' 
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that role (as an object) in terms of norms, expectations, 
discourses and practices but also the way that that role 
(as a sub~ect) invites certain motives, emotions, 
perceptions and investments. However, I will not be 
considering the way that a role effects individual 
subjects, rather I will focus on the general subjectivity 
that comes ready-packaged with the role. As mentioned 
briefly above, my main concern is to detail the relation 
between a particular role and a particular category of 
explanations; how the role shapes or constitutes 
individual 0elves, other than in a broad, ideal-typical 
sense, is beyond the scope of this project. In addition. I 
will consider the way that such a role can serve to 
constitute other roles, specificallY that of the rape 
victim and the alleged rapist (and also of the general 
roles of 'man' and 'woman'). This it achieves through the 
overt power invested in it both institutionally (eg in 
that the police have a virtual monopoly on the legitimate 
physical coercion of adults) and discursively (eg in that 
the police role has attached to it the potent 'capacity' 
to delimit tr~th and rationality). And, .of course, as we 
remarked above. the policeman role (and masculinity) is 
itself constituted 
defines itself. 
by other roles against which it 
Thus we must provide a theoretical account of the way 
that explanations serve roles. and vice versa. In Chapter 
2 we showed how cognitive processes were 'called up' and 
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conditioned by the role and circumstances in which the 
explainer found her/himself. Roles also 'call up' up other 
processes, including needs concerning control. 
self-presentation, self-esteem, and so forth. 
Additionally, we argued that roles serve social functions 
the characterization. of which depends on the model of the 
social system that is adopted. Thus one model will 
pinpoint certain social functions of a role. which the 
role-holder. adhering to another model, will not be aware 
of. This is another way of saying that a necessary part of 
examining role-related explanations is a concern with the 
ideological function of those explanations (cf Ch.4). 
b. Roles and Explanations. In this section I will 
present a brief overview of the way that roles might 
effect explanations. In doing this I will start with 
general roles and move onto progressively more specialized 
ones. 
At the most general level we have the subject 
deposited in the role of 'ordinary person' or agent. This 
is what / Harre(1981a) impresses upon us in his 
re-formulation of Actor-Observer differences. Subjects are 
intent on establishing their good honour, their 
rationality, their agency in sum, they are intent on 
projecting themselves as good and worthy people. This 
will deeply e~fect explanations. Part of the problem with 
this theory ~s that actors belong to groups and 
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occup~ roles which condition the form their behaviours 
might take.. An~ behaviour, b~ virtue of the fact that it 
can be traced back to its social antecedents, can be 
intepreted as a form of mimicking, a flatter~ of others 
and hence an embodiment of the desire to draw honour. 
Subjects in the role of 'agent' are also interested in 
attaining some control over their environment and others, 
however illu~or~ this might ultimatel~ be (Wortman,1976: 
Bains,1983). But as Bains notes, control needs are 
culturall~ mediated. Bond(1983) likewise stresses the 
cultural dif~erences in requirements for control. Thus he 
suggests that the United States is peculiar in its norms 
for consistenc~ (self-control) and internal attribution. 
It would seem then that the configuration for the general 
role of 'person' varies across cultures. However, it also 
varies within cultures, pla~ing a covertl~ oppressive role 
where 'person° is epitomized b~ a particular role (or 
group) such as white middle-class male (Deschamps.1982; 
but cf Taj fel,·1984). Explanations that do not somehow 
reflect this role (eg through the use of highlY personal 
references in the explanation of social phenomena) will be 
seen as reflecting a sub-person. 
More specific, institutional roles can influence and 
be mediated by more specific, as well as general, styles 
and types of explanation. This relation need not be an 
overt element : in the role, but may have arisen 
surreptitiously. Thus illusor~ correlations (Chapman and 
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Chapman,1969) between homosexuality and popular invalid 
signs of homosexuality have been found in the evaluations 
of psychodiagnosticians. Another version of this is the 
that psychiatric professionals attach to 
mental patients and their actions (Rosenhan,1973). In this 
case the relation between the role and the explanation is 
two-tiered. On the one hand, the role influences the 
its accent on expertise. explanation through, s~. 
However, it should be mentioned that Chapman and Chapman 
found that illusory correlations were more prevalent 
amongst l~persons (ie undergraduates). This perhaps 
suggests that while the ethic of the diagnostician has 
diffused into the 9 general 9 population, it is lacking the 
corollary of a professional pride in being 9 accurate'. 
Against this .• some institutional roles do not undercut 
9 popular prejudice 9 but magnify it. Thus Burt(1978) found 
that policemen have a more negative evaluation of rape 
victims closer to that of rapist than to that of the 
general public, which in turn is closer to the police than 
to rape counsellors. The second tier in the above relation 
accesses the way that the explanation serves to support 
the role. At the crudest level, the illusory correlations 
that psychodiagnosticians indulge in serve to convince 
them and others of the need for psychodiagnosticians. 
Cantor and Brown(1981) have provided an interesting 
account of the relation between explanation and roles. 
Pointing out that subjects have different roles in 
Page 136 
relation to the explanations the¥ give and the phenomena 
the¥ explain. the¥ suggest that people rna¥ be situated in 
explanator¥ roles. Explainers will differ with respect to 
the degree of involvement and the degree of expertise that 
the¥ can claim regarding an¥ explanation or phenomenon. 
Involvement will be partl¥ determined b¥ the nature of the 
event or incident. and partl¥ b¥ the social and personal 
investments of the individual. Expertise will likewise 
var¥ according to what information is public!¥ available, 
special to the situation. and special to the role. These 
various factors combine in numerous wa¥s to shape the t¥Pe 
of explanation that a person gives. The precise 
configuration emerges onl¥ b¥ investigating explanations 
in situ. 
Unfortunate!¥. the notions of involvement and expertise 
are directed solel¥ at the role-holder and do not address 
the functions of roles in a wider sense. This includes an 
interactive mode in which the expertise that accrues to 
one particular role can serve to sustain. elevate or 
undermine expertise of another. Moreover, the 
explainer/role-holder is not onl¥ expert and involved in 
the event being explained. S/he is also 9 expert in 9 and 
0 involved in 9 much wider social processes. To illustrate 
using one of Cantor and Brown 9 s own examples, the 
explanatory roles of 9 Estate Agent 9 and 9 House Buyer 0 are 
also instrumental in the continuation of certain propert¥ 
(the private ownership of housing) and class (what income 
Page 137 
groups can afford housing?) relations: also they may be 
involved in reinforcing the nature of housing as dwelling 
places for particular groupings of individuals (eg the 
nuclear family). So that while the explanations that these 
two roles generate in evaluating a property may differ 
greatly, in another wav they are in league, sustaining a 
particular view of housing and, indeed, bargaining. 
Moreover, we are given no indication of how group factors 
will influence such explanatory roles. In brief, roles 
have to be placed in a social context (practical, 
discursive and ideological) if we are to comprehensively 
characterize explanations. 
Finally, we must consider the way explanations relate to 
personal roles (Biddle,1979) roles which individuals 
have constructed for themselves. We should be careful here 
and take heed of Tajfe1 9 s(1981) warnings against a purely 
interpersonal form of interaction, one which would 
presumably involve personal roles. Personal roles can 
perhaps best be conceived as roles in which the general 
and institutional elements are minimized. Alternatively, 
we can highlight their novelty or their biographical 
eccentricity. However, this apart, personal roles are 
deeply cross-cut by broader relations. Hollwav(1982) has 
shown that, even what had appeared to be highly 
idiosyncratic and spontaneous actions within close 
relationships :<in radical couples), such as the desire for 
intercourse without contraception, in fact reflected very 
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general role requirements, in this case expressing an 
element of the 9 feminine 9 role concerning the need for the 
man to show commitment to the relationship (the 
9 have-hold 9 discourse in Hollway 9 s terms). Orvis, Butler 
and Kelley(1976) have looked at attributional conflict in 
young couples. Again in such intimate conditions, typical 
gender-role related unities emerge. The female partner 9 s 
high external attributions to herself are a roundabout 
indication .of the 9 feminine 9 
Conversely, ~he male partner 9 s attributions generally 
indicate the greater control capacity that the 9 masculine 9 
role affords (see Ch.6). We shall not be examining the 
relationship between personal roles and explanations. Our 
interest is in more general and institutional roles. 
2.Intergroup Theory and Explanation 
In this section, I will first outline the basic tenets of 
intergroup theory and review the relevant experimental 
evidence that has accumulated around it. As with role 
theory, I will examine both the expressive and practical, 
and the individual .and social functions that groups have. 
Secondly I will criticise these theoretical formulations, 
especially in regard to their general neglect of the role 
of content in the construction of group identity and the 
production 
strategies. 
of typically intergroup behaviours and 
In the light of these reservations, the 
relationship b~tween group-membership and explanations 
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will then be considered, especially as it relates to the 
deployment of stereotypes. Finally, the relationship 
between intergroup behaviour to power will be considered 
as a prelude to a more detailed discussion of the 
interaction of roles, groups, power and explanations. 
a. Intergroup Theory. Stemming out of his early work on 
categorization (Tajfel,1981 for an overview), Tajfel et 
al(1971; Billig and Tajfel,1973) showed that on the basis 
of categorization alone (even when this was conducted on a 
completely arbitrary basis) subjects belonging to a group 
would exhibit gross in-group favouritism. This is 
manifested as maximum differentiation in which the 
out-group was maximally deprived of rewards, even where 
this resulted ~n a relative loss in the in-group's profit. 
However, Turner(1975) went on to show that it could not be 
categorization alone that was responsible for the minimum 
group results. By introducing the possibility of rewarding 
the self, where the choice of rewarding either self, 
out-group or iri-group preceded the choice of rewarding 
between in-group and out-group, then the out-group 
discrimination 'effect diminished significantly. (Although, 
more recenty Taylor and Doria,1981, found that 
group-serving biases can be preferred to self-serving 
ones.) Turner interpreted his findings as showing that 
self/other competition can be contrasted to 
in-group/out-gr9up competition, and that the two processes 
are independen~. He suggested that in addition to 
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categorization, social identity also played a part in 
intergroup behaviour. He has since developed these notions 
(Turner,1982,1984) in a cognitivist direction, attempting 
to formulate a cognitive definition of the social group. 
According to this social identity theory, individuals 
define themse~ves in terms of distinct social categories, 
learning the stereotypic norms of that category and the 
behaviours that are criteria! attributes for category 
membership. Actors assign norms to themselves in the same 
way that they assign stereotypic traits to others: in 
other words, there is involved in group identification a 
process of self-stereotyping. As category membership 
becomes more salient, behaviour becomes more normative and 
conformist. Under these circumstances social identity is 
positively enhanced. 
To this end the following processes should come into 
play: ( 1 ) Individuals will tend to evaluate distinctive 
(in-)category characteristics positively; (2} Conflict 
with out-groups will be manifested for the purposes of 
distinguishing the in-group from outgroups; (3} Within the 
in-group, individuals will move (and claim to be) closer 
to the group norm and thereby assert that they are 
superior to other group members. 
Within the confines of its own framework, one of the most 
problematic aspects of this theory is 99 the spontaneous 
emergence or formation of self-defining social 
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categorizations ... we can speculate that variables such as 
similarity, proximity, common fate etc contribute to 
perceptual unit formation, but research is necessary to 
specify precisely the determinins conditions'' 
(Turner,1984,P535). Turner cites two experiments in which 
it was found that even where identification and group 
formation were based on similarity for disliked 
characteristics, intergroup discrimination still appeared 
(in contrast, disliked, non-categorized individuals seemed 
to exhibit a form of self-hate), and that failure and 
defeat actually enhanced group cohesiveness. Thus for 
Turner, this social identity perspective ~reinstates the 
group as a psychological reality'' (P535). ~The group is a 
social reality and a psycholosical process and there 
is constant reciprocal determination between these two 
sides of the phenomenon at play in group behaviour~ 
(p536). However, though Turner is quite right to stress 
this reciprocity, he does not see the ~psychological 
process'' being socially mediated. Indeed 
"Identifications are cognitive structures but they are 
also social products" (P536). It is the type of 
identification, 
social operates. 
below. 
not identification itself, on which the 
A critique of this will be presented 
What emerges from this brief survey of the literature on 
intergroup pr,ocesses is that they are largely driven by 
the search for a positive social identity and 
Page 142 
categorization. In functional terms, intergroup theory has 
been largely geared towards analysing the expressive and 
personal functions of group processes. However, before 
developing this theme further, it is worth pointing out 
that not all workers in the field agree with such a 
formulation. Some, for example Deschamps(1984) and 
Doise(1978) place their theoretical emphases squarely on 
categorization and category differentiation. Elsewhere, 
subordinate Linville and Jones(1980). Linville(1982) 
affect (such as that which might be mediated through 
positive social identity) to cognition, particularly the 
perception of complexity. Accordingly, the greater the 
perceived complexity of the other or the self, then the 
less extreme the affect associated with the target; 
conversely, the greater the simplicity, 
extremity of affect. In a similar vein, 
the greater the 
Wilder(1978) has 
shown that individuation of the outgroup attenuates 
intergroup discrimination. A similar accent crops up in 
Hamilton 9 s theory of stereotyping (1979) in which 
cognitive attribution (in cahoots with salience and 
illusory correlation biases) result in the stereotyped 
conception of others. And yet, Turner 9 s results suggest 
that these cat~gorization effects cannot alone account for 
intergroup behaviour (nor, for that matter, stereotyping). 
Similarly, van Knippenberg and Wilkes(1979) reanalyzed 
Doise and Sinclair 9 s(1973) data on the effect of status, 
interaction, 
comparison 
~nd the competetive/consensual nature of 
dimensions on categorization and group 
Page 1U3 
diPPerentiation. They Pound that the diPferent items 
summed by Doise and Sinclair conflated social identity and 
categorization processes. The positive value oe social 
identity was evidenced in the fact that the greatest 
differentiation occurred Por those items important for the 
ingroup (eg differentiation was most dramatic on 
consensual items on which relative status was agreed upon 
by apprentis and collegiens). With respect to the 
categorization-loaded theories of stereotyping, the role 
of motivation seems likewise instrumental. Greenberg and 
Rosenfeld(1979) showed that even for dimensions 
uncorrelated with a stereotype (eg Blacks and E.S.P. ), 
ethnocentrism appeared with whites positively evaluating 
E.S.P. in whites. Thus a characteristic usually excluded 
from a stereotyped category, not initially salient, or 
illusorily correlated, becomes all these things in the 
interests of the bigot. Moreover, such purely cognitive 
approaches are limited to the cognitive functions of 
supposedly categorization-based intergroup behaviour and 
stereotyping. They do not, and indeed cannot, theorize the 
social Pormatioh of stereotypes that Tajfe1(1981) suggests 
is integral to the very notion of the stereotype (cf 
Huici,1984). We will be further criticizing the reliance 
on categorization processes below. 
Given that there is an explicit and pivotal role Por 
positive social~ identity, in what ways does it manifest 
itself? There ar~ various aspects of intergroup behaviour 
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in which it operates. First, positive social identity as 
evidenced in those studies addressing the tension between 
intergroup and interpersonal differentiation. Brown and 
Turner(1981) suggest that when group-identity is 
de-emphasized, self-favouritism emerges. And yet, as Codol 
(1975,1984) has suggested, even where the in-group is kept 
very much in mind, individual differentiation can occur. 
For Codol the individual is caught in a dilemma between 
the desire to epitomize the group norm and the 
simultaneous desire to avoid being deindividuated, that 
is, the desire to . remain a discrete and novel individual. 
This is resolved in the 9 superior conformity of the se1f 9 
by which individuals claim that they are closer to the 
norm than are other members of the in-group. Thus at one 
and the same moment. they establish their similarity and 
their differetice. As ever, ~erceptions of similarity 
within the group are modulated by other factors such as 
the presence of an outgroup (Wi1der,1984) or whether the 
group norm is unanimous (Allen and Wi1der,1977). Fraser 
and Foster(1984) go further, reporting that not only is 
there pro-norm deviance, but also anti-norm deviance. In 
other words, individuation within the group can be 
conducted through counter-normative behaviour. Studies of 
minority influence indeed suggest that this is ~erfectly 
feasible. At this point, as we ·begin to discuss groups 
within groups, we might also begin to wonder how much of 
the original c~nception of the group is left. What this 
discussion does reveal is that the conception of the 
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group in primarily cognitivist terms relies on a gross 
simplification of the dimensions and strategies subjects 
have available to them in using the group as a means to 
enhancing their positive social identity. If, as 
Wilder(1984) suggests, groups can differentiate the 
in-group from out-groups by actually highlighting the real 
contradictions and factions within the in-group, the 
implication is that subjects have a far more dynamic view 
of the in-group identity: 
negotiation and change. 
that is, one that is open to 
All this natu~ally brings us back to intergroup processes 
and their parameters. Various debates have raged as 
regards the nature of differentiation and discrimination. 
Brewer(1979) suggested that it was in-group bias rather 
than out-group denigration that characterised intergroup 
discrimination. However, Locksley, Ortiz and Hepburn(1980) 
found that information about in-group and out-group 
rewards had an equal and opposite effect on the rewards 
subjects 
Clearly 
awarded to out-group and in-group. members. 
this contradicts Brewer 9 s contention. As 
Billig(1976) warns us, such minimalist analyses must be 
contextualized, placed in relation to ideological, 
political and economic variables. Similarly, Tajfel(1984) 
emphasizes the conditioning of intergroup processes by 
myth. Inevitably, then, the models that come out of such 
an approach will: be hemmed in with 9 it dependses 9 • In 
contrast, it mlght be more appropriate to start from the 
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'it depends' end of things, exploiting rather than 
resigning ourselves to the contingent nature of theee 
processes. (For example, we could start off with a 
speculative typology of concrete intergroup struggles 
through history.) 
When actors do distinguish their in-group from out-groups 
(and in doing so engender conflict), they do so in fairly 
complicated ways. For a start, what can count as a 
plausible out-group will depend on a variety of factors, 
most important of which is perhaps the relative position 
of the groups qn a valued hierarchy. Brown(198LJ.) notes how 
similarity of status is insufficient to provoke much 
differentiation between groups when the hierarchy is 
stable and perceived as such. Van Knippenberg (198LJ.) 
notes, howeve~. that groups use complex presentational 
ploys to support or undermine the legitimacy of the status 
quo. So when supjects give descriptions of the in-group or 
out-group, they are often loose enough to allow strategic 
negotiation, ~specially where the outcomes or 
characteristics being described are not the ones that 
characterize the in-group's identity. This suggests that a 
flexibility in presentation and personal identity affords 
room to 9 hype 9 both the self and the group (van 
Knippenberg and van Oers,198LJ.). Similarly, Mummenday and 
Schneiber(198LJ.) have shown how out-groups may be 
positively judged on what for the in-group constitute 
second-class comparison dimensions. Here we can briefly 
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illustrate the contingent and content-laden nature of 
intergroup processes: Where Brown(198U) warns that too 
much similarity might exacerbate intergroup 
differentiation. van Knippenberg(198U) suggests that 
intergroup behaviours do not just involve antagonism -
cooperation is also a feature of intergroup life. Putting 
these two observations together, we might ask: when does 
similarity lubricate social cooperation? Following on from 
this and the minimal cognitivist definition of a group, we 
can set up the following situation: where two members (or 
sub-groupings) of the same group encounter one another, 
unaware that they have both identified with the same 
group, to what degree will similarity hamper their 
acknowledging their membership of the same group? to what 
degree will it facilitate it? to what degree will it lead 
to cooperation qr conflict? This cannot be answered in the 
abstract; one of the main reasons being that the use of 
similarity in the process of comparison/cooperation will 
depend on the way that similarity is integrated into the 
in-group identity. In other words, social identities 
contain norms regarding the way that as a group-member one 
should treat others, both in- and out-group members. 
area within intergroup theory concerns Another 
conflict. Tajfel and Turner(1978) have provided the most 
extensive theory of intergroup behaviour. This has been 
refined by Taylor and McKirnan(198U). In Tajfel and 
Turner 9 s scheme, a status hierarchy will remain secure: if 
individual mobilit~ is possible; where comparisons can be 
shifted onto new or alternative dimensions; where the 
in-group characteristics become more positive!~ evaluated; 
and where comparison groups can be changed. Conflict 
arises where the hierarch~ is seen as both unstable and 
illegitimate, and especial!~ where the possiblilt~ for 
individual mobilit~ is precluded. Tajfel and Turner go on 
to state th~t such subjective conflict does not have 
priorit~ over objective (economic. social, historical) 
conflicts. Taylor and McKirnan raise the objection that 
Tajfel and Turner 9 s model is historical!~ too vague. The~ 
suggest an amendment in which the historical 
underpinning of intergroup conflict are more explicit!~ 
integrated into the model. The~ envisage five stages in 
the generation of intergroup conflict. Firstl~. there must 
be clearl~ stratified intergroup relations. Second, an 
individualistic social ideo log~ must have arisen 
historical!~. Third, social mobilit~ is attempted, 
individuals try to penetrate advantaged groups. Fourthl~. 
those who have been repulsed realize that the possibilit~ 
for their own status enhancement lies in elevating the 
status of the disadvantaged group as a whole. Finally, 
competetive intergroup relations and collective action 
should be viable. These authors assure us that causal 
attribution and social comparison processes will play a 
pivotal role in the operation of such a model. 
How such collective action might be orchestrated is 
Page 149 
suggested the research on minorit¥ influence 
(Moscovici,1976; Ng,1980; 
Moscovici, 
Mugn¥,1984; Mugny et al,1984). 
According to a minorit¥ 1 s st¥le of 
presentation, the consistency especiall¥. will exert an 
influence oVer the majorit¥ easing its views in the 
direction of the minority 0 s. For minority and majority we 
could read low and high status group respectively. 
However, both Ng and Mugny stress that the earlier work 
failed to take into account social factors involved in 
minority 
argues 
influence. Charismatic power, 
subsumes minorit¥ influence, is 
Which Ng 
sociall¥ 
contingent, appropriate at some points in history, 
laughable at others. If a minority is not to be wholl¥ 
marginalized, if it is not to be seen as a purveyor of 
deviance as opposed to innovation, there have to be 
alternative modes of presentation. Flexibility is vital in 
order to avoid being dismissed as deviant. Such 
flexibility also permits cross-category identification in 
that, at the ver¥ least, the minority shares the common 
feature of 0 being reasonable'. In terms of high and low 
status groups, we might consider such an arrangement as 
hegemonic insofar as it is the ruling groups that will 
dictate what counts as reasonable (eg to be politicall¥ 
reasonable in most Western democratic countries means 
being willing to follow the parliamentar¥ road). Finall¥, 
Ng points out that the effort that is put into making an 
attempt to raise: the status of the in-group is liable to 
be influenced by:perceptions of how far the top of that 
Page 150 
hierarchy is and by the depth of its rungs. 
b. Groups and Explanations. Before I launch into a 
full-scale critique of the above theories of intergroup 
behaviour, I will first locate them in relation to 
attribution theory and lay explanations. I have already 
given some examples of the way that groups and 
explanations have been connected (in the construction of 
outgroups and stereotypes, and in processes of group 
conflict). In this section I will consider in more detail 
the literature on the interrelation between explanation 
and group processes. 
Early work by Taylor and Jaggi(197ll.) and Mann and 
Taylor(197ll.) showed how attributions were effected by 
ethnic group and class membership. Thus for positively 
evaluated behaviours in Muslims and Hindus, in-group 
members were attributed internally, out-group members 
externally. 
evaluated 
This pattern was reversed for negatively 
behaviours. In the case of English- and 
French-speaking Canadians who were either middle- or 
working-class, a more complex set of results emerged. 
French-speakers tended to judge others according to 
ethnicity, whereas English-speakers were more influenced 
by class, though in a counter-in-group fashion (that is, 
middle-class English-speakers attributed favourably to 
working-class Epglish speakers). Mann and Taylor explain 
these results by pointing out that the French, being a 
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minority, need to bolster the group and thus their 
self-identity. The English-speaker results possibly arose 
because the English-speaking middle-class community tends 
to be large and undefined. Stephan(1977) showed that 
in/out group conflict could be mitigated by what we might 
call a 9 supranorm 9 of high internal attribution for 
positively evaluated behaviours. So, while intergroup 
theory would predict that positive behaviours are 
externally attributed for out-group members, the above 
supranorm should counteract this effect. This Stephan 
illustrated by analysing the attributional evaluations of 
whites, blacks and Chicanos in which he found that the 
whites were more prone to internal attributions. 
While Hewstone and Jaspars(1984) are right to criticize 
this study for not being social enough (it lacks 
interaction, group identity could have been more 
prominent, etc}, it at least taps into norms that cut 
across intergroup processes. Indeed, as we will argue 
below, intergroup processes, rather than being at core a 
biological mixture of categorization processes and a drive 
for positive social identity, might themselves 
reflect a 9 norm 9 to behave in the group-biased way the 
literature documents. Pettigrew(1979), Hewstone and 
Jaspars(1982a,1983,1984}~ Hewstone, Jaspars and 
Lalljee(1982) have refined and elaborated the theoretical 
interdigitation of attribution theory and intergroup 
behaviour, int:roducing such factors as social 
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representatlons (Moscovici,1980,1973; Herzlich,1973), the 
role of interaction, and explanations of socially relevant 
behaviours and events. In general terms, this work showed 
that there was a complex, indeed dialectical, interweaving 
of social representations, attributions and social 
identity. with social representations (of the out- and 
in-groups) 
identity. 
deployed in order to sustain positive social 
However, intergroup processes themselves were 
not conceived as the result of social representations 
that is, intergroup behaviour could reflect expectations 
embodied in the social representation of the schoolboy or 
adolescent. Put another way, the schoolboy is a 
group~member par-excellence because that is the way the 
role of the schoolboy is constructed. Social 
representations, as well as more covert processes, have a 
hand in the construction of that role. Below we generalize 
this point to men as a whole. 
Hewstone and Jaspars(1982b) have also looked at what 
happens when discussion is allowed and when the in- and 
out-groups meet. In a study of unemployed black and white 
youths. they ·found evidence of risky shift which 
exacerbated intergroup discrimination. Thus white youths 
tended to attribute even more internally to black youths 
for unemployment. whereas the blacks explained this 
condition thro.ugh system-blame. When the groups met, 
polarization took place. However. even amongst whites 
there was considerable system-blame as they too had 
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encountered discrimination and lack of opportunity. This 
study also found that in accordance with social identity 
theory, the lower status group (blacks) elevated its 
social standing by positively situating itself on the 
valued dimensions of religion and music. Overall it was 
blacks who perceived intergroup differences. The whites 
were more 9 ega1itarian 9 • 
As a final instance of the relation of intergroup theory 
to attribution, Deschamps(1983) sees attributions as a 
function of category membership, both symbolic and real. 
For him, attribution is the process whereby social 
representations are put into operation. These social 
representations are governed by certain cognitive laws. 
amongst which categorization is uppermost. We can see that 
there are similarities between the Deschamps and Hewstone 
et al formulations though the latter are more rigorously 
social in their stress on social identity. 
The above treatment of the intergroup theory literature 
has attempted to do fair service to the variety of 
initiatives in the field. However, there have been 
omissions, 
groups to 
most glaring of which is the work relating 
language use, as in the deployment of 
evaluatively loaded language in intergroup differentiation 
and discrimination {eg Giles and Johnson,1982). This 
aspect aside, what seems to emerge from this survey are 
the pivotal roles of categorization and positive social 
Page 154. 
identity. While there are constant reminders throughout 
these writings of the importance of social factors, again 
and again 
cognitive 
identity) 
we are left 
(categorization) 
factors pushing 
with the impression of' 
and motivational (positive 
from behind, as the dual 
generative cores of' stereotyping, intergroup conflict or 
superior conformity of' the self'. In other words, despite 
claims to the contrary, this paradigm is infused with 
the individualism that we detected in cognitive 
approaches t~ attribution theory. 
To substantiate this charge we can look at the conception 
of' intergroup conflict which sees it as essentially a 
means of' furthering or maintaining positive social 
identity. According to these theories recourse to 
intergroup conflict is likely when individual exit from a 
low status group is blocked. 
left for self-sacrifice 
account 
aristocrats 9 
for 
(eg 
certain 
Prince 
In such a theory no room is 
or 9 humanity 9 • It cannot 
intellectuals 9 and 
Kropotkin, Woodcock,1971) 
identification with and allegiance to oppressed groups, 
individuals who would otherwise be members of' high status 
groups. In other words. this is a theory of' 
self-interest which in spite its social trappings 
ignores that most social of' parameters, morality. As such, 
it is dangerously ahistorical. We have seen that 
intergroup confl'ict has payoffs for the groups involved, 
and more essentially, according to the terms of' social 
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identity theory, for the positive social identity of 
individuals, and we have seen how these processes 
are reflected in the use of stereotypes in order to 
oppress som~ out-group (eg blacks, women). Yet, as various 
authors in a different context have remarked {eg in the 
case of masculine sexuality, Metcalf and Humphries,1985), 
there are also negative pay-offs in the form of 
self-stereotyping that comes with intergroup 
discrimination. Why then does the balance between pay-offs 
stand as it does? We can best approach this question by 
altering its form - what function does intergroup conflict 
serve for broader, historical processes? The sometime 
self-stereotyping of men into what Hoch(1978) has called 
the 9 White Hero 9 (ascetic, puritanical, etc) has served 
not only to differentiate them from women, but also to 
justify and mediate the rapid generation of capital. 
(However, cf Kelvin,198U, for a critique of Weber 9 s.1932, 
Protestant work ethic which this stereotype partly 
embodies). More mundanely. intergroup processes can serve 
the requirements of a third party. The imperialist dictum 
9 divide and ru~e 9 captures just such a function: foment 
conflict and when troubles are at their bloodiest, step in 
and take advantage. The following quote suggests how 
conscious such manipulation can be. H.S. Truman was never 
a fervent supporter of either communism or the USSR: 
~When the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in 
1941. he was quoted as saying: 99 If we see that 
Germany is winning we should help Russia and if 
Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and 
that way :we will let them kill as many as 
possible, although I don 9 t want to see Hitler 
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victorious under any circumstances~. Truman 
modified this view later and accepted the Soviet 
Union ~s an ally.~ 
(Gosne11,1.980,p238) 
Even more mundanely, and ironically, we might suggest 
that the experimenter in the intergroup experiment takes 
on Truman's role exacerbating division for his/her 
personal gain (as well as for the gain of 0 science 0 of 
course), and simulataneously denying his/her role in the 
conflict that appears by cloaking him/herself in the veil 
of 'scientific method'. 
These latter points are neatly paralleled by those in 
Henriques'(l.984) critique of the minimal intergroup 
experiments. He notes that the errors, that is, the 
gratuitous discrimination against the outgroup in fact 
reflects comparison ... between the scientist's 
objective perception that there is 'no real difference' 
between group members and the subjects' subjective 
perception that there are significant differences between 
the groups." Moreover "the scientist's viewpoint, 
completely untheorized in the methodology of the 
experiment, produces the correct observations from which 
the subjects' are considered incorrect divergences" (p76). 
Henriques thinks it ~not unreasonable to suppose that 
subjects, if they continue to cooperate with the rules of 
the experiment at all, were left no option but to make 
'gratuitous' qiscriminations. Positive and negative 
evaluations wer~ required by the methodology. The power of 
the experimenter, to make the rules governing the subjects' 
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behaviour resides partly in more general authority 
relations ... (and) in the unrecognized power o~ ~ormulating 
a procedure which limits the possibilities o~ response~ 
( P77) · Both the lack o~ meaning~ul criteria and the 
requirement to make judgements on individuals even when 
the provided criterion was a group one show how subjects 
were constrained. In other words, the apparent lack o~ 
content in terms o~ group identity is a chimera borne 
0~ experimental procedures and theoretical constructs. 
There might well have been per~ectly valid reasons ~or 
subjects discriminating as they did - reasons derived ~rom 
the experimental situation in which they ~ound themselves. 
The experiment was the experimental psychologist 9 s version 
o~ ~omenting discord. 
Billig(l.985) has produced a detailed critique of the 
priority accorded to categorization in the social 
processing o~ prejudice. He is especially concerned with 
the way that categoriation. as a cognitive process, serves 
to render simpli~ication and distortion, and thus 
stereotyping, inevitable. As he points out, there is an 
opposing process, that o~ particularization in which a 
stimulus is distinguished ~rom a general category and ~rom 
other stimuli. Billig also criticized the underlying 
biologism o~ an approach which sees the perceptual as the 
substrate of all higher processes. including the social; 
he noted that w.e should distinguish the peculiarly human 
in these processes, particularly the role of language, 
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which can both · simplify and enrich. However, Billig is 
wary of a simple one-to-one correspondence between 
categorization and prejudice. and particularization and 
tolerance. Rather, he opts for a form of analysis that 
examines the rhetorical aspects in the use of categories 
(attitudes and arguments included). It requires that we 
directly address the fluidities of thought and the 
ambiguities of language. Such a project is of necessity 
social and requires, in the context of intergroup 
behaviour, an analysis of the way in which the content of 
a particular category constrains fluidities and 
ambiguities to the point where it comes to generate 
intergroup behaviour. 
In this respect, Wi11iams(1984) has pointed to the way 
that intergroup behaviour is conditioned by gender. She 
notes that social identification theory does not take 
fully into account affiliation and attachment processes 
which might undermine the potency of intergroup 
discrimination. She highlights the fact that men tend to 
engage in these social identification processes more so 
than do women, and that women are more involved in 
communal processes such as helping other groups. This 
latter involves a form of agency somewhat different from 
that typical in ~he masculine role; this will effect the 
sort of group identity and processes that women might 
develop (cf ~h. 6. ) For Williams, then, the social 
identity posited: by social identity theory is 19 an analogue 
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of the type of personal identity encouraged in males" -
that is, "an agentic identity" (p313). Overall, this 
theoretical sex-bias suggests "that the relationship 
between identity and intergroup behavior is more complex 
than that proposed by the original formulation of social 
identification theory" (p314). Extending 
observation a little further, this complexity cannot be 
confined merely to the role of gender identity, but must 
be extended to.class, race and age 'related identities. 
Indeed the intricate relationship between identity and 
group processes needs to be specifically mapped out for 
each, given instance. Moreover, we must not forget that 
many identities are hegemonic and that their influence on 
intergroup behaviour is likely to reflect broader social 
processes. This can be briefly illustrated by considering 
the 9 plausibility 9 that a given comparison dimension is 
endowed with. There are certain overarching criteria as to 
what dimensions and thresholds can be used for 
These cannot be said to derive simply from 
the in-group. There is a supra-norm of rationality that 
must be met 
9 irrational 9 
in making any comparison (it would be 
for athletes to compare themselves to 
paraplegics on the dimension of physical prowess.) The 
factor of ratioriality (perhaps mediated through similarity 
- see above) is dealt with in the next chapter. 
In this section I have considered the mechanism and 
function of ~nte~group behaviour and found that mechanism 
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has been undu1;y' t'oregrounded. Categorization and positive 
social identit;y are the twin engines of' intergroup 
behaviour which: are located deep in the interior of' the 
individual. In consequence, function, however socia11;y 
phrased, a1wa;ys returns to the personal. I hope to have 
' shown both that mechanism cannot t'u11;y explain the 
function and t'9rm of' intergroup relations, and that these 
core processes are themselves shaped b;y the content of' the 
categories and identities which are supposed mere1;y to 
pass through them. In the following section I wi11 detail 
this interaction b;y describing some of' the wa;ys that 
roles and group~ p1a;y oft' one another in the production of' 
social behaviour and the t'u1t'i1ment of' certain functions. 
It should be noted at outset that the links I wi11 detail 
are abstractions: in concrete examples it is t'ar more 
difficult to disentangle group from role in order to place 
them in an order of' priorit;y. Histor;y tends to complicate 
these connections to the point where it is not 
rea1istica11;y possible to unravel the two. 
3. Roles and Groups 
a. Groups, Roles and the Individual. In this section I 
wi11 be looking at the effect of' role and group 
identification on the individual. In our discussion on 
roles, we intimated that 9 ro1e 9 could be interpreted as 
shorthand for _the range of' discourse/practices that serve 
to shape the ide~tit;y and subjectivity of' the individual. 
In the case of' intergroup identit;y, the reverse seems to 
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hold insofar as the drive for social identity shapes the 
type of identity. Thus Turner(1982) suggests that the 
self-concept is a relatively enduring. multi-faceted 
system carried about in the head from one situation to the 
next. Overall coherence and organization lead to a sense 
of unity and consistency. Yet the parts are highly 
differentiated. At any moment the part or combination of 
parts that is conjured up constitues the self-image. In 
the case of intergroup processes. this implies a 
differentiation between social and personal identities, 
that is a dimension of identity with interpersonal at one 
end and intergroup at the other (Tajfel.1981; but also 
Stephenson.1981). The self-concept is a social 
construction derived from interaction with and reflection 
in others (Mead.1932). Tajfel has noted that a purely 
interpersonal identity is an absurdity - there is no way 
of avoiding at least some group categorization of the 
other and the self. In contrast. Hollway(1982.1984) 
locates this process outside the individual in the types 
and range of discourse/practices brought to bear on 
interpersonal interaction. 
With respect to the consistency between the various 
disparate self-images, rather than individualize it as a 
given of social cognition (Festinger.1957; Billig.1982), 
we will externalize it as a norm in the way that R.H. 
Turner (J.H. Turner,1978) has in his notion of 9 the folk 
norm of consistency' a social norm to present a 
Page 162 
consistent self to others. As Billig points out, this norm 
may be in the process of being superceded by norms of 
ambivalence or 9 trimming 9 • (Though, here too, there are 
ambiguities in that the underpinning motive of 9 trimming 9 , 
namely survival, is itself consistent. When one trims, one 
can trim consistently.) 
We can now return to Turner's (1982,198ll) ideas 
concerning the way that an individual ever comes to locate 
him/herself within a group, that is, choose a group 
membership and thereby construct a positive social 
identity. It should be apparent from the above discussion 
that this can best be viewed through the role-positioning 
of individuals, including those aspects of the roles that 
incorporate or facilitate the workings of intergroup 
differentiation and discrimination. In other words, 
role-derived identity 'precedes' group-oriented identity. 
This is not to pose a contradiction between personal and 
social identity, in the sense of reversing the priority of 
social over personal identity set up 'Tajfel(1981): we 
have already stated that roles are not personal but 
inherently social in their construction and function. Our 
reformulation serves to narrow the scope of intergroup 
behaviour, but also to broaden it by entrenching it in a 
more socially concrete context. 
To round this section off: in terms of individual 
funtion, roles serve to shape and fill identity in its 
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unity and multiplicity. This occurs through both the 
interactional and structural aspect of role and, for each 
individual, must ultimately be traced biographically. Role 
is here used to encompass such forms of 
discursive/practical imposition as measurement, 
discipline, medicalization and so forth. These may be seen 
as (partly coercive) socializing processes that squeeze 
individuals int1o particular social positions to use 
Heath 0 s term, which 0 fix 0 individuals. The constitution of 
roles and th•ir incumbent identities will determine 
whether the intergroup processes, described by Tajfel and 
Turner, are a behavioural o~tion. However, this is highly 
simplified. In the real world things are more complicated; 
not only will roles lead or not lead to grou~ 
identifications, groups will also serve as the basis for 
certain roles. Ultimately, the relationshi~ between role 
and group cannot be outrightly formalized in the somewhat 
elementary way attempted here. Rather it must be teased 
out of history in the process of close and detailed study 
for a ~articular grou~/role configuration. This is 
precisely what is attempted in Chapter 8 when I analyze 
the interaction between role and grou~ amongst policemen 
as it reflects and effects the relations between women, 
rape victims. rapists and men. 
b. Groups Yielding Roles. The most blatant way in which 
groups induce roles is through the differentiation within 
groups to produce 0 leader 0 and functionaries. Bales and 
Page 1.6ll. 
Slater(l.956),Ba~es(l.958) distinguish between task and 
socio-emotional leader. The former is intent on improving 
the group 9 s rel.ation to the environment and especially in 
the fulfilment 6f its assigned task; the latter is geared 
towards keeping ~he group intact, smoothing out difference 
and so forth. 0~ course such groups are iask-oriented and 
interactional wh:ereas the Turnerian group is cognitively 
generated. Nev~rtheless, this is in itself instructive in 
that it suggests that Turner 9 s conception implicitly 
characterizes the group-member as somewhat naive. Most 
individuals ha~e been members of interactional groups 
the family, in t:he classroom, with friends. workmates. etc 
- and are aware: of how leaders and functionaries arise or 
are imposed; they are well-acquainted with the strategies 
people use in maintaining and changing their positions 
within a group ~nd how this effects the constituion of the 
group. It seems unlikely that individuals will identify 
themselves with~ group and not have some inkling of.their 
position within it. Where individuals do perceive the 
ingroup as hom~geneous it is usually for the purposes of 
differentiation;: however, even differentiation may be 
mediated through reference to in-group roles (which, we 
must note, cut ~cross groups). Thus aritors may claim that 
their group is ~ocially nicer, that is, it contains better 
socio-emotional 9 leaders 9 ; or more efficient, that is, 
contains more proficient task leaders. Thus we might argue 
that intergroup ~ifferentiation can take place in such a 
I 
' 
way as to ~remote within-group role-differentiation 
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Alternative supra-group comparison dimensions might re~er 
to style or decorum (Go~~man,1959) in which groups are 
compared according to the slickness with which they pull 
off their identities convincingly. 
Role di~~erent~ation might also occur via superior 
conformity of The self (Codo1,1975). Subjects who attempt 
to resolve the ~raternalist and egoist moments o~ group 
membership (Billig,.l976) by achieving greater conformity 
to the group n9rm, may have their e~~orts recognized. 
On a more obvio~sly sociological plane. group-identities 
can also serve as the content of particular roles as and 
when 9 required 9 by particular circumstances or groups. The 
sociological roie o~ 
I 
9 scapegoat 9 comes most readily to 
mind here. J~ws (Billig,1978; Aronson.1983). blacks, 
Vietnamese, etc have all been ~orced into this unsavoury 
role. Groups can also construct a role ~or themselves when 
it af~ords certain advantages. Thus the Confederation of 
British Industry (the Bosses 9 9 Union 9 ) is a group 
comprised o~ disparate and competing elements which has 
forged a role for itself as economic advisors to the 
government. The same might be said of all power~ul 
pressure groups which claim to have a monopoly o~ 
expertise in a' given area. Indeed, we might suggest that 
' 
when a group begins to monopolize a given social ~unction 
it is on its way to fashioning a social role. Thus in 
Marxist theory:. when that group known as the proletariat 
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becomes 0 for itself 0 it comes to realize it true historic 
role. 
c. Roles Yielding Groups. The discussion immediately 
above suggests a terminology largely ignored in writin~s 
on groups. I have in mind the Marxist distinction between 
something which is 0 in itself 0 and something which is 0 for 
itself 0 (cf Bil1ig,1976). Classically, this is applied to 
the working class a disorganized mass which is 0 in 
itse1f 0 a group but otherwise unaware of its destiny (or 
0 truth 9 ). 
conditions. 
In time, under appropriate historical 
the proletariat becomes aware of its strength 
and its mission and overthrows capitalism, that is, it 
becomes 0 for itse1f 9 • Something of this is captured in 
Taylor and McKirnan 9 s(1984) five-stage model of intergroup 
conflict. And yet, as mentioned above intergroup theory 
reduces the 0 for itself 9 to a 9 for him/herse1f 9 in the 
form of positive social identity. It cannot encompass the 
social (and economic and political etc) furthering of the 
whole group as a process in its own right. 
9 for her/himse1f 9 occupies centrestage; 
for a 0 for the other 0 • 
Moreover. this 
there is no room 
Within this framework we can see how roles act as a basis 
for the constitution of groups operating both 
instrumentally and expressively. An illustration of this 
process is provided by the formation of professional 9 s 
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representative bodies such as the British Medical 
Association, w~ich in banding the various role-players 
(doctors) together can increase the political and social 
' 
muscle of both the group and the role. Indeed, its power 
may be so great that it can come to have monopoly over the 
definiton of the role of 9 doctor 9 ; that is, determine what 
count as the relevant comparison dimensions. In this case, 
this monopoly has recently come under severe attack from 
alternative medicine. 
The transformation from role into group also proceeds 
at a broader social level. The distillation of a group out 
of a number of roles can often entail the suppression of 
certain other roles which would not fit in with the 
emergent group identity. Hirst and Woolley(1982) for 
example outline (and criticize) the feminist view that the 
witch-hunts of the 16th and 17th centuries were in fact a 
suppression of common women 9 s medical practices by men 
(ie the esteem of the woman healer was usurped by male 
doctors who organized themselves into group in order to 
achieve this). Irrespective of whether this is accurate or 
not, we can admit that it is a possibility which reflects 
a potential group-role relation. 
The gravitation of roles into groups can be prompted by 
other social factors such as theoretical or technological 
innovation. Increasing technologization of medical 
research has meant that a variety of expertises (roles) 
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are required for any given project (Lemaine,1984). Also, 
developments in theory which spans several disciplines, 
can serve to polarize individuals within a given role or 
expertise, while causing them to form alliances with other 
experts. Thus we find that the new French social theory 
has created divisions within several disciplines (Literary 
criticism, philosophy, sociology, history, psychology) 
whilst facilitating cross- or multi-disciplinary research 
groups. Finally, Stephenson(l981) has perceived both 
intergroup and interpersonal elements active in 
negotiation and bargaining. However, we can make 
the following counter observation: around the negotiation 
table there is a common role in operation, namely that of 
9 negotiator 9 or leader. This can serve as the 
role-identity that leads to a (more or less tenuous) group 
identification of negotiators. In other words, there is 
here a form of cross-category membership, a factor which 
Mugny(1984) has singled out as important in minority 
influence. In this case such influence takes the form of 
negotiation. So, here we can see a role mediating or 
directing conflict through serving as an intermediary 
social identity. 
This analysis of the relation between roles and groups 
has not attempted to be exhaustive. For example, I have 
not even tried to systematically set out the types of 
dimensions and norms or discourse/practices which might 
serve to generate roles out of groups and vice versa. In 
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my opinidn this can only be done by studying concrete 
examples (see Chs 6.7,8). To sum up: role is our main 
conceptual tool. This is because, in the view developed 
here. it theoretically 0 precedes 0 intergroup behaviour by 
delimiting the type and range of intergroup behaviours 
that are permissible. Additionally. it has the advantage 
of being more socially inclined. shaped as it is by a 
network of discourse/practices. and not reducible to 
internal factors. And of course it can incorporate power 
as exerted not only over others. but also over the self. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IDEOLOGY AND RATIONALITY 
Introduction 
The relationship between ideology, rationality, 
discourse/practice, power and social psychology is a 
multifarious one. Not only does it refer to the object of 
social psychology, in our case attributions and lay 
explanations, it also concerns the ideological or rational 
status of social psychology itself, which is after all a 
form of explanation in its own right. We have touched upon 
such issues before in our discussion of cognitivist 
analyses of social behaviour. In this chapter, we shall 
reiterate some of the points made above and provide a more 
detailed account of this relation. Necessarily this will 
include a consideration of the concept of ideology. In 
outline then, this chapter will address the following 
topics: 1. The treatment of ideology by social psychology; 
including the study of ideology in attributions and 
ordinary explanations; 2. A discussion of the relation 
between ideology and discourse/practice in the context of 
critical theory; 3. These concepts will then be considered 
in relation to rationality, irrationality and the problems 
of relativism; 4. Finally, various arguments developed in 
the preceding,sections will be drawn together and related 
to explanations. 
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The position that eventually emerges is that it is 
unreasonable to invest too heavily in an absolute 
9 rationa1ity 9 • Rather we adopt an 9 historica1 objectivity' 
which serves as a (temporary) basis from which to analyze 
discourse/prac~ices. This position also provides the 
(contingent) justification for attachin~ the perjorative 
9 ideo1o~y 9 to those discourse/practices that have worked 
to block critical reflection. say through an oppressive 
shaping of individuals. As such when we deploy the term 
ideology to various discourse/practices on rape and 
sexuality, it is from our adopted position - socialist, 
feminist and libertarian. 
1. Social Psycho1ogy 9 s Treatment of Ideology. 
adopted approach to ideolo~y has in 
the main been descriptive. This means, following 
Geuss(1981), that 99 ideo1ogy in the purely descriptive 
sense (implies that) ... every human group has an ideology-
the agent of any group will have psychological 
dispositions, use some concepts and have some be1iefs 99 
(p5). This meaning of ideology incorporates diversity in 
that not all members of society are expected to hold the 
same ideology or set of beliefs. Moreover, this sense is 
9 non-eva1uative 9 or 9 non-judgemental 1 • Pluralism is of the 
essence. 
Brown(1973), :in overviewing social psycholo~y's use and 
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investigation of the concept of ideology, quotes the 
Webster 9 s dictionary definition: 99A systematic scheme or 
co-ordinated body of ideas or concepts, especially about 
human life or culture~ (Brown,1973,p9). For Brown, the 
descriptive sense is always uppermost. Attitudes and 
beliefs must be explained with reference to wider 
ideological content. This is affected by 
structures - economic at one pole, genetic at the other. 
Since ideolog~es relate to the content of systems of 
thought, a primary psychological interest has been in 
their acquisition, maintenance and structure, and in the 
behavioural processes that are their effects. These 
interests stand in 99 contrast to the more specific 
interests of philosophers, historians and sociologists~ 
(Brown,1973,p14). And yet, in what way are the concerns of 
other disciplines more specific? The fact is that they 
very often 
ideologies 
focus on the political implications of 
their role in domination. As such they will 
eschew relativism by arguing that some ideologies are more 
oppressive th~n are others• in other words, they will take 
sides. The sa~e can be said for the psychological form 
which these ideologies take. That is, social psychologists 
should not be averse to linking their study of ideologies 
to those ideologies 9 social 9 function 9 • 
However, in social psychology, in 1973 at least, ideology 
refers primarily to the matrix of attitudes and beliefs, 
and involves both proximal (groups, roles) and distal 
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(economic, historical) conditions, though the latter are 
not social psychology 9 s immediate field of concern. Also 
pressing are the influences of genetic factors. Thus as 
Brown summarizes: 99 A complete theory of ideology must take 
account of intra-personal, specific situation and 
socio-cultural factors 99 (p178). Predictably, our 
adherence to discourse theory means that we cannot regard 
this neat separation of factors as unproblematic. The 
intra-personal derives from and contributes to the social 
and 9 external 9 factors. Furthermore, there needs to be a 
greater specification of the nature of the social field in 
order to evaluate both the 9 social function 9 of an 
ideology and the relative status of internal versus 
socio-cultural or economic factors. This must include an 
analysis of the ideological standing of social psychology 
itself, given that it makes up part of the socio-cultural 
factor. 
Another problem with Brown 9 s exposition is that it 
tends to assume that ideologies are systematic. that 
is. internally consistent. However. Billig(1982.198U), 
has noted that this forensic ideology in which a tightly 
knit. consistent network of beliefs operates. is not the 
sole mode of ideological practice. The use of ambiguity 
and contradiction, of balance-as-counterweight, 
contributes to what is classically ideological (ie 
denying, bypassing. swamping objective contradictions, 
Marx and Engels,1968). What is more, as we briefly 
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mentioned in Chapter 2, what counts as consistency is open 
to choice, though a choice that is mediated by socia1 
norms. Ideo1ogy cannot be c1assified according to its 
degree of interna1 consistency un1ess we specify its and 
our own criteria of consistency (see be1ow); additiona11y 
we have to estab1ish the superiority of one criterion over 
the other. 
More ideo1ogica11Y blatant than Brown°s treatment is 
(Eysenck and Wilson,1978). Billig(1982) 
concludes that Eysenck 0 s analysis is ~a double-headed 
criticism against the revolutionary left and against 
existing society whose strand of egalitarianism impedes 
the march towards Kantsaywhere 00 (p126). In this respect we 
can point to Eysenck 0 s automatic espousal of statism 
(his examples of political groups only inc1ude those that 
presuppose the necessity of the state) and his consignment 
of both right and left wings to the far reaches of 
toughmindedness. Statism per se is not itself considered a 
form of toughmindedness (inflexible when it comes to 
considering other forms of socia1 organization). This 
blindspot is exposed by the lack of an entry in the 
far-tendermindedness/radical quadrant of his schema. 
Evidently 1ibertarian communists (eg Clarke et a1,1980; 
Guerin,19701 Ward,1973) or critica1 theory (see below) do 
not figure in his scheme of things. 
E1ster(1982) has produced a more sophisticated theory of 
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the psychological basis of ideology. From the outset he 
breaks with the descriptive predilections of social 
psychology: for Elster ideology is a wrong belief. The 
mechanisms b~ which this wrong belief is acquired and 
sustained are fourfold: wishful thinking, adaptive 
preference, preference change by framing and inferential 
error. Drawing on mainstream cognitve psychology, Elster 
suggests that these are due to defective information 
processing. However, Elster is also a Marxist; these 
shortcomings have to be historically located. Ideology is 
thus the culmination of class position and cognitive 
defects which means that Marxism, methodological 
individualism and causal explanation can provide an 
adequate theory of socially groUnded beliefs/ideologies. 
The criticism I wish to level at Elster's formulation 
refers to his acceptance of methodological individualism. 
This assumes that the experimental techniques of cognitive 
psychology adequately access the relevant processes. In 
Chapter 2 we argued that they do not: such processes must 
be placed in context of social interaction, intergroub 
behaviour and role situation. To put it another way, the 
power relations that Marxism analyzes on the sociological 
level also permeate the cognitive psychology laboratory 
and experiment, and shape the types of processes that are 
reported. These contextual factors do not simply converge 
with cognitive factors to produce ideology, as Elster 
' seems to suggest. Rather they are complexly interdependent 
and mutua~ly influencing; their interactions should be 
Page 176 
studied in their historical specificity. 
Billig(1984) provides a subtler framework for analyzing 
the social psychological bases of political ideology. 
Billig distinguishes between forensic and non-forensic 
ideologies. The former involves vvthe belief that complex 
world events have relatively simple explanations. The 
classic example is the conspiracy theory ... vv and "the need 
to preserve the logical coherence of the explanatory 
framework ... vv ( p461). vvThese two feature follow on from the 
oppositional nature of forensic ideology ... " which permits 
"determined action against a defined group"(p461). The 
contrast between forensic and non-forensic ideologies is 
mirrored in Sampsonvs(1978) distinction between paradigms 
I and II, entailing masculine and feminine styles of 
discourse respectively. The former is considered more 
rational, rigid, and distanced; the latter more intuitive, 
malleable and involved. 
In keeping with our interest in the function of 
explanations, I want to briefly consider the relation of 
forensic and non-forensic ideologies to the production of 
power/knowledge (truth) and their potential to oppress. 
(To reiterate: Power/knowledge refers to the use of 
knowledge, particularly that which embodies expertise, to 
mediate power in the shaping of individuals.) In Chapter 1 
we noted that explanations were placed in a framework of 
discourse/~ractices, acting as glosses on the point of 
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intervention s~ecieied by the relevant frameworks. We can 
see a parallel of this in Bi11ig 9 s account of the way that 
forensic ideologies afford determined action a~ainst a 
defined group. Similarly, non-forensic ideologies. by 
obscuring contradiction through a variety of linguistic 
contortions. serve to facilitate a more diffuse form 
oe action (e~ general reliance on the status quo). From 
these observations we can distil the fo11owin~ theme: 
power/knowledge (and the directed action or oppression 
that follows from it) is best served when contradiction is 
not overtly present. The following questions may now be 
posed: (1) When is power/knowledge so secure that overt 
contradiction does not matter? (Eg When the difeerential 
status of the ideologue and follower is so great. that the 
follower will assume the correctness of the ideologue 
irrespective of his/her inconsistencies. The charismatic 
leader might be an example of this.) Phrasing this a 
different way: when does the power of a given discourse 
(and all its trappings) become so great, that its 1o~ica1 
form has no bearing on its perceived validity? A corollary 
question is: When is power/knowledge itself so taken for 
granted, so built into a system. that directed action 
needs no overt legitimation and appears self-evidently 
rational? (Under such circumstances, a supporter of the 
status quo can assume that its momentum will assure its 
longevity); (2) Conversely. when is consistency (whatever 
the type) ~o tightly bound to a given role that it must be 
maintained ,at all costs lest that role lose its rationale 
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or its power. Explanatory roles are heavily invested with 
rationality and consistency: when they begin to issue 
contradictory statements or judgements, their status as 
explanatory roles becomes open to doubt and their power 
diminishes. Here, ~orensic ideology is probably only 
implicitly oppositional. (3) I~ we momentarily ~ollow 
Kruglanksi and Ajzen(1983), we can suggest that logical 
consistency is a subjective criterion o~ validity. 0~ 
course. in Chapter 2 we rejected this, arguing that such 
criteria were necessarily socially embedded. Nevertheless, 
we can speculate that there are other criteria o~ validity 
(truth) such as the aesthetic, narrative or normative. In 
the West the logical seems paramount, but it may be that 
other criteria are operating. For example, 
Spender(1980), suggests that an exclusively logical 
criterion re~lects the patriarchal monopoly o~ 9 proper 
thought 9 ; in contrast, alternative means o~ assessing the 
coherence o~ statements might proceed multidimensionally. 
I~ this is viable, then the distinction between ~orensic 
and non-~orensic becomes problematic: the non-forensic 
ideologies ~ay in ~act be internally consistent along 
dimensions alternative to the logical. (4) When can 
power/knowledge and action be generated despite an 
awareness and admission of contradiction? Here we move 
away ~rom the Enlightenment version o~ the rational 
individual to consider the irrational in behaviour. Habit, 
phobias, and compulsions can all lead to directed action 
despite the knowledge that these are riddled with 
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contradiction. More rationally, where can contradiction be 
positively used? (eg in Adorno 9 s Negative. Dialectics 
coherence seems to thrive on contradiction.) 
Leaving the social psychological study of ideology per 
se, we can consider research which looked at the effects 
of ideology on attributions and ordinary explanations. 
There have only been a few studies explicitly relating 
ideology to explanational form and content, though others 
have implicitly incorporated an element of ideology, say 
in the shape of beliefs, expectations or gender norms. 
These can be illustrated by the Just World Hypothesis 
(Lerner and Mi11er.1978), expectations of 
gender-related competence (Deaux,1976; Ch. 6); norms of 
internal attribution (Jellison and Green.1981). All these 
factors can be re-interpreted as the ideological 
antecedents 
Hypothesis 
Of 
is 
explanations. 
ideological in 
Thus the Just World 
that it obscures 
contradiction and injustice in the apportionment of good 
fortune by falsely equating fortune and dessert. 
Expectations and sex likewise reflect ideologies regarding 
the status of women, consolidating the discourses that 
regard women as generally incompetent and ideally excluded 
from certain labour markets. Jellison and Green 9 s findings 
suggest how an i~eology, in this case the causal primacy 
of the individual, is sustained through a process of 
normalization w~ereby to deviate is to draw reprimand, 
itself a practic~ that presupposes and manifests that same 
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norm. 
Our immediate interest however is in that research which 
has directly 
explanations. 
Conservative 
unemployment 
addressed the role of ideology in 
Furnham(1982a) showed that employed and 
subjects were more likely to blame 
on the unemployed than were unemployed 
persons. Similarly, he (Furnham,1982b) found that, with 
respect to 
attributions, 
poverty, Conservatives deployed internal 
while Socialists were more likely to 
blame social conditions. Furnham and Henderson(1983) found 
a parallel pattern of explanations eor delinquency 
Conservatives focusing on the failure of moral and social. 
education (the assumption being that subjects are 
intrinsically bad and kept in check only by the operation 
oe the relevant social. institutions); Labour voters, on 
the other hand, homed in on those failings in the system 
that generated discontent, anomie and so forth. There is 
something profoundly obvious about these findings. In 
part this is because they lack a sense oe history: we do 
not receive any impression of how it is that the links 
between Conserv~tism and explanation arose, nor do we get 
any impression o£ the deep conservatism oe the traditional 
Labour voter. In regard to delinquency it is worth taking 
note of Foucaul t:v s analysis of the penal. system ( 1979ao 
Poster,1984) in which crime, originally equated with the 
working classes: and their discontent, came gradually, 
through the oper'ation oe the penitentiary and the various 
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disciplines that sprung up around it, to be located in the 
psychological make-up of the individual lawbreaker, 
exemplified in. his/her recidivism. Foucault has the 
advantage over Furnham in outlining some of the ways that 
the conservative formulation of the criminal arose, how it 
was constructed in a given context. Thus, whereas Furnham 
and Henderson°s analyses effectively end with the 
correlation between ideology and explanation, for Foucault 
and those who have followed him, that explanation and the 
discourse (or ideology) in which it is located is 
intimately related to a whole set of practices that buoy 
or undermine that correlation. So, while Conservative and 
Socialist doctrines conceive of two opposing core subjects 
(bad and good respectively) they both nevertheless 
presuppose core subjects ahistorical, universal 
linchpins to the relevant explanations. We must, however, 
analyse how such conceptions arose and the functions that 
they serve. It is therefore necessary not simply to 
document the differences between discourses, but also to 
investigate their similarities. Once we do this, we begin 
to see that there is considerably more slippage between 
ideologies (or discourses) and their related explanations. 
We begin to take into account the fact that explanations 
have a rhetorical and practical function which sustain 
not only the ideology but its matrix of practices. With 
respect to Furnham and Henderson°s findings we could point 
out that deli~quency also occurs amongst Conservatives, 
say in the form of tax avoidance and fiddling, especially 
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in small businesses (Armstrong et a1,198lt). 
Conceivably, this would be explained by Conservatives not 
in terms 0~ delinquency, but through an external 
attribution to ~actors such as 9 cut-throat economic 
conditions 9 and the like. 
Gergen and Gergen(1982) have provided another view on the 
relation between ideology and explanation. In their 
analysis o~ the ~orm and ~unction o~ explanations o~ 
human conduct, Gergen and Gergen suggest that the 91 ~orms 
o~ explanation may also serve as grounding supports ~or 
broad social institutions. Di~~ering political, reli.gious, 
and economic bodies, ~or example, may be ~orti~ied by 
particular ~orms o~ explanation and hold an ideological 
stake in their continuance"(pllt7). However, there need 
not be a simple correspondence between ideology and 
explanatory ~orm. Individuals have a considerable 
repertoire o~ explanatory ~orms at their disposal and will 
deploy these as and when the situation arises. For 
example, the Gergens suggest that Republicanism is best 
allied with empowered and person-centred explanations, 
which is to say that the target behaviour has been caused 
by internal ~actors which have 99 ~ull determinative 
~orce 91 {p130). Further they add that as this "assumes a 
uni~ormity o~ nature, ie that all people are moved to 
action by the same internal mechanisms and that such 
operate in relative autonomy ~rom environmental input, 
then a ~orm o~ governance might be ~avoured in which the 
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state is proper!~ viewed as a product o~ the multiplicity 
0~ individual agreement 99 ( p147). However, we can readily 
point to disparities in this. Adherence to the 99 uni~ormity 
in nature 99 does not prevent Republicans ~rom asserting the 
pro~ound 'otherness' o~ communists and the transgression 
o~ community autonomy ~or the purposes o~ economic gain 
or ideological monopoly (eg the American way o~ li~e). 
Moreover, internal attribution can be suspended as, say, 
in the case o~ wayward Republican presidents. The point is 
that expedience will temper the use of explanations in the 
service o~ ideology because that ideology is interwoven 
with political and social practices that are inevitably 
ambivalent and ambiguous. The same argument can be 
extended to any ideology-explanation equation, such as 
those uncovered by Furnham and his colleagues. 
One tradition we have not as yet considered in detail is 
that dealing in social representations 
(Moscovici,1973.1981; Herzlich,1973; Moscovici 
Hewstone,1983). 
99 By social representations we mean a set o~ 
concepts, statements and explanations 
originating in dailY li~e in the course o~ 
inter-individual communications. They are the 
equivalent in our society o~ the myths and 
belie~ systems o~ traditional societies, they 
might even be said to be the contemporary 
version o~ pommon-sense." 
(Moscovici,1981,p181.) 
and 
Herzlich has related social representations to the way 
people attempt : to explain illness and health, in 
particular the w~y that they use social representations 
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of, for example, country and town as generative sites of 
health and illness. Moscovici and Hewstone(1983) have 
attempted to conceptualize explanations around the model 
of the explainer as an amateur scientist who has at 
his/her disposal various scientific social representations 
with which to transform and restructure initial 
experiences so that they are rendered familiar (eg 
figuration, personification, categorization - these serve 
to anchor and objectify otherwise alien experiences). 
Social representations, some deriving from science, 
others more traditional (Moscovici and Hewstone point to 
the often oppositional nature of these two sources) are 
99generated in daily life in the course of inter-individual 
communication 99 • Here we can begin to distinguish our 
approach from Moscivici 9 s. We are not told whether in the 
process of such communication power is exercised. This 
contrasts with ideology which many writers assume arises 
out of conflict, or is immanently conflictual (and this 
applies to discourses too, despite Foucault 9 s sometime 
claims to the contrary). It should also be noted that 
Moscovici(l972) is well aware of the role of both power 
and ideology as it pervades groups and social psychology 
itself. However, his recent writings seem to have 
subordinated ideology to social representations, and with 
that, the social to the individual or cognitive functions. 
We argue that the two cannot be so separated. Social 
representations, in the form of categories and labels, are 
derived in an interactional process that is profoundly 
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in~used with power; they re~lect discourse/practices that 
are geared, increasingly so, towards control and the 
shaping o~ individuals. ~Inter-individual interaction~ 
obfuscates what in feminist and humanist socialism is now 
a commonplace: 99 the personal is political~. Further, these 
individuals must be properly theorized. In stating that 
the categorization, etc processes that underlie social 
representations are a means to a cognitive security, we 
must be sensitive to the fact that such a strategy can 
itself be oppressive, limiting and ideological (Deleuze 
and Guattari,1983; Ch.6). We must counterpoint the stress 
on control and stability against an emphasis on 
de-anchoring and de-objecti~ying which we can argue are an 
important means to 
apprehension of the 
changing what is an undesirable 
world (ideological insofar as it 
mediates domination). For our purposes then, social 
representations miss those vital, concrete aspects of 
social interaction which work through roles, and the 
relative power invested in them, to shape the self and 
others, both through anchoring and de-anchoring, etc, and 
thereby to affect the social world. That is, social 
representations do not simply effect the apprehension of 
the soc~al world, but also its constitution. A more 
appropriate way of analysing these interactions is through 
the examination of specific discourses, and the interplay 
of these with other practices/discourses and 
power/knowledges including counter-normative ones. 
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'· 
2. Ideology and Discourse. 
This section is concerned with the notion of ideology 
and its relation to the couplets of discourse/practice 
and power/knowledge. Our discussion as regards the 
Marxist treatments of ideology will deal primarily with 
the formulations by Marx and Engels(1968), 
Althusser(1971) and the critical theorists, largely 
by-passing the works of Mannheim(1935), Gramsci(1971), and 
Lukacs(1971). In this we follow Abercrombie et al 9 s(1980) 
advice, who have with various others denied the utility of 
long drawn-out theoretical discussions of the concept of 
ideology. For them, in their specific concern with the 
dominant 
empirical 
coherence, 
ideology thesis, 
research into 
what 
the 
is needed is direct 
actual distribution, 
and modes of transmission of ideology. Our 
discussion is aimed at how best to go about this with 
regard to explanations. 
a. Traditional Marxism. Larrain(1981) sums up Marx 9 s 
position thus: ~In short Marx is putting forward the 
priority of being over consciousness 99 (P39). Material life 
is the historical product of people 9 s practice, though 
this practice is not merely subjective. Reality and this 
practice entail contradictions which result from 
humanity 9 s subjection to, as opposed to control over, 
material conditions and which can only be solved when the 
appropriate conditions exist or are in the process of 
formation. As Larrain points out, from this we deduce that 
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''men cannot solve in consciousness what they cannot solve 
in practice 91 • Solutions to contradictions which have no 
basis in practice are illusot>y: ''ideology is therefore a 
solution in mind to contradictions that cannot be solved 
in practice ... it is the necessary projection in 
consciousness of' man's practical inability91 (pl!.6). 
Ideology's ot>igin in resiricted practices must be 
historically located - these practices and ideologies are 
generated by particular classes. 11 Thus the ideas of' the 
ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, ie the 
class which is the ruling material f'orce of' society, is at 
the same time the ruling intellectual f'orce 11 (Marx and 
Engels,1968,p6l!.). The result is that ideology "serves as a 
condition for the functioning and reproduction of' a system 
of' class domination'' (Larrain,1981,pl!.7). The primary f'orm 
that this takes is a denial of' class difference and 
contradiction. 
There are many counter-conceptions (cf' Plamenatz,1970) 
but given our interest in the relation between 
ideology and power, as it finds expression in the shaping 
or fixing properties of discourse/practices, our treatment 
will adhere to those analyses arising out of' the Marxist 
tradition. Developments since Marx's original statements 
have taken on a number of' guises (Larrain,1981; 
Thompson,1984). Two important strands are CCSI,1977: 
cultural and orthodox Marxism, both comprehensively 
rejected by Barnett and Silverman(l979): 
~orthodox Marxism 
basing itself on a 
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searches for a correct line, 
materialism that foregrounds 
base and relegates superstructure to a secondar~ 
place ... cultural marxism searches for ideological 
structures at the level of s~mbolic meaning as 
such. This too separates thought and action in a 
wa~ congenial to the reproduction of capitalism. 
Both orthodox Marxism and cultural Marxism in 
advanced capitalist societies have lost the sense 
of a social whole that animates Marxist praxis.~ 
(Barnett and Silverman,1979,p73) 
We will add that this sense need not be a totality, but 
an appreciation of the complexit~ and interwovenness of 
factors, an appreciation which effectively dissolves the 
the base-superstructure metaphor (see below). 
b. Althusserian Formulations. The structuralist 
anal~sis of ideology, exemplified b~ Althusser(1971) and 
developed by, for example, Therborn(1980), has, as 
pointed out b~ Thompson(1984), recent!~ receded. I will 
not therefore go into great depth regarding this approach. 
For Althusser, ideology is a s~stem of representations. 
This has nothing to do with consciousness: it is as 
structures that these function. It is through the s~stem 
that representations come to have meaning. As ideological 
structure cannot be reduced to the wa~ it is lived, it can 
be studied as an objective phenomenon. Ideology is social 
cement: dominant ideologies alwa~s prevail over dominated 
ones. There is an explicit contrast between science and 
ideology: science is correct; ideolog~ is not. Ideologies 
are external, based on the structure of human thought -
they exist across histor~. Ideo log~ 'substantiates' 
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individuals through its propagation via ideological state 
apparatuses. 
Various criticisms have been aimed at this model. 
Larrain(1981), 
all argue that 
Henriques et al(1984), Clarke et al(1980) 
the division of intellectual effort into 
science and ideology is highly spurious especially in 
the context of the work of sociologists and philosophers 
of science (Barnes,1981; Kuhn,1970: Feyerabend,1976,1978; 
Henderson,1981; Fee,1983). Others have pointed to the 
necessary role of the subject in resistance (Seidler,1980; 
Poster,1984) and the need to avoid Althusser 0 s reduction 
of the social field to a functionalist whole. As 
Thompson(1984) has pointed out, the connection between 
ideology and domination needs to be kept intact. 
Althusser 0 s notion of interpellation, through which 
subjects are 0 called forth 0 in the service of the whole 
must be re-worked to accommodate the fact that this 
c~lling forth is full of contradictions and resistances. 
So, ideology is both oppressive and positive, in the sense 
of shaping and reinforcing the social constitution of 
subjects and their perceptions, which at one and the same 
time limits the potentialities of those individuals and 
yet provides a subjectively valued stability of sorts. We 
will look at this in more detail in our analysis of how 
one set of ideologies (rape myths) serve to limit, 
stabilize and pppress both the self and others. 
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c. Critical Theory and Ideology. The critical theory of 
Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas is engaged in 
counteracting ideology (though Marcuse,196U, argues that 
even critical theory cannot evade an 9 ideological 
character 9 under prevailing historical circumstances}. For 
critical theory, ideology can be said (if we mix our 
terms} to be that set of discourses/practices and 
significations that counteract critical reflection for the 
sake of particular interests. To quote Held(1980}: 
critical theory 9 s 99 ••• social enquiry (is) a critical 
analysis insofar as it discloses the extent to which 
existence is a 9 means 9 or a 9 block 9 to free 
self-realization 99 (p235). This blockage is most thoroughly 
achieved through the presentation of the relevant 
discourses as absolutes, facts, universals; usually these 
discourses are aimed at the defence of the status quo. 
Hence the successive onslaughts that these writers have 
launched at positivism and its privileging of the 
perceptible. For Adorno(1973) negative dialectics (his 
version of critical theory} entails first and foremost a 
sense of non-identity, a sense of something beyond what is 
immediately available. Thus the identification between a 
concept and its object, as if a concept could directly 
access and wholly encapsulate its object, is the primal 
form ideology. In his introduction, Aranowitz points out 
that for Horkheimer(1972): 99 • o o the task of critical 
theory ... is to penetrate the world of things, to show the 
underlying relations between people" (pxiii). In what 
follows I 
Hegel(1955) 
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shall be following Marcuse 9 s reading of 
in explicating some of the main concerns of 
critical theory. (This is not to impose a uniformity on 
the practitioners of critical theory there are 
fundamental differences between them, cf Thomas,1979.) 
In transcending appearance as it might be manifested in 
the concept, fact, theory, etc, critical theories attempt 
to grasp the essence of the object of that concept, fact 
etc. This can be done either through immanent criticism 
which would lay bare the internal contradictions of that 
concept, contradictions which the concept itself is partly 
designed to deny. In the case of social psychology, we can 
say that its apparent scientific status and autonomy is 
open to various counts of immanent critique. For, as we 
have suggested, its various attempts to signify its 
independence belies its embeddedness in a complex of 
interests (Sampson,1981: Wexler,1983). Similarly, its 
assertions of scientificity insofar as it claims to study 
a 'pure' object (individual) covers up the fact that it 
partly creates that object (for example, through the role 
of the 'experimental subject', Silverman,1977). 
In attempting such a critique we need to address the 
multiplicity of relations in which our target phenomenon 
is engaged. Only in this way can we begin to tease out an 
effective es~ence (with all the contradictions that are 
contained therein). In Adorno's terms (1973). given the 
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inevitable e~ailty of the ~elation between the (c~itical) 
concept and its object, the decline into ~andomness can 
be counte~ed by: consistency oe (thought's) 
pe~fo~mance, the density of its textu~e (that) helps 
thought hit its ma~k~ (p35). 
Against immanent c~itique, we have utopian c~itique which 
cont~asts the conceptual appea~ance of an object in a 
theo~y. fact etc with its potentiality. its 't~uth' in the 
Hegelian sense. We could say that utopian c~iticism 
focuses on the pove~ty of expectation and imagination 
that appea~ance engende~s. That is. against the 'what is' 
of the concept, etc utopian c~itique cont~asts a 'what is 
good' and a 'what could be 9 • 
counte~point is not absolute, 
conditioned (though Habermas' ideal 
However, 
it is 
the utopian 
historically 
speech situation ends 
up being absolute o~ t~anscedental). One problem is that 
any such utopian derivation is liable to suefer f~om 
vanity (Adorno,1967) in that the autho~ makes claims to 
knowing what is possible and good. Examples oe 
utopian derivations are implicit in Ma~x's analysis oe 
alienation which hinges on a conception oe the euleilled 
wo~ke~ as an artisan (Israe1,1971), and Marcuse's 
multidimensional person (1965). 
The c~itical analysis of essence, object and appearance 
(ideology) is :by its natu~e open to revision. This lies at 
the heart oe c~itical theo~y which must be ~eflexive and 
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self-referential. In Geuss' words: "··.critical theories 
are always in part about themselves"(P55). To be affirmed, 
a critical theory must be reflectively acceptable, where 
that reflection acknowledges the tentativeness of any 
theory. In producing critical theories the aim is to have 
them feed into the consciousness and practice of the 
theories 9 target groups (the oppressed). There they: 1. 
dissolve 
illusions; 
origin: 3. 
unconscious 
self-generated objectivity and objective 
2. make the subject aware of its genesis or 
serve to bring into consciousness the 
determinants of action or consciousness. 
Whether such revelations (in Habermas' case(1971), this 
procedure is explicitly modelled on the psycholanalytic 
encounter) 
oppressed 
actually have any effect on changing the 
group is however open to question (cf 
Hollway,1982, for a discussion of the 
acceptance/resistance to such critical insights by 
feminist stalwarts who again and again find themselves at 
emotional loggerheads with the rationally obvious). 
Unlike those writers (Henriques et al,198U) who have 
dismissed this essentially Enlightenment and rationalist 
view of the individual, I would like to leave the question 
open. In the same way that Foucault is happy to allow for 
the possibility of a classical confrontation between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie under appropriate historical 
conditions (Gillan and Lemert,1982), I do not preclude the 
possibility 
rationalist 
'Of 
:in 
'spontaneous 
us emerges, 
change 9 in which the 
and where emotion and 
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motivation squares with intellect and reflexivity. 
I will not engage in a critique of Habermas 0 views which 
according to Poster(198Li.) constitute a 9 Kantian step 
backwards for critical theory 90 (p32) as, with Poster and 
Geuss, I want to stress the relativism of Critical Theory, 
and emphasize the 
99 extraordinarily 
(Geuss,1981,p63). 
status of critical theories as 
fragile historical entities 99 
Simultaneously. in deliberate 
contradiction, critical theory is historically objective: 
it announces its objectivity while firmly embedding itself 
in history, thereby admitting its partiality. By virtue of 
its reflexivity and its commitment to resist oppression, 
it becomes 9 non-ideological 9 • 
d. Foucault, Discourse and Ideology. Various writers 
have characterized Foucault 9 s work as a contribution to 
critical theory (Poster,198Li.; Smart,1982). Jay(l98Li.) has 
remarked that Foucault has himself recognized a 99 striking 
parallel between his own analysis of the disciplinary 
carceral society of modernity and Adorno 9 s administered 
( p22). But as Lemert and Gillan(1982) have 
suggested there are profound differences in that, unlike 
the critical theoretical critique of the visible world of 
power relations, Foucault is concerned with the power 
contained within knowledge and vice versa, that is, with 
power 9 s positiyity, its capacity to shape and fix 
individuals. My· specific interest in this section is to 
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locate Foucault 0 s work in the critical theoretical project 
of uncovering those modes by which critical reflection is 
immobilized. 
Foucault is deeply involved in critique; rather than "the 
provision of programmes, prophesies or policies 00 
(Smart,1982,p135). His work 00 is a challenge directed to 
what isoo (Foucault, quoted in Smart,1982,p136). Yet 
Foucault attempts to avoid the impulse to totalization 
present in many of the critical theorists, that is, the 
tendency to provide an overall account of the 0 state 
of the world 0 • This temptation to totalize is something 
that even Adorno succumbed to (Jay,1984) insofar as his 
anti-system ended up a system. Instead Foucault 00 proposes 
a multiplicity of forces in the social formation, a 
multiplicity which is dispersed, discontinuous and 
unsynchronized 00 (Poster,1984,p88). 
Another difference between critical theory and Foucault 
is in their respective perceptions of ideology. 
Foucault(l979c) seems to have severe reservations 
regarding the usefulness of 0 ideology 0 (cf Poster,198U). 
He perceives three difficulties: that ideology 00 is in 
virtual opposition to something like the 
(Foucault,1979c,p36); that 90 it refers to something like a 
subject 99 ; and that it 00 is in a secondary position in 
relation to s9mething which must function as the 
infrastructure or the economic or material determinant of 
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it 00 (p36). It should be clear that Foucault is here working 
against a Marxist version of ideology. For critical 
theory, as for Foucault, the contrast between science and 
ideology does not hold: as we pointed out above, the 
objectivity that critical theory yields is an historically 
contingent one. We might also call it, a rhetorical one, 
intent on furthering the emancipation of oppressed groups. 
As Urry{1981) points out, there need not be any simple 
dichotomy between true(science) and false(ideology) 
consciousness or between concealment and non-concealment. 
Here concealment refers to the fact that propositions 
embedded within a discursive structure and its related 
practice 99 involve the concealment of the causes, nature or 
consequences of that practice, or indeed some related 
practice 90 (Urry,1981,p60). Left like this, everything 
becomes ideological. However, as Urry goes on to point 
out, there are ~degrees of concealment~ through which we 
can: 
~ ... concei~e of discursive change and 
development, the understanding of which seems 
essential to comprehending conflict and 
struggle, of both classes and of other 
important social forces in civil society. To 
argue that there are ideological effects of 
certain practices does not mean that one is 
committed to a true/false or science/ideology 
dichotomy. 09 
(Urry,1981,p62.) 
In effect, we can point to the way that certain 
discourse/practices play a greater ideological role than 
do others by serving particular groups or concealing 
particular caus~s or consequences. Yet this analysis must 
be carried Ol,.lt from within the terrain of a 
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counter-discourse. To characterize a discourse as 
ideological. 
practices 99 , 
because of its ~inappropriate isolation of 
its 99 conflation of practices 99 or its 
~eternal.ization of practices 19 (Urry,1981,p61) necessarily 
means that that discourse has been appropriated through a 
set of concepts that are wrapped in their own discursive 
framework, in this case, Urry 9 s brand of Marxism. At this 
level., discourse theory is itself a discourse an 
interpretative schema which as Poster(1984) notes ~can be 
judged on the basis of how one perceives the needs of the 
present situation 99 (p91). Those needs are perceived as both 
historical. and objective which implies that what is 
appropriate now may become inappropriate in the future. 
The limits of our own reflexivity (both individual. and 
collective), is what is responsible for our sometime 
claims to objectivity; indeed, if we were perfectly 
reflexive we would never actually do anything (here, we 
might speculate on a 9 bodil.y objectivity', where the 
necessities of the body ground our activities - however, 
even at this basic level. history intervenes). 
In sum, while I sympathize with Foucault 9 s criticisms 
of traditional. Marxist views of ideology, I do not see 
9 ideol.ogy 9 as incompatible with a use of the concepts of 
discourse/practice and power/knowledge. The two approaches 
can be used in tandem, the precise configuration being 
dependent on the perceived nature of the subject-matter 
under examination. Thus in our case study of rape 
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explanations, I will use the term 'rape myth 0 rather than 
rape discourse because the former, carrying distinct 
ideological implications, points directly to the falsity 
and power of these ideas (Chs.7,8). 
3. Rationlity and Relativism. 
In what 
ideology 
follows 
and 
I wish to consider the relation between 
the rationality/relativism debate. 
Limitations of space and expertise mean that I will not 
attempt to come to grips with this extensive field, but 
rather consider a number papers (Hollis and Lukes,1982) in 
order to show how the bounded relativism, or historical 
objectivity, which we have espoused above finds parallels 
in this field. Furthermore, as much of the latter is 
concerned with both lay and (social) scientific 
explanation, it tackles questions relevant to our own 
project, namely the rational/ideological status of 
explanations. On the whole I will try to draw out the 
similarities rather than pinpoint the differences between 
the various perspectives presented. This aim also applies 
to the relation between the philosophical analyses 
outlined here and the more overtly political ones reviewed 
above. 
Hacking(1982) suggests that the truth of a proposition is 
dependent on the style of reasoning; and that there are 
different styles of' reasoning, there being no absolute 
rules as such. This allows Hacking to dub himself an 
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9 anarcho-rationalist 9 : Thus, in consigning a proposition 
to the realm of 9 truth 9 one needs to place it in the 
context of its associated mode of reasoning. In doing this 
we can limit the generalit~ of that truth. Indeed. we can 
go a step further, and assess the rules of logic that make 
up a mode of reasoning as propositions in their own 
right. The degree to which these rules are open to 
critical reflexivit~. whether the~ absolutize or 
eternalize themselves, whether the~ are capable of 
revealing the unthought implicit in them, whether the~ are 
capable of acknowledging their own historical and 
theoretical backdrop, can serve as contingent parameters 
with which to judge the ideological index of a st~le of 
reasoning (Fe~erabend,1976). 
Sperber(1982) records that traditionall~ where there is 
inconsistenc~ between beliefs, this is assumed to be 
indicative of irrationalit~. Against this he suggests that 
such beliefs should be given 9 semi-propositiona1 9 status -
that is, the~ are intrinsicall~ tentative. However, 
contradiction is not absolute. It can be denied for 
example where two contradictor~ beliefs lie in different 
cognitive domains (Gouldne:i:',1970; Nichols and 
Armstrong,1976, illustrate this operating in workers 
against their own interests). Thus. as we have mentioned 
several times, consistenc~ is subjectivel~ 
drawn from w{der trends (cf Bi11ig,1982). 
anchored but 
However, the 
notion of 9 semi-propositiona1 9 holds promise in that it 
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captures the tentativeness o~ much thought. Indeed, i~ we 
continue to ~ollow Adorno in his insistence on 
non-identity, then non-ideological thought needs a 
semi-propositional edge. 
Taylor(1982) argues that rationality entails an 
articulation and theoretical understanding which yields a 
more comprehensive grasp o~ things. This works, in part, 
through a process 0~ disengagement. Theory and 
articulation are cross-culturally viable when related to 
human-beingness in the ~orm o~ the requirements ~or 
survival, technological control and a modicum o~ pleasure. 
Science as theory is superior to other modes 0~ 
apprehension (especially non-theoretical ones) inso~ar as 
it ~urnishes a greater technical understanding, innovation 
and control. In other words, science is superior in the 
physical realm (and to some extent in the social). 
However, as Taylor readily recognizes, this is not the 
sole realm in which we move. 
social balances to be struck, 
There are ecological and 
and, ~or these, science 
cannot be the objective arbiter. As Taylor puts it 
~Perhaps critics are right to hold that we have been 
estranged from our world· in a technological 
civilization ... But i~ it were (true) It would just mean 
that we now had two transcultural judgements 0~ 
superiority, only un~ortunately they ~all on dif~erent 
sides 99 ( p103-4). When Taylor talks o~ disengagement and 
attunement, he:re~ers to the degree to which individuals 
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cognitively 9 merge 9 with the social and physical realms. 
Moderns are better at disengaging from the physical realm 
(to the extent that it can actually be separated from the 
cultural) than are primitives. And yet. as our above 
analysis has suggested, the moderns are necessarily 
historically attuned - our capacity to disengage is itself 
historically attuned to the context which has given rise 
to it. This is brought into relief when we consider the 
truth or meaning of scientific findings as a function of 
their use. of the interests that direct scientific 
research (eg Feyerabend,1976). Whilst this is certainly 
the case for the positive social sciences in their 
creation of 9 truth 9 and appropriate techniques (eg 
Donzelot,1979), so too this applies to the physical 
sciences in their production of relevant knowledge and 
technology. 
attunement 
intertwined: 
In contrast to Taylor, I would suggest that 
and disengagement are dialecticallY 
disengagement entails attunement and vice 
versa. For example, drug-induced attunement can require 
the drug-taker to theorize the notion of a 9 man of 
knowledge 9 which effectively explains the reasons and aims 
for attunement (Castaneda,1970). Without the interplay of 
these two modes. at however rudimentary a level, there 
could be neither justification nor deviation. 
Barnes and Bloor(1982) focus on the credibility enjoyed 
by beliefs. asking the question: On what is credibility 
based? The source of this credibility must be sought out 
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irrespective of whether the investigator subscribes to the 
relevant belief or not. For these authors. rationality is 
subjective - a judgement of plausibility taken from 
within the given position or discourse. The 
counter-argument is that the rationality of any such 
position. that is. its internal cogency. can always be 
offset when it is located against the appropriate 
background of practices and conditions. Thus while Barnes 
and Bloor are happy to state that their radical relativist 
analysis ~accepts that none of the justifications for 
(its) preferences can be formulated in absolute or 
context-independent (p27). drawing on Urry(1981), 
we note that there are degrees of concealment and that 
some positions actively conceal more of their contexts of 
emergence than do others. That is, some positions and 
discourses can be counted as relatively irrational or 
ideological. 
Barnes, in a commentary on Kuhn (1982), in the 
concept of finitism present~ us with a further twist to 
his relativism. Finitism 9 s 99 core assertion is that proper 
usage (of terms, theories, etc) is developed step by step, 
in processes involving a succession of on the spot 
judgements. Every instance of use ... of a concept must in 
the last analysis be accounted for separately. by 
reference to specific, local, contingent 
determinants .. ~consequently it denies that truth or 
falsity are inherent properties of statements 99 (p30-1). For 
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Barnes, 11 Theories (have) no predetermined set o~ 
app1ications, no given scope or domain; and hence, ~rom 
the outside it is point1ess to 1abe1 (them) 1 true 1 or 
9 :f'a1se 1 00 (P33) · But who is· ever on the outside? 
Predetermination inf'uses scientific practice and its 
truths: this is the investment of' power that is ref'1ected 
in the ru1es of' combination and dif'f'erence with other 
concepts, theories or discourses. Thus theories, etc p1ay 
a more active1y constitutive ro1e than f'initism a11ows, 
acting to f'ormu1ate their object. Science as a movement, 
undercuts this f'ixing or reif'ication in f'its and starts, 
in the f'orm o~ paradigm shif'ts. The truth or f'a1sity of' a 
concept, theory, etc can be partia11y ~auged by the de~ree 
to which that theory, etc is aware of' its own partia1ity 
and positivity. 
In this respect, we can ref'er to Feyerabend(1978) f'or 
whom "a11 ru1es have their 1imits and there is no 
comprehensive rationa1ity~(p32). Feyerabend arrives at 
"the idea of' a ~uide (idea/reason) who is part of' the 
activity ~uided and (is) chan~ed by it ... ~(P33). For 
In activity we can read a 0 testin~ a~ainst rea1ity 1 • 
eff'ect, Feyerabend 9 s 99 interactionist view of' reason and 
practice 00 is a f'orm of' ref'1exivity, one which is in part 
automatic 99 For there is no tradition, no matter how 
hardheaded its scho1ars and how hardlimbed its warriors 
that wi11 remain unaf'f'ected by what occurs around 
it 00 (p27). It is a :f'orm of' 19 Protas;orean re1ativism (which) 
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is reasonable because it pays attention to the pluralism 
of tradition and values. And it is civilized for it does 
not assume that (it) is the navel of the world 99 (p28). We 
might add that Feyerabend 9 s animus against rationalism is 
directed at its self-sacralization. Feyerabend suggests 
that an appropriate reflexivity would best be instituted 
through structural changes in the way that research is 
conducted. This would entail giving all cosmologies and 
traditions equal status and a forum in which to engage in 
open, as opposed to guided, debate. In a sense, this is 
what Foucault has attempted to do by undermining the 
monopoly of truth (and thus power) of the human sciences -
that is, he has helped to clear a space for such a debate, 
though the game is still heavily weighted 
orthodoxy 9 s favour. 
in the 
This view seems to me to strike a cord with Lukes 9 (1982) 
perspectivism, in which it is held that 99 some areas of 
social enquiry are inherently perspectival 99 • By 
perspective, Lukes means 99 a more or less closely related 
set of beliefs, attitudes and assumptions that specify how 
social reality is to be understood"(P301). Here, Lukes 
vaguely suggests that it is only for some fields of social 
enquiry that perspectivism holds, but does not specify 
these. However, arching over these various perspectives 
are rules which insist that "data itself must be as 
distortion-free as possible - free both of the observer 9 s 
influence and, more generally, of the distorting effects 
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0~ power, generating both deception ... and 
self-deception~(p305). To this end ~the data must be as 
systematically gathered as possible. And the interpreter 
must be as reflexive as possible, maximally aware of his 
(?) interpretative situation, without supposing that he 
can escape it 99 (p305, question mark added). Once again the 
relation between reflexivity and rationality that we have 
propounded emerges. 
Despite its similarity to an extended list, I will 
brie~ly summarize the above section. The above papers 
addressed the classical epistemological question: What are 
the criteria ~or judging a theory or proposition to be 
true? The approaches to this question seemed to settle out 
into two related types. The ~irst emphasized the the style 
of reasoning. Hacking suggested that the truth o~ a 
proposition has to be set against the style o~ reasoning 
in which it is embedded. Other authors set out to 
investigate what and how styles o~ reasoning e~~ect 
'truth'. Sperber suggests that contradictory statements 
are not necessarily false, but semi-propositional; Lukes 
focuses on the way that some rules o~ data collection 
minimize distortion; Taylor argues that disengagement is 
the necessary antecedent o~ scienti~ic enquiry. The second 
type of analysis considers the conditions that bear on the 
emergence of theories and on the perception of their 
truth. Barnes and Bloor, Barnes and Feyerabend address the 
local and historical circumstances that endow theories 
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with truth. Feyerabend goes on to consider the 
circumstances that have led to the hegemony of one 
particular mode of reasoning, namely rationalism. One of 
the broad ways of 9 optimizing 9 the truth that we have 
suggested is through critical reflection. Of the authors 
discussed above, certainly Lukes, Sperber and Feyerabend 
make more or less explicit references to this, while the 
rest are not openly hostile to it. 
Overall then, these authors, in attempting to ground 
theory. have encountered similar problems to those which 
have dogged Marxist and other analyses of ideology. Though 
positions differ substantially, I have extracted a set of 
themes that address the ways in which ideology and the 
dangers of relativism and rationalism can be minimized, 
though not altogether eradicated, through a contextually 
sensitive critical reflection. We can add that this 
should take place at both individual and social levels. 
It is important to note here that much of the argument has 
been couched in highly individualist terms, placing the 
onus on the reflexivity of the individual (person, 
theorist, theory etc). Activity, whether it be individual 
theorizing or social interaction. involves some form of 
collectivity (eg a multiplicity of internal audiences and 
perspectives). One condition for a social form of 
reflexivity is, as we reasoned above, an open structure 
for debate. Thi~ entails the minimization of power, in the 
form of the ~onopolization of the 
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perspective (or cosmolog;y, discourse/practice, theor;y, 
etc) which would guide debate. In indicating this, we 
necessaril;y propose a sociological and political anal;ysis 
of the various discourses, cosmologies, etc in order to 
uncover the institutional and corporate interests that 
animate (and are animated b;y) them. As Poster insists 
(1984) we need an anal;ysis of the texts (the theories etc 
themselves) and of the social (the historical, social, 
political context). 
In short, we are suggesting that non-ideological 
thought's relation to relativism and rationalism involves 
a complex oscillation between the two. What is ideological 
is alwa;ys context-bound: the lack of reflexivit;y in 
rationalism can at certain historical conjuctures turn out 
to be non-ideological in that it can counter (however 
contingently) 
reflexivit;y 
ideological 
oppression and domination. Conversely, 
(h.owever critical) ma;y end up being 
at those points where it takes on a 
self-contained d;ynamism of its own, that is, locks itself 
in a. critical loop from which it cannot escape: it 
turns into a habit which effectivel;y precludes (political) 
action. ( Occas,ionally, the critical theorists were 
themselves accused of being other-worldl;y snobs). The 
fruitful, critical interpla;y between rationality and 
relativism is neatl;y captured b;y Adorno(l973): each should 
be used to unde~mine the other. "Dialectics is a.s strictl;y 
opposed to (re~ativism) as to absolutism, but it does not 
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take the middle ground between the two; it opposes them 
through the extremes themselves, convicts them o~ the 
untruths o~ their own ideas" {p35). 
4. Ideology, Rationality and Ordinary Explanations. 
In the ~allowing paragraphs I will bring this lo~ty, 
abstract discussion back down to earth. The observations 
we have made will here be related to the investigation o~ 
ordinary explanations, especially those concerning rape. 
As indicated in previous chapters, explanations need to 
be considered in terms o~ the interests they realize, the 
~unctions they ~ul~il, their practical role in domination 
and constitution (that is, the means by which they can 
shape both the sel~ and others). These e~~ects can be 
achieved in part through 
re~lection in the explainer, 
the blocking o~ critical 
in the subjects to which 
that explanation is addressed, and to the object o~ 
that explanation. Our analysis o~ explanations must 
there~ore consider what it is about the explanation 
itsel~. about the explainer, about the context in which 
the explanation is given, about the object and audience o~ 
that explanation, 
muscle. 
that impart to it its ideological 
These then are roughlY the means by which we may map out 
an explanation's ideological ~orm and ~unction. As regards 
~orm. Billig's(1984) analysis o~ ~orensic and non-~orensic 
ideological ~orms is a good starting point (see above). 
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This needs to be supplemented with an analysis of the ways 
that the content of a discourse conditions its form, 
especially as that form is expressed in explanation. As 
Billig has pointed out, authoritarian discourses are more 
likely to take on forensic shape than are liberal or 
libertarian ones. However, this is not to say that 
authoritarians are not capable of packaging their views 
non-forensically. The point is that both these forms are 
directed towards the denial of contradiction: the forensic 
through an airtight structure; the non-forensic through a 
fleetness of tongue. As we argued above, it is necessary 
to place the need to ward off contradiction in context. If 
lack of contradictoriness is a (popular, Western) measure 
of plausibility, and if this plausibility indexes truth, 
which in turn mediates (but also reflects) power, we 
can argue that the need to (more or less 
scrupulously) deny contradiction is partly dependent on 
the power that the explainer perceives him/herself as 
having. Thus contradictions can be indulged in those 
situations in which the explainer is relatively secure in 
his/her position of superior power. To put this another 
way: what would be the purpose of critical reflection 
where rewards are guaranteed? (For example: a policeman 
might claim that he wouldn't have minded raping an 
attractive rape victim too. Though this contradicts his 
role as a police officer, in the presence of other 
policemen or persons of lower status, this does not 
matter. More grievously, some policemen will rape and 
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sexually intimidate women, who are, almost by de~inition, 
of lower status.) When the explainer is more vulnerable, 
then contradictions are perhaps more rigorously guarded 
against. 
This above example should convey an impression o~ the way 
that context, and in this case speci~ically the power 
relation to the audience, will in~luence the ideological 
form of a statement or explanation. But as should also be 
apparent, the context complexly interacts with the role 
0~ the explainer. Some roles make demands on the 
discursive practice o~ the explainer that others do not. 
In the case o~ the policeman role, it is expected that the 
holder will be strictly rational, 
~orensic. In part this derives 
stereotyped masculinity that in~uses 
non-contradictory, 
~rom the pro~ound 
this role - as we 
suggested above, masculinity seems to have a particular 
a~finity with forensic thought. Further, and more 
mundanely, forensic thought is part o~ police practice -
simple, coherent explanations are sought because they are 
the stuf~ that convictions are made o~. Yet under certain 
circumstances, policemen will forego the possibility o~ a 
conviction for the sake o~ masculine prejudice (c~ Ch.8). 
Here we can see how contradictions within the role 
manifest themselves in practice. 
While contradi~tions surface and are dealt with by 
individuals and groups (denied, dismissed or concealed), 
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that this is at all an option reflects the cultural weight 
that such contradictions often enjov. That is, despite the 
inherent contradiction of manv explanations, 
appear to be .self-evident truths, obviouslv rational. In 
considering the truth of a statement or explanation, which 
to the observer reeks of contradiction, it is important to 
look at how the constant reiteration of that statement 
through the media, familv, roles and groups, has served to 
consolidate its apparent rationalitv. That is, the 
frequency and vehemence with which something is stated mav 
suffice to blur the incoherence of that statement, to 
blind individuals to its irrationality. Converse!¥, we 
must be aware that the given explanation we are examining 
contributes to 'that process and is itself a moment in that 
generalized rehearsal. In other words, we need to be 
sensitive to how that explanation mediates and reinforces 
those wider structures. The policeman 9 s statement we cited 
above, not onlv manages to deny a contradiction, it also 
recvcles a set of mvths about masculine prowess and 
feminine passivity, keeping them alive and potent. 
Moreover, the denial of contradiction as a process is 
itself rehearsed, implicit!¥ (re-)savoured and 
( re-) dignified. ' 
So, we can access the ideological status of explanations 
coming to grips with the contradictions the¥ 
incorporate. Ho~ever, this must always be set in the 
context of the~r role in domination and oppression. We 
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have noted above that power, truth and contradiction are 
closely associated. The precise relation of these must be 
dissected if we are to achieve a worthwhile understanding 
of the ideological in the explanatory. The way that truth, 
asserted in part through the denial of contradiction, 
serves to block critical reflection and thus mediate 
power, and the way that power comes to ground truth, that 
is. the profound interpenetration of truth and power, can 
really only be examined in specific, historically traced 
instances. The second part of this thesis attempts just 
such a project. The contradictions we perceive and the 
domination that we recount regarding the explanation of 
rape are derived from and accessed through a socialist, 
feminist and libertarian set of discourses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Introduction 
The title of this 
the one hand. it 
cha~ter has a dual im~lication. On 
refers to our intention to ~ut the 
theory deve~o&ed in the first part of the thesis into 
~rectice. to apply it to men°s and policemen°s ex~lanation 
of rape. On the other banda it evokes our ettem~t to get 
beyond the antecedent(theory) exr;>lanation 
configuration by showing how behaviour( practice) 
explanation fits into the the integral relation between 
theory(discourse) and practice. Thus. in the first ~lace 
it is necessary to draw Chapters l. to ~ together and show 
how they a~~ly to men°s and policemen°s ex~lanations of 
ra19e. In the second. we must outline the methodological 
tack we take in locating ra19e ex19lanations in their 
~ractical/discursive matrices. 
A familiarity with recent literary criticism might 
suggest that parts of the foregoing sections can be 
roughly subsumed under what are loosely called 
structuralism or post-structuralism. defined as ap~roaches 
in which ~languages and structures. rather than the 
authoria1 self or consciousness. become the major source 
of ex19lanation~~ (Cul~er.l.983.p2l.). And yet. following 
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Cul.l.er. such l.abel.l.ing serves to confuse rather than 
cl.arify. es~ecia1l.y in the l.ight of the mul.ti~l.icity of 
techniQues and concepts that fal.l. under this rubric. As we 
remarked in the Introduction. m¥ method is ecl.ectic; but 
this ecl.ecticism is not arbitrary. it is guided by 
~ol.iticel./generative interests. For in this res~ect. lam 
QUite ha~~Y to heed Ea~1eton°s(1983) eKhortation to depl.oy 
~any method or theory which wil.l contribute to the 
strategic goal of hum&~ emanci~ation. the production of 
·
0 better peo~le 9 • through the social.ist <~;.ransformation of 
society .•. 00 (~211). To this we might al.so add that our own 
brand of social.ism encorporates libertarian. feminist and 
ecol.ogical concerns. It might be objected that Eagleton is 
referring to the anal.ysis of literary texts. But then. it 
is ~ossible to consider human social. behaviour as a text 
too (eg Ricoeur.1971). Both are. 
the same faptors of 
after all. 
consciousness. 
~roducts of 
practices. 
discourses. language and so forth. Ordinary explanations 
are texts. But they are not simpl.y teKts. We must also 
bear in mind Poster 0 s(198ll) point that it is necessary to 
steer a course between the textual and the social. (and 
this a~~lies for texts too). Ex~lanations also serve 
~articul.ar social functions that sha~e experience. 
This cha~ter effectively begins with a restatement of our 
aims as they rel.ate to our s~ecific subject matter (rape 
expl.anations). The core of this chapter addresses the 
notion of the 0 ideal ty~e 0 • The second part of this thesis 
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is concerned with the construction of a set of ideal ty~es 
of men°s and J90liceman°s ex~lanations. An 
ex~lanation is conceived as the 19roduct and recursive 
producer of a whole set of relations between 
discourse/J9ractices that can be worked into a variety of 
guises - role, grou19, etc. What will emerge is a com191ex 
of factors that can be framed around discourse (ra~e 
ro¥ths, legal and clinical formulations, etc), and ~ractice 
.(self-change, arrests, etc) • At the centre of this 
com19lex, we 19lace ex191anations. As a 19relude to this some 
of the connections between the first four chapter that 
have been hinted at in Part I will be detailed. Finally, I 
will outline the organization of Part II. 
1. A Restatement of Aims 
In the Introduction, we characterized this thesis as a 
contribution to what Gergen(1982,1978) has called 
generative social J9SYchology. To reiterate: the main 
~urpose of this pers~ective is to undermine common or 
orthodox conceptions o£ social behaviour. Of the various 
generative approaches that he has identified, we opted 
for critical theory. In ~art this is because of its 
explicit political and historical allegiances, and its 
self-conscious reflexivity.Within that tradition, we have 
drawn upon a recent development, namely, Foucault 0 s 
discourse analysis (cf Ch.4; Dreyfus and Rabinow,1982; 
Poster,1984g Smart, 1982). Though Foucault 0 s method has 
primarily been directed at the analysis of historical 
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material (ideas, docume~ts, institutional and would-be 
institutional practices, etc), I concu~ with Henriques et 
al 9 s(1984) view that this approach is well-suited to the 
study of social behaviour. This method, directly sensitive 
to the multiplicity of moments that go up to make the 
historical ev.ent or conjucture ( Lemert and Gillan ,1982). 
allows us to tap the multiplicity that constitutes the 
construction. performance. and outcomes of an explanation. 
Foucault 9 s historical method involves settling on a 
point in the past at which events appear to us to be 
thoroughly alien. or irrational (eg the elaborate, 
horrific execution of the regicide~ Damiens). He then 
traces the processes whereby what had once been 
commansensical has been transmuted into something 
incomprahensibla. Tha point of this is that it teases 
apart the means by which the self-evident rationality of 
our current perspectivas 
irrational or barabaric). 
(which condemn the past as 
has itself been historically 
constituted. We do something similar in our analysis of 
explanatory types: we embed them in their practical and 
discursive matrices - in doing this we can map out the 
sources of their 9 commonsensibleness 9 , their relation to 
practices. and their power. 
Of course we do more than this~ we also look at the 
means by which explanations. .r;lS parts of 
discourse/prac'tices. have their own formulative and 
formative ram'ifications. In this, we aim to unpack the 
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ways in which expl.anations affect both others and 
oursel.ves. An expl.anation thus represents a moment of 
expressive and instrumental. activity. that exerts power 
(in Foucaul.t 0 s microsocial. sense) which (re-)shapes the 
expl.a.iner. the expl.ained and the audience of that 
expl.anation. That power is enhanced where the expl.anation. 
or the ex~l.ainer. embodies rel.ativel.y more truth or 
rationa1ity. An impl.ication of this is that we coul.d be 
pl. aced within project of anal.yzing 
expl.anations in the context of a weak functional.ism. 
However. our view of the social. fiel.d sees the Western 
worl.d as shot through with contradiction. expressed in the 
antagonism between cl.asses. races. sexes. ages. etc. The 
social cogency that we perceive is one that has to be 
constantl.y re-asserted and re-instated in the midst of 
confl.ict. 
mediated 
This tug and pull of social l.ife is partl.y 
explanations that aspire to truth and 
rationality. 
By limiting myself to men°s and poJ..icemen°s explanation 
of rape. I can study these relations in cl.ose detail. 
That is. I can better iJ..lustrate the configuration or 
packaging of rape explanations. th.e 19ractices they reflect 
and 19roject and the power relations they mediate. The 
specific study praticularl.y of policemen°s explanation of 
rape has a pqlemical and practical goal. too: the analysis 
of the variety of power relations that infl.uence the 
construction :and deployment of these explanations is also 
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a means to undermining those power relations. showing how 
explanations serve to mediate them. In other words. 
explanations implicate a point of intervention in the 
social world; to contradict an explanation is to challenge 
its sources b~ disrupting the oppressive loops of 
power-role-explanation. As regards the stud~ of rape. I do 
not agree with some feminists who see this as the 
exclusive domain of female researchers. Men can pl~ a 
part too. especial!~ in uncovering the w~ that rape 
serves men and also oppresses them (though this is b~ no 
stretch of the imagination comparable to what women 
endure). denies them their potentialities and the control 
over other spheres of their lives. As such. the stud~ of 
explanation of rape is not onl~ about the 
application of the various anal~tic tools outlined in 
Chapters 1 to u and below. it is also an attempt to 
explicate the means b~ whie~ explanations in their various 
aspects come to serve as blockages (o~ reinforcers 
thereof) to critical reflection on a number of phenomena. 
including rape. masculine and feminine roles. statuses. 
sexualit~. class and race relations. and the status of the 
self in groups. roles and institutions. It is in this 
sense that this thesis falls into the mainstream of 
critical theory. 
2. What Happened to the DeRendent and Independent 
Variables? 
attribution model seemed to take off when 
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operationa1ized by McArthur(1972) five years after it was 
origina11Y proposed (Ke11ey,1967). Part of the attraction 
of McArthur 9 s operationa1ization was its evident 
convenience. its more or 1ess simp1e method of question 
and answer in which information was provided, a question 
asked and an answer recorded. Much of the research that 
fo11owed stuck to this methodo1ogy. Variations on this 
theme were often directed at the type and range of 
information provided (ANOVA parameter information. 
perceptua1 information. further information about the 
target of the explanation. the persona1 re1evance of the 
information). More recent1y. methods have evolved which 
attempt to go beyond the rigidification resu1ting from 
the experimenter 0 s monopo1y of info~mation (eg Wimer and 
Ke11ey,l982; Schmidt,l972; La11jee. Lamb, Furnham and 
Jaspars,l984o Wong and Weiner,l981). 
Other techniques have been geared to uncovering those 
factors invo1ved in a1tering the subjects 0 re1ation to a 
given informationa1 arrav. This wou1d often invo1ve 
p1ac~ng subjects in particu1ar types of ro1e - and this 
is something that was rare1y explicit1y recognized in 
the experiment itse1f. These ro1es varied in type from 
the very genera1 ones such as that of 
intent on establishing a 0 Just Wor1d 9 , to those re1ating 
to the membership Of groups both artificia1ly and 
organicallY produced. An additiona1 socia1 factor has been 
that of interaction (or the threat of it). 
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All these ar;>proaches have effectively placed the 
exr;>lanation in the r;>osition of the der;>endent variable that 
is sup.r;>osed to be affected by changes in the inder;>endent 
variables. namely information. role. grour;> membershir;>. 
interaction and so forth. Now. this assumes a linear 
causality in which the array of inder;>endent variables 
shar;>e the ex&lanation that is eventually produced (or more 
often than not. chosen). The most sor;>histicated version 
of this type off procedure. that is. those experiments 
which have harnessed the gra&test number of inder;>endent 
variables. have r;>robably been those conducted by Hewstone 
and his colleagues (See Ch.3) in which grour;> membership. 
socially relevant information and interaction were all 
included. One of the r;>roblems with this is that the 
exr;>erimental setting is never fully analyzed. To what 
degree does it differ from the natural settings in which 
these groups operate? How is that setting affected by the 
history of the grour;>s both in reiation to each other and 
to internal nole differentiations? Hollway (1982, 198U) 
provided another sophisticated account of the way that 
antecedent factors effect explanations and accounts. Her 
analysis dealt with the ways that such exr;>lanations. 
mediated and negotiated by highly articulate and 
theoretically adept individuals, effected gender identity. 
However. unlike Hewstone, etc, she does not place 
explanations at: the end of a causal chain. but in the 
middle. That is, :,she re-works that chain into a complex 
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web. Wher~as for Hewstone, what is 'measured' is the 
explanation (and how it mirrors or resists positive social 
identity). we would suggest that there is in fact a 
circularity operating beyond the reach of ordinary 
e:t:t&erimental methods. In this, explanations recursively 
work back to shape and frame those 9 antec<edents 9 • There is 
a dynamic loop in which it is difficult to say which came 
first. the 9 antecedent 9 • the explanation. or the 
behaviour. Phrasing this differently: if we assume that 
the explanation is more or less predetermined, how has it 
reconstructed those 'antecedents' (or more accurately, 
correlates) in order to 9 ground 9 itself'? These 
circularities, however. vary in the degree to which they 
are locked. that is. the degree to which an explanation 
wholly determines the use of 'antecedents'. or 
9 antecedents 9 wholly determine the generation of an 
explanation (this is. of course. a false separation of 
explanation and antecedents). There are cases in which the 
explanations are so set. that it would seem that they 
somehow condition the way that information is used. This. 
it will be suggested, is what seems to sometimes happen 
with policemen°s explanation of rape. Of course. the 
reasons why that explanation has become set are to be 
found in 9 antecedent 9 factors such as the police 
role. The advantage of ths conceptualization is that by 
~l$cing the ex&l~ation in this position of 9 independence 9 
we can study its:(recursive) practical role. 
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Thus. for us. the notion oW independent variable is not 
very useful. Indeed. it is downright ideolo~ical in this 
context as it obstructs critical reflection on the ways 
that these variables interact. To sustain the distinction 
between dependent and inde&endent variables it is 
necessary to assert the primacy of the subject insofar as 
it is on and through the subject that the independent 
factors work. Yet according; to this argument. these 
factors not only &artially constitute the subject (through 
discourse/practices) they are also constituted by the 
subject. in part through the medium of explanations. An 
alternative way of' viewing these interactive processes. is 
in terms of' a package. The explanation is one element in 
the whole which includes a variety of other factors such 
as those mentioned above; no a priori causal status is 
attached to any of' them. The packa~e itself' has then to be 
considered in a wider context. in terms of its functions 
for broader so~ial .processes and traditions. 
To abstract and dissect this packa~e. we can focus on the 
explanation as a &oint of' entry and trace it backward and 
forward till the traces meet in a circularity. In doing 
this. we must be awere that these 19ackages are 
diachronically constituted and open to chanBe. th~y are 
no~ automatically self-sustainin~. Nevertheless. this is 
how I will treat th®m in order to illuotrate the 
complexity of factors involved in the construction and 
operation of an explanation. Thus the atomism of 
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dependence-independence gives way to the holism of a 
dynamically constituted package. We conceive of this 
package as an ideal type that sets out the constellation 
of factors. forms and functions for a given configuration 
of explanation, context and role. Before going on to 
consider how we will apply this to the explanation of 
rape. I will first detail what precisely is meant by ideal 
type and outline its advantages and pitfalls. 
3. The Ideal Type. 
In this section I describe Weber 0 s(1949) formulation of 
the ideal type, discuss some of its inherent problems, and 
outline how it will be applied in the study of rape 
explanations. 
Weber does not hold with the project of natural 
Such a scientific law-building in the social sciences. 
presuppositionless procedure would not allow us to 
discover what is meaningful in the social world. The 
causes of social events 
&s~chological phenomena) 
(and here we include social 
are too many for such & 
simple mode of investigation to be of any use. For Weber. 
scientific truth is what ~~ valid to those who seek truth. 
This of course has been echoed in the Kuhn~an uproar of 
the 60s and 70s. Weber 0 s alternative mode of analysis 
centres around the construction and deployment of an 
ideal type. As will become apparent. 
hypothesis nor a description: 
this is neither an 
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99 An ideal type is formed by a one-sidesd 
accentuation of one or more &oints of view and by 
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete 
more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified analytic construct ... In 
its conceptual purity this mental 
construct ... cannot be found empirically anywhere 
in reality .• vv 
(Weber,1949.p90) 
99 The goal of the ideal typical is always to make 
explicit not the class or average character but 
rather the unique individual character of 
individual phenomena.~ 
(Weber,1949.p101) 
~Only through ideal typical construction do the 
viewpoints with which we are concerned in 
individual cases become explicit. Their peculiar 
character is brou~ht about by the confrontation 
of empirical reality with the ideal type.~ 
(Wabero1949.&110) 
points out that Weber 9 s discussion of the 
ideal ty~e is at best vague. and he attem&~s to unpack 
Weber 9 s concept. At the core of it is still the notion of 
a one-sided em&hasis that is neither description nor 
hY&othesis nor average; it does not describe a concrete 
course of action. but an °objective1y possible one 0 • It 
contains. with the logical requirements of the relevant 
frame of reference. all the necessary properties for a 
complex act or complex of action. For Weber. Rogers notes, 
the ideal ty&e is rational in structure affectively 
determined elements of behaviour are treated as 
deviations. However. this entails &roblems, insofar as the 
relevant frame of reference might require behaviour which 
is 0 irrationa1 9 when considered from an alternative frame 
of reference. That is, the process of accentuation renders 
rational what might otherwise be jud~ed irrational. 
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' Another problem is the ideal type 9 s capacity to become 
I 
normative and static. re-conceiving what are essentially 
dynamic and ch;angeable phenomena in fixed terms. This 
problem is I qne that we have fully acknowledged in our 
study of id~al typed rape explanations. Indeed. only 
recently polide forces on both sides of the Atlantic have 
I 
become more s~nsitive to the needs of re&e victims and 
have made ' ,moves to accommodate these (Guardian 
Parkin(1982) :also &oints to a number of difficulties with 
the concept of the ideal type. Weber 9 s interest in 
analysing the individual case by contrasting it with the 
ideal type might not so much access the individual case 9 s 
I 
9 eccentricit~ 0 as the wsloppiness of the original 
construct 09 ( p~O). Moreover. the moral loading of ideal 
types serves .to relativize them: how are we to decide 
between the~? Which are applicable and which are not? 
Further, one~ we have decided to apply an ideal type. its 
value as d~rived from its comparison against data is 
meaningless.: as what counts as relevant data is determined 
by the ideal, type itself. Finally. the ideal type seems to 
contradict Weber 0 s main thrust. the getting of 
understandin:g ( Verstehen). by directing attention away 
from individual actions and their perception. 
I 
We have mentioned at various points that our overall 
approach 4raws on Weber 0 s concept of the ideal type. But 
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unlike Weber, we are not directly interested in Verstehen, 
but rather in the role. As regards Parkin 9 s point that 
the ideal type distorts data, we can counter with the 
observation that this is the case for all methode. In our 
case, by deploying the notion of an ideal type, we 
acknowledge the tentativeness of our construction. In this 
sense, through outrightly limiting t~~ scope of its truth, 
an ideal type becomes more reflexive. In terms of what is 
accentuated or stressed in the construction of an ideal 
our previous discussion of critical theory and 
feminism indicates that we will be particularly probing 
about the ways that ideal typical rape explanations are 
related to ideology and gender power relations. Certainly, 
from the outset we place ourselves in a given set of 
discourses regarding on the one hand the function of 
explanations. 
explanations 
and on the other, 
have been studied 
the ways in which 
in the past: in 
consequence. we admit to the partiality of our study. 
Essentially, our ideal type will accentuate those factors 
that can be accessed by Foucauldian, feminist and critical 
theories of the social field. It must consist of a package 
that incorporates 
sociological and 
psychological. 
historical 
discursive/practical, 
analytic elements 
interconnecting in a network whose point of entry is the 
ordinary explanation (of rape). The ideal type that 
emerges might not ever occur in a pure state - after all 
there are differences between individual policemen, 
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locales, public moods, and so forth. In fact, as some of 
the instances described below ~l~ show, our ideal type 
does seem to appear, aometimes in grotesguely 
caricatured form (eg The 1982 BBC 
documentary on the Police treatment of an alleged rape 
victim}. 
In addition to the latent reflexivity entailed by the 
ideal type, it also accommodates the holistic view of 
explanation that we are aiming for. It allows us to take 
an explanation as a case study and explore its various 
facets in such a way as to place the social psychological 
in a considerably wider context, to diffuse the primacy 
that is accorded it within social psychology. This is done 
by showing how these more global factors, rather than 
being simple adjuncts to the social psychological ones, 
also contribute to their constitution. Further, we 
effectively reverse the normal analytic procedure: we take 
the explanation as the starting point and trace out its 
multiple facetso this is in contrast to treating the 
explanation as the end point, as the dependent variable. 
4. Connections in Chapters 1, 2, 3. and 4. 
In this section I hope to bring out the connections 
betw~~n t~e criti~ues presented in the preceding four 
chapters. In particular. my intention is to show how the 
various orthodox concepts such as schema, 
internal/external attributions, group a~d role, theory 
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perseverance, consensus information, the fundamental. 
attribution error. ideol.ogy can be considered e~ements in 
a more gl.obal. anal.ysis when appropriatel.y l.inked to 
discourse/practice. 
In Chapter 1 we considered the ways that expl.anations 
were functional.l.y and cognitivel.y depl.oyed. In doing this 
we suggested tha~ exp~anations were not onl.y functional 
for individual.s, but also for systems. in particular, 
discourse/practices. Similarly, we rendered problematic 
the automaticity with which events could be absorbed by 
schemas. arguing that a purely cognitive approach could 
not explain this evident ease. Chapter 2 addressed more 
fl.agrantly cognitive analyses of attribution, criticizing 
their negl.ect of social factors. including the possible 
bases of cognitive 9 biases 9 in infrastructura~ processes. 
and the normative demands pl.aced on individuals to 
9 misuse 9 information. It was further suggested that 
9 cognitive biases 9 coul.d be re-thought as rul.es, specified 
in the configuration of role, information and 
circumstances. of the combination and difference between 
the relevant discourse/practices. Ch&&ter 3 considered the 
·notion of role in more detail. complexly relating it to 
and individual., socisJto . expressive and 
instrumental functions. The main point was t~at the role 
could be conceived as a complex embodiment of 
discourse/practices that serve to shape the individual who 
enters into it. In other words, the rol.e is the node at 
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which a number of discourse/practices intersect and it 
incorporates both behaviour- and identity-shaping rules. 
expressive and material functions and official and 
unofficial facets. Chapter 4 took up the issues of 
ideology and rationality as they relate to explanations. 
The overall conclusion was that the ascription of the term 
in addition to rhetorical and political 
functions. accesses particular modes of thought 
that are especially adept at barring critical reflection, 
and which serve to sustain or promote domination. As we 
pointed out. this process of blocking is in part a 
property of discourse (ideas. theories. etc) themselves. 
but also a property of the way they are packaged through 
groups. roles. institutions and so forth. which impart to 
those theories the sheen of absolute truth. 
It should be clear from the above summary that vrolev is 
a pivotal concept in our analysis, one that is complexly 
defined. multifaceted. and invested with power. We use 
vrolev because it seems to us to be particularly sensitive 
to the ways in which the social positioning of en actor 
can both render an event meaningful (or worthy of 
explanation)~ moreover by straddling the 
individual and the social, allows us to see how that 
meaning or explanation is incorporated into wider social 
structures and processes. 
undermining them. 
recursively supporting or 
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In relating to explanations. there are various 
levels of analvsis that need to be taken into ac~ount. 
Firstly. it is necessary to consider the interaction 
between the content and function of an explanation with 
the subject. The subjective feelings. motives. 
cognitions. etc that are demarcated and inscribed by the 
role must be shown to reflect in the explanations it 
However. roles can be coloured by biographical voices. 
tones: I will not be dealing with these subtleties. 
Rather. I will concentrate on the grosser. functionally 
oriented aspects of role: this is why. as mentioned above, 
I limit myself to the construction of an ideal type. 
Secondly. it is important to know the 
discourse/practices (or schemas &nd behaviours) 
range of 
that are 
&vailable to a specified role. To the extent that we 
e~Bider roles to be shorthand for the rules within which 
the role-holder must operate. then those rules will 
exclude some behaviours/thoughts and include others. For 
example. Hain(1979) suggests that the police role is 
geared towards achieving successful prosecution per se. 
Schem&s th&t are directed towards finding the truth (the 
job of the courts) are not paramount. indeed are relevant 
only insofar as they lead to successful prosecutions. 
Returning to Henriques et (198U) point that 
discourses have rules of combination and difference. roles 
are the loci of those rules. the point at which we find 
the play of inclusion and exclusion of schemas. etc. But 
that is not all: we must also be aware that specific or 
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situstiona1 ro1es are not iso1ated discursive nodes - they 
are in constant interaction with other discourse/practices 
which occasiona11y make inroads into them. or e1se have 
drained into them in the past and now constitute a more 
or 1ess secret underbe11y. Thus the po1iceman ro1e is in 
many respects the epitome of the patriarcha1 mascu1ine 
role {cf Ch.8). 
Once we estab1ish the types of schema that accompany a 
role. we need to go on to ana1yze the way that these 
sc~emas interact with 0 cognitive &rocesses 0 • themselves 
part1y determined by the specifications of the role. The 
cognitive &rocesses we have choOGm to consider are the 
neg1ect of consensus information; theory &araeverance. and 
the 0 fundamental 0 attribution error. These occur in both 
general and specific forms in that they might be derived 
from general-role constituting processes {ea: to be a 
proper person one must tend towards the fundamental 
attribution error) or from more specific role requirements 
{the police role is intent on identifying cu1prits 
and not detailing the influence of social history on 
biography). A finer grain of ana1ysis would show how a 
particular role cou1d app1y these 0 cognitive processes' 
selectively. In many cases these 0 cognitive processes' 
would be involved in ideological blocking. By attaching 
them to roles. we recognize both their historical 
specificity and their mediation of ideology. Consequently 
we open up the possibility of criticizing and 
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counteracting their action in a. holistic, 
non-technological way. 
Our analysis of role must also move onto the 
institutional plane. For example, the police force is 
still a predominantly male institution. This has allowed 
particular sub(terranean)-roles to manifest themselves as 
the underbelly of the formal police role. An example of 
t'·lhis is the social ident~ty of t.he police role that is 
mediated through group behaviour. Ths .status and power 
effects. the need for positive social identity. the way 
that these are in turn influenced bv the content of the 
formal role. must all be addressed. Further, this 
underbellY me.y itself be derived from other roles: in 
the example of the policeman role. the role of 9 real man 9 
is particularly relevant. as many aspects of the latter -
pragmatism. rationality, objectivity. toughness. etc, have 
long been absorbed as aspects of the former. In our 
account. very often it will become difficult to 
differentiate role from discourse or schema.. This is 
because. in this particular case. the policeman role 
often asserts its rationality by distinguishinc itself 
discursively from the irrationality that is supposedly 
embodied in the alleged rape victim or archetypal 
(beast-fiend) rapist. That is. the role-parameter of 9 male 
ra.tiona.lity 0 is expressed through the use of 
discourse/practices (schemas. explanations. etc) that 
propound the irrationality of the other. 
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A necessary adjunct to this is en. albeit brief, 
consideration of the way that the relations between men 
women. and the recursive construction of these 
relQt!ons through the media. sexuality. ~~ily. work and 
so forth have constituted these roles. This will be part 
of the project whereby we effectively re-assemble the 
roles of 9 man 9 and 9 policeman 9 in order to ascertain the 
range of sources from which they draw their power and 
credibility. 
Finally. we will consider the effect of explanations on 
roles - this will include both the role in which the 
explainer is situated and the roles into which object and 
audience are deposited by virtue of that explanation. 
Inevitably we assess the ideological standing of the 
given explanation. that is. its ability to project an 
image of role integrity. occlude the role 9 s internal 
contradictions and promote its capacity to dominate. This 
requires that weplace ourselves. critically. within our 
own particular political discourse. From this vantage 
point. we recount the ideological circularity of role. 
practice. process. power and explanation. 
5. Organization of Chapter 6. 7. and 8. 
Chapter 6 sets up the analytic background to Chapter 7. 
This will entail an exposition (from a. largely feminist 
perspective) of the current positioning of men and women 
at both material and representational levels. It will also 
involve an analysis of sex-ro~O-stereotypin~ and its 
partial basis in the relative positions ··,of men and 
women. As a necessary corollary. there is an account of 
the role of power/truth of these stereotypes and the way 
that it is imparted throu~h the media. social interaction 
and various disciplines such as sexology. All in all wer 
do not. in this chapter. progress much beyond feminist 
generalities. 
Chapter 7 is concerned with the explanation of rape. This 
is tackled by setting up three ideal types of explanation 
and exploring how they relate to feminism. rape 
mythological. professional (clinical. le~al) iscourses and 
men°s talk (interviews). The most important aspect of the 
investigation is the exploration of the relation between 
these to practice and power. That is. our ideal types 
attempt to encompass the the way that the form and content 
of rape explanations are related to their functions at 
both personal and social levels. In keeping with our 
general approach. these connections are traced via role 
( 9 traditional 9 and 9 anti-sexist 9 man in the most ~eneral 
sense). It is at this point that we proceed beyond a 
s!mple feminist analysiso that is. we explore a more 
extensive portion of the range of men°s explanations of 
rape. 
These types are discussed in the context of the more 
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concretely demarcated role of policeman in Chapter 8. The 
multiple delimitina: factors ( 0 cop cu1 ture 0 • law. 
organization) of the police role are shown to have 
different. sometimes contradictory. effects on the 
explanations made by policemen and their use of our ideal 
types. A number of ex~lanations and comments made by 
police officers are examined in the light of the tension 
that such influences set u~. FinallY. po1icemen°s rape 
explanations are considered from the perspective of their 
cognitive heuristica1 composition. 
In my concluding chapter. I will reflect on the 
limitations of our ap~roach in more detail. Also I will be 
explicating the practical im~lications of my work, 
commenting particularly on the moves within the police to 
reform their traditional means of dealing with rape. 
Fina11Yo I' will be ~ointina: to various alternative 
research strategies which were mentioned but not developed 
in the text. and sua:a:estina: some avenues for future 
research. 
~GE~6 
PART II 
CHAPTER SIX 
WOMEN AND MEN 
Introduction 
This cha~ter has the central aim of setting u~ the 
background fo~ Chapter 7. There. we argue that certain 
tv~es of ra~e ex~lanations trace ra~e back to 9 normal 9 
gender relations, 
continuitv. Here. 
while others attem~t to deny such 
we describe- theaociological relation 
between men and women as it is ~erceived from both 
feminist and traditional ~ers~ectives. Of course the two 
cannot be cleanly separated insofar as the traditional 
view is a~prehended from a feminist stand~oint. ie 
feminism addresses both gender relations and their 
re~resentation. We do not make anv strong claims about who 
holds either traditional or feminist feminist views 
(certainly. as we shall see in Ch.7, 
ideas circulate amongst some men. 
feminist-sym~athetic 
in both critical and 
ideological forma). Sim~lY. we ma~ out the res~ective 
constitution of these stances: as such. we do not, at this 
stage. ~rogress beyond feminist generalities. 
The first section of this chapter will briefly consider 
the sociolo~ical literature on the positioning of men and 
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women. This will then be linked up with a more detailed 
social psychological analysis of gender or sex-role 
and the mechanisms by which they are stereotypes 
reproduced. This will naturally include an account of the 
components that go to make up the stereotype, particularly 
those that are instrumental in the explanation of rape. 
Finally, the stereotypical portrayal of sexuality, as it 
is recursively produced in the course of social life, will 
be considered. 
1. The Socio1oeyical Relation of the Sexee. 
In this section I will be briefly review the literature 
on the sociological relation of the sexes. Limitations of 
space mean that I will not attempt an extensive overview. 
Rather I will concentrate on those accounts that derive 
from feminist and socialist positions. This stems from 
the conviction that these approaches are more generative, 
that is to say, potentiallY emancipatory, as well as 
analytically superior. 
In attempting to come to grips with the relative position 
of men and women in society, much feminist socialist 
theory has arrived at a dualistic conception of the social 
role of women. This is distinct from the radical feminist 
wing of research which conceives of women's social 
position as a function of the operation of patriarchy (eg 
Firestone,1.972). As Barratt(1.980) has pointed out, the 
latter theories of patriarchy give ~not only analytic 
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independence to male domination, but analytic primacy'' 
(p11). Barratt goes on to deal with the various problems 
such a formulation poses. Most important is the fact that 
it is reductionist - patriarchy takes on a universal, 
transhistorical character so that analysis cannot 
distinguish between differences and changes across time 
and societies. At the opposite analytic pole, coming out 
of Engel's original statement(l968), are those approaches 
which attempt to account for women's differential 
status, and also their sexuality and identity, in terms of 
their economic position, their reliance on (and more 
recently their increased independence of) the male's wage. 
However, this analysis is equally reductionist in that 
women's oppression is conceived as primarily servicing the 
interests of capitalism and its reproduction. Barratt 
remarks that this type of analysis is particularly 
susceptible to the pitfalls functionalism: there is much 
historical evidence to suggest that capitalism reproduces 
itself in ways other than through the nuclear family which 
is supposed to mediate the oppression of women (eg 
Donze lot, 1979) . 
Barratt suggests that it is not fruitful to: 
~try and resolve questions such as the 
independence or otherwise of women's oppression 
from the capitalist mode of production, or the 
degree to which women's oppression is to be seen 
as ideological, (to pose) them as strictly 
theoretical issues to which a correct formulation 
can provide an answer. It is, however, unlikely 
that such a formulation will materialize. since 
th~ questions themselves are historical rather 
tha~ exclusively theoret~c~l.~ 
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(Barratt,1980,p253) 
Such a project would require a recombination of 
patriarchy and capitalism, an undercutting of patriarchy 9 s 
theoretial autonomy, derived in the study of historical 
(including the present) cases in ~heir specificity and 
continuity. Our study of rape explanations is a 
contribution to that project, locating the oppression of 
women through the use of explanations in the configuration 
of patriarchal needs to assert control and masculinity, 
and the links that this has forged with the way that the 
police institution functions within contemporary society. 
The above discussion has been provided in order to better 
ground our observations as regards representations of men 
and women and the relation of these to rape explanations. 
In what follows I will roughly sketch the economic 
standing of women in order to show how 9 extradiscursive 9 
(ie material) factors might interact with t~e discursive 
as represented by gender stereotypes (and the agencies 
which support and disseminate them). In doing this, I make 
no strong deterministic claims as to which factors 
determine which. This can only be done, and then with 
extreme difficulty, for specific historical instances. 
Further. I make no attempt at a feminist-socialist 
analysis of the ori~ins of the sexual division of lebour 
(cf Leibowitz,1983). 
Economically, women have been confined to a relatively 
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narrow range of occupations. With the expansion o~ 
production a.nd trade in the boom era. a.~ter the second 
wor1d wa.r (Armstrong et a.1,1984~ Nicho1son,1984), more a.nd 
more women began to work outside the home. However, the 
jobs they did were somewhat 9 specia.1ized 9 • 
Oa.k1ey(1981) puts it: 
~More tha.n ha.1f the women emp1oved in Britain 
work in three service industries: the 
distributive trades (shops, ma.i1 order, 
warehouses) 17 percent~ 0 pro~essiona.1 a.nd 
scientific 9 (secretaries, typists, teachers and 
nurses) - 23 percent~ 0 misce11a.neous services 9 
(1a.undries, catering .... ) - 12 percent. Of the 
Quarter who work in ma.nu~acturing industries, a 
ha.1f are in four sectors: food and drink. 
c1othing a.nd footwear. texti1es a.nd e1ectrica1 
engineering. 90 
(Oa.k1ey.1981.p151) 
As 
Such corre1ations a.re not found in men°s emp1oyment 
patterns. This exc1usivity cannot be exp1ained by 
reference to 9 the needs of ca.pita.1ism 0 , for it c1ea.r1y 
ref1ects the domestic ro1e that ha.s traditiona11v been 
woma.n°s. It is necessary then to bring in the inf1uence o~ 
pa.triarcha1 structures tha.t is. those discourses and 
practises tha.t have shaped the respective qua1ities of men 
a.nd women, assigning woman to the position of 
0 home-ma.ker 9 • Fo11owing Ba.rra.tt(1980), we must stress the 
historica1 embeddedness of these discourses/practices and 
their re1a.tion to ~1uctuation within the 1a.bour markets. 
The prime exa.mp1e of a. pa.rtia.1 reversa.1 is that found in 
wa.r where women 9 s 1a.bour wa.s extended into heavy industry 
(a.s it sti11 is in the wa.r economy of the USSR - Barratt 
Brown. 1984) ·. However, after the first wor1d war 
1egis1atio~ wa.s passed supposedy to protect women 
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(femininity). but actually to ~rotect men's jobs. The 
overall effect was of course the reinstatement and 
retrenchment of traditional roles - the primac;y of the 
mother-housewife role was re-asserted. 
The above shows, albeit in an elementary fashion, the 
close and alwa;ys com~lex relation between ideology 
(roughl;y ~ackaged in the mother-housewife role) and the 
economic positioning of women. In looking at the 
construction and constitution of rape explanations, we 
will find that the mother-housewife role is still dee~l;y 
ingrained in our culture. even if it is under attack 
(though in recent times traditional gender roles seem 
to have re-&sserted themselves, Ehrenreich,1983). Our aim 
must be to set out the various roles (or images) into 
which women are cast, to analyze their constitutive and 
contradictory elements, and to com~rehend the way that 
these .roles serve as a foil for masculinity. In de 
Beauvoir 0 s (1972) terms, we must understand the 
9 otherness 0 of femininit;y. 
2. Images of Women and Men: Surface Stereotypes. 
In this section I will outline the range of stereotypes 
of men and women currently in circulation pa;ying 
particular attention to those aspects relevant to rape 
explanantions. A detailed consideration of the problems 
that have dogged the stud;y of gender stereot;y~es is beyond 
the scope' of this chapter (cf Deaux,198U,1985: 
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Smith,1985). Suffice it to say that gender stereotypes are 
neither unitary nor global. As Smith (1985) points out 
many masculine/feminine inventories are vvoperationally 
insensitive to the possibility of national and regional 
variation in sex stereotypes, as evidenced by the fact the 
criteria against which individual masculinity and 
femininity are assessed are fixed and invariant, being 
loosely based on the sex stereotypes of American students~ 
(p105). (A similar point is made by Huici,1984, when she 
criticiges Deaux 0 s 1976 
attribution -see below.) 
model of expectation-related 
Citing Williams et ol(1977), 
Smith nevertheless goes on to point out that there does 
seem to be ov ..• a great deal of general consensus about the 
characteristics and behaviours that are seen to be typical 
of men and women in Western societies ... vv (p105). In her 
review of the field, Deaux(1985) has remarked that 
vvinformation about role occupancy can influence the 
ascription of stereotypic traits, with people identified 
in positions of higher influence being accorded more 
instrumentality, irrespective of their sex9v ( p67). What 
this suggests is that the perception and use of gender 
stereotypes is mediated by the grain of social perception 
as it is effected by more specific information. And 
indeed, this is what we find in attribution to rape 
victims in which some women are judged 0 open territory 9 
{Clark and Lewis,1977) while others are intrinsicallY 
blameless (white, middle-class, very young). 
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The specificity of some stereotypes su~~ests that it 
might be more fruitfu1 to consider stereotypes in terms of 
a poo1 of traits that cohere in particu1ar configurations 
around a core or senera1 stereoty&ic formulation. This 
confi~uration wi11 accord with the amount and type of 
information that is available to the subject, and the 
subject 9 s own social &ositionin~ (which would t&kG into 
account Smith 9 s concern with localized stereotypes). Of 
course. information can be garnered through the process of 
interaction though whether this counters or is merely 
assimi1ated to the stereotype will depend on the 
positioning (&references) of the subject and the nature of 
the circumstances. In making this point. I ackowledge 
Smith 9 s criticism that much of the research into gender 
stereotypes has tended to dichotomize traits - conceiving 
the masculine and feminine com&onents as essentia11Y 
oppositional; it obscures the diversity that exists within 
genders. Moreover, often there is no consideration of the 
evaluative connotations of the various traits. However, 
the main argument is that a stereotype is evoked, in much 
the same way as a schema is called forth, by the 
combination of the role in which the subject is 
situated. the informational array that is presented to 
that subject (the overt characteristics of the target 
person or persons), and the circumstances. The role in 
which the subject is placed is partially correlated with 
the pool of traits that can be attached to the other. In 
other words, that pool is not fixed~ as an individual 
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moves from one role to another, there are changes in what 
traits can be attached to the target (and that includes 
the self). The pool is also changeable in that it can 
absorb innovations in ideas about people. Thus a trait 
such as 9 ho1ism 9 (the abilit~ to take an holistic view of 
situations} may enter into a pool (regarding the make-up 
of women) while others ma~ become obsolescent (eg the 
hubris or valour of men). These innovations, it is 
suggested, will be linked to discursive developments in 
the human sciences, which are practicallY diffused through 
the practices of experts (see below for examples of this 
regarding sexuality). Also stereotypes are not necessarily 
internally consistent, especially when they are general 
ones. Thus the stereotype of 9 woman 9 can be recast in 
terms of a dimension with the 9 mother 9 image at one end, 
and the 9 prostitute 9 representation at the other. In our 
analysis of these stereot~pes, we will follow Huici(1984) 
in stressing that we must be sensitive to their personal 
and social functions, and their role in the domination of 
stereotyped groups. In this respect it is interesting to 
note the way that much research has shied away from openly 
facing this question: for example in Deaux 9 s(1984) 
analysis of a decade 9 s research on gender, in her attempt 
to reform the study of gender so that it takes. into 
account interaction and change, ~hG accent is almost 
wholly on choice• there is no mention of the use of power 
in the construction of those choices. More importantl~. 
the pervasive reticence regarding political judgement has 
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b1inded much socia1 psycho1ogy to what gender stereotypes 
rea11y represent. To access this core an assessment of the 
power re1ations between men and women is necessary: this 
wou1d require a theory of history and socia1 structure. 
In contrast. socia1 psycho1ogy seems to have attempted 
to derive the 1atter from the study of stereotypes. As we 
sha11 see be1ow. this b1indness is compounded by a fai1ure 
to adequate1y re~ate stereotypes to behaviour. and, as 
with scripts and exp1anations. to consider their status as 
praxis or discourse/practice. 
So, what are the traits typica11y assigned to men and 
women? As Deaux'0 s (1985) review indicates. this question 
can be approached from a variety of ang1es - from asking 
peop1e, .to watching them behave. to the ana1ysis of the 
cu1tura1 representations of women and men. As we have 
a1ready brief1y noted, asking people has a variety of 
drawbacks. But there is a1so a conceptua1 and practical 
problem that concerns the abi1ity of people to directly 
access those traits. In Giddens 0 s(1979) terms. discursive 
consciousness (that consciousness which reflects and 
commentates on behaviour. society. the sexes. etc) is not 
complete. There is also a practical consciousness that 
directs day-to-day behaviour. including the apprehension 
and treatment of men and women, that is not necessarily 
direct1y open to formu1ation {this contrasts with Harre 0 s 
second order accounting). An example to clarify: many 
feminists would c1aim that women generally are regu1ar1y 
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treated as: objects, as something not Quite human (which 
would make sense given the predominant definition of human 
as male Hubbard and Lowe,1983; de Beauvoir,1972: 
Spender.19Bq>. In deriving stereot~pes from a population. 
it is unlikel~ that we will find respondents voicing such 
traits as 0 women are objects. s~b-human °. unless those 
respondents ~re women commenting on men°s views. That is, 
the practice.~ stereot~pes held b~ men could be accessed by 
Questionnair~s if it is women, the 0 targets 0 of the 
stereot~ping.: who are asked. To explore these facets with 
the traditional or even with 0 anti-sexist' men would 
probabl~ require some considerable soul-searching. The 
alternative to these is the examination of men's social 
behaviour and of those representations that encompass and 
elaborate sue~ stereotypes (though this will impoverish 
the variety of; ~~n°s views). 
In the follow~ng I will give a brief account of the t~~Gs 
and range of s~ereotypic traits ascribed to men and women. 
as they have be·.en derived from Questionnaire studies. 
The earl~ studies of Rosenkrantz et al(1968) and 
I 
Braverman et 'al(1972) found that positively valued 
masculine traits clustered around competence; for women 
their core trait'· was warmth-expressiveness. On the whole, 
masculine trait~ were considered more desirable. These 
sex-role stereot~pes. including both positive and 
negative compor;-ents. were incorporated into the 
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self-image. Williams et al(1977) found that for the 
United States. England and Ireland there was 
cross-national similarity in the ascri~tion of items from 
an adjective checklist to women and men. Again. the 
masculine stereoty~e was cons~icuously more in need of 
autonomy. exhibition. aggression and dominance while the 
feminine stereoty~e differed was characterized by greater 
deference. debasement. succourance and nurturance. 
Table 1. 
Summary of Smith 0 s(1985) Gender Stereotypes 
Masculine traits desirable for both sexes: 
Logical: Adventurous: Decisive$ Sense of humour; 
Independent; Self-confident; Objective; Willing to take a 
stand; Conventional. 
2. Masculine .traits desirable for men. neutral for 
women: Willing to take a riskg Achievement-oriented; 
Ambitious; 
Forward. 
Strong; 
3. Masculine traits 
Daring; Competetive; 
desirable for men. 
for women: Masculine; Dominant; Hides 
Assertve; Tough; Outgoing. 
Leadership; 
undesirable 
emotions; 
U. Feminine traits desirable for both sexes: 
Neat; Gentle; Well-groomed; Soft-spoken; Sensitive; 
Tender; Warm; Understanding; Appreciative: Affectionate; 
Tactful: Helpful; Creative; Conscientious; Cooperative; 
Dignified: Egalitarian. 
5. Feminine traits desirable for women. neutral for 
~ Expressive; Home-oriented. 
6. Feminine Traits - desirable for women, undesirable 
for men: Feminine; Emotional; Passive; Shyg Dependent. 
7. Non-stereotyped traits desirable for both sex~s: 
Reliable; Intelligent; Contented; Friendly; Healthy; 
Competent: Self-sufficient; Interesting: Cheerful; 
Dependable; Enthusiastica Adaptablea Sincere; Practical; 
Likeable: Wordly; Smilingg Attractive; Self-reliant: Kind. 
8. Non-stereotyped traits desirable for women. 
undesirable for men: Flatterable. 
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Smith(1985) provides us with perhaps the most 
comprehensive study of sex-stereotype constitution to date 
which avoids many of the methodological deficiencies of 
its predecessors. To a sample of students and normals, 
men and women, he sent a list of 120 personality 
descriptive adjectives which the respondents were asked to 
evaluate in terms of desirability and 
femininity/masculinity. Items were then cross-tabulated 
for desirability and sex-stereotypicalness. The results 
that are presented in Table 1 and are a modified version 
of the tables presented in Smith(1985,p108-9). As he 
notes, hie study is lacking insofar it is 00 baaed entirely 
on disposition or character ..• ~(p107-110). Behaviours, 
interests and emotions will also have to be included 
eventually. However, he provides us with o basis from 
which to consider the deeper and broader re2ations of men 
and women. 
3. Images of Women and Men: Embedded Stereotypes. 
a. Women as Objects. The above listing presents the 
components of the surface stereotypes. In addition to the 
absences that Smith notes, we can point to the fact that 
sexuality is more or less by-passed in this study (see 
below). Nevertheless, given the scope of this analysis, 
the various factors can be clustered around the 
personality factors of 00 communali ty, expressivity, 
nurturance and affiliation~ for femininity, and ~agency, 
instrumentality, dominance and control 00 for masculinity 
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(Smith.1985.p137). However. as we remarked above. these 
factors contain other elements that are clearly present in 
interpersonal conduct and ~eneral social behaviour. but 
not readily verbalized (at least by the holder). 
Instrumentality and control suggest that what is being 
controlled is an object there can be no (human) 
negotimtion in such a process. it is not interaction 
between agents. This is not brought out explicitly by the 
conc®~ts of control or self-assertion. etc. That is. the 
way that s\Jlch control is exercised on othe~l!!. eapecially 
those of lower status. and in particular women. belies 
women°s enforced role as the object of masculine agency. 
Various authors have commented at length on this. 
Oakley(1981) put it well: ~women are human beings. But a 
society organized around gender division does not yield a 
concept of normal or ideal personality applied equitably 
to both genders~ (p62). Oakley pinpoints the following 
four covert components of the feminine stereotype: 
passivity. instability. 
should be apparent that 
materiality and maternalism. It 
these components cannot be based 
on an approach that views stereotypes as simply attitudes 
or stereotyping as a cognitive bias. Rather. it grounds 
stereotypes in the personality of women as it is lived and 
into which they are socialized. As such Oakley is 
providing the kernel to the stereotypic traits we listed 
above. In the followin~ paragraphs I will briefly consider 
in more detail Oakley 0 a observations. 
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Passivity comes in many guises. Berger 9 s(1972) 
encapsulates the representation of this passivity in art 
when he states: 99 ••• men act and women appear" (p47). In 
art a 99m~n 9 s presence is dependent upon the promise of 
power which he embodies •.. (it) suggests what he is capable 
of doing ~Q ¥OU or for you 99 (p45-6). By contrQat, 99 ••• a 
woman's presence defines what can and cannot be done to 
her. Her presence is manifest in her gestures, voice, 
opinions, expressions, clothes, chosen surroundings, 
taste ... 99 (p46). "Women are depicted in quite a different 
way from men .•• because the 9 idea1 9 spectator is always 
assumed to pe male and the image of the woman is designed 
to flatter him" (p64). Thus this agency extends beyond the 
frame: it is men who actively look at paintings. This 
relationship of male agency and female passivity is 
expressed in innumerable media. As we might expect this 
relationship also pervades literature: Cu11er(1983) has 
reviewed the way that novels both tend to ignore women 
characters as subjects and address only a male reader. In 
pornography ,we have what is perhaps the apotheosis of this 
representational trend (Heath,1982: Dworkin,1981; 
Griffin,1981). A milder, that is to say less blatant and 
more insinuating, projection of female passivity (and 
availiability) comes throua:h advertising. Root(1984) 
quotes from a woman's description of her feelings about 
advertisements: 99 ••• 99 a man comes into a tunnel and looks 
me up and do~n. All the ads are like his gang - telling 
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him I am a eunt-thing, a leg-thing. a breast-thing and 
that I am wai tint:t for him99 ••• 99 (~;>56). This quote 
illustrates what a· simple analysis of sex-role 
stereotypes cannot easily access in the stereotype-holder 
a practical consciousness. Goffman(1976) likewise 
detects women 9 s relative passivity (object-ness) in the 
ritualization 
advertisements. 
of feminine subordination in gender 
Various devices he has identified as 
signifying women 9 s subordination are: recumbent postures; 
the elevation of the male partner in couples; and the 
bashful knee bend. However. it would be wrong to assume 
that all depictions are this way directed. In her 
introduction to Strang 9 s(1984) photographic collection of 
furnishings. architectural features. implements (from 
cocktail sticks to nutcrackers) whose design draws on the 
feminine form. Johnson comments that there is some 
ambiguity as to how to characterize some of these 
representations. In some cases they are outrightly 
demeaning; sometimes there is a hint that they may be 
carrying deeper or more favourable connotations. as for 
example when 99 she ... supports the scales of justice and 
holds the torch of liberty99 (p9). Counter-images are also 
present in certain cinematic genres such as the film noir 
thrillers 09which feature stunningly sensual stars who use 
their attractiveness to trap and r@morselessly manipulate 
luckless men 99 (Root.1984,p17) - who are sexually active 
and proud of it. 
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One point that is rarely developed, even by the above 
more enlightened studies, is the relation between 
passivity snd the notion that women are closer to nature, 
while men more a&propriately embody culture (Ortner.1976g 
also see Sanday,1981b, for a critigue of this position). 
Obviously, the concepts of 
complicated in the extreme; however. the aspect relevant 
to the present discussion is that concernin~ the passivity 
of nature its status as something on which culture 
works. which is shaped and moulded bY civilization. In the 
West, particularly with the rise of capitalism and the 
acceleration in the exploitation of resources, the 
ecological disregard for the earth reflects a reduction of 
nature to the status of object, something which cannot 
answer back (eg Gorz,1980). It is no wonder that feminism 
is beginning to forge links with ecological perspectives 
(eg Caldecott and Le1and.1983); in both cases there is an 
urgent need to resist a monopolistic a~ency and to 
rehabiliate a form of 
This, then, is the problem: 
passivity suited to mutuality. 
to assert the agency of women 
but not end up mimicking the grosser of 
masculinity. 
The above discussion of a~ency/passivity could not have 
been conducted solely on the basis of the ~ender 
stereotype studies we cited above. What was needed was 
a background discourse. namely feminism, through which to 
draw out the profounder implications of the stereotypical 
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images which these studies present. 
b. Instabilit¥ and Irrationality. The second element in 
Oakley 9 s account(1981) of the feminine personality is 
instability. According to prevailing ideology. this 
instability is something that is inherent in woman 9 s 
nature. Just as in the case of passivity. so instability 
is instanced in the churnings of the popular media. In 
novels (Heath.1982}; in the cinema we can note the 
recent spate of nasties (The Shining. Don 9 t Answer the 
Phone. Dressed to Kill. etc) portraying women as the 
targets of madmen and simultaneously reducing them to 
hysterical. incompetent fools. It is rare to find this 
sort of role meted out to male actors. 
Emotional instability manages to colour a whole range of 
feminine activities and behaviours: women 9 s supposed 
irrationality. their lack of objectivity. their 
predilection- for gossiping as opposed to 9 serious 9 talk, 
the feminine dwelling on emotions and the personal rather 
than on 9 important 9 abstract or practical matters. their 
reknowned practical incompetence (see below) and so forth. 
All these can b0 associated with the c~ntral factor of 
emotional instability. or more generally. irrationality. 
Here I will look at the relation of irrationality to 
women in more detail. Women 9 s irrationality is a special 
sort: ther~ is a ~tendency of women to specialize in 
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mental illness 99 (Oakley,1981,p77). After surveying the 
literature on sex differences in mental illness, Oakley 
sums up thus: 
~women 9 s energies in our kind of society a~~ear 
to be devoted to 9 doing good and feeling bad 9 • 
Masculine culture delegates them to the care not 
only of humanity 9 s lowest needs (the 
9 lavatorial 9 function of housework, the cleaning 
of small children, etc) but its 9 highest 
necessities 0 the intense, emotionally 
concerted cooperation and creativity necessary 
for human life and growth .•. it is the very 
sensitivity of women to other people 0 s needs 
that is likely to ~roduce the ap~earance and 
conseQuences of mental instability women°s 
instability stabilizes the world.~ 
(Oakley,1981,p81) 
Thus again we find the kernel at the core of the feminine 
stereoty~e - one which reflects the oppression of women 
in the way that the stereotype itself, o~erating at the 
level of ims~es and ideas, can only weakly do. However, we 
can elaborate on Oakley 0 s analysis to show how women °·s 
instability not only derives from their everyday 
activities, but is channelled and fixed through a number 
of discourses and disciplines (eg Foucault,1981; 
Heath,1982) such as ~sychoanalysis and sexology. Thus 
Foucault talks of the 0 hysterization° of women°s bodies by 
psychoanalysis - a sha~ing of their sexuality and of their 
reaction against the restrictive sexual mores of the 
Victorian era so that it came to be ex~ressed through 
hysteria. For men, hy~ochondria was provided. Heath(1982) 
goes on to show that su~~lanting these in modern times are 
the complaints of frigidity in women and impotence in 
men: these derive from sexology. We can, in accord with 
this approach, hypothesize that the condition of 
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'depressive psychoses' and 'psychoneuroses' in which women 
far outstrip men. are not 0 natura1° expressions. but 
mediated ones. shaped by a variety of discourse/practices. 
Indeed. we can suggest that this shaping is a means of 
underlining the stereotypic irrationality of 
women: women's typical depressions and breakdowns are the 
most readily accessible channels through which women can 
express their disaffection. (This is not to detract from 
the genuine pain tl'l'&t women and other mental patients 
experience - Sedgewick.1981). 
In contrast to this extreme pole. there are milder ·a~ 
more pervasive forms of feminine irrationality such as 
those instanced in the everyday activities of women - eg 
housework. McMi11an(1982) rightly points out that 
rationality is context bound (cf Ch.U) and goes on to 
highlight the rational in housewifery. However. also at 
stake is the form of rationality we are dealing with. As 
mentioned below. the type of masculine agency that has 
hitherto been credited with rationality is aimed at the 
production of what Griffin(1982) sees as a near 
pathological certainty ( 01 His Certainty" as she puts it). 
Whereas some feminists have attempted to broaden the 
rational to ecological and personal political spheres, 
McMillan seems to want to relocate it in housework. (This 
is not to deny that housework is rational.) 
Also important is the fact that rationality is not the 
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core criterion by which feminine and mascu1ine activities 
are judged. It is in a sense the g:1oss on status: it is a 
means to justifying: and excusing: the differentia1 status 
of mascu1ine and feminine activities. In other words, 
rationality ~s &n assert~on of truth, &nd through that an 
exercise of ~ower - it mirrors the o~eration of Foucau1t 9 s 
power/know1eds:e coup1et. When it is SQid that women are 
irrationa1, that they gossi~. that they are too emotiona1, 
what is actua11y being: said is that they have no right to 
~ower because they 1ack the means to access truth. And 
when they do make inroads into this truth/power, again and 
again they are re~u1sed (eg the status of an occu~ation 
that women begin to infi1trate p1ummets - Nicholson,1984). 
Of egua1 re1evance is the fact that whatever the 
rationa1ity or status that attaches to these feminine 
activites, many of them are sti11 chores - are boring, 
unrewarding: (exce~t extrinsica11y), and exhausting. To 
disclaim their rationa1ity is in effect to c1aim a right 
to something: more p1easurab1e, to encroach on men's 
freedoms. 
analytical. 
In sum, 
McMi11an misses the rhetorica1 in the 
women 9 s stereoty~ic irrationa1ity manifests 
itself in various ways~ Though it has some kernel of 
truth, it is a1so a fabrication, reflecting rationality's 
mediation o~ p9wer through its exc1usive claims to truth. 
The ~osi tiv:e feminine traits of warmth, succourance and so 
forth are the acceptable face of irrationality and 
PAGE 257 
emotional instability for. vitally. they make no claims 
on truth and power. One of the reasons that madness. 
exudes such negativity is becsuse it laughs in the face 
of rationality 0 s self-importance (Foucault.l.967). Some 
feminists ~ave adopted these very tactics. and in doing so 
have attempted to reclaim rationality from masculinity. 
In the following paragraphs I will show how the 
irrationality of women is specifically mediated by 
concrete social discourse/practices as embodied in the 
insitutions of science and the law. This is because I wish 
to avoid the tendency to reduce stereotypes to the 
level of ~ndividual expression. By relating them to 
institutionally fashioned practices. we can investigate 
how they · are deployed and to what effect. and explore 
their embeddedness in a complex. 
discourse/practices. 
concrete matrix of 
As a discourse/practice we find that· science works on 
various levels to maintain its facade of 
disinterest~d rationality: this is at the expense of 
women. At the· grossest level there is the scientific 
community 0 s general exclusipn of women through such 
devices as not providing adequate childcare services 
(Messing.l.9~3). Also there is the channelling; of 
schoolgirls 0• interests away from the 0 hard 9 sciences for 
middle class girls. and from academic ach·ievement per se 
for wo~kin~ class girls (Sharpe.l.976). Fee(l.983) has 
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pointed to the way that the liberal ideology of science 
sets UP a series of. dichotomies (eg 
man-as-rat~onal/nature; or objective/subjective) 
I 
reflecting :the former traits in its own constitution, even 
in the ordering of disciplines from the hardness of 
physics td the softness of the social sciences (we need 
not draw out the full connotations of 'hardness'). This 
decontextualized version of rati~nality is paralleled in 
the scienc~s' claims to neutrality. As Fee(1983) details, 
the type o~ questions posed, the sources of funding, the 
political and economic as well as the human and 
philosophic•l interests all serve to sully the much 
vaunted value-freedom of the sciences. Messing's 
(1983) examble of medical research on women which takes no 
I 
account.of women°s actual needs well illustrates this. The 
relation between science and society is supposed to be 
one-way - I the above comments suggest that it is not. 
Neverthelesf'l, science certainly strives to maintain its 
apparent independence and keep its distance. This can be 
seen in the! relation between the scientific expert and the 
public. As 1 Fee remarks 00 the voice of scientific authority 
is like the,male voice-over in a commercial, a disembodied 
I 
knowledge that c&nnot be questioned, whose author is 
inaccessible00 ( p19). Put another way: 
00 If a man can protect his position in an 
argument as the point of view of rationality and 
define the woman°s position as the emotional 
one, ~hen we know that she has already lost the 
struggle to be heard; he has already won. In 
termsiof the politics of science, this power 
relationship is reproduced on a social scale: 
the scientific experts are in the male role, 
I 
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while the vast majority of citizens is given 
the female role.~ 
(Fee,1983.P18) 
Orthodox scientificity is supposed to rationally generate 
certainty. As we have mentioned at various points. this 
can be seen as a largely masculine concern (though of 
course women are prone to it too. Also I should re-iterate 
that certainty is distinguished from historical or 
contextual objectivity.) This is built into the 
methodology of the sciences - for example. the application 
of impersonal. nomothetic. and decontextual procedures 
(Sampson,1978) insures that the disruption of the smooth 
production of certainty is minimized: subjects cannot 
answer back. Yet. as Henderson(1983) puts it: ~uncertainty 
is valuable because it keeps us awake and aware, whereas 
certainty and exactitude allows us to hard-programme our 
responses to the environment, become rigid, or fall asleep 
mentally99 (p207). and. tellingly in the current politic~ 
climate. she comments: 99 Cartesian science 9 s search for 
certainty. equilibrium. predictability and control is a 
good.definition of death~ (p206). 
However. we should not simplistically equate science with 
its patriarchal trappings: it has also been conditioned by 
its servicing relation to Capital and the West. Further, 
given its. albeit limited, self-critical procedures. it 
has also served to undermine traditional views of men and 
women. as well as furnishing the occasional analytic tool 
that can counteract the excesses of patriarchy and 
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capitalism. That is, science should not be reduced to its 
institutional and ideological forms: it is partially 
autonomous. 
If science represents the utmost embodiment of 
rationality, then not far behind is the law. Here too 
women are 9 excluded 9 at various levels. Recruitment of 
women into the law is lower than for such professions as 
medicine and journalism. Unsurprisingly, women are 
concentrated on the lower rungs of the profession. In 
there were "10 women circuit judges out of a total 
of 339 •.. A typical profile of all those High Court judges 
appointed between 1980 and 1982 is of a 55 year-old white 
male, educated at one of th~ top schooLa and Oxbridge, and 
an experienced barrister and QC 99 {Patullo,1983,p6). Once 
women have found tenancies they are usually 9 guided 9 into 
specialized areas such as family law which has low status 
within the profession. But also, discrimination infuses 
legal procedure: "the qualities of a good barrister tend 
to be associated with male arrogance, pomposity and 
9 erudition 9 ••• 99 {Patullo,1983,p7; also cf Toner,1982). 
Women are expected to model themselves on this archetype. 
Similarly, traditional rituals in court can render women 
invisible, or undermine their professionalism. 
On the other side of the fence, the law also denigrates 
' 
women defendants. Thus Iris Mills, one of the defendants 
in the 19~9 Anarchist 9 s trial remarks: " ... "The general 
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impression you get is that everyone involved thinks that 
women must be victims - you 9 re either led astray or you 9 re 
sick. If you 9 re not that. you must be 
evil. 99 ••• 99 { Patu11o.1983. P9). As Patu11o puts it. for the 
law. 99Men commit crimes for rational reasons. women 
because they are mentally imba1anced 99 (p9). This is all in 
addition to the fact that women 9 s crimes tend to reflect 
their social position {shoplifting. social security 
~r&ud. etc) which themselves carry low status and exude 
an ·air of pettiness and pathology. 
But even as victims women are seen as culpable. or else 
the crime is itself belittled (eg domestic violence - see 
Ch. 7). This: is especially the case in those instances in 
which the woman does not fit in with the classical image 
of feminine virtue. Under these circumstances, it is often 
the { 9 deviant 9 ) woman who is put on-trial. It is no great 
shock that the prosecution strategy in rape trials is 
based on establishing the victim(s) 9 s deviance from this 
norm. Even women as witnesses are open to the same sort of 
attack. Th~t this is an appropriate strategy simply 
reflects the fact that the law itself regularly practices 
this form of sexist denigration. This is encapsulated 
with sweeping certainty in Judge Sutc1iffe 9 s proclamation 
at the Old Bailey in 1976: ."It is well known that women in 
particular and small boys are liable to be untruthful and 
invent stbries 99 (Patu11o.1983.p18). Thus women are 
intrinsically unreliable and irrational (cf Ch.7). 
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We have seen how irrationality is associated with women 
in a number of ways, mediated through a number of 
channels. In outlining some of these associations, my 
inten~ion has been to show how, when ex&laining ra&e, 
these will play a major &art in undermining the 
--·reliability of the alleged :victim 0 s testimony. 
Moreover, this irrationality comes to pervade the women 9 s 
role in.the ra&e incident itself. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, this is expressed by rape myths in which the 
woman is represented as (irrationally) putting herself 
in potentially dangerous situations; or as (irrationally) 
leading the man on and then denying him his due. In the 
next section I will consider another partial measure of 
rationality women°s and men°s views of their own and 
each other 9 s competence, a .competence which is itself a 
partial measure of rationality. 
c. Judgements of Competence. The literature on the 
perception and judgement of men and women°s respective 
competencea is extensive and I do not intend to review it 
thoroughly. 
differential 
What I will try and show is that the 
competences assigned to men and women 
reflect, in part, the undercurrents of rationality, agency 
and certainty described in the preceding sections. As 
Huici(198l!) notes there are links between the 
justifications for women 9 s low status and economic 
excl.usion, and judgements of competence in which there is 
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an "attribution to women of a lack of traits associated 
w:l:th the competence dimensions (independence, 
competetiveness, ambition, logic) .•. " (p587). Instead, 
women are linked with needs "related to the warmth and 
expressiveness dimensions". Rather than equate men and 
women's stereot¥pic traits with judgements of competence, 
I wish to suggest that the derogatory attributions that we 
find are regularly made to (competent) women represents a 
broad form of intergroup (inter-gender though women 
self-derogate) differentiation that implicitl¥ involves 
the assertion of women's irrationality and objectness. 
Deaux and Emswiller(197U) found that men attributed to 
ability more for male success on both feminine and 
masculine-typed tasks, which suggested that men were 
popularly conceived as generally more skillful or 
competent than women. Deaux and Farris(1977) produced 
similar results for self-attribution, with men evaluating 
their own performance.more favourably and claiming greater 
ability for that performance. By comparison, women were 
more likely to resort to luck explanation even for 
successful performance on female-typed tasks (cf 
Battistich et al,1982). Deaux,White and Farris(1975) 
observed natural counterparts to these laboratory findings 
when they recorded that. at fair grounds, women preferred 
games of chance while men were inclined to games of skill. 
S:l:milar game preferences were replicated for games 
presented in laboratory settings. Moreover, this array of 
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results has been mirrored in non-student subjects in their 
OCCU!9ational roles (Reno,1981). These results were 
interpreted as indicating that women invoked luck more 
often than did men and that chance success was a more 
19otent experience for women than for men. Conversel~. 
Nicholls(1975) found that women attributed failure more to 
their own inabilit~ than do men. Feldman-Summers and 
Kiesler(197ll.) showed that the derogation of women's 
performance could be mediated b~ a re-evaluation of the 
task itself. Thus men 19erceived a female ph~sician as 
having an easier job than did her male colleagues. 
However, this was not the case for women observers who 
judged the female ph~sician's job as harder. Indeed, on 
this score, Rosenfeld and Stel9han(1978) have found that 
the more ego-involved women are in their assigned tasks, 
the more acclaim the~ seek. Moreover. where attributional 
modest~ in women does appear (ie denigration of own 
performance) this might be for self-presentational effect 
(Berget al.1981). Other factors will also influence the 
appearance of these attributions! 19henomena. such as the 
salience of group membership. or authoritarianism (Dovidio 
et al.1982).a~d~ the colour of the actor (Ys•ki~ et 
al.1982). Finall~, Lochel(1983) found that these 
sex-differences in attribution were present in four 
~ear-olds. In. fact. she goes on to liken this reliance on 
luck to learned helplessness (cf Ch.l). 
Certainl~ the above findings are mixed: sometimes women 
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self-derogate, sometimes they do not. As ever, we can 
point out that the ex!;)eriments are not necessarily 
commensurate, that is, there are a number of factors at 
work which are not uniformly dealt with across the various 
studies. This includes the specificity of the tasksi the 
sample; subject 
openings; 
motivation. 
the salience of self-!;>resentational 
the salience of individual achievement 
Despite this variability of variables, when 
placed in an historical and social context of the sort I 
have outlined in this cha!;>ter. the results can be broadly 
said to demonstrate that men tend to attribute to ability 
for their own successful performance. and women tend to 
attribute to luck for their own similar performances. 
I will now consider this. broad finding in the light of 
the way that various researchers have attempted to explain 
i.t. My first observation is that attri.bution to luck 
for euecess is equated. with self-derogation. In 
contrast we cou.l .. d invert this relation and see a-t-tribution 
to ability for success as a form of self-aggrandisement. 
The point being made here is that attribution to luck is 
negative onl~ where the norm is ability attribution. And 
ability attribution 
competetive societies 
is 
in 
particularly prevalent in 
which success is directly 
associated with the performer as pure individual, rather 
than with his/her context. training. and collective 
nature. Intrinsic to this set-up is the differential 
distribution of rewards. As such. though this research 
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appears to be accessing and debunking the operation of 
sexism. in fact it does so on1y by accepting patriarcha1 
terms of reference as to what constitutes appropriate 
performance.and eva1uation. A simi1ar criticism is made by 
Furby(1979) of the 1ocus of contro1 research which 
downgraded externa1 1ocus of contro1 attributions made by 
workers. Her point.was that the workers were not being 
unrea1istic; rather. they were honest1y ref1ecting on 
their own socia1 condition. This research bias of 
individua1ism (interna1 1ocus of contro1) is precise1y 
mirrored in the above gender-attribution research. 
Where women do seem to se1f-denigrate is in their abi1ity 
attributions :for fai1ed performance. However. whether this 
is qua1itative1y the -same as abi1ity attributions fo~ 
success is open to question, insofar as what women are 
attributing ~o themse1ves for fai1ure might be a 1ack of 
abi1ity. To say 9 1 am bad at this 9 is not equiva1ent to 
saying that 9 1 am good at this 9 in that the 1atter 
suggests the presence of a ski11. whereas the former can 
suggest the absence of it (as opposed to the possession 
of an incompetence). Taking this together with the trend 
for women to attribute to 1uck for success. we can 
propose that women see themse1ves and are seen by others 
as comprised of absences. (To re-emphasize this is derived 
from the broadest reading of the above mentioned results 
and is not seen as the so1e process present). Where men 
are competent. :or more accurately. adaptable. they have a 
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repetoire of ~kills at their disposal, including the skill 
to innovate. which they can apply to any task. whatever 
its gender-type. Women, on the other hand, recognize no 
such repertoire: what they have is a void 
that is continually in need of definition 
something 
(and this 
applies quintessentially to their sexuality. Heath,1982). 
As we pointed out above, women are constituted in the gaze 
of men (Berger.1972); or as Spender(1980) put it: men are 
-the namers; women Qr~ the named. Once more we have come 
round to the notion of women 9 s o·the<?ness. Also, we have 
glimpsed the way that while at the same time reflecting 
this, the attributions we have considered can also be seen 
as an attempt to constitute both men and women. to define 
them against each other. Thus we see the recursive 
functioning of these attributions as they practically work 
to formulate and thereby form women and men. 
d. Otherness and Evil. So far we have seen how women, 
over and above their stereotypical representation. play 
the object to the masculine subject, nature to culture, 
subjectivit¥ to objectivity and the 9 other 9 (deviant) to 
the norm. In all these instances, power is operative: the 
subject apprehends the object; culture subdues nature; 
subjectivity must be wiped off the face of objectivity: 
the deviant must be brought back into line. At core. these 
opposi tiona, express a relation of subordination and 
domination.: This need not be the case - various authors 
have attem~ted to break these dichotomies. The Frankfurt 
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School, Deleuze and Guattari, Hallway, have tried to 
I 
reconci~e the 1 subject and the object; Foucault. Firestone. 
Sampson, Fee have tried to inte~rate the subjective and 
t~e .ebjective~ art and science. Unfortunately. this is not 
I 
the place f'pr utopian meanderin~s •. ~Suffice it to say 
that part of the project of' undermining these relations 
must be t~ realize the true potential of' women~s 
otherness. 
Otherness: de Beauvoir describes it thus: 
I 
9 ~ ••• she is simply what man decrees; thus she is 
called· 9 the sex 9 by which is meant that she 
appears essentially to the male as a sexual 
being.~ .. She is defined and differentiated with 
reference to the man and not he with reference to 
her; ~he is incidental. the inessential as 
opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he 
is the Absolute she is the Other" 
(de Beauvoir,1972.p15-16) 
As de Bea~voir states. this otherness is fundamentallY 
concerned with the sexuality of' women (though of' course it 
is also r~lated to irrationality. incomr;>etence and 
abjectness). The facet of' women~s sexuality we will be 
dealing with here is particularlY relevant to rar;>e 
mythology. :of' the various ima~es of' feminine sexuality 
that are portrayed. the two which are most alien to men 
are those concerned with female reproduction and extreme 
female sexual prowess or capacity. While the former might 
' 
well engender apr;>rehenaion in men (Chesler.1978: Stockland 
and Johns'on.1979 for varieties of womb envy; 
it does not directly f'eed into rape 
mythology. thou~h it might well do circuitously. In 
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contrast. the conceptions of female sexual insatiability 
certainly do - thou~h it should be remembered that this 
image is reserved for particular types of women, usuallY 
beautiful. distant. alluring and novel. In other words, 
this image does not readily generalize to women with whom 
a man has been intimate. and especially not to his wife if 
he is married (Hite.1982. thou~h we must be wary of the 
representativeness of her sample. cf Ch.7). Because of the 
supposed potential insatiablitlity of the feminine sexual 
appetite. women can become threatening. that is, evil. 
Rape and the explanations that support it in some cases 
can be interpreted as en~aging this evil in battle (a 
version of what Brownmiller.1975. has called the 'heroic 
rape'). But it does more than that. it also serves to 
constitute that evil. to impress an identity on women. In 
turn. men's own view of themselves is consolidated (see 
below). There is a self-sustaining circularity here. This 
is demonstrated when men (and women) excuse rape with such 
comments as: 99 That 9 11 teach the bitch''. 
This is by no means the whole story. For evil is 
perceived in many aspects of women 9 s behaviour and 
condition. has noted how many men are 
dis~runtled by the fact that · their wives who takG a 
portion of their pay will often not provide sex. They feel 
they are being ripped off. They see their wives' 
9 fri~idity 9 as a ploy. Amongst the untold numbers of rape 
within marriage (Hall,1985), some will be a form of 
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~unishment for this evil. No doubt some will be 
rationalized through the nwth of rape as seduction: 19What 
she needs is a good fuck 99 • In both cases women 9 s 
recalcitrant sexuality is recast in terms of its evilness, 
with the im~lication that it must be harnessed to the 
good, namely men 9 s needs. 
So, evil can become a covert element in the ~erce~tion of 
women. We witness this in other cultures (Hoch-Smith and 
Spring, 1980; Sanday,1981b) in which women 9 s movement is 
circumscribed lest through their sexuality, they pollute 
men 9 s society; and we can identify it in the long and 
distinguished lineage that runs through such figures as 
Eve, Pandora, Delilah, and Dietrich in the Blue Angel 
(Root,1981). In sum, if the irrational and the uncertain 
contain elements of threat and fear, they are also to be 
seen as infused with evil, especially where the norm 
centres on the rational and the certain. Women by being 
~laced in the ~osition of 9 other 9 will always contain a 
thread of evil which will be-cused to bind and subjugate 
them. 
e. Sexuality. In the following discussion my ~urpose 
is to connect the dee~ stereoty~ic characteristics we have 
outlined ~bove to the sexuality of women and men. But 
before thi~ I will briefly describe the stereotypical 
ascription 'Of sexual traits to men and women. For example, 
Oakley(1972) has ex~licated the respective sexual 
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stereotypes thus: men are naturally more sexually 
arousable and have a greater sexual appetite than women. 
(This is in spite of the stereotype of the 'evil' 
salacious woman we commented on above~ generally speaking, 
men are supposed to be the more sexually inclined.) 
Further, men take the active part in initiating sexual 
interaction: the woman must be chatted up, aroused, 
conquered. These are the two main components of 
stereotypical, sexuality and can be readily 
accommodated by the surface and deep stereotypes provided 
above. That is the man is still the agent, the 
independent. assertive partner, while the woman is the 
emotional, affiliative target whose emotion and 
affiliation have to be engaged, nurtured and. more 
blatantly, manipulated. Oakl~y supplies us with a variety 
of data to show that these general sexualities. are not 
biological givens. I do not intend to enter into the 
numerous arguments for the biological or cultural 
determination of sexuality, at least not in the 
traditional way. Rather, 
projected. 
I will show how these images are 
Certainly these stereotypic images have come to inhabit 
much of the media (Root,198U); these deeper stereotypes 
can only be properly accessed by social analysis. For 
Cove nay et al(1984), normal masculine sexuality is 
comprised of the following components: Power (eg taking 
the initiative though many men don't like this, 
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especially given the possibility of rejection, Hite,1982); 
aggression; &enis orientation; sex emotion separation; 
the objectification of women; fetishism (of clothing, 
parts of womenQs bodies, etc); uncontro11abi1ity the 
belief that masculine sexuality is uncontrollable and that 
without release men wi11 physically and psychologically 
suffer (it is interesting that amongst some Chinese men 
who have been influenced by a misconceived Taoism, the 
opposite view holds, that ejaculation is actually 
detrimental to health. Lieh-Mak and Ng,1981}. In sum. 
there ia a com&~laive masculine sexuality that is 
reflected in the quantitative app~oach that many men have 
towards aex. This is instanced in the masculine 
identification of sex with intercourse &er se. and the 
relegation of foreplay and other forms of sexual activity. 
As Hite(1982) puts it wsex should be un-defined to become 
something with infinite varietyQQ (pU77} - the identical 
point is made by Heath and Foucault. A11 these elements 
combine to justify a masculine sexual behaviour that is 
geared towards reconstituting the general masculine 
identity. and shaping by constraint the feminine identity. 
These representations are disseminated through a variety 
of discourse/practices and media. 
advertising (Root.198U; Dyer,1985); 
Through film and 
through pornography 
(Dworkin,1981; Moye,1985); through the novel (Heath,1982). 
Likewise various know1edges have yielded data that 0 fixesQ 
sexuality into its orthodox configurations. Of these, 
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sexol.ogy (more so than psychoanal.ysis - at l.east in the 
Angl.o-Saxon worl.d. Heath,1982) has been particul.arl.y 
potent. especial.l.Y given its rapid dissemination through 
such 9 enl.ightened 9 magazines as Forum (Covenay et 
al..198L!.).. Thus for Havel.ock El.l.is (Jackson,198L!.a), sex 
inol.ved an el.ement of aggression; this was embodied in the 
chase. The woman°s diffidene~ must be overcome, and she 
recognizes this. In other words. the pursued woman. 0 aware 
of the biol.ogical. necessity for sex. in fact wants to be 
caught. As such. any confl.ict that occurs between 
hunter-mal.e and prey-femal.e is onl.y apparent: women have 
an investment in their own submissiveness then - pain and 
l.ove are intimatel.y connected. Here we have a partial. 
l.egitimation of prevail. ins; sexual. practice and. 
potential.l.y, for rape. Even for the l.ater sexol.ogists, the 
l.iberal.ization of sex did not guarantee equality: whether 
as 9 servicer 0 or 9 serviced 0 the woman, according to 
.Jackson(198lJ.b). was the subservient partner. In the 
former. she aroused the man; in the latter. her 
0 passivity 9 facil.itated his necessary sexual. rel.ease. This 
is the view that has been popularized by magazines such as 
Forum (Cov~nay et al.198L!.). However. there is running 
parall.el. with this a genuine concern for the woman°s 
position. and certainly this work laid some of the ground 
for the more radical conceptions of sexual.ity. 
More broadly. it should be remembered that sexuality has 
been conditioned by a mul.tipl.icity of factors. Weeks(1980) 
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decomposes these intot f'amil¥ and kinship systems; 
economic and social factors; the forms of' social 
regulation (eg Church, peer grou~~); the political moment 
(the juridico-legal and legislative systems); and cultures 
of' resistance (folk-knowledges, counter-movements). The 
rise of the welfare state in Britain, the state support of 
birth control, abortion and divorce reforms, the 
liberalization of censorship, the post-war consumer boom, 
and a host of other factors have influenced the 
(re-)f'ormation and formulation of sexuality. The rise of 
9 permissiveness 9 in the sixties one which largely 
worked in men 9 s favour - at one level has receded on the 
tide of a moral revival, and at another has been 
superceded by more radical and thoroughgoing demands. When 
we analyze rape explanations, our ideal type will be 
concerned with the conservative end of this polarization. 
Until now, I have touched only implicitly upon the 
stability of the various components of sexuality and 
sexual stereotypes. It is possible to discern in the 
vigour of the sexological discourses and the vehemence of 
the current moralist backlash a profound unease about 
the secure standing of traditional gender roles. On the 
one hand this applies to masculine sexuality (Tolson,1977: 
Reynaud,1981; Metcalf,1985; Ryan, 1985). On the other it 
applies to the :insecurity experienced by many middle class 
women regardi~g their oocial standing as wives with 
responsible husbands 
' 
Some authors 
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(Metcalf, Ryan) believe that masculine insecurity has at 
least some of its roots in socialization 9rocesses, 
especially in the tenuous disidentification from the 
mother and the identification with the father, and stress 
that this universal condition of masculine uncertainty has 
recently been exacerbated by feminist attacks on the 
inte~rity of the male identity. Others (Tolson) focus on 
the class differences in masculinity, and 9in9oint the 
way that masculine identity, in its essentials of 
inde9endence, 
consistently 
self-reliance, a~ency and so forth, is 
conditions. 
onslaught 
and 
In 
takes 
continuously undermined by social 
the case of working class men, the 
the form of the humiliation and 
a1ientation of the work process; this is diffused through 
the collective nature of work groups in which traditional 
masculine virtues can be reinforced. For middle class 
men, their particular brand of masculinity incorporates 
an element of morality and duty centred around the 
cultural capital that their schooling has 9rovided them 
with. This is undermined by the futility they often 
perceive in their work and with which they cope either 
throu~h a decline into cynicism or Q uge of professional 
fronts or business personalities. A11 in a11 then, we 
could say that masculine identity is not the bulwark it 
appears to be; rather its constant striving for certainty, 
rationality, and power reflects its manifold instability. 
As an example of this masculine insecurity we can mention 
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the feelings that men often experience in intimate 
relationships. that is. ~the fear of being dominated, 
contro~led. swallowed up or suffocated. Underlying these 
fears. which on the surface appear to be concerned with 
autonomy and freedom, is a more basic fear about the 
disintegration or loss of their sense of maleness. Behind 
this appears to be the wish to surrender to the woman. to 
be like her. to be in union with her 00 (Ryan.1985.p22). So 
men differentiate themselves in order to pursue their 
masculine identity. In addition to the few examples we 
have mentioned above. we can speculate that this need is 
an underlying moment in all. but particularly the more 
virulent. strains of intergroup behaviour that men 
manifest: a group mediated social identity. replete with 
its sense of certainty and control. will serve as a 
welcome supplement to the more tenuous individually 
mediated masculine identity. At a more abstract level, 
this instability is countered through the oppoaitio~of 
rationality and emotionality. subject and object and so 
on. And this is conducted recursively in everyday life: eg 
in the way thatmany men will cut off emotionally in a 
90 tendency to denigrate or discount passionate or romantic 
attractions as unreal or undesirable90 (Hite,1982.P139); or 
in the way that reflexive men will. when 
talking about themselves. automatically change register 
and couch their discourse in abstract academic terms 
(Hollway.1982). However, the practical workings of this 
stereotype are now being recognized• and as some of Hite 0 s 
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respondent~ show, there is a 'broadening' of masculinity 
which part~encompasses the feminine. 
The of masculinity is something which the 
simple stu~y of stereotypes and their use could not 
reveal. In order to look at the way that men construct and 
deploy their explanations of rape it has been necessary to 
outline the,deeper elements of these sterotypes, elements 
which are grounded in the historically specific 
conditions of women and men. These affect not only the 
construction of rape explanations (eg what discourses and 
information, are held to be relevant), but also the 
0 motivations 9 that lie behind them. However, 
I 
there is no 
simple re~aton between such a masculinity and rape 
explanation.', Inevitably other factors intrude - factors 
that relate to biographical (eg friends, experiences with 
women and m~n. education. etc). local (eg work role, 
institutions~ requirements) and general (eg prevailing 
public mood) conditions. We will encounter some of the 
biographical:factors when we consider the types of rape 
explanations: presented in interviews (cf Ch.7): local and 
general factors will be more closely examined in Chapter 8 
on policemen~s explanations of rape. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
THE EXPLANATION OF RAPE 
Introduction. 
This chapter will overview the literature on rape and 
rape explanations. My main aim is to analyse the form 
which rape explanations take in order to show how they 
incorporate the sexist, and indeed anti-sexist, 
discourse/practices considered in Chapter 6. While I will 
lean heavily on feminist analysis, this is done 
reflexively, treating it as an ideal type in its own 
right. To reiterate: this is part of the generative 
strategy of adopting a minority response with which to 
critically apprehend the norm. 
An analysis of explanations and comments given by men in 
various research literatures and in interviews will be 
presented. These will be framed in terms of ideal types 
with which I will attempt to access the interests (or 
practices) that lie behind the explanations given. The 
three ideal types presented are derived partly from 
the analysis of interview material, from feminist and 
legal formulations of rape, and from the abnormal 
behaviour literature. We start with an account of the 
ideal types, as opposed to an analysis of the interviews, 
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as a means of setting out from the start our main concern: 
the interpenetration of explanation, practice and power. 
While the interview material might appear merely 
illustrative. we emphasize that it has also played a 
formulative part in the construction of the ideal types. 
These are the dimensional, the typological and the 
schismatic types and, in the context of rape explanations, 
are related to feminist/anti-sexist, clinical/legal and 
machismo/defensive functions respectively. Thus the form 
of the rape explanation or discourse comes to be tied to a 
practice. In this chapter, 
considered in broad terms 
practices will only be 
the dimensional is aligned 
with an 'anti-sexist' practical orientation which entails 
both self and social change; the schismatic involves the 
denial of continuity so that conventional (sexist, 
oppressive, etc) practice may continue. In the next 
chapter these practices are pinned down to the more 
specific role of policeman. Needless to say, our equation 
of form and function is simplistic; nevertheless it allows 
us to view the ways that explanations serve to rehearse 
the individual's positioning within a discursive/practical 
matrix. In this specific context, the dimensional is 
considered to carry generative weight. 
This chapter will take the following form: First there 
will be a discussion of dimensional and typological types 
of explanation that draws on debates within the 
personality and abnormal psychology literature. These two 
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ideal tvpes will be elaborated and their relevance to the 
explanat.ion of rape drawn out in the following section. In 
addition, the schismatic ideal tvpe will be 
considered, especiallv as it relates to the law. After 
this, there will be a detailed consideration of wavs that 
these ideal tvpes are represented in feminism, in clinical 
theory and in evervday discourse. Finallv, there will be 
an analysis of their use in rape explanations as presented 
in the attribution and related literature, and in 
interviews. (This analysis will be extended to the account 
of a specific rape presented in ~The Glasgow Rape Case~. 
cf Appendix. ) 
1. Dimensional and Tvpological Explanations. 
This section outlines our two basic ideal types. In 
framing them as we do, we are attempting to bring out what 
we consider to be their primary quality: the embodiment of 
both discourse (explanation, attitudes, beliefs, etc) and 
practice (behaviour). In this respect, the term ideal type 
0 exp1anation° is a misnomer for clearly it encompasses 
practices too. This is why, below, we link, perhaps in a 
reductive manner, discursive posture(form of explanation, 
content, myths, etc) to practice (research, broad social 
change, efficient differentiation between categories). 
Dimensional explanations underline the continuity between 
what on the surface appear to be disparate or discrete 
conditions. Typological explanations are concerned with 
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the criteria that demarcate conditions. For the 
purpose of exposition, we can suggest that in clinical and 
personality psychology, the dimensional approach tends to 
be research oriented. More so than the typological,it is 
aimed at the production of theoretical verities and the 
discovery of causal mechanism. Here, I have particularly 
in mind the dimensional work of Eysenck (see below). By 
contrast, the typological is relatively more practical; it 
is interested in identifying and treating mentally ill 
types with the least fuss. Of course there is overlap. The 
latter 9 s accent on categories is meant to reflect 
substantive differences in aetiology, in the causal 
mechanism underlying the types. The former 9 s focus on the 
continuity between various conditions (their placement on 
a dimension) suggests that treatment is more personalized. 
Kendall(1975), summarizing the pros and cons of these two 
.approaches, suggests that the dimensional allows an easier 
mobility along the spectrum of conditions and minimizes 
the distorted perception of what, in the typological 
scheme of things, would be borderline cases. Despite these 
advantages, Kendall remarks that ultimately dimensional 
data is 
description 
implication, 
reduced to categories because these allow 
and conceptualization, and, 
a readily practical means of treatment. (His 
view is complicated by the fact that he considers 
dimensional analysis appropriate for neuroses, and 
typological for psychoses.) 
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The differences between these two approaches lie at the 
centre of the controversy over the usefulness of the 
Eysencks' Psychoticism scale (Eysenck and Eysenck,1976). 
The criticism that the scale fails to distinguish between 
ill and normal subjects (Block,1977; Bishop,l977) is not 
really rebutted by Eysenck and Eysenck 9 s(l977) argument 
that it is a measure of predisposition. Such an argument 
does not tackle the practical problem of identifying 
psychotics (eg many art students scored higher on the P 
scale than did schizophrenics). For our purposes, we 
can simplistically treat this debate as hingeing on the 
conflicting practical meanings of 'predisposition'. For 
Eysenck the theoretician, predisposition refers to the 
potential for developing psychosis;. whether that potential 
is realized is immaterial other factors are bound to 
intervene. For Bishop the clinician, diagnosis (the 
derivation of an aetiology from a set of symptoms) is what 
is sought from and found lacking in the P scale. It is the 
typological approach that seems to hold in the traditional 
view of rape and rapists. 
It should be apparent that the distinction between 
dimensional and typological is partially echoed by that of 
particularization and categorization (Billig,l985). 
However. there are differences in emphasis. Where 
particularization acknowledges the individual, its 
complexity and cross-category membership, dimensional 
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explanation explicitly assumes a similarity between 
apparently di~~erent individuals inso~ar as they possess, 
in varying degrees, the same core processes or 
mechanisms, or can be located on a common dimension - ie 
it assumes quantitative di~~erence. This is only implicit 
in particularization. Moreover, the practical use o~ 
dimensional explanations has been to counter typological 
approaches. Though, as with 
particularization and tolerance, 
the equation between 
dimensionality and a 
better use o~ in~ormation is not guaranteed. As regard 
typological explanations, while there is a tendency 
towards the same exaggeration that is present in 
categorization, this is not intrinsic to it inso~ar as, on 
the view developed here, the main purpose is to 
specify and deploy the criteria o~ di~~erence. Further, 
there is no necessary denial o~ an underlying continuity -
it is bracketted ~or the practical purpose o~ identi~ying 
and treating v abnormal s v • In sum, dimensional and 
typological discourses are allied to given practices, o~ 
generally theoretical and generally practical bent 
respectively. However, this is so only ~or the given 
discourses I have been considering; it is possible that 
these discursive ~orms and practices will dissociate ~or 
di~~erent discourses and under di~~erent circumstances. 
However, it is argued that the equations as here outlined 
by and large hold ~or rape explanations. 
Finally, a moment 0~ re~lection reveals that in 
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distinguishing between dimensional and typological modes, 
I have myself engaged in a typological explanantion. I 
acknowledge that there are gradations or combinations of 
these (cf Foulds and Bedford,1975). However, by treating 
them as ideal types I defer to, what in Chapter 5, I 
called their latent reflexivity, and thereby admit their 
partiality. 
2. Rape., Mythology, Explanations. 
In this section I will consider the way that the 
dimensional and typological types of explanation apply to 
the explanation of rape. I will also introduce a third 
ideal type, the schismatic. The next paragraphs will act 
as a prelude to the more detailed investigation of the 
interaction and use of these types in the following 
sections. 
The definition of rape, while potentially clearcut, blurs 
in the face of the complexity of concrete events and the 
variety of both theoretical and practical perspectives. I 
will not, therefore, attempt an outright definition of 
rape but outline some of the ways that the term 'rape' has 
been deployed. Thus we can access the dividends that 
applying or witholding the term 'rape' to a rape event (an 
event which is potentially open to the term 'rape'), 
afford. 
couplet: 
Such a procedure assumes the power/knowledge 
the use of the term 'rape' is, openly or 
surreptitiously, simultaneously the use of or the struggle 
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for power. Inevitably, its use is subtly altered by 
specific circumstances and concerns. And so, the accent 
.can be placed on: .the presence of coercion (Clark and 
Lewis,1977): the presence of force (Medea and 
Thompson,1974); the presence of extreme violence 
(Brownmiller,1975); the absence of consent or the 
negligence of the rapist as to whether consent was 
forthcoming (Toner,1982); as exemplary masculine sexuality 
(Dworkin,1976); the 9 looseness 9 of the alleged victim 
(Clark and Lewis,1977). and so on. 
However, as we noted in the introduction to this chapter, 
the various accents can be distilled into two types of 
emphasis, the dimensional(D) and the typological(T). 
While I treat these separately here, this is for 
analytical purposes; in actuality they have a tendency to 
merge (see below). Applied to rape, D explanations focus 
on the connection between the deviant behaviour (rape, 
rapist) and the normal; its aim is to explicate the broad 
and general conditions of emergence of the deviant; 
to use the deviant as an illustration of the potential in 
the normal; to stress the continuity between deviant and 
normal. In contrast, T explanations accentuate 
difference between the normal and the deviant: 
the 
they 
attempt to establish or deploy the criteria of that 
difference, criteria which may be embodied in the defining 
characteristics of the deviant category- or else in the 
local/proximal circumstances that 9 resulted 9 in the rape. 
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On the whole D analyses have come from the feminist camp. 
The stress on the continuity between rape and normal 
masculine sexual functioning has several implications. 
Firstly, it implies that the prevailing form of masculine 
sexuality ~s what is at the root of rape: in the 
Gergens 9 s (1982) terminology, it provides the enabling 
conditions, in Kelleyian terms, it is a necessary causal 
factor. Thus it is this that must be fundamentally 
changed. Here, I deal with the socialist feminist version 
o£ this analysis, which ties masculinity to specific 
historical conditions, rather than the radical feminist 
which has a tendency to set up a biological typology 
between men and women. A corollary of the D view is that T 
explanations tend to obfuscate the 9 real 9 mechanism behind 
rape, or at least obscure rape 9 s general conditions of 
emergence. 
explanations 
ideological 
As such, 
often 
in the 
D explanations can (and feminist 
do) consider T explanations as 
sense of sustaining, through 
detraction, the 9 basic 9 conditions that have produced 
rape. Below, I will present studies which support the 
feminist position. In doing this I adopt the minority 
feminist position and use it to re-appropriate T 
explanations. 
Now, it might be argued that the dimensional form is not 
confined to feminist explanations. The relation between 
rape and normality can be explicitly recognized in the 
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form of biological necessity, which effectively excuses 
rape by seeing it as a more or less natural phenomenon. In 
other words, rape is a legitimate technique of seduction. 
But what seems to be actually happening here is a 
redefinition of rape: while harrassment-type rapes are 
acceptable, extremely violent ones are not. It is the 
latter that constitute 9 real 9 rapes. Thus this apparent 
dimensionality in fact serves as a typological criterion 
to demarcate the boundary between legitimate and criminal 
uses of force in seduction. Also, the dimensional can 
refer to the irrationality of women 
outcome of women 9 s failings (see below). 
seeing rape as an 
As I have remarked, T explanations focus on the difference 
between categories. The likely motives are twofold. The 
first is practical: to specify the novel conditions which 
have resulted in rape. Archetypally, this is the terrain 
of criminal law and I will deal with this below. However, 
often running in parallel with this is the possible desire 
to deny any connection between the deviant and the normal. 
The T explanation, in the case of psychiatry, can be 
interpreted as concerned with isolating and treating those 
novel .factors that have resulted in deviance. It has a 
practical purpose, and one of the criticisms it can level 
at D approaches is that they fail to provide workable 
criteria for such isolation: they are impracticable 
(though one practical implication of the D analysis is to 
impose a curfew either on men or on women). Of course, the 
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rebuff to this hinges on what is workable, and that is a 
complex historical question. The tension between D and T 
is present in the feminist literature (cf 
Box-Grainger,1982). The explication of the continuities 
between normal and deviant is necessary to long-term 
eradication of the sexual harrassment of women and sexual 
inequality generally; the identification of individual 
differences between rapists and non-rapists is necessary 
for the immediate protection of women. Both long and short 
term. requirements need to be met. Nevertheless, because 
it has been relatively neglected, it is the D that is 
stressed, occasionally to the detriment of the T, T 
explanations being seen as ideological under the 
appropriate circumstances. 
I wiLl distinguish between the T explanation with its 
concerns with differentiation and its neutrality as to 
the continuity between rapists and normals, and 
schismatic explanation which serves to detract 
from or deny such continuities, and thus to vprotect' 
normal masculinity and male prerogatives. It is this 
schismatic aspect of T explanations that, we suggest, is 
abhorred in feminist critiques. 
The problem now revolves around the degree to which T 
explanations are indeed schismatic(S). As will become 
apparent this is a difficult problem to resolve, primarily 
because many factors need to be taken into consideration. 
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Placing an outwardly T explanation in its historical 
context will often reveal that it is indeed schismatic. 
However, the problem is then simply transferred to a 
different plain; that is, the historical characterization 
becomes the point of contention: a feminist history might 
end up seeing all T explanations as essentially S, as 
asserting patriarchal ascendency. This might or might not 
be happening: applying a variety of perspectives might 
dilute the polemic, but it will do greater justice to 
the complex of payoffs that a given T explanation 
feeds into. It is worth re-emphasizing the problematic 
status of the more 0 dubious 0 T explanations: often, 
whether T can be judged schismatic will .depend on our 
reading of the contextual factors. The more evidence that 
accumulates in support of a pervasive sexism in the 
explainer, the more likely that some of some of his T 
explanations will have a schimatic edge. 
A case in point is the legal determination of guilt in 
rape trials. The law 0 s concern with determining the 
conditions of actus reas (whether the act actually 
occurred) and ('guilty mind 0 ) mens rea (Seago,l981) can be 
considered an example of the typological process. Its aim 
is to identify and remove the criminal element from 
society: it aims to be practical, efficient and fair. It 
does not focus on social change or general social 
conditions but on local/proximal factors. This is not 
surprising given that the law is supposed to embody and 
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reflect the common(sensical) constructs of right and 
wrong. This concern with practicalities moulds the legal 
definition of rape as enunciated in the Sexual Offences 
Amendment Act,1976. A man commits rape if (1) he has 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time 
does not consent to it and (2) at the time knows that she 
does not consent to intercourse or is reckless as to 
whether she consents. As Toner(1982). notes, this helped 
clarify the criteria by which to determine whether rape 
had taken place: the jury must take regard of whether the 
defendant had reasonable grounds for his belief that 
consent had been forthcoming. As ever, those grounds will 
be conditioned by the prevailing social mood: if there is 
a pervasive sympathy for the defendant then reasonableness 
will be projected into the grounds. But, as regard the law 
itself, its deeply patriarchal roots and its continuing 
masculine bias (cf Ch.6) can turn a typological practice 
into a schismatic one. This can be manifested in either 
particular or general forms. 
At the particular level, we have a range of statements 
issued by judges which are little more than the repetition 
of rape myths. For example, characterizing the rape victim 
as negligent can typologically place her as a vital 
factor in the extraordinary circumstances that led to the 
rape. Thus Judge Richards 9 statement, 9 99 1 am not saying 
that a girl hitching home late at night should not be 
protected by the law, but she was guilty of a great deal 
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of contributory negligence 99 9 (p,21,Patullo,1983), by 
explaining the rape in terms of the woman 9 s negligence, 
can potentially imply that she provoked the attack. This 
typological criterion might thus deflect attention from 
the possible dimensional factor that it is generally men 
who define the nature of an intersexual encounter. That 
is, in feminist theory, it is men who are considered as 
empowered to attribute 9 availability 9 to women, and 
therefore to place the woman in a 90sition where she 
becomes 9 negligent 9 • Thus the typological becomes a 
schismatic statement. Another example involves the 
protection given alleged victims as regards evidence on 
their prior (good or bad) character. While offerred in 
general, because it has been left to the judge 9 s 
discretion, it has often been withheld some two-thirds 
of applications for such character evidence to be given 
have Qeen allowed (Adler, cited in Toner,1982). The 
general victimization of women is reflected in the 
requirement for corroboration in rape cases. The 
requirement for corroboration takes three forms in all 
(Murphy and Barnard,l984). Firstly, there is the statutory 
requirement of corroboration in which conviction cannot be 
obtained without it (eg speeding, procuring women and 
girls for purposes of prostitution). In the second class, 
corroboration is required because the evidence is 
9 regarded at common law as being inherently suspicious or 
dangerous 9 (p105,Murphy and Barnard,1984). Included here 
is the sworn evidence of children, the evidence of 
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accomplices and the evidence of sexual misconduct). 
Corroboration is required as a matter of practice. not 
law, and the 99 bench may convict on uncorroborated 
evidence, 
so doing~ 
but must first warn themselves of the danger of 
(p105). The final class is where the danger of 
convicting on uncorroborated evidence is assumed and does 
not need to be stated explicitly. Toner(1982) notes that 
the 99 danger of convicting a man on uncorroborated evidence 
is apparent in all trials, yet in one of its extraordinary 
incons~stences the law sees it only when the testimony is 
made by rape complainants, children, accomplices or 
witnesses in treason trials. In rape trials the reason 
given to juries is that it has been the experience of the 
.courts over hundreds of years that women make unfounded 
rape accusations for totally malicious reasons and 
innocent men must be protected ... 99 (p1~8). Later she adds: 
09 Looking for corroboration is hardly offensive, but as the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee remarked in its working 
paper, it might be offensive for a rape victim to hear a 
jupge directing a jury that it would be dangerous to 
convict on her evidence without it ... many judges do labour 
the point about female malice and sexual neurosis which 
can only cast a slur on the complainants evidence, 
corroborated or otherwise ... ~(p1~9-150). Thus the 
typological aim of duly distinguishing the genuine rapist 
as reflected in the reasonable requirement of 
corroboration becomes schismatic through a general 
denigration of. the alleged victim 9 s testimony. Of course. 
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this need not be the case. 
As we mentioned, S and T modes ·are often difficult to tell 
apart - not surprisingly given that the former is a 
- version of the latter. To reiterate, , that the s is 
operating is often onlY apparent once the context of the 
explanation, both proximal and historical, is brought 
into the reckoning. This we shall see in some of the 
interviews. As regards some of the radical men's 
explanations, ~e encounter a tension between the D and T 
forms: the dual concerns with continuity on the one hand, 
and the need to fairly identify and remove rapists on the 
other. occasionally leads to confusion. 
In the next section I will consider the D explanation of 
rape in p1ore detail, showing how historical, 
anthropological and cultural research has provided support 
for such explanations. 
3. Rape Explanations, Ideal Types and Payoffs. 
The three ideal types outlined in the preceding sections 
have been equated with particular practices: D - the aim 
of connecting rape to masculinity; the T - purporting to 
explicate those features that differentiate rape from 
non-rapa; and the S an ideological version of T that 
aims to sever the links between rape and normality. As 
remarked above, these equations are not absolute, and 
there is much' slippage. However, being ideal t:ypes this 
does not matter too much: their use~ulness lies in the new 
insights into explanation and its intertwinement with 
discourse/practice that they give. Nevertheless, 
throughout, occasional re~erence to the partiality o~ our 
three types will be made. 
a. Dimensional Explanations and Feminism. 
In this section I will go through ~eminist explanations o~ 
rape and consider the ways they have used various research 
strategies to support the dimensional view. Part o~ the 
ground ~or this has been laid out in Chapter 6. The broad 
representations and processes outlined there will be 
shown to underlie the more speci~ic phenomena o~ rape and 
rape explanation. Further, the ~eminist analysis o~ rape 
di~~ers ~rom others in that it is also involved in the 
analysis 0~ rape explanation; it is through these 
explanations, drawing on rape myths. that the necessary 
conditions ~or rape are partly reproduced, that rape is 
repeatedly marginalized. The variety 0~ ~eminist 
analytical strategies can be grouped into two interlocking 
kinds. The ~irst considers the evidence which positively 
charts the dimensionality of masculinity-rape (historical, 
anthropologicaL, statistical); this continuity is placed 
in the context of the payo~~s men derive from rape and the 
threat of rape. The second scrutinizes the processes by 
which that continuity is denied (through legal procedure, 
clinical categories, rape mythology). The latter will be 
dealt with in the section on T and S explanations. 
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i. Histor¥ and Rape. This section is intended to 
il~ustrate how D explanations draw on historical material. 
For feminism, as represented b¥ Brownmiller, the focus is 
on the Wa¥ that rape relates to the oppression of women. 
Rape is at once a reflection and an instance of the power 
relations that exist between women and men. Brownmiller 
summarizes her view thus: 
"From the earliest times, when men of one tribe 
freel¥ raped women of another to secure wives, 
the laws of marriage and the laws of rape have 
been philosophical!¥ entwined ... The criminal act 
he viewed with horror and punished as rape was 
not sexual assault per se, but an act of unlawful 
possession. a trespass against his tribal right 
to control vaginal access to all women who 
belonged to him and his kin ... Although these 
legal origins have been buried in a morass of 
forgqtten histor¥. as the laws of rape continued 
to evolve, the¥ never shook free of their initial 
concept that the violation was first and 
foremost a violation of male rights of 
possession, based on male requirements of 
virginit¥, chastit¥ and consent to private access 
as the female bargain in the marriage contract 
(the underpinnLngs. as he enforced them, of man 9 s 
economic estate)." 
(Brownmiller,1975,p422-423) 
However, Illich(1983), in line with his distinction 
between the reign of vernacular gender (in which there is 
an "eminent!¥ local and timebound dualit¥ that sets off 
men and women under circumstances and conditions that 
prevent them sa¥ing, doing, desiring and perceiving the 
same thing 99 , p20) and the rule of economic sex (in which 
the rise of competition between the sexes has 
resulted in the relative devaluation of women), remarks 
that the 99 the social histor¥ of rape has ¥et to be 
written, in part because modern. sexist rape under 
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assumptions of general conditions of scarcity still has 
not been distinguished from age-old forms of physical 
violence against women" (p31). The implication is that, 
with the transition from vernacular gender to economic 
sex, in addition to the 'age-old injuries', modern rape 
constitutes a further "sexist insult" (p30). Presumably, 
in Brownmiller's terms, where previously rape had been a 
process of theft of men's property (cf Bashar,1983), 
modern rape is also a direct attack on women: whereas 
before the position was clearly mapped out through 
vernacular gender boundaries, now these are enforced 
partially through the means of rape and violence. Hence 
women's increasing fear of rape, as Illich has it. 
In the above analysis we have attempts to link the 
perception and practice of rape to broader historical 
trends. Rather than seeing rape as a marginal phenomenon, 
as a manifestation of given individuals' madness, the 
connections of rape are traced by Brownmiller to the 
proprietary rights of men, and by Illich to the rise of 
economic sex 
'normality'. 
Illich both are characterizations of 
Historical examples of schismatic explanations have been 
analyzed by Clarke(1983). She considered the discourses 
that converged on the rape of Mary Ashford by Abraham 
Thornton. The controversy that ensued entailed three 
positions: "the libertine view which excused violence in 
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seduction, the chivalrous view which urged women to submit 
to male protection, and the view of Mary. Ashford as a 
working class heroine 99 (p16). In the first case, there is 
basically a conflation of surrender (to violence) and 
consent. But, further, ~if violence was an acceptable 
technique of seduction (it) was always women's 
responsibility to defend themselves against men's 
allegedly uncontrollable passions. A victim's failure 
stained her, rather than her attacker, with dishonour" 
(p19). Indeed, it was ~Her chastity, not her refusal or 
acceptance of a certain act, (that) determined a woman's 
consent~. And Chastity ~in fact meant that she behaved as 
the exclusive property of one man rather than common 
property to all men 99 (p19). When she was a bad character, 
then whatever the form of rape, acquittal was highly 
probable. The second approach, urging women to seek male 
protection effectively conjured 99 the threat of crime to 
control women's behaviour 09 ( p21). Here, it was necessary to 
marginalize Thornton, to represent him as a "wild, 
inhuman, diaboli.cal creature99 (p21). As Clark notes, this 
is a process still in use today (cf Hollway, 1981 below). 
Nevertheless the fault is still hers: for she was 
imprudent and impudent enough to place herself in a 
position of danger, that is, to spurn masculine 
chivalry. Finally, the view of Mary as a victim of 
class exploitation (inappropriately, given that 
Thornton, despite being represented as well-to-do, was 
in fact a bricklayer) still managed to emphasize the 
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affront that her male relatives felt. 
Again we have the analysis of a particuLar incident and 
the surrounding events which, bY placing both the rape and 
explanations in the context of gender power relations, 
serves to uncover the links between explanations and the 
traditional interests of men. The feminist oriented 
histories we have here considered attempt to show the 
roots of contemporary rape and its mythologization. An 
historical continuity is emphasized (though Illich alerts 
us to the changes wrought by modern! ty), one that 
highlights the continuing, deep-set power relations 
between ~en and women and the effects of this on the 
contemporary production of rape. This is in contrast with 
pseudo-historical views (because they are in fact 
biologistic) that cast rape as the result of masculine 
sexual fraiLty or intrinsic feminine maliciousness, or 
else see rape as a more or less accidental occurrence in 
the form of the historically random appearance of the 
fiend-rapist. 
ii. Rape and Anthropology. In this brief section I will 
consider only one anthropological survey of rape, 
conducted by Sanday(1981). 
that 
Sanday analyzed data on the cross-cultural incidence of 
rape and related this to the structural characteristics of 
those societies. She found the outstanding feature of 
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rape-free societies was that women were perceived as 
having high-status: usually they represented a source of 
spiritual power. Moreover, there was little leadership in 
the sense of an exclusive possession of power; rather, 
decision-making was 
societiesv sexual 
through common consent. These 
relations were hinged on 
complementarity. Against this, rape-prone societies (that 
is, societies in which rape was commonly practiced on 
enemy women, in ceremonies, or used as a threat by which 
to control women) were most highlY correlated with the 
existence of interpersonal and intergroup aggression and 
violence. Under these circumstances, Sanday argues, 
aggression and violence are measures of male status. If 
the sexual act is one expression of a self which is 
essentially aggression-oriented, then it is only to be 
expected that sexual relations are liable to be violent, 
or contain an undercurrent of aggression. 
rape will be endemic in such societies. 
In other words, 
Once again, a 
feminist-oriented analysis by grounding rape in 
particular structural factors has evoked the continuity 
between rape and what is within the culture considered 
normal. 
iii. Contemporary Evidence for Menvs Payoffs. Perhaps 
the most influential accounts of the payoffs for men 
that rape generates have been Brownmiller's(1975) and 
Griffinvs(l971). For these authors, rape and the threat of 
rape has been a way of containing the autonomy of women. 
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That this is a structural effect means that most men 
benefit insofar as women are forced to seek men 9 s 
protection (at least so long as they do not organize 
themselves). Thus masculine power is reinforced and the 
masculine stereotype and identity goes largely 
unchallenged (however, things do seem to be changing). 
Evidence that women are indeed intimidated by the threat 
of rape comes from Riger and Gordon(1981) who tested this 
thesis for Chicago, Philadelphia and San Franscisco and 
found that those women with the fewest resources to cope 
with victimization (ie the elderly, ethnic minorities, the 
poor) are the ones who are most fearful and least mobile. 
These conditions led to two broad strategies isolation 
and 9 street savvy 9 such as the wearing of sensible shoes, 
taking care where to sit on public transport and so on. 
Riger and Gordon note that it was the relatively educated 
women who took up savvy techniques. Hall(1985) found 
almost identical results for inner London. However, as 
Hall noted, this fear extended into the home. It goes 
without saying that the fear was greatest amongst women 
who had previously been raped. This fear can be rephrased 
in-terms of a socialization process through which women 
take on the role of legitimate victim: in the case of 
rape, this is often transmuted into the responsible 
victim (Weis and Weis,1975). 
This type of evidence traces the continuity in terms of 
the payoffs for men and the general denigration of women. 
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Another tvpe of argument attempts to establish the 
continuitv between the natures of the rapist and the 
normal. An examp.le of this can be found in Dworkin 9 s 
writings in which rape is represented as the primarv model 
of heterosexual sex in that it expresses the traditional 
propertv relations at the heart of marriage. As we have 
seen, rape was original!¥ and explicit!¥ conceived as a 
crime against propertv (cf Bashar,1983), but for Dworkin 
it also inheres in the 
~polar definitions 
congruent with these 
is not committed b¥ 
of men and women. Rape is 
definitions ... Remember, rape 
psvchopaths or deviants from 
our social norms - rape is commited b¥ exemplars 
of our social norms ... Men are defined as 
aggressive, dominant, powerful. Women are defined 
as passive, submissive, powerless. Given these 
gender definitions, it is the verv nature of men 
to aggress sexual!¥ against women.~ 
(Dworkin,1976,p45-46) 
Dworkin goes on to further localize the nature of men in 
aggressive phallocentrism. And so rape is an act of power; 
as Dworkin puts is it: ~male eroticism is welded to 
(1976,p43). This power manifests itself 
schizophrenicallv: on the one hand through chivalrv - the 
power to protect women; and rape on the other. Ostensibl¥ 
at least, these two faces are directed at different women: 
chivalrv is reserved for women of high propertv or moral 
value (the voung, the old, etc - hence the outrage when 
the old or voung or rich are sexuall¥ assaulted); rape is 
what 9 cheap 9 or 9 loose 9 women ask for. 
This continuitv is further detailed at the 
microsociological level b¥ some feminists who attempt to 
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discern the seeds of rape in everyday masculine behaviour. 
(The opposite strategy, which will be considered below, is 
to explicate the normality of rapists). Hite 0 s(1982) 
analysis of her respondents' answers is telling in this 
respect. At the outset, it is worth approaching Hite's 
results (and indeed our own interview data) with some 
circumspection. The type of men willing to engage -in an 
interview or in answering a detailed personal 
questionnaire are liable to differ in some way from those 
who refused; we_ are bound to be dealing with a skewed 
sample. Nevertheless, the array of ideas offered by her 
respondents at least provides a pointer to the broader 
spectrum. Be that as it may, Hite(l982) summarizes thus: 
but because of 00Most men do not rape out of 0 lust 0 , 
feelings of anger, lack of self-esteem and a desire to 
assert masculinity or male dominance and put a woman °back 
in her place' ... ~ (p769). As we noted in the previous 
chapter, it seems that the lack of self-esteem and the 
desire to assert masculinity has become particularly acute 
in recent times. We noted that the present depression has 
eroded many men°s perceived economic security. As many of 
Hite 0 s respondents admit, their anger at women has an 
economic basis in their perception of marriage as 
basically a financial contract. In addition to the anger 
that stemmed from women's perceived clingingness and 
weakness, much of men's anger derived from the fact that 
they saw their wives as economically exploiting them, 
depriving them of their rightful sex in a relationship 
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that was based on the exchange of money for sex. In other 
words, men saw themselves as being short-changed by their 
wives; the contradiction in this was that men's rancour 
persisted irrespective of their wives', or lovers 1 , 
economic independence. So, sexual violence can be 
derived from men's (illusory) perceptions of their own 
exploitation at the hands of their wives. But, more 
mundanely, as Schechter(1982) points out, much violence 
against women (and this includes rape and the threat of 
it) is effectively an attempt to bring about a state of 
affairs ~esired by the man, whether this relates to 
domestic work,. possessiveness, sexual jealousy, or 
allocation of family resources. 
The links between rape and the material conditions and 
power expectations of masculinity are liable to be 
apparent in those groups which have a particularly high 
investment in their masculinity. In adolescent groups, 
rape might be used as a mode of initiation (Hite,1982; 
Groth,1979); similarly 
machismo count (eg 
Brownmiller,1975). 
Clearl;y feminists are 
in 
the 
older 
army, 
groups 
police 
with a high 
Hall,1985; 
aware of the complexity of -
influences that have affected the incidence of rape. In 
addition to.material changes there have been cultural 
ones. Both Medea and Thompson(1974) and Smart(~976) point 
to partial changes in the sexual mores which instead of 
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9 liberating 9 women have taken them out of the protection 
of the family and simultaneously rendered their apparent 
sexual freedom, when interpreted along traditional lines, 
as signifying availability. Nevertheless, a constant 
lurking beneath these changes is the power imbalance 
between men and women which, if anything, according to 
Illich(1983) continues to grow with the erosion of women 9 s 
prior domain. 
The seeds of rape are also encountered in- other areas such 
as the relatively common sexual harrassment of women 
(Sedley and Benn,1982), and in the media depiction of 
women and gender relations (cf Ch.6). As we shall see with 
specific reference to rape myths, the broad denigration of 
women in sexist discourse/practice can be said to find its 
true fruition in the practice and mvthologization of rape, 
a fruition which simultaneously attempts to dissociate 
rape from normality. 
Perhaps more potent is the perception of the normal in the 
deviant, the uncovering of ordinary masculinity in the 
rapist. Much of the effort that has gone into establishing 
~uch a connection has taken the form of dispelling rape 
myths. These will be dealt with in the section on S and T 
type explanations. Here I will illustrate the type of 
evidence mustered in the reconnection of the rapist to the 
' 
normal. 
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(1). The rapist is not a stranger: as Box-Grainger(1981) 
puts it in her review of studies of the incidence of rape, 
''· .. the stereotype of the stranger rapist, 
who is distinct from the 'normal' lives and 
the attacker 
'normal' men 
that most of us know is a half-truth ... ~(no page number). 
For example, ih Amir's(1972) study, some 42.3% of the 
rapists were not known to the victim. However, when 
this is taken in tandem with with the probable fact that 
women who have been raped by acquaintances, relatives or 
friends are less likely to report it because they suspect 
a hostile reaction from the police, 
immobilized by guilt or fear of reprisal, 
or else are 
then we can 
speculate that rapes by known men are somewhat higher than 
the statistics show. As regard police response, we can 
take into account Clark and Lewis'(1977) finding that if 
the alleged rapist was an acquaintance of the victim only 
23.8% of reports were classified Founded (that is, 
merited further investigation). This dropped to 20% if 
the offender was known. If the offender was unknown, 51.6% 
were consider~d Founded. 
(2). Many rap~s are not the explosive events that are 
commonly portrayed in the media. Thus Amir's finding that 
-58% of, single. 82% of pair and 90% of group rapes were 
planned suggests that rape is not the simple result of 
some sponta~eous sexual urge, but involves something 
considerably' more normal, 
faculties'. 
namely the use of 'rational 
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(3). The popular view o~ rape as an openly and extremely 
violent event renders it ~ar more clear-cut than is 
actually the case. By emphasising the presence o~ 
violence, such discourse serves to project rape as 
something thoroughly alien to normal sexual intercourse 
(though. as we noted in Ch.6. some discourses have 
attempted to legitimate ~orce as a necessary ingredient in 
heterosexual. sex). However, as various researchers have 
pointed out, the evidence does not bear this view out. 
Thus in Amirvs sample o~ 6ll6 rapes. vv .•. in a large number 
o~ cases (67%). vonlyv temptation and verbal coercion were 
used to initially subdue. the victim; in 55% no physical 
~orce was used at all ... in 50% o~ the cases when ~orce was 
used. the vict~m was vonlyv manhandled ... vv (p336, inverted 
commas added). A corollary o~ this emphasis is that the 
woman must struggle i~ the rape is to be genuine. Again, 
Amir ~ound that vvover 50% o~ the victims ~ailed to resist 
their attackers in any way.vv (P337). Bart(1980) has looked 
at the presence o~ victim struggle and related it to the 
occurence o~ penetration. She ~ound that those cases 
where struggle ensued and rape was curtailed involved a 
vict~m who was intent on not being raped; where victims 
re~rained from struggle, their main priority was survival. 
Thus the presence of violence or overt resistance by the 
victim should not be singled out as the criterion ~or 
' 
rape. Once it is admitted that other. less spectacular 
means can be used to induce passivity in a woman (and 
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this, of cou~se, includes fraud), then rape is not so 
easily marginarized. 
(4). Other ins~ances where the continuity between deviant 
and normal is recognized have been drawn from the 
psychiatric profession and the prison service. I will deal 
with the former when I consider T explanations. Suffice it 
here to illustrate the profile of the. rapist that has 
surfaced in a number of disciplines. Amir(1971) has shown 
that there is:little that can be considered abnormal in 
most rapists: the profile of the common rapist that he 
sketches falls somewhere between the thief and the violent 
offender. Sentencing policy in the UK and US rarely treats 
rapists as psychopaths. Benn et al(1983) note that the 
Rape Counselling and Research Project found that many 
rapists had. 9 normal scores 9 for aggression towards women. 
This is in line with Melamuth 9 s(1981) review which showed 
that exposure to aggressive-erotic films led to arousal in 
both rapists and 9 normals 9 • Benn et al note that ~Prison 
governors. are often quoted as saying that rapists form the 
most 0 normal 9 ,section of the prison communi ty 99 (P9) and 
they go on: to quote from the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists 9 submission to the Advisory Group on the law 
of rape in 1975: 00 The most common type of rapist is not 
mentally abnormal. He will be young, sexually unsatisfied 
and inexperienced 00 ( P9). This, of course, emphasizes the 
sexual nature ~of rape as opposed to its power aspects (see 
below). Never~heless, it does assert the partial normality 
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of the rapist. , 
( 5). A further means by which the dimensionality of 
rapist/normal is founded rests on the notion of 
victim-precipitated rape and the arguments feminists have 
levelled against this. Amir 9 .s report dubbed 19% of the 
sample of rapes 9 victim-precipitated 9 • Victim 
precipitation describes those rape situations in which 
the victim actually, or so it is deemed, agreed to sexual 
relations but ~etracted before the act-proper, or else did 
not react strongly enough when the suggestion was made by 
the alleged offender. 99 The term also. applies to cases in 
risky situat~ons marred with sexuality, especially 
when she uses what would be interpreted indecency in 
language and gestures. or constitutes what would be taken 
as an invitati~n to sexual relations 99 (Amir,1972,p266). 
Amir tried tp characterize what the differences were 
between victim-precipitated and non-victim-precipitated 
rape. For Amir, the former seemed to involve more alcohol 
consumption. ~closer relationships between victim and 
offender, and 1a victim with a bad reputation. In the cause 
of victimology the study of crime from the victim 9 s 
perspective, Nelson and Amir(1975), followed up this 
analysis with research into hitchhiking rapes as examples 
of victim-presipitated rapes. In this scheme of things, 
hitchhiking signifies availability. Clark and 
Lewis(l977) in their chapter ~victimology: The Art of 
Viet im Blami~g99 criticize Amir 9 s analysis because, though 
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he is happy to promote the notion of victim-precipitation, 
he never adequately defines it for us; it is largely a 
circular characterization. In the present context, the 
important point is that Amir does not full acknowledge 
that the degree to which behaviour is precipitating 
depends on the man/offender 0 s interpretation of it. That 
is, the reasonableness of whether a man is right to 
believe a woman is consenting or not needs to be 
explicitly examined (cf Toner,1982). This should take due 
consideration of gender power relations~ 
Amir 0 s typological view that some women are liable to 
precipitate rape by virtue of their 0 provocative 0 
behaviour is thus reconceived by Clark and Lewis in terms 
of the continuity of women°s experience of having the 
definition and characterization of their behaviour set 
largely outside their control; ie the meanings of their 
behaviour, etc is primarily determined by men (see below). 
These, then, are some of the main ways through which the 
dimensionality of rape has been construed. Till now I have 
perhaps given the impression that D explanations have been 
generated by women. However, while this may have been so 
originally, they have certainly diffused into a proportion 
of the male population, especially those men familiar with 
feminist discourses and/or actively engaged in its 
anti-sexist projects. Further, these discourses have also 
entered less committed talk and, as we shall see in our 
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ana1ysis of men 9 s views on rape, the simp1e regurgitation 
of rape myths often imp1ied by feminist work seems to have 
been rep1aced by a subt1er rhetoric. Before that, however, 
I wi11 1ook at the T and S exp1anation of rape. 
b. Typo1ogica1 and Schismatic Exp1anations. 
In preceding sections we have seen how T exp1anations can 
very often shade into the s. In this section I wi11 be 
1ooking at how these pervade a number of discip1ines. We 
wi11 be seeking the schismatic 1urking in the 
typo1ogica1. In doing this we are appropriating T 
discourses from a feminist perspective: we consider a 
discourse which emp1oys T exp1anations to become S when it 
tends to deny D. However, it shou1d be borne in mind that 
our initia1 terms of reference sti11 ho1d; name1y, T 
does have a specific function, to practicab1y identify 
and remove offenders, and this is something that D is not 
very good at doing. Neverthe1ess, as the S is contextua11y 
engendered (see above), we can fee1 justified in ca11ing T 
exp1anations S which by virtue of their dimensiona1 
si1ence serve, within the prevai1ing socia1 context, to 
margina1ize rape. As we sha11 see, 
discourses ignore D. 
not al1 T-oriented 
i. Clinica1 Typo1ogies. T exp1anations were originally 
expounded in terms of their use in the clinical analysis 
of mental illness. With regard to rapists, T explanations 
focus on the dysfunctional sexua1ities or the relative 
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lack of control of the offenders (eg Gebhard et al,1966). 
In this vein Levine and Koenig point to vv ••• the role of 
sexual repression and the fact that these men have little 
or no understanding of their own sexuality or that of 
their victims ... Perhaps the key ingredient is the 
extremely flimsy barrier between fantasy and reality that 
these men have, and it is this that separates them from 
equally repressed, hostile and ignorant men- who do not 
rape~ (p2). So the difference is based on the di~ferential 
access to reality between rapists and 9 normals 9 • However, 
anticipating a future discussion, we can argue that this 
difference between reality and fantasy is suspect: a 
9 reality 9 can often be created or asserted by the man by 
virtue of the power invested in his masculinity. Levine 
and Koenig 9 s attempt to psychiatrize rapists rest on 
an over-idealized view of masculine sexuality, one that is 
only in minor and· marginal ways related to power. In 
Chapter 6 we suggested a far closer relation between 
these two. Still, Levine and Koenig are attempting to 
outline the differentness of rapists. Yet in failing to 
acknowledge vhe continuity they tend to reinforce the 
schism between rapists and normals. Groth(1979) provides 
/ a more sensitive analysis which categorizes rapists into 
three types: rapists motivated by anger; by power; and by 
sadism in which power and violence have been eroticized. 
Common to the first two, which make up the vast majority 
of his sample of 170 (Anger rapes-UO%; Power rapes-55%; 
Sadistic rapes-5%), is the fact that sex is a means to 
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other ends, not an end in itself. And anger and power, as 
we mentioned above are salient in the make-up of 
masculinity, particularly under prevailing conditions. 
This is something that Groth draws out explicitly; the 
roots of these rapes can be found in the social order 
rather. than reduced to personality traits per se. For 
Groth then there is no extreme separation of the T and the 
D. In the field as a whole however, it would seem that 
confusion (or, in more respectful terms, controversy) 
reigns. As Toner(1982) comments, there are a variety of 
disparate assessments: 00While one psychiatrist will say 
that few rapists are mentally ill but all have some 
personality defect, another will say that certainly all 
men who commit rape do not suffer from personality 
disorders~ (p145). 
ii. Psychological Typologies. An uneasy balance between 
the 4imensional and the typological is also found in the 
research on rape proclivity. Melamuth(1981) has reviewed 
the literature on rape proclivity. Most striking amongst 
his various findings was that 35% of a 0 normal 0 population 
of male students said that they would rape if guaranteed 
non-detection. 
version of the 
Clearly, this research takes rapists as a 
0 normal 0 male and not a species apart, and 
in so doing blurs the distinction. Still, much energy has 
been expended in attempting to develop reliable methods by 
which to distinguish rapists and men with high and low 
proclivities to rape. The two major findings are that 
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rapists show a greater acceptance of rape myths, and a 
higher sexuaL arousal. to rape depiction (Melamuth, Hein, 
and Feshbach,1980). This finding was replicated amongst 
men who reported a tendency to commit rape (Melamuth, 
Haber, and Feshbach,1980), which added fuel to the 
suggestion that sexual response to violent pornography 
might serve as an index of rape proclivity. However, as 
other studies have shown, there is a two-way interaction 
between the perceiver and depictions of violent sex. 
White(1979) found that such depictions increased the 
likelihood of violence in the perceiver; Donnerstein(1980) 
found that this aggression was more likely to- be directed 
at a woman (the victim in the depiction) than a man. 
Malamuth and Check(1981) found that such depictions also 
facilitated acceptance of rape myths. In a sense then, 
pornography engenders or primes the proclivity to rape. 
Feningstein°s(1979) finding, that men who have just 
engaged in aggression show a . preference for viewing 
violence, completes the cycle. Men want to see violent sex 
which prompts them to behave violenty which triggers a 
desire to see violent sex. The problem with this is that 
it is feedback loop without purpose there is an 
obsession for (sexual) violence and depiction of (sexual) 
violence which is self-con.tained. In line with our 
previous attempts to ground the psychological in a more 
social context, we can suggest that the tenuousness of 
masculinity,· the recursive need to shore it up is what 
underlies this dynamic. 
The main criticism I shall direct at this research is 
that it is too individualistic. In addition to the social 
embeddedness of masculinity, it misses out on the 
collective or group processes that are involved in the 
generation or reinforcement of rape proclivity. Even in 
the case of watching or reading violent pornography, very 
often this is not done alone, but with peers (Root,1984) -
pornography is . a pivot in many groups, a means 
through which women are generally degraded to the benefit 
of the group 9 s masculine social identity. Further, 
Melamuth(1981) does not have a genuine sense of the 
historical. While he documents the recent increase of 
violence in pornography and gender advertising, he does 
not comment on the possible reasons for this. We would 
suggest that this increase is tapping and feeding a 
masculine audience whose identity is~ through a number of 
factors becoming less stable (see Ch.6). 
As _regards the relation.. of this research to T and D 
explanations,, then it does certainly incorporate both. Our 
criticisms have been directed at the quality of the 
dimensionality which this research partly addresses. It is 
not appropriately contextualized in history; indeed, it 
tends towards a biologistic dimensionality in which 
proclivity to rape is placed on a biological 
continuum, reflecting the same basic biological structures 
as opposed to common social conditions. Thus, this 
I 
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research parallels the radical ~eminist analysis 0~ 
rape, as re~lecting biological givens, which we rejected 
in section 2- above. Even so. this is a timely reminder 
that the D form can be used ~or.va~ying ends, and is not 
exclusively tied to socialist ~eminist analysis o~ rape. 
Still, it should also be remarked that it is partly by 
virtue o~ the injection o~ typological interest that the 
dimensional becomes dissociated from the polemical 
practical end. 
iii. Rape Myths and Everyday Discourse. The 
transition 0~ a T to an S explanation is particularly 
evident in the deployment 0~ rape myths. These 
effectively present themselves as typological, as 
embodying the criteria by which to judge whether a rape 
has occurred, whether an alleged rapist is an actual 
rapist; in ~act their primary function is to deny the 
continuity between rape and normality. Here we shall 
consider rape myths at length, as they appear in the 
media, the legal process, in the supposed talk and 
behaviour o~ men. This will serve as an introduction to 
our analysis o~ men 9 s explanation of rape. 
Rape .myths have been considered by various authors (eg 
Schwendinger and Schwendinger,197U; Benn et a1,1983). 
Brownmiller 9 s inde~ proves instructive: the rape victim 
is: a beautiful victim: a masochist; 
so on. The rapist is: a black man; 
a liar; vengeful and 
a lover; biologically 
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driven; heroic. Rape myths apply to the victim, the rapist 
and the act itself. Brownmiller sets out those that apply 
to the victim: 
99 ALL WOMEN WANT TO BE RAPED 00 
00 NO WOMAN CAN BE RAPED AGAINST HER WILL 09 
09 SHE WAS ASKING FOR IT 09 
09 IF YOU 9 RE GOING TO BE RAPED, YOU MIGHT AS WELL 
RELAX AND ENJOY IT 09 
(Brownmiller,1975,p346) 
Benn et al(1983) add to this list: 00 0 All women should be 
pure 0 -women over 60, girls under 16, accreditied virgins 
and indisputably faithful wives are 9 pure 9 • A woman who 
has sex outside marriage is impure ... the more sexual 
freedom she has enjoyed in the past, the less culpable her 
attacker .•. 00 ( p6). Overlapping with both the myths that 
0 All women want to be raped 9 and 9 she was asking for it 9 , 
is the myth that 99 ••• 0 No 9 reallY means 0 Yes 0 -women often 
say 9 no 0 when they mean o yes o • If they lead a man on and 
say 0 no 9 , they probably don°t mean it ... their 
protestations need not be taken too seriously. 09 (Bennet 
al,1983,p6). In contrast to Brownmiller 9 s account of the 
0 relax and enjoy it 0 myth, Benn et al stress the myth that 
0 Dishonour is a fate worse than death 0 • 99 Faced with the 
prospect of rape, a woman has a duty to defend her honour, 
even at risk to her life00 (p7}. These contradictions well 
illustrate the double-bind in which women are placed. The 
0 enjoy it 0 myth is 90predicated in two propositions: (a) 
the inevitability of male triumph and (b) 0 All woman 
want to be raped 0 ••• 90 (Brownmiller,1975.P347). As such it 
is a myth derived from the perpective of the rapist. The 
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0 dishonour 0 myth is grounded in perspective of the injured 
party, namely the male 9 owner 9 • If a woman resists she is 
liable to appear foolish, -unreasonable, contributing to 
her attack, untrue to her true sexuality; if she does not, 
she sullies her honour and those of her relatives, and 
further there is creeping conviction that, in fact, she 
desired the rape: in accusing someone of rape, she is 
merely indulging her feminine spitefulness. Either way, a 
woman cannot win. 
Runni~g parallel with these are the myths concerning the 
rapist (which necessarily reflect on the 0 normal 0 male). 
As we suggested in Chapter 6, a recurring theme of 
masculine sexuality is that it is a biological given, 
which, in arousing circumstances, generates sexual energy 
that surges towards a threshold beyond which there is no 
holding back. Progress towards and beyond this threshold. 
is very often mediated by the appropriate behaviour of a 
woman. Her 0 come ons 0 nudge the man closer and closer to 
that threshold. Once reached, there is no going back; the 
man loses control. In the case of rape, the victim has 
precipitated her own violation. The problem with such a 
formulation is that, when coupled to the ~ 0 No 9 means 
0 Yes 090 myth, it becomes self-fulfilling. Thus, a man who 
monopolizes the meanings of a woman°s behaviour, (ie knows 
better than she does that she wants sex) and is aroused 
through that understanding of her responses, 
effectively edges himself towards that mythical sexual 
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threshold. Accordingly, a struggling woman 
9 teasing 9 , is covertly arousing him to the point where he 
cannot help himself. Simply, this is a means of offloading 
responsibility onto the woman. The opposite side of this 
mythic coin is constituted by those discourses that see 
the rapist as an extreme deviant, who, through some 
genetic defect (or else through dealings with bad women -
see below), manifests the characteristics of what must 
inevitably be described as a monster - something inhuman, 
something that is fully cut off from the mainstream of 
men. 
What I will now do is go through three myths ( 9 No means 
Yes 9 ; 9 All women really want to be raped 9 ; 9 Real rapists 
are .fiend-beasts 9 ) in somewhat more detail to show how 
they are constructed, how they relate to the stereotypical 
traits we treated in Chapter 6, and how they are 
prom~lgated through media and social scientific portrayal. 
It should be mentioned that there is no easy division 
between the first two of these myths (though the first 
stresses women 9 s supposed inability to access their actual 
feelings, while the second emphisizes their wantonness). 
In both cases 9 irrationality 9 and 9 closeness to nature 9 or 
9 objectness 9 have a role in the grounding of these myths 
(eg how can an object reflect? has this,wanton object no 
self-control?). But this also works the other way: what 
is rational/cultural is not exclusively gauged by levels 
of 9 non-naturalness 9 ; it is also alloyed to the capacity 
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to resist and constrain the dangerous sexuality of women 
(eg their ability to swamp men - cf Ch.6). In this 
respect, we can note that the 9 civilized 9 middle classes 
have claimed to be better at controlling this dangerous 
sexuality than the disreputable 9 barbarian 9 working 
classes (Don~elot,1979: Weeks,1981). 
( 1). Irrationality, Wantonness, Sexuality. The mvths 
that will be recounted in this section are essentially 
attempts to explain away rape incidents by placing the 
burden of the· responsibility on the alleged victim; 
they are typological. Particularly amenable in this 
respect is her supposed inherent characteristic of 
irrationality. As we have mentioned, irrationality can 
take on the form of evil: this is usually manifested in 
women 9 s propensity to lie spitefully- for the woman to 
make the whole thing up. To 9 cry rape 9 is an act of 
spiteful vengeance. While this might occur in a small 
minority of cases, the 9 cry rape 9 myth deserves neither 
the weight that is habitually attached to it nor the light 
in which it is often presented (see above)·-
Foucault(1967), formulates the classical apprehension of 
madness, as a circularity. The truth o~ madness is 
constituted in the language of delirium which is 
contrasted with rational language/discourse outside it. 
The analytic discourse of the observer-doctor embodies 
reason and thus ~cts as the standard of reason. Delirium 
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falls outside this sphere in its use of language, in its 
discursive form and content. The circularity consists in 
the incommensurate relationship between the two forms and 
the power of the one (the rational) over the other. The 
rational dict•ates what is true (good, desirable), and, 
because of its power, can demean the irrational, deny it 
voice. This circularity is present in the power relation 
between masculine and feminine/feminist discourses. Thus 
rape can be dismissed by reference to women's putative 
irrationality. When it is claimed that women who say 'No' 
really mean 'Yes', this can often be taken to mean that 
they don't know there own minds; indeed that the rapist 
and his masculine cohorts know these minds better. Another 
example of this monopoly of rationality is found in sexual 
harrassment (Sedley and Benn,1982). There, the meaning of 
harrassment is almost exlusively male-defined. The woman 
who cannot take such treatment (lewd jokes about women, 
sexually loaded physical contact, pornographic posters, 
etc) with a giggle, lacks a sense of humour, is 
irrationally, unreasonably touchy. 
''Women who say· no do not always mean no. It is not just a 
question of saying no, it is a question of how she says 
it, how she shows and makes it clear. If she doesn't want 
it she has only to keep her legs shut" (Judge Wild, 
Cambridge County Court,1982, in Pattullo,1983,p20-21). So, 
there are certain reasonable ways in which·a woman might 
project this 'No'; the implication is that there is a 
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definitive 9 No 9 • But this is simPl¥ not the case even 
this definitive 'No' slides about on a male-defined scale. 
For some victims, is embodied in their ver¥ 
constitution - eg children, old people, the indisputabl¥ 
reputable. For others, such as prostitutes, however the¥ 
might aspire to this 'No', it will rarel¥ be granted them. 
This is because some victims are seen as 9 0pen Territor¥' 
- that is, fair game. In part, this might be because the¥ 
have inadvertent!¥ put themselves at risk. However, as we 
noted previousl¥. this. too is a sign of irrationalit¥. For 
within this discourse, the actions of these women have 
fallen outside the bounds of common sense. ~It is the 
height of impudence for an¥ girl to hitchhike at night. 
That is plain~ it isn't reallv worth stating. She is in 
the true sense asking for it 99 as retired High Court Judge, 
Mel ford Stevenson would put it (Pattu11o,1983,p21). 
However, this impudence is not intrinsic to the women 
concerned; often women resort to such means of 
transport because the¥ cannot afford the alternatives. 
Ha11(1985) found that 50% of her sample who had accepted 
rides had done so because the¥ could not afford public 
transport. This point brings out the class (and race), as 
well as the sexual, blindness of 9 reputable 9 men. 
At issue here is the status of verbal and behavioural 
consent. As w~ remark elsewhere, it is men who seek out 
consent, read ~t into situations where, from the woman's 
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perspective, none exists. Often this seeking is a form of 
harrassment which continues unti1 a recognizab1e consent 
is secured. This 1atter point sheds 1ight on the 
prob1ematic nature of consent. Consent as a T 
criterion, under conditions of harrassment, can become 
schismatic insofar as it effective1¥ uses the utterance of 
consent as the so1e marker of 1egitimacy, as opposed to 
acknowledging the comp1ex of (dimensiona1) factors 
invo1ved in the generation of consent. So the T comes to 
mediate mascu1ine power through an over-rigorous reading 
of the concept of consent. However. as we have mentioned, 
such a strategy has the practica1 payoff of serving to 
identify rapists. U1timate1y, there must be a notion of 
in~ividua1 consent, but it must be du1y sensitive to the 
more subt1e (dimensiona1 insofar as the¥ shade into norma1 
genden re1ation techniques) means by wh~ch it comes to be 
obtained. 
The fo11owing extract i11ustrates the S dep1oyment of 
consent to suggest the cu1pabi1ity of the woman: ~For the 
second time since her abduction twe1ve days previous1y, 
she he1d the 1ife of her bruta1 captor in her hands. She 
g1ared at the man who'd raped and sodomized her repeated1y 
and knew genu~ne hatred. She a1so found herse1f unab1e to 
pu11 the triggern {p35.Detective Fi1es,Nov,1982). The 
tit1e of this 9 artic1e 9 is: ~The Case of the Irresistab1e 
Rape-s1ayer. (Women who survived cam~ back for moreY) 99 • 
Unsurprising1y •. this sensationa11zed account of a 'true 
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story 9 (whether it is actually true or not does not 
matter: it is the .representations of rape that it projects 
that interests us) reeks of the rape myths that women 
want to be raped and that they are subject to a profound 
irrationality. The irrationality of not slaying the 
rape-slayer and freeing herself is due to the fact that 
she is actually enjoying her ordeal. Here, rational 
consent is seen to be corrupted by the wanton, masochistic 
urges of the victim 9 s make-up. Naturally, there is no 
consideration of the mundane possibility that she might 
lack experience and confidence in the use of a gun; that 
if she missed or merely wounded her captor, he would 
punish her; or that she might have background knowledge of 
the police 9 s hostility to rape victims. Rather, it is 
implied that lack of resistance is tantamount to consent, 
if not craving. 
( 2). Rape-Fiend. As we have briefly remarked, the 
rapist comes in two popular forms: either he is generally 
mad (a beast, fiend) and in need of psychiatric treatment 
or confinement; or else he has momentarily lost control, 
overshooting his sexual threshold. We have shown above how 
the latter is often a means of forcing women to shoulder 
the blame for rape. By comparison the former fomulation is 
a mode of marginalizing the rapist, of setting him up as 
an absolute other. This is one of the.. favour! te 
stereotypes oi the press. ~The Beast of Broadmoor gets 
Life99 (Sun,U/10/75. quoted in Smart and Smart,1978) and 
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vvThere is no earthly way to cite the total number of 
beautiful young girls slain by the malevolent entity whovd 
launched his sadistical rampagevv (p22,Detective 
Files.November.1982) are just two examples of the rapist 
as beast/fiend. Smart and Smart(1978) have noted that this 
type of representation is stressed in the press when the 
rape is a stereotypical one in which the victim is 
helpless and virtuous, and in which an extreme amount of 
violence is used. In more complicated cases, it is the 
nature of the victim that comes to the fore. In achieving 
this, various devices are deployed, such as a preference 
for Judges 0 comments as opposed to experts 0 testimony. As 
we have seen. Judges are as prone to conventional (sexist) 
imagery as laypersons. As we . have seen experts would 
present a very different 
profile above). 
picture (cf Amir(1971) Rapist 
Typological analyses however can become· schismatic, ie 
depositing rapists in an exclusive category serves to 
marginalize them; . the act of rape comes to be seen as 
extreme, abnormal - it becomes detached from its social 
bases. This is clear in press reportage with its gross 
individualizing of rape events and its concerns with the 
minutae of the event, as opposed to the social context in 
which it took place (Smart and Smart,1978). However, 
though this sleight of hand is common, it is a measure of 
last resort. For the reputation of the man behind the 
rapist must be salvaged at all but the most expensive 
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costs, expensive ~n the sense that it is only the more 
grotesque rapes that lead to rapist-blame. Thus 
Holl.way(1981) .noted that, in the reporting of the 
Yorkshire Ripper trial., it was intimated that it was 
excusable to murder prostitutes insofar as these women, by 
their .sexual. deviance, constituted a gross provocation to 
Sutcliffe. Further, it was attempted to shift blame onto 
his wife: to this end the image of the hen-pecked husband 
was evoked. We suggested ~n Chapter 6 that madness and 
irrational.i ty. are the prerogatives of women: it is part of 
their nature. Men must be driven forcibly into this state. 
Intoxicants other than women will hav.e the same effect:-
thus the madness of the irresistable rape-slayer, Morin, 
was externally induced for ~He was snorting coke and 
gulp~ng bennies and obviously on the run~ (p35. Det. 
Files,1982). And so the contradiction plays itself out: 
the madman/fiend versus the woman-driven rap~st. Whatever 
the upshot of this contest, the aim to. set the rapist 
apart is never lost sight of. Thus, the finger points to 
his abnormality or his personal. misfortune, but never to 
the potentiality for rape that is intr~nsic to 
masculinity. 
To sum this section up: We have seen how rape myths can 
be used to sever the relation between rape and normal. 
gender functioning. However, this does not map easily onto 
I 
our SJ T a"id D: types. In particular, the D type is used to 
link the putative irrational.~ty or emotionality of women 
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to their role as partly guilty victims. Rape thus becomes 
partially naturalized. The feminist and this 9 macho 9 o 
perspective differ in terms of their normative bent. While 
the feminist locates the seeds of rape in the social 
constitution of gender relation, the 9 macho 9 identifies 
them in the nature of woman (for 9 led on 9 rapes). The 
latter can thus have a typological function: it serves to 
demarcate the 9 1ed on 9 from the 9 extreme violence 9 rapes. 
The former are not 9 rea1 9 rapes; that is, their 
seriousness is attenuated, the continuum of feminine 
irrationality seems only rarely to be extended all the way 
to ·the explosive rape scenario. We will see more example 
of this in the interview material below. In contrast, the 
feminist D perceives both types of rape as situated on the 
same continuum of power relations; it is more dimensional 
in this sense. 
4. Lay Explanations of Rape. 
In the following pages I will overview the social 
psychological research that has been conducted into rape 
explanations. I have divided this into two related types: 
that concern~d with the factors that influence attribution 
in rape, and that which has assessed rape myth acceptance. 
In the context of the present concern with D, T and S 
ideal types, the problem with the former research is that 
by focussing its efforts almost exclusively on jury 
judgements, it has neglected the type of broad, generative 
explanatLon represented by dimensional explanation. In the 
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case of the latter, it has not directly cons~dered the 
role of explanation in the reproduction of rape 
discourse/practices. These will be followed by a 
consideration of men 9 s views on rape as represented in a 
series of interviews, and by an analysis of a book on a 
given. rape case. Both of these illustrate - that the 
complexity _of explanatory strategies and their link with 
practices is somewhat greater than the ideal-typological 
schema developed here allows for. Even .so, such a schema 
affords, us a number of important insights, especially as 
regards the relation of explanation to practice. 
a. Rape Explanation Research. The majority of this work 
has been directed at the relation between explanation and 
the use of various categories of information such as the 
attractiveness of the victim, or her similarity to the 
observer. The informational variables are further 
considered in terms of their relevance to the observer. 
Jones and Aronson(1973) attempted to locate the 
explanation of rape within Lerner 9 s(1970) Just World 
Hypothesis framework. This predicted that, in order to 
ensure that people deserved what they got (ie that Fate is 
just). the more respectable (eg married or a virgin) the 
victim, the greater the need to attribute internally, (in 
this case a momentary lapse in behaviour). Moreover, they 
found that the defendant was given a longer sentence for 
raping a married (respectable) woman as opposed to a 
divorcee. However, Fulero and Delara(1974) provided an 
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alternative interpretation in which Jones and Aronson°s 
results were seen as reflecting defensive attribution 
strategy (Shaver,1970). On this theory, attributions are 
made on the basis of the positive or negative implications. 
for the attributer. Accordingly, Fulero and Delara found 
that if there was similarity between the. victim and the 
observer, then there was less internal attribution to the 
victim. Jones and Aronson°s subjects were not, then, 
responding to respectability per se, but to perceived 
similarity. Sex differences- currently represent one of the 
greater dissimilarities (male observer/offender - female 
observer/victim). Calhoun, Selby and their various 
co-workers have investigated the effect of sex difference 
on rape explanations. Calhoun, Selby and Weng(l.976) found 
that male observers attributed more to victims than d~d 
female observers. Moreover, -this effect was greatest when 
it was known that the victim had been raped previously, 
and where there was a relatively low frequency of rapes 
in the locality. Likewise, this informational 
configuration produced the highest victim blame scores in 
female observers. Selby et al(l.977) have reported more 
evidence in support of this difference, placing female and 
male attributions in the context of their social 
perception of rape incidents in general. They found that 
men :were more generallY-likely to blame the victim. Their 
results were interpreted as being congruent with defensive 
attribution theory, and actor/observer difference analysis 
(Jones and Nisbett,l.972). In line with the latter, Deitz 
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et al(1982) found that empathy with the victim tended to 
lead to a reduction in victim-attribution (cf Ch.2). Other 
variables that have been shown to influence victim-blame 
are: the attractiveness of the victim (Calhoun et 
al,1978); the (British) male observervs traditional versus 
liberal view of gender roles (Howells et a1,198U); the 
observervs attitude to societal norms, locus of control 
and perceptions of potential victimization 
(A1exander,1980). In this last study of nurses' 
explanations and evaluations, it was found that, whereas 
attributions to the victims of beatings were made on the 
basis of actions (which permits leewav for external 
attributions), for rape, attributions were made to the 
victimvs character. (ie stable and internal). In this 
study, the degree _of victim blame was, relative to other 
studies, very low. Nevertheless, all these findings 
suggest that rape events are judged according to the 
perceived merit of the victim. As Sealy and Wain(1980) 
have shown, jurors decisions in.a rape trial appear to be 
unconnected with the defendant; it is the victim who is 
assessed. The opposite was the case when the crime under 
consideration was theft. It would seem, then, that for 
rape the victimvs character is peculiarly salient. 
Luginbuhl and Mu1lin(1981) found that the respectability 
of the victim led to a general decrease in attribution to 
her. suggesting that similarity was not necessarily a 
major contributory factor to attribution. 
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If we consider these studies together, we can see an 
increasing awareness on the part of researchers of the 
ideological influences on the explanation of rape. 
What were originally conceived as generally guided 
explanations (general in the sense that the Just World 
Hypothesis and Defensive Attribution are supposed to be 
broad, pervasive phenomena) , have come to be regarded 
as specific explanations with a particular ideological 
content that relates to a given disposition in the 
observer. An example of this increased sensitivity is 
found in Smith et al(1982) who explained the differences 
in rape attributions between German and American men 
and women in terms of the sexual polarization that is 
occurring in America, but which is less extensive in 
Germany. (Their results were: orderedin decreasing 
likelihood of attribution to the victim: US men, German 
men and women, US women). Theoretical accounts that refer 
to global processes such as Defens~ve Attribution 
presuppose that the blame that subjects seek to avoid is 
legitimate. Rarely do they bring into the open the 
historical and cultural conditions that have led to or 
constrain that legitimacy_ Through their lack of social 
and group analysis, they implicitly posit a universal 
morality: this must be challenged - for it is one of the 
prime modes of ideology. This becomes all the more 
imperious for issues/explanations as contenti.ous as rape. 
Smith et al 0 s findings hint -at how the social field may be 
' 
split up (and this is a continuing process). In looking at 
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the attribution of rape, it is imperative to specify 
the ideological and discursive/practical divisions that 
parcel out blameworthiness, and relate these to the 
subject populations being studied. 
But perhaps, as we noted in the beginning of this 
section. the most important factor is that the studies 
have emphasized the T explanatory form by using the jury 
experimental procedure. If rape explanation are more 
directly -and openly accessed then we are mor.e likely to 
get an indication of whether D explanations are part of 
the respondents' repertoire. Krulewitz and Pa;yne's(1978), 
and Howells et al's(198U) more extreme findings that 
liberal or profeminist men were more likely to blame the 
rapist or social conditions than their conservative 
couterparts suggests that sex-role attitudes might act as 
pointers to the types of explanations subjects are willing 
to use. However, if these are to be expressed there must 
be opportunity within the questionnaires for such a 
link-up. For example, in Howells et al 0 s study, of the 9 
items rated. none explicitly referred to the social 
conditions of emergence of rape; ie typological 
explanations were assumed to be the only ones relevant to 
rape ,explanation. though the authors themselves are 
cl.-early aware of wider implicatins of rape. as their use 
of the 'attitudes to women scale 0 indicates. The same 
point applies to the Krulewitz and Payne study: none of 
the rape attribution scales directly addressed dimensional 
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factors, though they were partially accessed through the 
attitude measures. 
In the next section I will look at the influence of 
various factors on these attitude measures, in particular 
those concerning rape myth acceptance. 
b. Rape MYth Acceptance. In all the above studies, rape 
myth acceptance, however contingent it might be, must 
figure as an intervening variable in rape explanations. 
This is because, in making an attribution to the victim or 
offender. the explainer must assess the victim or offender 
according to some criterion of responsible or normal 
behaviour. Such popular criteria are implicitly set out in 
the various rape. myths we have considered in Chapter 7. As 
we saw with Alexander(1980), nurses 9 attitudes towards 
societal rules and norms were important in the evaluation 
of rape victims. The two main studies from this 
perspective have been by Feild(1978)' and Burt(1980). Feild 
found that a number of background factors plaved an 
important role. in the evaluation of rape. Sex. race and 
marital status were the most important amongst these. As 
we have already noted, men tended to have a more positive 
view of rape than women. Rape crisis counsellors were the 
most hostile to rape in Feild 9 s study. Police officers and 
rapists. did not differ on four out of the eight rape 
dimensions that Feild used. Burt(1980) has made a more 
detailed study of the grounding factors of rape myth 
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acceptance such as personality, life experiences and 
attitudes. Her main aim was to assess whether rape myth 
acceptance could be predicted from attitudes as expressed 
in sex-role stereotyping, adversariaL sexual beliefs, 
sexual conservatism and acceptance of interpersonal 
violence. What she found, and this is in line with 
observations (cf Ch.7), was that the more 
traditional the general sexual views of her subjects, the 
greater the rape myth acceptance. By comparison her 
younger, better educated subjects showed less of these 
attitudinal characteristics. Moreover, the attitudinal 
configurations Burt has uncovered are not related to 
concrete social contexts (eg roles) nor to the way that 
attitude and role functioning serve to re-constitute one 
another. 
As we commented. in the introduction, these two 
approaches, explanation-oriented and attitude-oriented 
respectively, in a way presuppose one another. 
Explanations require some background attitudes, and those 
background attitudes will often find expression in rape 
explanations. However, even combining these two approaches 
(as Howells et al,198U, attempt to do) does not meet our 
requirements for an appropriately contextualized analys~s 
of rape explanation. The problem stems from the fact that 
both these approaches are highly individualist. By this I 
mean that the antecedent factors to rape myth acceptance 
and rape explanations are mostly sited in the individual. 
This of course ignores such influences as the demands of 
roles and group membership, and the relevance of such 
-explanation and acceptance to the power and identity of 
those subjects. As regards the latter, the use of rape 
myths needs to be seen as a mediator of power 
against/over women and (such as the 
rape-fiend), but also as a recursive support of the 
ideologies, group processes, 
power. 
roles, etc that mediate this 
In this chapter we have not dealt directly with these 
latter aspects, except at one stage removed, at the level 
of motive as encapsulated in our three ideal types. To 
summarize this section: these studies on rape attribution 
and rape attitudes have addressed the discursive element 
of rape explanation, but have failed to realistically 
attach it to practice. By focussing on the 9 motives 9 , or 
the practical facets of the discourses, -we can better 
embed these attitudes and explanations in their 
appropriate matrices. I will not be .attempting this for 
the studies cited as the use of vignettes and scales has 
overly constrained subjects 9 responses. Rather, I will be 
using interview material that I have gathered in which 
subjects were given considerable room to expand on what 
they considered to constitute rape, as well as to provide 
detailed background and biographical information. 
c. Interviews. ,These interviews were conducted with the 
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aim of illustrating the interaction of S, T and D ideal 
type~ of explanation in men 9 s expressed views of rape. 
Further, given that I have characterized these types as 
incorporating particular ranges of practice (ie S implies 
a sexist practice; T reflects a practical identification 
and removal of culprits; D designates a practice geared 
towards broad social change), then these interviews can 
also serve to indicate the types of specific practice that 
interviewees are involved in and to show how they are 
supported or otherwise by their statements on rape, men 
and women. These interviews are not meant to be 
representative, of the population at large: and the 
validity of my interpretations is certainly open to 
revision given this early and tentative stage. 
·Nevertheless, they can be viewed as broadly illustrative 
of the . way that explanations are integrated into the 
.matrix of of discourse/practices relating to the biography 
(or portion thereof) of the respondents. In- fact, as 
mentioned previously, I am particularly interested in that 
aspect of the biography that draws on the general role of 
9 man 9 • Here, how individuals characterize themselves as 
men will be shown to vary dramatically, but it will also 
become apparent that their manly role does, by and large, 
square with their explanations of rape. 
There were twelve men in all participating in 10 
interviews,. of . which one involved a group of three. The 
men were either' acquaintances or friends of acquaintances. 
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The reason for this was that, given the relatively 
intimate natur• of the subject matter to be discussed, it 
was felt that individuals were more likely to 9 open up 9 
wi-th someone they knew or knew of. Even so, in one of the 
interviews it was clear that the subject was not really 
willing to talk, or even to speculate. The men were drawn 
from a variety of walks of life, and an attempt was made 
to access a range of views. 
30 minutes to three hours. 
Interviews took anything from 
Table One sets out length, 
interviews. The interviews 
date and place of the 
were semi-structured or 
focussed (as broadly defined by Kidder,1981). Questions 
were not pre-worded, and their open/closedness and 
in/directness (Cannell and Kahn,1968) were left up to the 
interviewer 9 s discretion. Inevitably this means that the 
comparability of the interviews is problematic, but it 
allows us to access the peculiarities and subtleties of 
the individual respondents in a more sensitive manner. In 
keeping with the focussed procedure, a set of topic areas 
was decided on beforehand. These were usuallY covered in 
the following· sequence, (though there was some overlap, 
particularly in the latter topic areas): 
1. Per~onal details: (Age, occupations past and 
present, hobbies, class identification,· education, 
political and ~eligious affiliation, etc). 
2. Perceptions of and relations with 
men: .(Friends; where they meet; activities; what dis/like 
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about male company; what types of men are there?). 
3. Perceptions of and relations with women: (Types 
of women; what dis/l~ke about women, whether having 
sexual relationship with them or not; how talk to/treat 
women: how mix with men friends; financial arrangements). 
4. Views on and explanations. of .rape: (Definition 
of rape; who commits it; who suffers it; when, where, how 
does it happen; where place responsibility generally and 
in given instances; how stop it, etc). 
This, then, was the checklist to be covered: in the 
the finer detail of the interviews, it was attempted to 
follow up the the interviewee 9 s own predilections. 
We can reiterate that these interviews were not intended 
-to be representative but illustrative, exploring the ways 
that our ideal types are packaged and juggled in the 
process of explanation and comment. The interviews were 
recorded, 
their S, 
partly transcribed and analyzed in terms of 
T and D content, and the degree to which 
perceptions of and relations to women and men were 
consistent with such content. The alignment of types with 
9 radical 9 or traditional masculinity that became apparent 
was not meant to reflect rigorous categories: the final 
analysis emerged from an overall impression of the 
interviewee 9 s position. As ever. this is open to revision. 
The complexity and subtlety of the interviewees' 
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responses tended to undermine the somewhat coarser picture 
presented in the feminist literature. For example, the use 
of rape myths was relatively restrained. Few of the men 
spontaneously applied them, and those who did, did so 
circumspectly or else, in the process of interview, 
qualified them. In addition the interviews revealed 
rather more self-relfection and even a 0 lack of 
confidence 9 in·men than they are usually given credit for. 
However, this might have been due to the quirks of our 
sample which, on the whole, had a relatively high level of 
education (4 graduates; two of the 0 bikers 0 had over 5 
0-levels), and was undoubtedly politically leftward 
leaning. Below, I will first go through two sets of 
interviews with the (perhaps over-provocatively named) 
0 bikers 0 and th.e 9 radicals 9 , summarizing and illustrating 
their explanatory stance on rape and the ways that this 
fits in with more general views and reported practices. 
Subjects 
HL 
FC 
TM 
NS 
GF 
BI 
CD BS} 
JG 
HT 
sx 
NO 
TABLE ONE 
Details of Interviews 
Date Period Place 
3/3/86 2hr Psychology Dept, Durham. 
4/3/86 I 1.5hr Interviewee 0 s home 
7/3/86 2hr 00 00 
9/3/86 2.5hr 00 00 
13/3/86 2.5hr 00 90 
13/3/86 3hr Interviewer 0 s home 
16/3/86 30mins Mutual acquaitance 0 s home 
20/3/86 3hr 00 00 00 
21/3/86 2hr Interviewee 0 s workplace 
21/3/,86 1.5hr 00 09 
The rest of the interviews will be briefly considered in 
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the 1ight of these two 0 po1ar 0 positions. Phrases in 
quotation marks are verbatim statements from the 
interviews. Initia1s and p1ace names have been changed. 
(1a) HL (24, a photoprinter, from and resident in 
Thur1ey, County Durham). His main interest is motrobikes 
and membership of the 1oca1 bike c1ub. Most of his friends 
share this same interest. Educated up to 0-1eve1 standard, 
and having gained his City and Gui1d 0 s as a p1ater, he has 
various1y worked as p1ater, a civi1 servant, and a 
caretaker. Po1itica11y he is 1eftwing though disi11usioned 
with both the Labour Party and his 1oca1 union. 
HL 0 s overriding priority is motorcyc1ing and much of his 
time, effort and money goes towards this pursuit: for him 
00 i t 0 s a way of 1ife00 • Bikes and bikers come first, before 
women; it is c1ear that he thorough1y enjoys and seeks the 
company of his fe11ow bikers. When asked whether there was 
anything he dis1iked about his group of c1ose biking 
friends (which he numbered at about 50), he cou1d think of 
nothing. However, within the group, because of gir1friends 
and marriage, members were "dropping off 1ike f1ies". 
Women were 1arge1y seen as a dampener on the activities of 
the group, whether in th pub or, though 1ess so, when out 
camping: in the presence of women, the men were 1ess 
they had to constrain their behaviour. HL 
stated that he preferred it when women were not present. 
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In untramme~led male company, talk mostly revo~ved around 
bikes. mickey-taking and women. The objectifying talk 
about women {eg ~Look at 
according to HL simply talk. 
the arse on that~) was, 
On the whole, HL and his 
friends would only approach women who were likely to fit 
in with the group. that is, who were sympathetic to the 
biking way of life. For HL this was vitally important; any 
girlfriend had to fit in with the group; if she did not, 
sooner or later she would be ejected. Further, any 
girlfriend of HL 9 s had to meet certain criteria of good 
looks. criteria which were public. those of the group, 
rather than personal ones, (~I wouldn 9 t be seen dead 
walking around Durham with a dog 99 - Dog: an ugly woman). 
His current girlfriend. who had recently had a baby, 
certainly fitted in with his crowd, but he felt 
uncomfortable with her because of the threat of being tied 
down ( 99She 9 s still very good to me, even though I won 9 t 
admit it. She won 9 t take- money off us 99 ). When it came to 
personal problems, HL would always rather seek support 
from his male friends (though he jokingly suggested that 
.this was because he got the answers he wanted to hear from 
~hem). In contrast, he felt suffocated by some of the 
women he had been involved with. As far as he could see, 
no-one could be happily married. As regards domesticity, 
he loathed it: four or five night a week he sti~l had his 
tea round at his mother 9 s. 
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On the topic of rape, his immediate response was to 
derogate reports that it was a regular occurrence in the 
biking fraternity. In most instances, the women were 
likely to be part of it c~what 0 s a lass doing there in the 
first p1ace 90 ). His definition of rape involved 00Somebody 
who puts a gun to sobebody 0 s head and says drop your 
knickers ... that 0 s rape, but apart from that I don°t think 
half of it 0 s rape00 ). He emphasized the physical difficulty 
of raping a woman, of 00.getting her wet enough 00 • In 
add~tion, a lot of women ~ask for it~ by the way they act 
and dress ( 00getting lads to buy her drinks all night~). In 
response to the question of whether women °cry rape 0 , he 
estimated that perhaps 30% were false allegations, mostly 
because the woman did not want to be labelled a ~slag~, 
especially if she 0 d been drunk. In this context, HL 
stressed that whether a man was negligent as to the 
woman°s consent was immaterial; the presence of a physical 
threat was the defining characteristic - after all, he 
noted, it ~doesn°t take much struggle to stop a rape~. 
When asked whether anything justified hitting a woman, he 
responded that nothing did. Later, he argued that women 
were 09dirty sods 00 and implied that their liking for sex 
might lead them to saying oNoo and meaning 0 Yes 0 • In his 
own experience, he found that ignoring the owoo did not 
result in any subsequent complaints. Men who raped were 
either ~psychos 09 or had lost sexual control. Finally, as 
regards the feminist view of rape as an expression of 
gender power relations, he was thoroughly dismissive: rape 
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involved a loss of sexual control. Dominance was not very 
important because ~you get dominant lasses~. 
For HL, women were less important than the group. This 
might have been a response to his current. circumstances 
and the perceived threat to his independence. 
Nevertheless, he continually stressed the importance of 
the pleasure and camaraderie that he derived from his 
biking life 
unacceptable. 
and 
He 
that 
did 
any constraint on that was 
not seem to see the woman 9 s 
adaptation to his group as being an imposition on the 
woman. A sense of helplessness came through in his talk on 
rape. Women_ led men on until they lost control and this 
was the woman 9 s fault. There was no D e.lement (in our 
sense) to his view of rape. Rape was typologically 
characterized either by the 9 loss of control 9 motif or by 
extreme physical threat. The continued emphasis on the 
loss of control, plus the overt denial of the link between 
rape and normal gender relations suggest that. hi~ typology 
was very likely schismatic. Perhaps the best insight into 
this comes from his characterization of women as dirty 
sods (~lads do all the talking about it(sex), girls want 
it~). partly asking for it, partly deserving it; that 
is, women are often the responsible party. Here D is used 
to suggest that 9 led on 9 rapes had their source in the 
wantonness of women, but simultanously, 
considered real rapes. As we noted above, 
these were not 
the D has here 
been deployed typologically, to identify rapes as those 
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entailing gross violence. 
( 1b). The interview with BU. JG and HT was conducted at 
HL 9 s home as they were all friends of his. He was present 
at the interview though did not contribute. BU (25. a 
motor mechanic, 6 0-levels). JG (23, a motorcycle 
mechanic, 2 0-levels), and HT (23, a driver-handyman, 7 
0-levels) were long-time residents of Thurley, and like HL 
fanatic bikers. Their interests were very similar to HL 9 s 
and they likewise stressed the importance of the group to 
them as individuals. However, their views on women 
differed markedly. BU didn 9 t want his lovers to look like 
9 slags 9 , (his current girlfriend did look like a slag, but 
did not behave like one, 
women should be loyal, 
ie was unioval). To his mind, 
there if needed, and should not 
make demands on you. He did not think that he could change 
for a woman. By comparison, HT felt that he could change 
substantially for the right woman who must be intelligent, 
evidenced in her capacity ~to know when to shut up~. This 
desired girlfriend must also be reliable. JG felt that he 
could not really change for a woman, although it was 
possible. A·discussion ensued in which BU suggested that a 
man could be changed by a woman who would ~wear you down 
over a period 99 • Fortunately , if 99you look out for it, ;you 
could. change back again~. 
As with HL, it was important that an;y girlfriend fit in 
with the group. HT couldn 9 t stand women 9 s 99 •• 9 all you ever 
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talk about is bikes 0 routine ... ~. But preferable to the 
presence of acceptable women, was their absence. The¥ all 
agreed with BU 0 s point that they would ~never be able to 
talk like this 00 (to me) in front of women, in part because 
of the fear that the women would 00 blow it up out of all 
prox;>ortion °0 • 
In a parallel vein to HL, their sexual sights were aimed 
at the strictly attainable: women with a similar taste for 
jeans, etc. But all felt themselves to lack any techniQue 
in attracting women. Women who were particularly disliked 
were slags who ~get their tits out~. According to BU, this 
was all right as long it was someone else 0 s lass. The 
others were in sympathY. Of men, trendy, handsome and 
poser (effeminate;Ly dressed especially) types were 
reviled. In a conversation about posers, they emphasized 
their own basic, practically-oriented dress.This led to a 
vitriolic diatribe against homosexual and particular!¥ 
bisexual men (who 00 betray our sex90 ) • which BU saw as a 
reflection of decadent social decline (he later likened 
the incidence of rape to a similar decadent taste for the 
unusual). As regards the emotionality of men and women, 
views diverged. BU thought that the prevailing balance 
between women°s greater emotional expressivity and men°s 
emotional reticence was ~about right~. JG and HT thought 
that it would .be a good thing if men expressed their 
emotions more openly. 
As regards rape, there was uniform condemnation of it; 
they saw it as "taking something forcibly o.ff of somebody 
who doesn' want to give it ... generally it involves sex"-
JG. Catration was not good enough for rapists: BU thought 
that the punishment of rapists should reflect the fact 
that their victims were scarred for life. There was 
speculation as to whether tattooing 'Rapist' across the 
forehead of the convict or mutilation were suitably 
extreme, matching the permanence of rape trauma. BU found 
that even harrassment of women upset him, especially when 
he thought that it might happen to his girlfriend, or when 
he thought of its obverse, of "an old woman grabbing your 
knackers". He also went on to note that lots of men get 
raped too, and that was probably worse for them than for 
women. JG thought that men and women rape victims suffered 
about the same. 
On the whole, rapists were viewed as unbalanced ("though 
that's no excuse" BU). JG, however, stressed that "you 
don't know commits rape", anyone might be a rapist. This 
was not so much a D comment, as a statement of the view 
that there were fel•J outwards signs of imbalance. Wher• 
asked whether they themselves could commit rape, all three 
thought not. BU suggested that physical rejection allied 
to the perceived right to have sex led to frustration and 
the actions of going out and taking it (ie rape). For HT, 
rapists were not simply sexually frustrated, they must 
also be sadistic. JG noted that frustration could be 
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relieved by going to a prostitute, therefore the violence 
of rape must be the attraction. All agreed that however 
aroused a man was, that this was no excuse to commit 
rape. On the issue of women°s culpability. they estimated 
between 10 and 30% were false rapes. On the whole, they 
thoroughly condemned rape, including ~hat occurring in 
marriage. (HT: ~There 0 s no automatic right to sex in 
marriage 00 ). 
To s.top rape, the tattoing and mutilation ideas 
resurfaced: but the deterrent effect was felt to be 
minimal as rape was supposed to be largely a spontaneous 
affair. All felt that any woman could get raped,.though 
JG remarked that some women lead men on and deserve it. 
Yet for BU. even where it is 00 cockteasers 00 who are raped, 
0~i t 0 s the bloke 0 s faul t 00 - 00 they don ° t deserve it 0 but 
they bring it on themselves 00 • He then went on to 
explicitly distinguish between °0leading men on rapes'' and 
opportunist rapes. HT thought that teasers were asking 
for it. especially if they ~picked the wrong bloke~. BU 
felt that women should not be constrained by fear of rape. 
Now. clearly this interview is not wholly compatible with 
the others; nevertheless it does show how 0 secure 0 male 
company can shape explanations. In this case, initial 
statements often became progressively liberalized in the 
course of. discussion between the interviewees (in which I 
Page 347 
tried to participate as little as possible). Certainly, in 
comparison to HL 9 s statements. the views expressed here 
were somewhat less traditional (though, of course, this 
may be.because HL is more traditional). Still, certain 
underlying threads can be extracted. While they made the 
same points about the groups as HL. with regard to women, 
the emphasis was more on their independence from women, 
despite their demands. than on the due exacted by women 
that HL complained about. However, women were still 
subservient to the group: they would not be allowed to 
unduly disrupt it. Rape was divided into two types: the 
9 led on and lost control 9 rape was ambivalently regarded -
while the man was blame.d, the woman 9 s culpability as 
enticer was also pointed out. It was never mooted that the 
man might be pressurizing the woman, or interpreting 
signals for his own ends. Nevertheless. as a type of rape 
it was condemned. albeit problematically. MY own feeling 
was that it was regarded as inferior (less serious than) 
to the iend-beast rape. It was the fiend-beast rape that 
was borne in mind when the various punishments were being 
described or when it was deemed impossible that they 
themselves might rape. On the whole the typological 
explanations made no attempt to deny continuity, except 
when it came to confronting the possibility thatthey 
themselves might become rapists. As we shall see below, 
those interviewees who held to a feminist-dimensional view 
of rape certainly admitted to their own potential to rape. 
Thus, despite the apparent concern with the practicalities 
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of catching rapists there is also likely to be a schimatic 
edge to the typological. The disgust at rape, and the, 
perhaps too ready, identification with the victim(as 
manifested in the discussion regarding male rape) as 
opposed 
leaning. 
to the offender suggests a more schismatic 
This will come into relief below where the 
0 bikers 0 are compared to the 0 radicals 0 • 
( 2A). FC (28, a self-employed builder, ex-graduate, 
originally from Middlesborough but currently living in 
Evefield, Co. Durham) had been involbed in anti-sexist 
men°s groups for several years and was politically active 
(an anarcho-syndicalist). A libertarian or socialist 
feminist analysis seemed integrated into his general 
perceptions of himself, his relationships and gender. 
However, 
women°s 
he was sometimes annoyed by what he saw as 
occasional lack of confidence• though he 
contrasted this with men°s lack of sensitivity. As a 
result he felt he couldn°t be as open with men; they were 
often too pushy for his liking. As regards rape, he was 
fully aware of the feminist-D view of rar;>e as the extreme 
version of normal/patriarchal gender relations. 
Correspondingly, he explicitly recognized the potential in 
himself to rape. Even. so, in the course of the interview 
the D came to confuse the T. Thus. on being asked to state 
what differentiated rapists from other men, he answered 
that it was only that ~ •. rapists had actuallv done it~. 
When pressed, he elaborated that it depended on ~how 
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alienated they were from womenvv though all men were v•just 
very tuned ~n to female vu1nerabi1ityvv. Thus. for FC, rape 
was a social problem with the patriarchal ground rules and 
masculine socialization setting up the conditions for 
rape. Dealing with rapists was. then, almost secondary. 
Certainly they had to be taken out of circuLation and 
treated. but the important thing was social change. The 
amabivalence again appeared as regards the possibility 
that some women might very rapev. FC primarily saw this as 
an ideological ploy, though later he stressed that women 
had to be interrogated to ensure that the man was guilty. 
Subsequently he remarked that very rapev events. in the 
face of the numbers of unreported rapes were vvby the byvv. 
Again, the individual case, that would reguire T 
explanations was down played for the pruposes of 
emphasizing the D continuity of rape. It was apparent that 
the interviewee felt uncomfortable when confronted with 
the typological vpracticalities 9 , possibly. because he had 
not fully articulated them. 
(2b). In contrast. GF (37. currently a Research Associate 
and simultaneously engaged in completing his doctoraxe. 
Originally from Kinrow, now resident in Evefield) clearly 
summarized these two moments. Like FC he is politically 
sophisticated, though. partly because of this. he finds 
his political activity limited. To the domain of sexual 
politics, he has likewise devoted much thought. Though 
generally enjoying male company. he finds its frequent 
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competet i veness abho.rren t. However, he was unwilling to 
divide men and women cleanly along gender lines. He had 
perceived the same qualities in men and women and saw any 
differenti.tion as largely the result of social imposition 
( 99 the same things are there. but because of different 
frameworks, these are articulated differently ... ~). In 
discussiong his relations with women, he noted that he had 
previously divided these into the purely sexual. (ie the 
emotionallY uninvolved) and their opposite: this division 
he was no longer willing to uphold. But even when he had 
adhered to this schema, his sometime use of emotional. 
blackmail. to pursuade women to sleep with him, had made 
him feel. ve~y guilty. On the issue of rape, he could thus 
draw out two types: the 9 emotional blackmail. 9 and the 
rapist-fiend types. He considered the latter to be 
primarily elements in the process of rationalizing and 
marginalizing rape. Like FC, he stressed the continuity 
between rape and normal. sexuality, and admitted a 
potential. to rape in all men, including himself. However, 
unlike FC, the differentation of rapists did not come down 
to circumstance or opportunity; rather, ~there must be a 
dif~erence.~.but it is the potential. that is important, in 
rapists that potential is developed over a period of 
time 99 • GF emphasized that if one starts off categorizing 
rapists and non-rapists, one ends up blurring the 
continuity. Granted that around the individual. rape act 
parameters have to be drawn in order to 99decide what 
you 0 re going to do with them (rapists) •.. But at a basic 
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level ... the potential is there ~n all men~. 
So, ~n terms of our ~deal types, GF articul.ated all D, T 
and S (when the continuity is blurred) types. The a~ms of 
h~s rel.at~ons with women, in particul.ar his practical 
attempts to ensure that these are not alienated or 
superf~cial, are reflected in his comments on his own 
potential. to rape. Th~s we found, in a less explicit form, 
in FC 9 s talk. We can now contrast the 9 bikers 9 s 9 views 
with those of the 9 radicals 9 • What is immed~atel.y striking 
is that the 9 radicals 9 are wirling to admit to and combat 
what they see as their own potential to rape, whereas for 
the 9 bikers 9 ,where rape potential is admitted (HL), it is 
downplayed, or else they do not acknowledge such potential 
in their psychological make-up. Here we see how the D 
expl.anat~on has a different pract~cal implicat~on from the 
T/S; by placing the self in a position of partial 
responsibility (in the reproduction of necessary gender 
relations, etc), D suggests that the individual must act 
in such a way that women are not object~fied,etc: indeed, 
that they are given the space to act autonomously. Both FC 
and GF r~marked on this. By contrast, the 9 bikers 9 
insisted that women had to fit in with their lifestyle in 
which, it appeared, they had relatively low status. Any 
counter-demands on the part of women were interpreted as 
unreasonable or even oppressive. Conversely, male company 
was seen as unproblematic: no l.inks were drawn between the 
objectifying talk about women (~look at the arse on that~ 
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- JG) and the underlying conditions o~ rape. 0~ course, 
while both FC and GF avoided and sometimes challenged 
situations which generated such talk, this does not mean 
that they themselves had ceased to think in such terms. It 
might be 
opportunity 
th~ 
for 
I 
case that they were minimizing the 
themselves to fall into the old traps; 
alternatively, they could simply have been rehetorically 
voicing their idealized selves. HL, JG. BU and HT 0 s 
preference ~or the absence of women (and their 
censoriousness) at group gatherings suggests that such 
talk was positively valued, whether that be so because 
they genuinely enjoyed viewing women in such a way. or 
because it ser~ed as a medium with which to bind the 
group. The division between °bikers 0 and 0 r-adicals 0 was 
I 
further illust;rated by their respective views on what 
should be done to rapists. For the 9 radicals 0 this was 
essentially a side-issue: social change was the only true 
remedy. failing that. humane treatment. For the 0 bikers 9 , 
it seemed that extreme punishment was the pre~erred 
option. In the former,. sel~-change was a precursor to 
social change; 1in the latter. it did not feature at all. 
As we noted above, this division is artificial and the 
polarity of views is, in part, an outcome o~ the ideal 
types with which we have analysed the interviews. Even so, 
there do seem to be substantive dif~erences between the 
' 
two 9 grouping~ 9 ; all the other interviews ~all somewhere 
in between. Al~o, by way o~ reiteration, we can note that 
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the 9 bikers 9 held views that were considerably more 
complicated than might have been attributed to them on the 
basis of feminist portrayals of men. 
(3a). NS (32. managing director of a garage, lived all 
his life in Myburn, Co. Durham), while lacking the 
9 theoretical expertise 9 of GF and FC. has come to similar 
conclusions. Thus, the most important criterion as to 
whether a rape has been c.ommi tted is whether a woman has 
said 9 No 9 which has then been ignored. However ambiguous, 
whatever her state, that 9 No 9 had to be respected. He 
further differentiated between extreme violence and 9 led 
on 9 rapes, and considered that punishment should reflect 
the differing degrees of severity, with rapists of the 
latter ty.pe perhaps 99 doing a form of community service99 , 
while violent rapists should 99get psychiatric treatment 99 • 
Certainly. he felt that rapists were either . 99 suffering 
from mental illness 99 or perhaps 99 trying to get back at 
their mother~~ or else ~were afraid o~ rejection~. Thus 
there was a T distinction to be made for extreme forms of 
rape; there was something generally wrong with those sorts 
of men. However, there was an ambiguity concerning the 
the lenient punishment he 
suggested implies that such men were perhaps not so much 
at fault; and yet. NS himself, in keeping with his view 
that women 9 s integrity had to be respected, felt he could 
not rape. It would seem th·at a partial connecting thread 
between rapists and 9 normals 0 had been traced by NS, but 
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that he had not extended it to the normal as personified 
by himself. 
developed. 
That is. the D. element was not fully 
(3b) •. TM (37. a mucisian and music teacher. resident in 
Forrest ley, Co. Durham), like FC and GF, adopts a 
dimensional view: ~Most men could do it ..• It~s within me 
to do it ... ~~. but is less explicit as regards the 
theoretical basis of rape in patriarchal gender relations. 
The violent rapist will not just be suffering from sexual 
frustrat:i:on, but also from ~insecurity, dominance ... he 
will have something against women~. Unlike the more 
materialist emphases of GF and · Fe. TM pinpointed ~~the sex 
industry9~ as a major component in the production of rape, 
engendering sexual frustration especially in ~~the not very 
good looking guy whose bombarded by titillating stuff 99 • It 
is a ~change of consciousness~ that is required to fight 
rape. This perspective was echoed again in another 
context: as a trainee teacher he. had been warned not to be 
alone in a class room with some of the older girld lest he 
be accused of rape. When asked why schoolgirls should 
resort to this, he replied that it might be to make an 
overbearing teacher suffer. In other words, he saw this as 
an individual incident and not as an instance of a 
genrealized, gender power struggle. so. while TM was 
certainly aware of the continuity, it was not clearly 
formulated: D was present but was no~ correlated in any 
consistent way with the T as in GF 9 s case, or confused as 
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with FC. 
(3c). ND (36, co-ordinator on an MSC scheme, originally 
from Yorkshire, resident in Co. Durham for 6 years) 
provided an interview which was somewhat more problematic. 
His evident familiarity and ostensible sympathy with 
feminism was undercut by his unease in dealing with 
feminist ideas and by the occasional slip ( 99 ••• but most 
women like to keep the home tidy ... (referring to 
himself)chauvinist pig (laughter) ..• ~). The qualifying 
afterthought was reminiscent of the 
balance-as-counterweight (Billig,1982) tactic and appeared 
in several places. At other points it seemed that his 
familiar! ty with feminism had more dubious ends ( 99 There is 
especially today, a sort of protection for yourself about 
what your view is about women and what she should do, 
because there is so much about it in the press and TV~). 
As regards rape, statements that incorporated versions of 
rape myths .came to be toned down in retrospect by a more 
feministic analysis. Thus sexual frustration was 
considered a major component in rape only to be downplayed 
when he remembered that many 99 rapists have normal sexual 
relations 99 • On the whole, he found it difficult to 
characterize rapists, though he eventually settled on 
their 99 disturbed mind 99 • In the case of explicitly ~led 
on~ rapists, he believed that women could provoke men by 
the way they di:"essed ( 99 lt is very provocative (laughing) 
when you see a girl with very beautiful legs and low cut 
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blouse and she 9 s sitting there in the pub 99 ), but then 
partiallv retracted by add~ng ~But I don 9 t know what 
rapists 9 minds are like, some might go for ones that are 
nuns (laughter) .•. 99 • So, despite the fem~nist sentiments, 
these were not extended to rape. At one stage it seemed as 
if the dimensional was indeed present when he stated, in 
response to a question as to how to stop rape, that ~Each 
individual should be made more aware of what rape was 
about~. As it turned out, the 9 individuals 9 referred to 
women who should be educated about safety and how to avoid 
rape. In a parallel sense, in dealing with rapists the 
emphas~s was on the varietv of rapists on their 
individual problems. Thus, though humanely dealt with 
(~get them to do a useful job ... therapies~). the problem 
was set in typological terms; D, as an explication of 
cont~nu~ty. was absent. 
(3d). SX (30, community art~st, prev~ously in the Army 
for 3.5 years, born and currently living in MYburn) 
views as regards women that were openly expressed 
schismatic. Women were divided into those who were 
interested in casual, qu~ck-turnover sex, and those who 
were _not. In the army, though he had indulged in 
un~nvolved sex, he was generally more inclined to 
long-term relations. Even so, the quantitative view 
persisted: thus, when talk~ng about being on leave with 
h~s fiance who would not have sex until after marriage, 
given that he was getting sex fairly regularly in the 
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army, this meant that 00you were missing out on your 
batting average 00 • In his view, women were to be respected: 
even in casual sex there had to be mutual agreement. As 
regards men, he got on with most types though he disliked 
arrogant 
throroughly 
regulating, 
and ~gnorant ones. In the army, which he 
enjoyed, he found the group was self 
dealing with members who got out of hand 
itself. The camaraderie and the feedback he still sought, 
presently from a local football team of which he was a 
member. It was this need for feedback that meant that he 
could· not rape: reciprocation was vi tal to him now. For 
SX, ·rapes involved extreme brutal! ty; the rapist must 00get 
a kick out of violence~ for it could not be simply sexual 
there· was always prostitutes or masturbation. 9 Led on 9 
rapes were of another order: in these a man had reached 
the ~point of no return~ at which it is ~probably the 
hardest thing in the world to say OK ... switch off ... 09 • 
However, this was not the fault of the woman; the most 
important element was the type of man. The 0 type of man 9 
is also important as a protector of women. When asked who 
could get raped, SX felt that it was mostly women who did 
·not have a husband or a boyfriend who could take revenge 
on the rapist. Thus, in a sense, it was men who determined 
how women were to be treated, but not in a sociological 
sense reflecting power relations; rather, as individuals 
who were more or less good. In terms of our own analysis, 
the D emerged as a continuum of sexual tolerance, which, 
it was implied, was biologically determined. Those men 
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with low tolerance were more prone to rape. The 
typological was asserted through men~s biologically 
differing capacities to resist sex. Here, D serves to 
excuse men as a whole (whereas for the ~radicals 9 men had 
to take more responsibility), serving as a spectrum of 
reasonableness., The types who transgress happen to be 
different by virtue of an unusual sexual biology; their 
unreasonableness is a hiccup in a system otherwise all 
right. 
(3e). BI ( U3, a painter and printmaker, originally from 
Hartlepool, now living in Vinemoor, Co. Durham) is clearly 
deeply involved in his art, and the majority of his 
activities contribute to and are guided by dt. His 
interests are wide including philosophy, the occult, 
politics, art, my.sticism and so on. Partly because of 
this, what he cannot abide in either men or women is 
narrow-mindedness. His view of men and women is on of 
complementarity the one completes the other ( 99 woman is 
the other half of oneself ... that~s what I 9 ve been looking 
for, the other half of myself all my life ... it 9 s like a 
poetic woman ... you never really find her 99 ). As a result he 
feels himself to be vulnerable; though he acknowledges 
that his artistic way of life is liable to suffocate his 
partners. Outside the personal domain. he believes that 
socially women are equal, if not, in fact, in a superior 
position (he cites the examples of Thatcher and the high 
numbers of:women who hold exhibitions and run galleries as 
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indicative of this trend). Nevertheless, he is for the 
women°s movement, though he resents being got at by women, 
especially over his use of words (eg Man for Humanity). 
Further, he finds that women°s groups tend to be cliquish 
and too middle c.lass. Women who dress in masculine fashion 
he finds unattractive: for BI, it is a pose, dishonest. In 
BI 0 s eyes, androgyny is the ideal (the figures in his 
paintings reflect this). When it comes to rape, he defines 
it as physical violation, the cause of which is 
pornography and the quasi-pornography of advertising. 
These heighten the sexual urge and, with the additional 
stress of urban confinement, lead to rape. This socially 
inclined analysis is tempered wi~h a more biological 
perspective: 00 in nature, the male takes the female 
violently in a sense ... is that what is coming out? the 
animalness in man in this confined situation .•. because of 
.advert ising ... tantalizing dress of women? 00 • He noted that 
any women could get raped, and speculated that rapists 
were men who were ~absolutely lonely~. though this varied. 
The act of rape had to involve threat of serious violence 
simply because of the physical difficulty of subduing a 
woman. In ~led on~ rapes, BI was adamant that 00 once she 
says 0 No 0 then that 0 s it 00 , though later he accepted the 
suggestion that sometimes 0 No 0 means 0 yes 0 , though it was 
possible to tell such cases apart; personally he relied on 
intuition •. He felt that he could not rape. 
The larger part of the interview was taken up with BI 9 s 
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general view of people and the world; as regards the 
broader relations between women and men, it was the 
spiritual perspective that prevailed. The complementarity 
of the sexes tended to blur the power relations that exist 
between them. Thus rape is primarily sexual -for AH~ the 
social ingredient feeds into the natural, 
unproblematically differential sexual urges of women 
and men, as opposed 
constituted at outset. 
to those urges being socially 
This emphasis was reflected in his 
disagreements with feminism which he sees as, through its 
oppositional stance, deflecting from the essential 
mutuality of the sexes. His view of rape is conditioned by 
and feeds into this position. Rape is a violation of the 
mutuality of the sexes and therefore must be categorized 
outside normal functioning. Here, the notion of 
complementarity is descriptive (his talk of his own 
needs to be complemented suggested this); as such it 
serves as a typological criterion. 
(3f). Finally, CD ( 43. unemployed forced to stay at 
home and tend his disabled wife, born and resident in 
Myburn) provided by far and away the shortest interview. 
It was clear that of all the interviewees he had devoted 
least thought to rape. As with all of the other topics 
covered, he was not willing (or able) to expand on rape. 
(In answer to many of the questions he would say that he 
hadn°t rea~ly thought about it, and did not seem willing 
to specula~e - this may have been that he did not trust 
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me, or else, that the questions I was putting to him were 
too general) . Rape, he thought. was ~interfering with 
somebody99 and agreed that it might involve violence. 
Rapists were perverts or ~oversexed~; probably they had 
lost control of their sexual urges. He suggested that 
women could avoid rape by 99 carrying sprays 99 • As regards 
~he provocativeness of women 9 s dress, he replied that ~it 
depend 9 s how you take it 99 • To lower the incidence of rape 
he suggested stiffer sentences or hospitalization of 
rapists, but otherwise 99 there was nothing you could really 
do~. 
Because of the lack of background material, it was very 
difficult to place these comments in any meaningful 
context. Certainly, however, some of his statements 
indicated a T view of rape. I will not, therefore, 
elaborate on this interview. It will suffice that I sound 
the following warning: because of the likely atypicality 
of our sample as a whole, it may be that CD was in fact 
the more representative, insofar as he displayed a 
pervasive indifference to rape, and. a general lack of 
reflection. This of course suggests another problem with 
the interviews. Namely, that the process of interview 
forces people to think about issues that they would 
otherwise ignore. However, it was clear that some of the 
interviewees, especially in the light of recent media 
reports on rape, had considered rape spontaneously. 
is likely that the interviews obliged Nevertheless, it 
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subjects to think about rape and its related issues in 
more depth. 
To sum this section up: the D. T and S explanatory ideal 
types were illustrated with respect to men's actual 
comments on and explanations of rape. Contrary to 
feminist~inspired expectations, a good deal of complexity 
and subtlety was uncovered: the ideal types were present 
though often in contorted forms. But more important than 
their facile evocation, were their possible links with the 
interviewee 9 s reported practice. The links between 
dimensional and self-change, and schismatic/typological 
and self-stability became particularly apparent. In 
addition. these seemed to feed into the sorts of 
personal-politi9al involvement that the men sought/found 
themselves involved in. Thus the dimensional was present 
in the reported practice of personal-political attempts to 
alter the way one perceived and interacted with women and 
men. The schismatic, by comparison. tended to subordinate 
women, to reassert traditional views of and practices 
within gender relations. The types of practices that were 
spoken of varied from the verbal objectification and 
stereotyping of women and their marginalization from the 
primary male group to chivalry. In all, the most important 
outcome of the analysis of the interview material was the 
illustration of the intertwinement of discourse 
(explanation) and practice(treatment of men and women), 
with ther latter incorporating power exercised over women, 
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men and the self. Of course, we must remember that these 
are reported practices; they would need to be 
substantiated against first-hand observations or the 
perceptions of the menvs women friends, acquaintances, 
etc. The intertwinement of explanation and practice 
as it relates not only to gender but also to class is 
further developed in our analysis of the book vvThe Glasgow 
Rape Casevv (cf Appendix). 
5.Conclusion. 
In this chapter, we have developed three explanatory 
ideal types. Primarily, these have been explored in their 
rel.a.tions to practices: to the feminist polemical 
strategies, to legal-juridical and lay practical, 
retributive and vsafetyv concerns, and to the masculine 
protective/assertive function. Naturally, these relations 
involve power/knowledge; they are assertions of the truth 
and of power, and here this aspect has been dealt with in 
a relatively abstract way. In the following chapter, the 
use of T and S types in particular, will be situated in a 
more concrete context, that of policework and its varying 
demands. Finally, it has also become clear in the course 
of this chapter that the ideal types that we have set up 
are not tied in any simple way to the practices we have 
considered. There is a good deal more complexity than our 
ideal types can accommodate; nevertheless. and this is 
their original' purpose, they serve to illustrate the way 
that explanation is part of a discourse/practical matrix, 
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of how it 9 incorporates 0 practice and power (cf Ch.l) at 
levels variously distanced from its surface or immediate 
implications. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POLICEMEN 9 S EXPLANATION OF RAPE 
Introduction. 
In the previous chapter our concern was to outline and 
illustrate three ideal types o~ rape explanation which 
addressed various relations o~ discourse (explanation) to 
practice (behaviour). Thus we ~ound that D 
explanation, in both ~eminist discourse and men 9 s 
interviews, linked rape to wider social trends and implied 
an anti-sexist practice. Conversely, S explanations tended 
to point to discriminatory behaviour. These links, 
however, were only broadly drawn; both the role and the 
practice o~ the explainer was detailed only in the most 
general terms (eg as anti-sexist man or traditionally 
masculine man). In this chapter these connections are more 
~inely explicated ~or a particular subgroup o~ men 
policemen. This al1ows us to study the explanation o~ 
- rape in a ~ar more concrete social context which accesses 
a better delineated role and · practice. The reasons ~or 
choosing the poli~e are ~ive~old. Firstly, as a group they 
are in a position to help women, and vet they are o~ten 
said to mis-use that power. Secondly, an extreme 
' 
masculine element is incorporated into the police role 
which can be related to the dicussions in Chapter 6 
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regarding the the effect of masculinity on the 
apprehension and control of women. However. because of 
this extremity and the ways that it is partially waylaid 
by institutional strictures. any parallels between 
policemen and other men must be duly circumscribed. 
Thirdly. in the police we have a potentiallY good example 
of the way that grou-p processes might mediate mascul·ini ty. 
Fourthly. we can examine slippage from T to S explanations 
as it is conditioned by the police role. Finally, we can 
study the use of various 9 cognitive biases 9 in a concrete. 
organizational environment and examine the ways in which 
these might interact with the social and institutional. 
The format of t.he chapter runs as follows: First I will 
consider the complex constitution of the police role, 
taking in the organizational. practical and personal 
elements that contribute to its construction. It will be 
suggested that explanation (not just of rape) has a marked 
role to play in the recursive conditining of the police 
role. Secondly. the relation between policemen and women, 
both within and outside the force will be considered as an 
illustration of the operation of intergroup processes at 
work. Thirdly. a number of police explanations. culled 
from the literature will be analyzed in the context of the 
role and the discourse/practices associated with it. It 
should be mentioned that there are not many such 
statements. and those that have been used are not, 
strictly speaking, explanations. but comments which 
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implicate a particular explanatory structure. Part o~ the 
reason ~or this dearth is that the explanations. being 
integral to role-related behaviour, are not the sort that 
need to be openly expressed (ie they are incorporated in 
scripts). They are most likely to be voiced-when the 
discourses (or scripts) o~ which they are a part. are 
challenged; ~or example when policemen are con~ronted with 
alleged rape victims or academic investigators (see 
below). Finally, an analysis o~ these explanations in 
terms o~ the three cognitive heuristics considered in 
Chapter 2 will be compared with our own account. This will 
illustrate our contention that they can be reconceived as 
rules of combination ~or relevant 
discourse/practices. 
1. The Police Role. 
a. Preamble. Our analysis of the police role will not 
substantially di~~er from those expositions of the core 
characteristics of police work (eg Reiner,1985). though we 
shall be emphasizing the 9 machismo 9 element in such work. 
However. in line with the more recent sensitivity to 
multiple influences, ~rom organizational, legal and 
police cultural ~actors, we shall take into account the 
complex of conditions. That is: 
~A more complete equation in the analysis o~ 
police work requires a sociology that is 
structurally and historically contextualized at 
each level. The use o~ police discretion ... cannot 
be simply:explicated in terms o~ stereotypes, 
reflected .imagery and the pressures of the police 
working day. but must be located within the legal 
~orm which provides the discretion parameters, 
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and historically according to the specificity of 
police-civil society relations.~ 
(Brogden,1982,p221) 
The rules b~ which police work is conducted do DOt simply 
derive from the unofficial culture of the police ('cop 
culture'). Indeed, 
"The culture of the police - the values, norms, 
perspectives and craft rules - which inform their 
conduct is. of course, neither monolithic. 
universal nor unchanging. there are difference in 
outlook within police forces, according to such 
individual variables as personality, generation 
or career trajectory. and structural variations 
according to rank, assignment and specialization. 
The organizational styles and cultures of police 
forces may vary between different places and 
periods. Informal rules are not clear-cut and 
articulated, but embeded in specific practices 
and nuanced according to particular concrete 
situations and the interactional processes of 
each encounter. Non the less. certain 
commonalities of the police outlook can be 
discerned ... 00 
(Reiner,1985,p86) 
So, in spite of the variety of influences on the police 
role, there do seem to be a set of core characteristics 
that are centred on police culture. 
However, McBarnet(1979} complains that much research into 
the police has been of so interactionist a bent that 
structural factors. such as legal constraints, have been 
left relatively uninvestigated. As she puts it: "··.if 
abstract rules are redefined and used according to 
practical purposes, then practical purposes, the 'needs' 
of crime control, may be redefined according to the 
demands of formal rules ... 00 (1979.P27}. In other words, 
formal law does shape police behaviour. sanctioning the 
space in which police discretion comes into its own. But, 
Page 369 
at the same tima~ within these rules, there is ''sufficient 
elasticitv to assimilate departures from idealized values 
of due process of legalitv ... ~ (Reiner,1985,p85-6). Thus 
the ''legal rules mav well be used presentationallv, rather 
than being operational rules or inhibitors~ (p86). 
Another broad and amorphous influence on the police role 
is that of the police organization, which of course is 
intimatelv tied to legal parameters. Jones(1980) notes how 
the divergence between beat ideologv (ie the notion that 
foot patrols are the mainstav of desriable policing) and 
organizational requirements (eg the demand for increased 
efficiencv) has led to a devaluation of beat policing, 
which being comprised of prevention and communi tv 
relations is not amenable to the tvpes of quantification 
entailed in measures of efficiencv (in the wav that law 
enforcement/convictions are). 
Still, the high degree of discretiqn permitted ordinarv 
constables is inevitable since the nature of the work 
means that little supervision is possible. Indeed, in some 
cases, supervision is withdrawn so that illegal methods 
(eg force or verballing) can be applied (Holdawav,1983). 
Further, the autonomv of the lower ranks is positivelv 
asserted through a number of means, not least of which is 
their possession of ~the organizational power to ensure 
that thev retain a verv considerable measure of 
discretion'' (H~ldawav, 1983. p4): this organizationa power 
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often takes the form of secrecy whereby facts are kept 
from senior officers. Converse1y, as Reiner points out, 
whether the directives of the po1ice hierarchy are ever 
implemented depends, u1timate1y, on the front 1ine police 
off~cers. Naturally, this raises all sorts of problems for 
the mechanisms of accountability. 
In sum, there are clearly institutional and legal 
constraints on police behaviour, but these are mediated by 
police culture whose relative autonomy is assured through 
the high degrees of discretion inherent in the job. 
Henceforth, it will be ma~nly the cultural aspects I will 
be commenting on, though organizational influences will be 
alluded to: the rules and discourse/practices that pervade 
this culture wi11 be related to the dealings with and 
explanations of rape cases. 
b. Po1ice Culture. The police force 0 s function as an 
institution ~s difficult to pin down in anything other 
than the broadest terms. As Smith and Gray(1983) put it: 
~The Metropolitan Police is a very large and 
inevitably bureaucratic organization in which 
there tends to be more emphasis on form than on 
content. more concern with following procedure 
than achieving an end result. When talking to 
senior officers it is very difficu1t to get a 
clear statement of objectives or priorities 
except in the most general terms. Yet ... there 
must be a set of objectives implicit in the 
pattern of policing. In the absence of a 
continuing attempt, within the organization, to 
define objectives exp1icitly, the vaccuum has 
been filled by the preoccupations, percept~ons 
and prejudices that develop amongst groups of 
constables and sargeants in response to the 
people and problems they have to deal with.~ 
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(Smith and Gray,1983,p49) 
So, as we indicated above, the role of the police 
institution in demarcating street-level behaviour is, 
outside ~he most general inluences, minimal • 
. 
00 The objectives and norms that informally 
develop tend to be those of the group ... (and) 
there is considerable pressure to ... adopt or 
appear to adopt (these). Many of these norms are 
similar to those that develop in any 
male-dominated group especially where the need 
for loyalty and solidarity is paramount. One of 
the effects of the group psychology is that 
certain themes tend to be emphasized in 
conversation .•. male dominance ( •.. the denigration 
of women); the glamour ... of violence, and racial 
prejudice. 00 
(Smith and Gray,1983.P51) 
However, we must be sensitive to the way that the demands 
of the institution serve to apportion the 0 need for 
loyalty and solidarity 0 • This need occurs both with 
respect to divisions within the force and between the 
force and the outside world. 
Within the force. there are various specialist units (eg 
CID). In particular ~there is a continuing tension in the 
relation between uniform and (Smith and 
Gray, 1983, p179) wh.ich is expre.ssed by uniformed officers 0 
view that 00 the CID are incompetent. do too little, drink 
too much. and nevertheless consider themselves superior to 
uniform officers 00 (P179). Such friction will also occur 
amongst smaller groupings and at more local levels within 
the force - usually this rivalry will be expressed in the 
form of a mutual lack of trust. However, this in-fighting 
is likely to dissolve in the face of the main structural 
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d~vision - that between public and police. 
The police tend to divide society into the police and the 
rest (ie the public). As one officer put it: 
forget, we 9 re a tribe, a minorityvv (Evans,1974.P77). The 
public are further divided (as we shall clearly see with 
respect to rape) between. the bad and the respectable. 
Cross cutting this are the categories of sex, race and 
class. Also, there are categor~es of dangerous others: 
namely those who can potentially undermine the autonomy 
(.or expertise) of the police - challengers ( eg lawyers, 
doctors): disarmers (eg women, children); do-gooders 
(NCCL); polit~cians (cf Holdaway,1983; Reiner,1985). As we 
shall see below, there are also categories within the 
9 bad .v population which have different implications for 
police culture. 
The police-public dichotomy is enhanced at the structural 
or organizational level. Brogden(1982) has detailed the 
way that, by appealing to the specialist nature of the 
police organization, the police can detach themselves from 
what they see as undesirable degrees of accountability. 
Specifically, the chief constable, in bargaining with 
local police authorities, deploys a managerialist ideology 
of police professionalism which asserts his expertise at 
the expense of the influence of local elites - that is, 
efficiency can only be maintained if the chief constable 
is given .full freedom from outside meddling. This 
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autonomv, based on the defining goal of crime-fighting 
diffuses down to the police at all levels. As Brogden 
notes, the most potent source of control in police work, 
other than the social audiences to which the police pla¥, 
are the police officers themselves. 
The nature of police work, in serving to undergird the 
separateness of the police, facilitates solidarity and 
loyalty. A major component here is facing danger. Indeed. 
as in the case of racism, this danger can be exaggerated 
as a means of. at least verbally, asserting that 
separateness (through stressing the police 9 s 
differential masculinity). We shall have more to say 
about the emphasis placed on the danger of 9 real police 
work 9 below. The impression of separateness is furthered 
by the deep interpenetration of professional and private 
life. Reiner(1979) quoting Soloman writes: 99 From the 
available evidence, the police 
work/non-work in an extreme form 99 
display this sort of 
(p163). That is, police 
work pervades the lives of police officers. As one officer 
remarked: 99 You 9 re always noticing things. It 9 s been bred 
into you, a reflex action ... it 9 s a sect, it 9 s like a 
religion 
addition 
the 
to 
police force 99 
the overspill 
(Reiner,1979.p163-a). In 
of suspiciousness and 
surveillance, the discipline imposes restrictions that 
result in a similar carryover: 99 My private life is 
governed by the police force. I mean I can 9 t go out and 
get bloody drunk and start shouting and screaming in a 
Page 374 
pub 99 (CID constable in Reiner,1979,p164). Another factor 
that will doubtless also serve to consolidate this 
separate group identity is the fact that many police 
officers are drawn from the same communities and in some 
cases from the same families (Evans,1974). 
Till this point we have considered how the police might 
be constituted as a separate group - we have only hinted 
at what the actual content of its group identity might be. 
From the above discussion it is apparent that one such 
component is loyalty. By loyalty, we mean. something more 
than what is found in the intergroup behaviour research 
(eg maximum differentiation strategies). This might 
include actively covering up for members in one 9 s group 
(eg helping out fellow officers by adding to their arrest 
figures. Smith and Gray,1983). Moreover, backing up even 
occurs for those colleagues who are in the wrong, have 
committed illegal acts. Rather than resort to official 
force discipline 99which was something that attacked the 
in-group from the outside and which the group could not 
control in any way once it built up momentum 99 (Smith and 
Gray,1983.P72), control from inside the group was 
preferable as it was 99not only less damaging to the 
officer concerned, but also less threatening to the group 
as a whole~ (p72). And we might add that the acceptance 
of these internal, informal group disciplinary mechanisms 
serve to consolidate that group identity insofar as its 
uniformity of loyalty is maintained. 
Page 375 
In other words, police officers actively, 
self-consciously see themselves as loyal to their group. 
This is something which is poorly theorized in intergroup 
theory the degree to which a sense of loyalty 
characterizes the social identity (and inhibits exit). 
Rephrasing this in terms of the suggestion in Chapter 3 
(ie that 9 group member 9 should be reconceived as an aspect 
of a role). we can here see that the delimitation of the 
police rple requires a hefty group-identification 
component. This becomes particularly acute in those 
collective forms of police work in which a high degree of 
consistency is desirable (ie it would not do if in the 
process of an arrest or investigation one officer had 
different ideas from his/her colleagues). Consistency is 
desirable because it is a partial measure of (forensic) 
truth; dissent would dilute that truth. Truth is important 
in police functioning because it partly underlies power, 
but also it legitimates actions (eg the use of coercion, 
the development of an i-nvestigation in a particular 
direction, etc) necessary to fulfilling the demands of the 
police role. Here then, truth is mediated by group 
processes; consistency, borne of intergroup activity, 
serves the practical aspects of the police role. In 
framing the relation between role and group in this way, I 
have avoided individualizing group processes, ie reducing 
them to the needs of decontextua1 individuals for positive 
and secure social identities. It is certainly possible 
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that these social ident~ty 9 needsq may come to dominate 
the other aspects of the role - but they are likely to be 
conta~ned by the parameters of proper institutional 
funct~oning. Thus, as long as intergroup behaviour 
susta~ns the force, then it ~s f~ne; ~n cases where it 
embarrasses the force, it must be re-cast or purged. 
We can now detail the content of the police role more 
f~nely. Reiner(1985) summarizes one major bloc in the core 
of that role as 9 Mission-Action-Cynicism-Pessimismq. The 
police have a sense of mission - of danger from all sides 
threatening to destroy a valued way of life. This danger 
looms large in the form of criminals and it is aginst 
these that action is directed. Action is thus conceived by 
policemen, and certainly portrayed in the media, as 
largely law enforcement (the tracking down, arrest and 
successful prosecution of worthy criminal opponents with 
all the excitement and violence that that might entail). 
This picture pervades the self-image that many police 
hold: ~t is a main ingredient in the stories that officers 
tell (Smith and Gray,1983: Holdaway,1983). and it is 
fac~litated by such technological introductions as the use 
of radios and panda cars which can enliven what would 
otherwise have been routine matters (Holdaway,1983). This 
image is in stark contrast with the mundane activity that 
is day-to-day policing: the image is sustained through 
story-telling, exaggeration, the expressed desire for 
violence, jokes. But this desire for action, or its 
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generalized counterpart, law enforcement, is, as we noted 
above, a partial outcome of managerial demands for 
efficienc¥ which can only be quantified in terms of 
arrests, stops, etc. The police themelves refer to these 
as 0 figures 0 (Smith and Grav,1983; Jones,1980). However, 
it is also because much police work is considered boring 
b¥ the police themselves. As Reiner(1985) notes, out of 
his three t¥pes of police-public interaction. order 
maintenance (in which conflict is resolved without 
recourse to police powers) constitutes the bulk of police 
work (as opposed to consensual- work, and 
0 law enforcement, in which police legal powers are used). 
Order maintenance work lacks the sparkle of law 
enforcement, and is, indeed, denigrated b¥ the police 
themselves, often labelled 0 rubbish 0 (ie ~a matter which 
the police are required to deal with but which will not 
result in an¥ arrest or an arrest of a kind that is not 
valued~. Smith and Gray, 1983, p62). However, as we shall 
see below, the fact that the police decide in such cases 
not to use their legal powers, suggests that they are 
appl¥ing criteria which render some cases 0 rubbish 0 or 
0 mere 0 order maint'enance cases. If we talk in terms of 
audiences, we can imagine that in cases where there are 
conflicting audiences, as in some sexual offence cases, 
then being becomes problematic (cf below; Hanmer 
and Saunders,1984). 
However, it should be remembered. that not all police 
Page 378 
officers conform to th~s pattern. Some do stress danger 
and exc~tement Reiner(1985) dubs them the 9 New 
Centurions 9 • Others however, take on a peace-keeping role 
(the 9 Bobby 9 - Reiner,1985); still others are designated 
9 un~form carr~ers 9 (lazy, cynical, pessimistic); a fourth 
group are the 9 professionals 9 , who are ambitious and 
career conscious, doing their work with an eye to 
promotion. This latter point suggests that boredom is not 
the sole key to the action view of policing. Clearly, for 
boredom to manifest itself, a contrasting condition to the 
prevail~ng, boring one must be held in mind. As such 
boredom is not simply a physical condition, it is an 
evaluation. One element that will play a part in such an 
evaluative process will be (extreme) masculinity and its 
attendant predilections. Thus the traditional ideal of the 
village bobby chatting to local residents, though 
patriarchal in a different sense, encapsulates a more 
sedate social identity, one in which machismo is 
ostensibly downplayed. 
Before going on to consider the masculine component in 
the police role, I will list a number of other factors 
that contribute: suspicion, solidarity/isolation, 
pragmatism, 
conservatism 
and more contentiously, authoritarianism, 
and racism (cf Reiner,1985; Cohan and 
Gorman,1982; Waddington,1982; Cochrane and Butler,1980). 
Various authors have commented on the presence of a 
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machismo element in the police role. Niedhoffer(1969), 
remarking on the police 9 personality traits 9 , points to 
aggression and authoritarianism which we can, following 
Ch.6 9 s emphasis on the masculine desire for control, 
associate with masculinity. More positively, Adlam notes, 
for the police themselves, these characteristics are 
pos~tively valued. Masculinity means high independence, 
assertiveness, confidence and adaptability. 
(few) self-criticisms and doubts they have, 
Despite the 
the police 
generally hold a positive self image and have high levels 
of self-esteem. These aspects are floridly illustrated by 
the traditional masculine passtimes which the typical 
policeman should desire: sport and women 
preferably all at once 99 (Adlam,1981, p157). 
The various elements of an extreme masculinity can be 
briefly expanded on thus: Masculinity 9 s search for 
certainty can be expressed in a number of ways: the 
repeated claim to impartiality (Adlam,1981); an extreme 
cynicism and aggressiveness which denies the truth of 
others statements to the point of actually constructing 
confessions or statements for suspects (Holdaway,1983; 
Hain. 1979) • Hain suggests that the police are 
preponderantly concerned with gathering incriminatory 
evidence; they assume suspects to be guilty (hence they 
are. denoted 9 prisoners 9 as opposed to detainees,etc 
Holdaway,1983). Balance is something the defence counsel 
provides. This orientation will mean that suspects are 
Page 380 
liable to be disbelieved, especially if they fall into the 
appropriate social category (eg Black,1980) or exhibit 
particular types of behaviou.rs such as disrespect or 
anatgonistic 
Visher, .1981). 
demeanour (Moyer,1981; Smith and 
Other factors that will intervene in the 
perception of suspects include the presence of bystanders, 
the desires of the victim, and the seriousness of the 
crime (eg Smith and Visher,1981). 
Thus we see how certain elements of the police role both 
reproduce and reflect the extreme masculinity of the 
police. This complexly intermingles with the group 
processes that we considered above. As with the presence 
of authoritarianism and racism, the police 9 s 9 machismo 
count 9 mav be simply a magnified instance of traits in the 
general social body. Nevertheless, the magnification and 
the process that lead to it seem to be significant. As 
Feild(1978) (also cf Feldman-Summers and Palmer,.1980) 
has shown, as regard rape mvth acceptance, the police fall 
closer to rapi-sts than do laymen. 
Up to this point I have only considered the broader 
expressions of machismo in police work, as it has been 
instituted both organizationally and informally (though 
it should, by now, be apparent, that there is no ready 
distinction between the two). In the next section, I will 
more closely consider the manifestations of machismo in 
sexism. 
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c. Sexism in the Po~ice Role. We have briefly mentioned 
the way that the group serves to partly mediate 
masculinity. Where these processes are most likely to be 
evident is in the more or less overt expression of sexism. 
As Smith and Gray(1983) note, sexism is rife in the force: 
this form of denigrating women can be interpreted in group 
terms (cf Huici,1984; and for possible feminist versions, 
Giles and Williams,1977). Such processes serve to 
recursively condition both role and group. With regard to 
the Metropolitan force, Smith and Gra.¥(1983) state that: 
0
°From our observational work we would say that women face 
substantial prejudice within the force~ (p163). This 
occurs at all levels. At the institutional level ~the 
force discriminates against female applicants 00 {p163) 
and, once it has accepted them, it seems to hamper their 
promotion prospects. At a more informal level, 
majority of the men but only a quarter of the women 
(believe) that the women are given an easy ride 00 (p165) 
within the. force. For those officers who thought that 
policewomen face greater difficulties than men (54% of 
men, 68% of women) 31% of the men thought that it was 
because of physical inferiority, while 48% of women 
thought that this was due to prejudice. This suggests that 
there is considerable strain within the police force. This 
is continued informally through the 0 cult of masculinity 9 : 
much of policemen°s talk turns on sex and women 
including the ~denigration of women in canteen talk 
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(which) is also a devaluing of qualities within women that 
are actually required in much police work~ (p91). So 
policewomen°s nurturant qualities are themselves open to 
attack. But this attack/denigration is often directed 
through an aggrandisement of masculine sexuality - the man 
triumphing over the woman. This verbal assault has three 
facets: ~the treatment of women as a thing, the 
humiliation of a woman and sexual assault on her~ (p91). 
This sort of talk certainly goes on in the presence of 
woman and comes under the compass of sexual harrassment as 
defined by Sedley and Benn(1982). As a conversational 
tactic. it not only invokes the image of a woman as an 
object, it also constitutes her as such through what is 
effectively verbal terrorism. Indeed, 
that many women police officers 
attitudes of their male colleagues, 
Smith and Gray note 
accommodate to the 
simply suppressig 
reactions to the grossest types of prejudiced criticism. 
Given the importance of ~not losing face~. which policemen 
almost obsessively pursue, such passivity can only 
contribute to the stereotyped image that the men have of 
the women. The power relation as constructed around agency 
and masculinity thus comes to reinforce itself. This 
sexual .harrassment is recognized by many policewomen, but 
though they may allude to it when interviewed, they are 
reluctant to admit that it occurs outright (Jones, 
personal communication). Some policewomen have attempted 
to overcome this: by a process of 0 masculinization° through 
which they accep~ the norms of the policemen and then try 
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to go one better. Paradoxically, these women never 
achieve the same status as the men, because, from the 
perspective of the latter, they have given up their 
femininity can 9 t be both professional and 
feminine", Jones, personal communication). The other type 
of policewoman, who attempt to deploy their femininity 
are, because of it, unsuited to policework. Furthermore, 
there is no intergroup defence that women can resort to in 
that, since the Sex Discrimination Act, women have 
been spread across shifts and reliefs in small numbers 
which undermines any possibility of group formation 
(Jones,personal communication). 
Below I will focus on the way that police treat women 
outside the force - that is, how certain women, and in 
some cases, women generally, constitute the out-group. 
Given the way that women are objectified, it is sometimes 
difficult to imagine them as comprising an authentic 
out-group against which plausible comparisons can be made. 
Suffice .it to say that there is profound denigration of 
women, especially in the case of sexual offences, and that 
this act of denigration, itself an act of 
differentiation, is what (re-)constitutes the in-group 
identity of masculinity. That is, it is not simply the 
differentiation along valued dimensions such as agency, 
toughness, etc that establishes positive social identity, 
it is the process of and engagement in differentiation 
(itself ·a form. of agency) that practically (materially) 
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mediates masculinity. Indeed, within the limits of 
caricature, the more virulent this denigration, the 
greater the masculine pay-o:ff'. This phenomenon stems from 
the :fact that the police social identity is bound up with 
being a good group member. To restate this: whereas in the 
Turnerian group, group membership processes are the means 
by which differentiation and heightened positive social 
identity are achieved, :for the archetypally masculine 
police group, group membership processes are also part of 
the content of' that social identity. Conscious 
differentiation and denigration or aggrandisement are 
fully part of' that social identity. This, we have 
suggested, is partly true of' all such masculine groups (cf 
Ch. 3). 
However, if' these are the sorts of' processes we would 
expect from a 'macho 9 group, we find the police, 
0 
especially :for some women victims, suspects or witneses, 
as acting somewhat warily. Holdaway(1983) refers to women 
as being disarmers: through their perceived frailty they 
can throw the police off' balance, especially as regards 
their usual means of' questioning. Furthermore, there is 
a degree of' fear that some women will allege sexual 
assault against police officers. So, not all talk and 
practice serve to denigrate women; some is defensive. As 
Smith and Gray(1983) point out: it cannot be simply 
assumed that the: talk that police indulge in expresses 
itself in behavipur in an unproblematic way. However, as 
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regard rape and sexual offences, there is some evidence 
that practice does partiall~ reflect talk, though it is 
complexl~ linked to police work which is itself a complex 
combination of police role requirements (eg bringing 
9 credible 9 prosecutions) and masculine preference. 
A facet to which we have so far paid scant attention is 
the superior conformity of the self (Codol,1975). This, in 
this context. would embod~ the individualistic moment of 
masculinit~. The competition between individuals to out-do 
one another is a means b~ which the group identity is 
rehearsed while simultaneous!~ supporting a hierarch~. The 
form that this takes, and not just among~t the police, is 
the on-going attempt to disrupt others 9 and save one(s own 
face (done through mickey-taking, practical jokes, etc). 
Of course, such fun and games also have other functions, 
not least of which, as various authors have noted, is the 
release of tension. 
2. Police and Women Victims. 
At several points alread~ we have encountered police 
prejudice against women. We have also noted that women 
suspects can be both derogated and perceived as a threat. 
In this section I want to outline how women victims may be 
constituted as an outgroup. 
Hanmer and Sa~nders(198U) have looked at the pattern of 
violence agains~ women in an inner cit~ area (Leeds), 
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using inte.rviews and regular group meetings to access 
women 9 s experiences of harrassment and violence. The 
portion of their results that directly interests us here 
concerns women 9 s dealings with the police. In their sample 
of 129 women, for those women who experienced property 
crimes a minimum of a8% and a maximum of 73% reported it 
to the police. For violent crimes (attacks etc) only 13% 
reported to the police. Women based their (in-)action on 
the expectations they had of the police 9 s response, often 
derived from personal experience of hostile or indifferent 
police reaction. Hanmer and Saunders also point out that 
this reluctance to report is not simply a function of 
police response, it is also a partial outcome of the guilt 
that many women feel for the attack. We can also note that 
foreknowledge of the police 9 s attitude is liable to 
exacerbate those feelin.s, especially given the police 9 s 
lauded impartiality. 
In Hanmer and Saunders 9 sample, of the 21 minor crimes 
(indecent exposure, obscene or threatening phone calls, 
assault, bre~ch of the peace, insulting or threatening 
behaviour), the police answered all but one call. ~The 
most common outcome was that after the police had listened 
to the women 9 s account ... she heard nothing more ... one 
conclusion we draw from these experiences is that women 
are much more likely than police to perceive violence to 
themselves as serious ... ~ ( P57). Of those women that 
reported crimes of violence to the police, some 
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U0%(10/25) were satisfied with the police 9 s response. The 
three main complaints were: not responding swiftl¥ enough 
to calls, not being informed of the eventual outcome of 
the complaint and investigation, and the lack of 
seriousness with which the complaint was treated. This led 
to the conclusion 99 that the police do not interfere in an¥ 
serious wa¥ with male violence to women 99 ( p59). Hanmer and 
Saunders go on to point out that ~this is true even if 
police action (or lack of it) onl¥ reflects accurate!¥ 
what the¥ know would happen if those cases went to court; 
that is, nothing or next to nothing. The police are not 
necessaril¥ being hostile in not enforcing the criminal 
law in relation to. abused women 99 ( p61). This lack of 
accessible response b¥ the police feeds into a c¥cle of 
women 9 s oppression and debilitation. Even where there is a 
response, it happens in 99 some obscure wa¥, divorced from 
the active participation of women in curtailing the 
violence of particular men. This encourages dependence on 
a male protection s¥stem which has the effect of 
reinforcing a state of dependent helplessness 99 (p67). From 
this it would appear that, even at a structural level, 
policing contributes, b¥ virtue of its opaqueness as well 
as b¥ its overt hostilit¥/indifference, to the 
9 passification 9 of women. 
The not uncommon lack of police interest in sexual crimes 
against women,~ however, need not reflect a pervasive 
prejudice, but b¥ the more general attitudes of the 
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police. Certainly, it can be assimilated 
distinctions officers frequently draw between: 
to the 
a 9 good 
arrest v (ie an arrest ~which demonstrated skill, 
determination and physical strength 99 , Smith and 
Gray,1983,p61); a 9 good result 9 (in which ~the emphasis is 
on building a. good case against someone in connection with 
a reported crime .rather than catching someone in the 
a.ct 99 , p61); a ,v good villain 9 (who 99 is a. successful criminal 
and who is, 
arresting a 
therefore, sometimes a worthy antagonist; 
9 good villa.in 9 is counted a. much greater 
success than arresting an incompetent or occasional 
law-breaker, even if the offence committed is fairly 
serious~. p61-2), and 9 rubbish 9 (which ~is a. matter that 
the police are required to deal with but which will not 
result in any arrest or in an arrest of a kind that is not 
p62). These categories can be mapped directly 
onto the police 9 s attitudes towards violence against 
women. In particular. most instances of rape or sexual 
assault are not likely to be carried out by a 9 good 
villain v: 9 ca.sual 9 assualts by drunken men or men in 
groups are too occasional to warrant the title of 9 good 
villain v. Those 9 sexual 9 assailants and rapists who do 
receive the accolade of 9 good villain 9 are few, especially 
in view of the popular conception of rape as an explosive 
event (cf Ch.7). If rapists per se are not generally 
considered 9 good villa.ins 9 , then rape and sexual assault 
might tend to be considered 9 rubbish 9 • Domestic disputes 
99 a.re the clearest example of what PCs . call 9 rubbish 9 ••• 99 
(Smith and Gra¥,1983.p64); and often these will involve 
wife beating of some sort. Of course, the law on rape (in 
Britain and most states in the US) does not recognize rape 
in marriage and so the police are constrained in 
intervening. Nevertheless, even where there is risk of 
Ph¥sical injur¥. the police are often unconcerned, seeing 
these disputes as essential!¥ outside their jurisdiction 
(Smith and Gra¥,1983; Ludman,1980). 9 Rubbish 9 also applies 
to minor sexual offences (as outlined above) and the 
response of the police to these seem to testify to this 
evaluation. The same is often true for rape offences 
though this will depend on the 9 seriousness 9 of the rape 
particularly as it is gauged against the perceived nature 
of the victim and the degree of coercion used. -
All these terms 
reflect the competitiveness within the force, as well as 
the institutional pressure to perform up to (and beyond) 
scratch (ie to make figures). This latter is instrumental 
in the police 9 s self-image as professionals, equipped 
with the specific skills and know-how to cope with the 
police work of law enforcement. The criteria for 
professionalism are largely worked out within the force, 
as we saw above: there is only a relatively minor input 
from outside, and very little from the women victims of 
minor sexual offences (though, as we have commented, the 
more extreme the offence, the more likely an investigation 
- cf Rose and Randall,1982). However, seriousness is 
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intertwined with a whole range of other conditions. These 
can be seen to centre on two points: the credibility of 
the woman (and it is at this point that the sexism comes 
into play). and the 0 prosecutability 0 (Rose and 
Randal1,1982) of the case (ie the likelihood that 
further investigation of allegations will yield a 
credible prosecution). The problem is that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine precisely what 
contributes peculiarly to credibility and what to 
prosecutability. This is because what counts as credible 
to the police carries similar weight in court, and 
credibility in court is the measure of prosecutability. 
Still, extra-legal factors do play a part in the 
assessment of a rape event and in the following, while 
always admitting the importance of the prosecutability, I 
will mostly be concerned with those indices of credibility 
that reflect the masculine component of the police role. 
Thus we might expect and indeed find (eg Rose and 
Randa11,1982) that women victims who do not exemplify the 
virtuous aspects of the traditional feminine stereotype, 
namely, an unblemished past, innocence and chastity, will 
be viewed with suspicion, disbelief, and derogation 
rather than a forlorn sympathy which accepts the 
theoretical credibility of the case but, say, because of 
the woman°s status, is constrained by its low 
prosecutability. That is, despite the bias imposed by the 
courts, this dqes not preclude a more enlighteed treatment 
of victims by: a force less intent on making figures. 
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However, as we have mentioned, the view of the courts is 
resoundingly echoed in the talk and overt attitude of 
police officers. 
There are also the procedures that the police force 
recommends to itself in its dealings with rape victims 
especially. As Toner(1982) points out, the ultimate 
decision to prosecute rests with the D.P.P.; for the 
decision to prosecute to be reached there. needs to be some 
corroboration. However, ~finding enough corroborating 
evidence to convince the court does (present problems)~ 
(Toner,1982,p167), especiall¥ where the issue is consent. 
In the process of gathering such evidence and. constructing 
a 9 strong 9 case, the alleged rape victim must be 
throroughl¥ questioned. However, it is at such points 
that the gaining of prosecutability seems to shade into 
the C¥nical (macho) undermining of credibility. Here, I 
am thinking of the advice given in the Police Review to 
investigating officers in there dealings with alleged rape 
victims: 
~If a woman walks into a police station and 
complains of rape with no signs of violence she 
must be closely interrogated. Allow her to make 
a statement to a policewoman and then drive a 
horse and cart through it. It is always advisable 
if there is any doubt about the truthfulness of 
her allegations to call her an outright liar. It 
is very difficult for a person to put on genuine 
indignation who has been calle a liar to her 
face. 99 
(p15. quoted in Bennet al,1983) 
So, in addition to the more or less formal pressures of 
court requirements at one extreme, and the leanings of 
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9 cop culture 9 at the other, there are in the middle advice 
on the proper ~andling of rape investigations. It is these 
latter that are currently being changed by 
introduction 
questioning, 
of more 
examining, 
sympathetic procedures 
the 
for 
etc, alleged rape victims. There 
is no guarantee however that these reforms will diffuse 
either into 9 cop culture 9 or into the legal process. 
Returning to the operation of 9 cop culture 9 , the measure 
of cl?edibility (eg virtuousness) is highly flexible: 
indeed, it is determined by men (and that naturallY 
i.ncludes policemen) themselves. Thus Smith and Gra~l(1983) 
report an incident in which a police officer (CID) who 
after interviewing 99 two teenage girls (the younger one 
aged 1l.l.) who alleged that they had been sexually 
attacked ..• came back saying that they played the man along 
and that he found the girls very 9 tasty 9 himself 99 ( P92). 
Policemen indulging in this sort of talk imply not only 
that the victims enjoy or deserve these experiences, "but 
also that they would have liked to commit the offence 
themselves 99 (p92). Given this. who counts as virtuous and 
who as open territory is partly determined by the police 
themselves and their perceptions of the status of women as 
they differ along class, race, subculture, age, etc, 
lines. Further. who counts as a doubtful or legitimate 
victim varies from period to period. 
The next paragraphs will be concerned with the ways 
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that the police discretion manifests itself in the 
reproduction of rape and the open-territor¥ victim. In 
this we shal.l follow Clark and Lewis 9 (1977) 
characterization of the open territor¥ victim and profile 
of the rapist-fiend. The relevant data from this study 
runs as follows: It was conducted in Toronto in 1970, 116 
rapes were reported by 117 complainants with 129 alleged 
offenders. Of these 36.2% were considered Founded; 63.8% 
were classified as Unfounded and investigations were 
terminated. Unfounded cases were, as it turned out, not 
based primarily on the evaluation of whether or not the 
victim had been raped - other reasons also played a part. 
Extra-evidential factors that influenced the police 9 s 
judgement were: (1) The unsuitabilit¥ of the victim (eg 
she was separated or was on welfare); (2) lack of 
9 corroborative evidence 9 acceptable in the courtroom (eg 
whether there were other witnesses, or material evidence -
Clark and Lewis maintain that these are immaterial to 
whether a rape had been committed. In this respect, 
consider the police reaction to a murder or an instance of 
grievous bodily harm); (3) The victim decided to halt the 
investigation that is, she became a 9 hostile witness 9 
(eg as a result of pressure from relatives, the fear of 
publicity and court procedure. or the police 9 s own 
antics); ( 4) In some cases, despite independent evidence 
(eg bruising). the incident went unclassified; (5) In 
other cases t,he police just seemed prejudicially unwilling 
to investigate plausible complaints. 
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The sort of factors that prejudiced police judgements of 
rape were: (1) Alcohol (In only 20% of the cases in which 
alcohol was present in the victim were the claims judged 
Founded. In 100% of the cases in which the victim was 
drunk at the time of reporting Unfounded judgements were 
passed); (2) Where other sex acts were present (acts of 
humiliation as Amir(1972) calls them), 60.9% were 
classified Founded; (3) Where weapons were present 71.4% 
were classified Founded; (4) 62.5% and 61.1% were 
classified Founded for cases which involved physical 
violence and verbal threat respectively. Of course, this 
factor occludes the fact that rape can be conducted using 
subtler means 
victim-offender 
classification 
(cf Chapter 7); 
relationship, 
of Founded 
(5) 
the 
The closer the 
less likely a 
strangers:51.6%; 
acquaintances:23.8%; known:20%; (6) Except for cases of 
rape in the victim 9 s residence (63.2% Founded), attacks 
outside and in the offender 9 s residence were mostly 
considered Unfounded. Here, the implication is that women 
who are physically 9 exposed 9 exceptionally so in the 
offender 9 s residence - are effectively advertising their 
availability; (7) Also important were the following 
characteristics of the victim: a. Separated/divorced and 
common-law wives were the most discriminated against 
yielding judgements of 37.5% and 22.2% Founded 
respectively;;b. Occupational status also played a large 
part with professional women complainants being accorded a 
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100% Founded judgements, students 50%, housewives 28.6%, 
and women who were unemplo¥ed. idle or on welfare, and 
prostitutes a meagre 4.5%; c. Age. The highest Founded 
categor¥ were those wqmen in the age range 9 0ver-40 9 
(62.5%). The lowest were for women in ranges 14-19 ¥ears 
(30.6%) and 30-34 ¥ears (16.7%). However, it should be 
noted that these latter women were drawn from the same 
socio-economic group and had similar (low) marital status. 
Relating these three variable to one another: high 
Unfounded judgements were made for ¥oung women not living 
at home, independent with no occupational skills. The 
most 9 credible 9 victims were children from ·solid middle 
class backgrounds. Another factor was mental state of the 
victim: the more contra-normal it was (drunk, on drugs, 
mentall¥ retarded) the greater the likelihood of the 
police passing an Unfounded judgement. Also. the time of 
first report was important: the longer the victim left it, 
(if the person she first reported the rape to was not 
the first she encountered), 
against a Founded judgement. 
the more this militated 
While Clark and Lewis do describe the t¥pes of rapist, 
the¥ do not anal¥ze in much detail the effect of pol~ce 
perceptions of the rapist on their judgements. Where, 
for example the victim 9 s claims point to links with a 
fiend t¥Pe rapist (such as the Yorkshire Ripper) who has 
been operating for some while and who is currentl¥ being 
sought, then investigations are more likel¥ to be 
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galvanized; the police will tend to take such allegations 
more seriousl~. This comes across vividl~ in an incident 
outlined bV Hanmer and Saunders(1984). A woman on 
reporting ~n indecent exposure found the police were 
indifferent, simply not bothered. 99 ... 99The~ took a 
statement and followed it up two months later with a visit 
from the vice squad. They wanted a better description. 
They asked if he had a beard~ ... " (p59). The implication 
was that the original indecent exposure incident became 
relevant and was followed up only when Peter Sutcliffe 
(The Yorkshire Ripper) had been arrested. This woman was 
justifiabl~ indignant because her experiences were not 
treated with concern; interest was onl~ forthcoming when 
it was thought b~ the police that it might be associated 
with a major crime. 
This last point suggests that, in examining the 
explanations of police for a given rape event, it is 
necessary not onl~ to take into account long term factors 
as embodied in the role of policeman and the situational 
(and infor,mational) factors such as the type of victim, 
the situation etc, but also intermediate factors, such as 
the investigation of similar cases within the area, or 
recent public sensitivit~ to rape. 
To summarize this section: We have outlined some of the 
factors that have contributed to the generall~ poor 
treatment of women victims of sexual offences. These have 
Page 397 
included: the demands of juridical credibility or 
prosecutability: the common, semi-formal advice for the 
questioning of such victims: the obligations of cop 
culture and its facet of machismo in particular. This 
complex of influences, lastly, must incorporate individual 
differences between officers (see preceding section on the 
different 0 types 0 of policeman). Out of this jumble 
emerges a core or ideal typical role (perhaps 
0 orientation° would be a better term) which predisposes 
officers toward particular types of behaviour toward 
particular types of women. So far we have not directly 
considered the relation of this orientation to the 
types of rape explanation examined in Chapter 7. This will 
be done in the following section. The shading of T and S 
types is what will emerge, an intertwinement driven by the 
dual and sometimes conflicting demands of 9 figures 9 on the 
one hand, and machismo on the other. This oscillation 
reflects a tension in the application of partiallY 
dissonant discourse/practices. As we remarked in Chapter 
1. our interest is in the automatic, initial (socially if 
not subjectively problematic) application of a discourse 
(script). As such, I will not be dealing with explanations 
per se (of the reflective form) but with examples of 
discourse application. 
3. Policemen°s Explanation of Rape. 
In the above s~ction we have surveyed the variety of 
factors which influence the ways that policemen will treat 
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:female victims, the circumstances under which the¥ 
will believe them, and their willingness to follow up 
complaints. We have seen that it is the police who hold 
the balance of power: the¥ are the ones who decide (or, 
perhaps more accurately, are impelled to decide) what is 
and what is not worthy of credulity. The aim was to 
present this process within an appropriately social :frame 
o:f reference. Our discussion has so :far confined itself to 
the antecedents (role. group, masculinity, institutional 
demands) and outcomes (behaviours, the treatment of women, 
the willingness or otherwise to investigate). In terms of 
Kelle¥ and Michela's(1980) and Eiser's(198U) theories, we 
have not directly dealt with the explanations that 
interpose themselves between antecedents and outcomes. And 
yet, this is exactly what we have achieved in a roundabout 
way. Instead of looking at explanations per se, we have 
detailed 
applied. 
the c~rcumstances under which rape myths are 
That application is what constitutes (ideal 
typical) explanation here. For rape myths are nothing more 
than rather rigid and power-ridden scripts, that is, 
discourse/practices, the deployment of which comprises 
explanation of the automatic type (Ch.1). 
However, this needs to be :fleshed out in somewhat more 
detail. We have seen the complexity of factors that bear 
on police behaviour; we can suggest that, :for rape 
explanation, these come to be distilled in the rape myths 
that are utilized by the police. These, as we saw in 
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Chapter 7, perform the dual schismatic and typological 
functions. On the one hand they serve to differentiate 
credible rape events (this is a 9 practical 9 process which 
attempts to bring cases to court that have a good chance 
of conviction); on the other, simultaneously, they 
reassert traditional gender representations and power 
relations, partially through a denial of the links between 
the rape event and 9 normal 9 sexuality. Thus rape myths 
partly reflect the 9 practicalities 9 of legal procedure 
but also whatever sex-bias pervades both the law and legal 
establishment (cf Edwards,1981; Ch.7) and the traditions 
of 9 cop culture 9 ; at the same time as contributing to the 
job of policing, rape myths assert male hegemony. 
When we look at policemen 9 s rape explanations what we are 
searching for are the sorts of parameters used in 
characterizing an event and the implications that these 
have for the victims, the police themselves (recursive 
conditioning) and for those broader structures suc-h as the 
legal-juridical and general gender relations. Clearly, 
then, these myths are closely tied to the of 
policeman. If the role can be interpreted as the point of 
intersection of legal, organizational, group, masculine 
and 9 cop cultura1 9 discourse/practices, then a part of 
this package are the rape myths in both their T and S 
form. 
array 
These are summoned according to the informational 
(diachronically considered, cf Ch.2). To 
illustrate this.process we have gathered a number of rape 
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explanations from the literature on the police or rape (or 
both). Clearly there are not enough to inspire 
unconditional confidence in our overall analysis. 
Nevertheless, ·when they are interpreted in the context of 
the basic delineants of the police role, and appropriately 
located within that matrix, then our analysis can, given 
these limits, be considered viable. 
In Chapter 2 we noted that role 
{discursive/practical positioning) and 
disposition 
information 
condition one another. Thus, what counts as information is 
partly determined by the role; what aspects of the role 
are stressed in the process of explanation are 
influenced by the array of information that is available. 
And so on. The various configurations into which 
components of the above categories combine will determine 
and reflect the type of explanation that is given (and 
also, concurrently, the degree of power that is exercised 
over both women and the self). 
In sum, we can compose a set of ideal types 
combinations of role and information that equate with the 
use of a given rape myth and the generation of a 
concomitant explanation. High maculinity, extreme group 
identification and differentiation, overt sexism combines 
with informatio.n that denotes 9 open-territory-ness 9 (eg 
victim inebriation; the rape occurred in the offender 9 s 
residence; the offender was known to the victim; there was 
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an 'uncommonly' long lapse between the time of the rape 
incident and the time of first reporting; the victim is 
working class, black, young, unemployed, etc) to summon a 
myth (from the role's repertoire) that is appropriate to 
the information and the 'demands' of that role. In cases 
where the information suggests an 'innocent' victim, other 
myths are brought into pl~ (the monster-fiend myth). 
In the following pages I will consider some statements and 
reported statements made by the police in order to 
illustrate how they fit into this general scheme. I have 
attempted to look at explanations or accounts given 
spontaneously, rather than those reflecting the advice 
gien to officers for the interrogation of alleged victims 
(see above) . That is, I wish to look at those 
explanations/comments in which the exhortations to 'drive 
a horse and cart' through a women's testimony are not in 
the forefront of the policeman's mind. 
a. I~ this section I will consider the view sometimes 
expressed by police officers that there is no such thing 
as rape. 
win 1972, I was invited to address a seminar for 
police lieutenants training for promotion to 
captain at New York Police Academy. I spoke about 
rape and was met with a chortle of hoots and 
laughter from the assembled 30 men: ''Honey, you 
don't believe there is such a thing as rape do 
you?w a lieutenant called out. 
''Don 9 t you?'' 
wNoooo'' came the near unanimous response.'' 
(Brownmiller,1975,p409) 
The first thing to note here is that things are liable to 
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have changed since this exchange 
Neverthe1ess, as recent reports {eg Ha11,1985) show, these 
attitudes do persist. A b1anket dismissa1 of rape is 
doubt1ess an un1ike1y event, and we can expect that this 
response was as much a ref1ection of the group taking the 
opportunity to cohere against a member of an outgroup (a 
feminist woman), or e1se an examp1e of pushing to see how 
far they cou1d go before Brownmi11er wou1d respond (cf 
Smith and Gray,1983: police constab1es wou1d test one of 
the researchers byshowing him grotesque photographs of 
murder victims). However, the answer does suggest that 
their stock of exp1anations inc1udes those which imp1y 
that many rapes have been manufactured by the a11eged 
victims; a1ternatively, they might consider that many 
rapes are 9 neutra1ized 9 by the supposed fact that the 
woman actua11y wanted to be raped, ended up enjoying it, 
or that simp1y 9 things got a bit out of hand 9 • Thus, we 
might interpret this outburst as a summing up, in a gross 
nutshe11, the genera1ized devaluation of the crime of 
rape. Now, while skepticism is encouraged by the courts, 
they still recognize the offence of rape: the above 
exchange reflects not practical evaluations of 
prosecutability, but tne operation of the machismo 
perspective as it pervades cop culture. 
b. At a more concrete level, we can see the particular 
underpinnings of the blanket dismissal (which, as we 
suggested above, was likely to be rhetorical). Thus we 
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have the following account: 
"· .. some PCs take everv opportunitv to give 
detailed accounts of reported rape cases. 
Sometimes there is reason or an occasion for 
telling these stories. For example, as thev drove 
past a particular nightclub, a PC started to tell 
DJS (one of the researchers) a long story about 
the rape of a barmaid there. He told it without 
gloating and his account was entirelv sympathetic 
to the victim .... This contrasted with an account 
of the same incident given by another PC in the 
same relief, later the same day. This time there 
was no particular occasion for telling the 
story .... He ended by saying that the woman was 
not really upset and stronly implied that she 
thoroughly enjoved the whole experience." 
(Smith and Gray,1983,p92) 
Here, we have operating in the latter instance a case of 
the 9 all women want to be raped 9 much flavoured with its 
9 lie back and enjoy it 9 counterpart. The fact that the 
first constable stressed the victim 9 s trauma while the 
second denies it, suggests that the second believes that 
rape is not so bad an experience after all. That is, that 
it can be assimilated by the victim without undue bother. 
Once more the implication is that rape or interpersonal 
violence in gender relations is the norm, or is in some 
way natural. As we saw in Chapter 7, this has a 
dimensional aspect insofar as it suggests that rape is on 
a continuum with normal sexual encounters. Of course, it 
lacks a critical edge and actually serves a typological 
function: to define rape as that event in which extreme 
violence is perpetrated in the process. In practical terms 
it means ;that less extreme or less stereotypical rape 
cases can be dropped; or rather, it can serve to 
facilitate or rationalize the procedure of deliberately 
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and systematically undermining the victim's allegations. 
c. Associated with the above example, are those cases 
which are perceived as largely the women's doing; that is, 
a woman has a led a man on to the point of no return where 
he loses control and 9 things get out of hand 9 • 
~victim: I rang the police and they showed up 
very casually about ten minutes later. They 
sauntered in and one of them produced a flick 
knife when I asked him to untie me. They started 
saying things like, 99Well, I don 9 t think you've 
been raped. This was obviously someone you met 
last night. It got too heavy and you decided to 
call the police this morning." They kept 
suggesting it was a casual affair gone wrong. 
They said, "If everything you say happened had 
happened you would be completely hysterical now. 
You would have thrown yourself out of the window 
to get away. 99 They obviously didn 9 t believe me. 99 
(Toner,l982,p15ll) 
As Toner notes this ties in with both the 'cry rape' myth 
and the male sexual uncontrollability discourse. In fact, 
it reverberates between the two. In the latter instance, 
the implication is that the woman can only say no if she 
does so in good time. In the above case, even the fact 
that the woman was tied up did not hinder the police 
officers from questioning the genuineness of her 'No'. On 
the subject of the validity of the 9 No 9 , a detective 
Inspector from the Northhamptonshire Police force puts it 
thus: 
99 I 9 ve got no time for the bloke who attacks a 
girl he doesn 9 t know and rapes her .... But I have 
some sympathy for the boy who is allowed to go so 
far and is told to stop at the last minute 
because I think the fault can lie with the girl. 
One wonders how forceful they were in saying no, 
whether they really meant it if they did say no." 
(Toner,1982,p155) 
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The .reverberation between rape 9 (the false 
allegation) and the genuine rape (where the victim 9 s 9 No 9 
has been illegitimately ignored) makes the distinction 
between the two problematic. Nevertheless, this is itself 
indicative of the pressure placed on the woman to fulfil 
men 9 s criteria of a forceful As we suggested in 
Chapter 7, these are constantly shifting across different 
men, states of inebriation, types of victim. But also, we 
saw how some men felt that any 9 No 9 had to be respected. 
The police reflect the masculine bias in this respect by 
tying the 9 he1plessness 9 of the man (his automatonism in 
the face of his sexual urges) to the credibility of the 
Here we have the typological shading into the 
schismatic. The T criterion (a man has intercourse without 
the woman 9 s consent) is softened by the parameters of the 
masculine condition and the irrationality of women 9 s 
response. The dual aspects of the mythological sexual loss 
of control and the (more or less standard) ambiguity of 
women 9 s respones (which need to be 9 sorted out 9 by the 
man) shift responsibility onto the woman. Rape thus 
becomes diluted (as indeed it must do given that grey 
areas do exist), but it is a dilution which can end up 
9 blaming the victim 9 • The schismatic inheres in the fact 
that the ambiguity is viewed as a natural property of 
women, and that the uncontrollability of men is brought 
about by t~e antics of the woman, rather than seeing these 
as read into or generated by patriarchal gender relations. 
Thus the dimensional connections with broader historical 
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and social trends are severed; the causal locus comes to 
be individualized in the particular woman, or naturalized 
in women in general. It is men who become the victims. 
This, of course, all relates to the problems of 
prosecutability. The discourses outlined above also 
prevail amongst the judiciary (cf Toner,1982; 
Patullo,1983; Chs. 6&7), and as such might simply reflect 
the police 9 s ~ttempts to accommodate to the courts. And 
yet, the manner with which such discourses are enacted 
(the reported casualness of the police) suggests that 
these discourses might be fully integrated into 9 cop 
culture 9 • Ie the police are responding to such cases as 
men with traditional views and investments, not simply as 
realistic officers. 
d. The blame that is attached to the victim is not always 
so problematic as made out above. Some victims are 
presumed to ask for it: 
wThe police implied that I asked for it because I 
was wearing shorts in a red light district.~ 
(Hall,1985,p112) 
So the types of clothes worn, and the places a woman 
ventures into signal to men that she is available. 
However, as we remarked in Chapter 7, these signals are 
largely male-determined. The typological aspect, which 
quite accurately notes that dressing in a certain way, 
going into certain situations, leads men to assume that a 
woman is sexually available (irrespective of whether she 
is or not) becomes schismatic when that woman is seen as 
being solel¥ responsible for the signals she emits; that 
is, where ~he become the primar¥. not to say solitar¥, 
cause. Where women deny such responsibility then they 
might be accused of simple stupidity. of essentially not 
knowing, what to men are, the obvious rules. The 
t¥Pological specifies the sorts of situations in which 
rape might occur, but it slides into the schismatic 
when it renders those rules absolute. Transgressing them, 
under such a routine, provides the causal impetus (the 
contributory negligence) that results in rape, not the 
rules themselves. The dimensional would counter that the 
rules set up the conditions of emergence for rape events; 
the schismatic detracts from these. These rules are. 
probably, by and large recognized by most people as being 
commonsensical. and legal expectation and juries are 
liable to follow this. As a result we would expect the 
police to again reflect this and temper investi~ation to 
suit legal reality. However, rough, unsympathetic 
approaches adopted by the police are not the onl¥ ones 
available (see above). It would seem that the repetition 
of these realities, and the relish with which this is 
sometimes carried out. su~gests that prosecutability 
serves as a ve~l for the rehearsal of masculinity. 
This becomes clearer in the police 9 s responses to attacks 
on prostitutes (Benn,1985) where the sense of urgency is 
even less. Indeed, the police will occasionally equate 
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rape with a prostitute 9 s false allegation (cf Ch.l). This 
view spills ·over so that other women 9 s rapes are devalued 
by the sugge~tion that the victim is a prostitute. For 
example: 
~The police called me a prostitute and they upset 
me so much that I withdrew the allegation ... ~ 
(Hall,1985,p112) 
The devaluation of prostitutes to the point at which it is 
not possible for them to say 9 No 9 convincingly, appears to 
come most glaringly to light in the pronouncements of the 
senior officer on the Yorkshire Ripper case 
(Burn,1984,p236). 
~west Yorkshire 9 s Acting 
"He (the Ripper) has made 
Chief' Constable said. 
it clear that he hates 
prostitutes. Many people do. We as a police :force 
will continue to arrest prostitutes. But the 
Ripper is now killing innocent girls" ... " 
(Root,1984,p115) 
And so there ~re innocent and guilty rape victims that 
the police differentiate between. However, this is not 
just the police. Others, relatives of the 9 innocent 9 
victims, also attempted during the Yorkshire Ripper 
investigations, to appeal to this distinction in order to 
shame those supposedly shielding Peter Sutcliffe into 
exposing him (Burn,198~,p277-278). The contrast between 
the completely innocent victim and the implicitly culpable 
prostitute is echoed in the contrast between the 
beast-fiend a.nd the righteous avenger representations of 
Sutcliffe (cf' Hollway,1982). These two contrasts remained 
closely tied to one another: Prostitute-Avenger; 
Innocent-Beast. Such equations would have :facilitated the 
assumption that someone must have consciously known and 
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shielded 
Burn(1984) 
the Ripper (because of his beastliness). 
suggests that this was not the case. Further, 
these two typological discourses, by remaining separate 
become schismatic: 
their ideological 
their discreteness convicts them of 
function. For there to have been 
cross-over between these two versions there would have had 
to have been some acknowledgement of the dimensionality of 
rape. The prostitute-beast alignment would undermine the 
putative blameworthiness of the prostitute; the 
innocent-avenger link would reflect the potential anger of 
men towards any woman, or at least help conceptualize the 
possibility of a man just wanting to kill a woman (as 
Sutcliffe himself at one point described his state, 
Hollway.1982). 
The practical implications of the equations set out above 
is that perhaps too much energy was expended in looking 
for someone who fitted into these slots (though things 
were considerably more complex. crucially complicated by 
an information overload). Still, we can make the point 
that seeking someone who is quintessentially diabolical 
fits in more neatly with the notion of 9 real 9 police work 
than would a search for someone who is more 9 ordinary 9 • 
The tracking down of a fiend would fall easily into this 
exalted category, whereas the hard, relatively menial work 
that actually goes into tracing a murderer or rapist who 
is otherwise 9 normal 9 would be perhaps less valued, less 
romanticallY action-oriented. 
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e. Here I ~ill discuss the way that rape explanations are 
conditioned by the relation of victims to their attackers. 
In the Clark and Lewis(1977) study, we found that the 
relation between offender and victim was influential in 
determining whether a rape was considered Founded or not. 
This was echoed in Rose and Randall 0 s(1982) findings that 
police investigators used this relation as one index in 
their assessment of whether consent had been withheld or 
not (this ~ssessment contributed to their overall 
perceptions of the legitimacy of a rape as represented in 
the Offence Incidence reports). 
The following extract suggests one of the possible reasons 
underlying this parameter: 
Again. 
"She ~as taken to a local hospital for 
examination where the police were telephoned. She 
was then taken to the station and question for 
approximately six hours and medically examined 
further. She said the police told the women who 
had t~ken her to the hospital that there was 
proof of rape. but her uncle denied it. The 
police told the woman that there was no proof and 
that she should let the matter drop for the 
family 0 s sake. The woman lived with her aunt and 
uncle and the outcome was that the aunt threw her 
out." 
(Hanmer and Saunders.1984.P51) 
we must stress that not all police "explanations" 
or behaviour are as extreme as this in Hanmer and 
Saunder 0 s sample. Nevertheless. here we have an example of 
a close relation between victim and alleged offender; 
moreover. we have the family involved which edges this 
event into the terrain of domestic disputes. and thus, 
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potentially 
I 
9 rubbish 9 • However, it does reflect the 
perceived sanctity of the longstanding relationship, 
whether tha~ be for family, spouses or lovers. The 9 No 9 of 
I 
the under such circumstances often becomes 
subordinate' to the length of the relationship: it is the 
relationship that must remain intact. Of course what this 
I 
means is that it is the woman who suffers. The typological 
function of more or less discounting such events as bona 
fide rapes becomes schismatic because it effectively 
I 
denies that men in longstanding relationships are 
logically, if not technically, capable of rape. 
! 
f. Finally,: there are cases where the police disbelieve an 
alleged victim because 
I 
she has delayed in reporting the 
rape. 
I 
99 Police did not believe my story because I did 
not report it till th following day, were very 
discouraging about my pursuing it to court, 
and w.arned me of how unpleasant it would be. Felt 
very resentful they were not more helpful." 
(Hall,1985,p115) 
99 DETE:CTIVE SERGEANT (MALE) • PETERBOROUGH: A girl 
who report rape eight or twelve hours after it 
happened can be taken with a pinch of salt." 
(Toner,1982,p159) 
This atti t:ude suggests that rape should lead to an 
' instaneous : outrage/trauma/shock that will result in an 
I 
immediate c:omplaint. 
I 
Now such an assumption might reflect 
an ignoran~e of the rape trauma syndrome (cf Hopkins and 
' 
Thompson,1~84) but it also hints at a denial of the social 
stigma I thS!t attaches 
outraged at the attack, 
to rape. Victims are not only 
but also confronted with the 
Page U12 
potential of social disapproval and the possibility of 
police hostility. In other words. the police end up 
unduly narrowing the range of factors that can legitimate 
a victim 0 s response to rape. ignoring those threatening 
contextual factors that to her are all too apparent. Rape 
is a crime and should be reported as soon as possible. Any 
delay hampers investigation and must be indicative of 
ambivalence on the part of the alleged victim. That 
ambivalence reflects on the event itself. not on the 
after-effects. Again. this attitude can be seen from a 
practical standpoint that shapes itself to the demands of 
the courts; but it need not take so brutal a form. 
The typological aspect is thus rendered schismatic: the 
criterion of delay. by effectively individualizing the 
delay. serves to decouple rape and normality. Thus, 
unreported rapes are not 0 reallY 0 rapes. However. there is 
another point to be made here. The ambivalence might also 
be traced back to the event itself: that is. women might 
realize only belatedly that they have been raped (as 
opposed to balking at reporting it). This. according to 
writers such as Brownmiller(1975). is because women are 
confused by such encounters• if consent has been subtly 
forced. then only in retrospect does it become apparent 
that force of some sort was deployed. Yet. it is likely 
that the police will ascribe such confused cases, more or 
less openly and generally, to the lack of rationality on 
the part of the victim. This can be seen as the source of 
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ambiguity in the sexual encounter. In other words, the 
traditional dimensional view of feminine reserve that 
needs to be coaxed is projected into the rape event. 
Women must be persuaded and this is a necessaril¥ 
intricate and ambiguous process (ie it is men who 
persist; in ~oat cases it is men who define). On this 
view, some women will misread what are seen as being 
nothing more than natural techniques of seduction. Only in 
clearcut cases where the woman 9 s decision has been 
violated is rape admitted. If ambiguity is intrinsic to 
sexual encounters, then a woman 9 s complaint of rape might, 
if it occurred under conditions of such ambiguity, be 
considered unreasonabl¥ forced, in other words, contrived. 
The typological criterion that specifies that a rapist 
must ignore the victim 9 s denial of consent or else be 
negligent as to whether it was given, becomes partiall¥ 
schismatic because it rejects those cases where ambiguit¥ 
embodies the continuity between rape and 9 normality 9 • Once 
more, the p~acticalities of producing a believable 
prosecution contribute to the above. But, given that 
policemen do adhere to the traditional masculine view of 
gender relations, and further, if it is agreed that this 
is likely to b~ exacerbated by the nature of police work 
and its particularly strong group component, then we can 
argue that the above discourses relate to the 
personal/role related practices of policemen. That is, 
they might themselves exploit this ambiguity~ the¥ are 
unlikely to readily concede that it is an aspect and 
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condition of rape. 
In this section I have considered the way that 
explanations of and comments on rape 
incorporate rape myths and S and T forms. Further, these 
have been related to the functional demands of policing, 
the other. Of course, the limited scope of the material 
constrains the representativeness of our analysis. Still, 
it has served an illustrative role, demonstrating the way 
that our ideal types are shaped by the concrete exigencies 
of functioning within an organization. In this respect, 
the preceding section acts as a qualification of our 
analyses in Chapter 7, suggesting how the ideal types, 
that were previously related to the general role of more 
or less traditional or radical man, are mediated by the 
complex and contradictory demands of other (work) roles 
(in the above case, policeman). To put it another way, the 
police institutional and cultural limits placed on 
discourse/practice serve to refine, in the sense of more 
tightly demarcating, the discourse/practices of the 
general role of man. In the following section policemen 9 s 
explanations of rape will be investigated from a different 
slant; the cognitive processes that are believed to 
mediate explanation are reinterpreted as expressions of 
the rules of combination and difference of the 
discourse/practi~es that we have treated above. 
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l!. Cognition .in Policemen 9 s Explanation o~ Rape. 
In this section I will consider the workings 0~ 
cognitive processes as they relate to the application of 
rape discourse/practices. Following the thread of Chapter 
2, my aim is to demonstrate that, in the configurations o~ 
role, information, myth (explanation) and cognitive 
processes, those processes (and 9 biases 9 ) are conditioned 
by the content they are supposed to deal with. This 
emerges in the contrast of rape explanations given by 
police and those produced by their critics, in the 
production of S/T and D explanations respectively. In the 
stead of cognitive processes, we will have rules of 
combination and difference that demarcate the 
configuration of discourses/practices, rules which are 
historically and socially conditioned. We can 
' introduce these latter aspects because, in apprehending 
the 9 cognitive processes 9 of the Internal Attribution 
Bias, Theory Perseverance, and the Neglect of Baserate 
Information thr6ugh our three explanatory ideal types with 
their historico-practical dimension, we place them in a 
concrete, praxical context. 
a. The Internal Attribution Bias (Salience). In Chapter 
2, we argued that salience is a circular concept, 
self-fulfilling unless grounded in 9 biology 9 , ie made 
functional to some biological need or disposition in the 
organism. We maintained that this cannot hold for more 
social phenomena such as the objects of explanation. 
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Arguing that explanation is an inherently social activity, 
what counts as salient - what 0 swamps the field 0 is 
subject to a variety of factors few of them directly 
relevant to As regards rape explanations, 
women of a 0 disreputable 0 type can swamp a field comprised 
of a rape event far more comprehensively than can other 
types. This is of course mediated by the type of rape 
discourse to which the observer adheres. However, we 
should also be wary of too simple a division between 
person and field. An example to clarify: women who present 
themselves to police claiming that they have been raped 
and who are also evidently drunk will, as our survey of 
the literature indicates, most likely have their 
treated with extreme suspicion. The allegations 
explanation in operation here (ie the script/myth that is 
being applied) will be a combination of: alcohol-induced 
seduction i• legitimate; the woman wanted it (and 
therefore allowed herself to get drunk) but changed her 
mind at the last minute (ie 0 No 0 means 0 Yes 0 ). Whether it 
was part of the seduction process or not, the fact that 
she was drunk automatically renders her open-territory. In 
the simplistic and inadequate terms of attribution theory, 
she is the one who is attributed to; there is an internal 
attribution to the extent that her allegation is not 
accepted - the incident was her fault. At the same time, 
by virtue of her being drunk, that woman has defined her 
field as one of 9 legitimate seduction° or 9 an example of 
feminine irrationality/wantonness 0 • 
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The woman in this example swamps the field by virtue of 
defining it. Simultaneously, the field, inferable from 
her condition, pefines her. There is backward and forth 
movement between field and target that is akin to a 
hermetic loop of mutual definition (and difference), a 
hermeneutic circle in other words. This is a package that 
ultimately centres on victim-blame. However, this can only 
occur against another field or backdrop of ideological or 
discursive assumptions concerning the relationship between 
men and women, and the status of rape. By contrast, it 
could be held that drinking and socializing were not 
simple processes of social interaction, but loci for the 
exercise of power. Given that prevailing historical and 
social conditi~ns put this power largely at the 0 disposal 0 
of men, it would potentially follow that a woman°s drunken 
state reflected the degree of social pressure placed on 
the woman by the alleged rapist (or by other men). This 
social pressure manoeuvers women into conditions of 
debilitation in which they find themselves open-territory 
(See above). So, against an alternative set of assumptions 
(and practice~). against an absence of the relevant rape 
mythology, th~ woman no longer takes on the salient role 
as the prime instigator (and hence the point of 
intervention ' - which largely entails warning against the 
free movement of women, cf Ch.7). Rather, the field as a 
whole does, a field which stretches to incorporate wider 
socio-historical factors. By way of contrast, a different 
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t~pe of victim, the archet~pall~ respectable woman, would 
activate a different field whose most salient feature 
would be the rapist-fiend. Again, the same process of 
reverberation takes place to produce a standardized 
account of the probable sequence of events. Similar!~, 
this can be disrupted through the input of alternative 
discourses. 
In this discussion of salience, we have considered its 
relation to causal primae~, and the determination of that 
b~ the field, the figure and the discourses to which the 
observer adheres. However, we have not directl~ tackled 
how this is affected b~ and affects practice. That is, we 
must now examine how salience relates to our S, T and D 
ideal t~pes. 
primar~ and 
What is salient is apprehended as causall~ 
therefore to response (control, 
avoidance, manipulation, 
open 
etc). And ~et this response 
seems to be conceived wholl~ in terms of the individual: 
it is the individual 0 s response that marks the salience 
of the target object. It is not the social or collective 
response that comes into the picture. What relevance has 
salience as biological!~ conceived to phenomena that are 
overwhelmingl~ social? Ver~ little, we have argued. The 
individualized salience that Taylor and Fiske have 
demonstrated is a primed one, evoked by experimental 
conditions. This can be evidenced with regard to rape: 
the salience of the victim or the rapist-fiend is such 
onl~ because of the practical/discursive constitution of 
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the police, their inte.rest in maintaining the 
individual-centred status quo at the expense o~ the 
marginalized 9~ew9 (that is, they are interested in 
intervening at the level of the individual). And here we 
can bring in our T explanator¥ type. The T explanation 
aims at di~ferentiating the individual rape 
event/rapist/victim and, as such, is presupposed by an 
individualistic conception of salience-driven attribution 
one which focusses on the 9 manageable 9 (the 
prosecutable, credible and so forth). This is, of course. 
what the police and the law are constrained to do: their 
interest is in identifying and removing culprits (whether 
the¥ be rapists or false victims). In other words, the 
role delineants of the policeman serve to mediate and are 
mediated by the processes of salience as they bear on 
attribution. 
shaped b;y 
For a given informational array, salience is 
the configuration of discou.rse/p.ractices 
pertinent to the police role at that time, and it is 
expressed through t¥POlogical explanation. When the option 
for a more genuinel¥ collective form of action is present, 
as that implied in socialist-feminist analysies of rape, 
then it is the background factors that become 9 salient 9 , a 
potential canvas of intervention. This is incorporated in 
the dimensional explanation insofar·as it is directed at 
social change. The notion of an individualistic, 
biolog¥-centre salience process largely precludes the use 
of this t¥pe of dimensional explanation. 
Page ll.20 
b. Theory Perseverance (TP). In Chapter 
2Qs discussion of TP, we saw that the most resistent 
hypotheses are those that have the most plausible causal 
constitution. When an alternative theory is presented 
which has a similar or superior causal potency, and which 
can better accommodate the available evidence, then it 
will be accepted over the original theory. TP is thus 
conceived as a bias of conservatism that hinges on the 
perception of causality. 
However, causality can be subsumed under Qplausibilityv. 
Many explanations can persevere if their plausibility 
remains intact. Such plausibility can be grounded in a 
number of sources (eg faith, teleology- cf Bunge,1959). 
Dialectical explanations are particularly relevant in the 
present context: according to these an interaction 
between two elements, which are seen to lie in opposition 
to one another, produces an outcome. This type of 
dialectical explanation is reflected in the way some men 
perceive affairs as they exist between men and women, what 
Burt(1980) has called adversarial sexual beliefs. 
Under these circumstances, the dialectical form is 
effectively dimensional insofar as it traces rape to the 
adversarial relations perceived between men and women 
generally. But, this also serves, as we have argued at 
several points, a typological function. As Burt(1980) 
found, those subjects who hold adversarial sexual beliefs 
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also tend to consider rape myths to be accurate; that is, 
adversarial sexual beliefs partially underlie the latter, 
and excuse the (eg led on) form of rape. They 
tend to assert that only the more extreme, violent rape 
events constitute genuine rapes. Here, we see how 
plausibility is nurtured by the typological-schismatic 
practice of marginalizing rape. To put it another way, 
plausibility is conditioned by the discoursive/practical 
matrix in which the explaining individual is immersed - it 
is not simply a question of the formal causal coherence of 
an explanation or theory. The investments in a particular 
framework of discourse and practice ensure that some types 
of theories or explanations, irrespective of their causal 
status, are liable to persevere. 
However, there is also another question to be answered. 
Perseverance is itself a practice and must be accommodated 
by the discursive/practical framework. It should not be 
viewed as a negative outcome of a cognitive tendency, but 
as a positive component 
discursive/practical matrix. Its 
within 
positive 
a given 
status is 
especially likely where it has been integrated into a 
matrix by virtue of the explainerQs power. For example, in 
the case of police officers explaining rape, they can 
bolster their sexist impressions by essentially regulating 
the number of disconfirming instances, dismissing all but 
the most stereotypical rape complaints. The 
self-fulfilling nature of such explanations has been taken 
Page 422 
into account in that research which has looked at the 
propensity of subjects to seek out confirmatory evidence 
(cf Ch.2). However, in the example of the police, this 
takes on a more fervent form unsurprisingly, 
given their !~vestment in traditional modes of masculine 
behaviour and the demands placed on them by organizational 
and juridical factors. Further, it is worth emphasizing 
that the police do not exercise a simply cognitive power 
in the form of cognitively screening information; it is 
material too women°s claims/complaints are actively 
discounted, women are denigrated and humiliated. It is 
also not cognitive in the sense of being located in the 
individual~ rather, such behaviour is an element of the 
policeman role. 
The positive value of perseverance is that it feeds into 
and draws upon masculinity as present in the police role. 
Perseverance is not simply a form of bigotry, it is a 
means of rehearsing a theory or explanation, and that 
process of rehearsal (or resistance) is also an exercise 
of power, a reassertion of the priveleged access to 
certainty ( 0 eg through the capacity to determine what can 
and cannot count as disconfirming evidence). The findings 
of TP under experimental conditions may be a reflection of 
this positivity. Amongst policemen, it is likely to prove 
profound in the lightof their tightly-knit, supportive 
group environment. But also, it is aided by the 
typological-schismatic orientation of 0 cop culture 0 and 
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the police role, an orientation which is likel¥ to be 
geared toward protecting its own hegemony (ie by the 
reproduction of rape myths and 
dimensional). 
the denial of the 
c. Consensus and Baserate Information. Just as TP 
relies on plausibility, so too the use of baserate 
information will depend on its perceived plausibilit¥. 
Various researchers have looked at what conditions the 
uptake of baserate information. It emerges that the 
(causal) relevance of such information is particularly 
instrumental (cf Ch.2). We, however, would repeat the 
argument of the above section that what constitutes a 
relevant sample depends on the subject of that sample. Our 
review of the literature regarding policemen 9 s perceptions 
of rape victims, suggests that for some victims, no sample 
in which counter-stereotyped behaviours occur could dispel 
certain stereotypes which are strongly held. In other 
words, sample-based consensus information which does not 
accord with a given stereotypic image will be dismissed. 
This is, of course, what Ajzen(1977) is accessing when he 
refers to causal relevance. And Borgida et al(1981) have 
commented on how stereot¥pes may themselves be 
reconceptualized as a short-hand for consensus 
information; under these circumstances, consensus 
information is certainly used. 
However, it must be recalled that baserate information 
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relevant to a given event is not necessarily, or even 
usually, unitary. That is, different types of consensus or 
baserate information apply, and sometimes these will 
conflict. In our discussion of the Yorkshire Ripper case, 
we saw two baserates or stereotypes projected onto the 
rape event (Innocent-Beast; Prostitute-Avenger): the 
initial Prostitute-Avenger being superceded by the 
Innocent-Beast configuration. The fact that information 
comes to be shaped to fit the stereotyped image reflects 
the discursive/practical positioning of the explainer. In 
the above example, it was always unlikely that the 
intervening categories of Prostitute-Beast and 
Innocent-Avenger would be construed. This was because the 
discursive/practical weight (or of the 
former stereotyped configurations, which readily lend 
themselves to typological explanation, precluded the 
latter, more genuinely dimensional, pairs. 
That the stereotype (illusory baserate) of the 
rapist-fiend survives the actual baserate information 
about rapists as the most 9 normal 9 of inmates, is relevant 
here. Clearly, this might arise because policemen are not 
aware of the latter characterization of rapists; however, 
there might be other factors at work. Possibly, the 
9 normal 9 rapist might simply find no place in the 
traditional view of rape held by policemen. This, as we 
have seen in Chapter 7, is managed by nudging these 9 led 
on 9 rapes out of the category of 9 real 9 rapes. What would 
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then be a baserate that accesses the dimensionality of 
rape is rendered more or less irrelevant by an implicit 
redefinition of rape. Such a redefinition occurs in the 
9 unofficial 9 macho milieu of policing: it is a means of 
asserting orthodox discourse/practices. It will tend to 
fly in the face of the legal definition of rape which 
allows 9 normality 9 to enter into the picture (certainly it 
does not openly exclude it). Of course, this process also 
applies to evaluation of rape victims (respectable versus 
open-territory). 
As in the case of TP. the continued use of illusory 
baserates reflects and is an exercise of power: the 
production of counter-baserates that is. the use of 
feminist-dimens~onal explanatory types represent a 
struggle for power. The advantage at the disposal of the 
masculinized role is that. partly because of its tendency 
towards caricature. it will serve as a robust exemplar of 
the very baserates/stereotypes it propounds. 
In this section I have started off from the opposite end 
of the spectrum to cognitive social psychology. I have not 
analyzed behaviour through a near-exclusive concentration 
on the de-contextual operation of given (postulated) 
cognitive processes. Instead. I have looked at behaviour 
in a highly textured environment, superimposing three 
9 cognitive 9 processes on it to demonstrate their intrinsic 
contingency. That is. I hope to have shown that they play 
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only an intermingled part in explanation. What is striking 
about this process of explanatory production is its 
complexity. It is a complexity that deserves the holistic 
treatment I have attempted in this thesis rather than the 
atomistic approach of experimental social psychology. In 
looking into the interaction of the various 'cognitive 
processes', we find that they are not unitary, discrete. 
Indeed, we can draw altogether alternative lines of 
demarcation through this matrix. Thus, rather than isolate 
an internal attribution bias, theory perseverance and 
neglect of consensus information, 
factor that cuts across all three, 
we could pick another 
eg plausiblity. This 
could be a wide ranging rule of combination: the cognitive 
we have looked are localized examples. This rule 
is socially mediated and socially 9 functional 9 • Here we 
come close to Kruglanski and Ajzen 9 s(1983) epistemic 
theory. But whereas they are typically vague about the 
nature of the social environment in which agents operate, 
we have tried to be as explicit as possible. In doing 
this, we are also in a position to formalize the activity 
of plausibility, in the sense of seeing it as the 
subjective element in the configuration of role, 
institution, discourse/practice and information. 
group, 
To conclude this chapter: We have examined how our three 
ideal types enter into the rape explanations of policemen, 
and how they are variously integrated, or otherwise, into 
the discursive/practical framework of policework. We have 
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studied the complex of pressures that shape the 
explanator¥ orientation of policemen (their repertoire of 
scripts, m¥ths, etc) and have attempted to demonstrate 
that these serve to trigger, shape and rehearse various 
cognitive processes. There is no easy way to summarize 
these combinations (and hence the usefulness of the ideal 
type): a fuller summary will be presented in the 
concluding chapter. Suffice it to say that, while we 
cannot do full justice to the arr&¥ of factors that 
impinge on policemen 9 s explanations of rape, we have at 
least explored some of the (more important) ways that such 
a diversit¥ relates to and incorporates a power at once 
structural 
(masculine). 
(organizational, role-linked) and personal 
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CONCLUSION 
This concluding chapter will be organized in the 
following way: First there will be a summary of the main 
points of the thesis. This will be followed by an account 
of some of the practical ramifications of the work 
presented here, especially as regards the newly instituted 
police procedures for dealing with rape victims. Finally, 
I will consider some of the substantive weaknesses of the 
thesis and outline some implications for future research. 
1. Summary and Overall Conclusions. 
The central and basic point of this thesis is that social 
psychology has failed to do explanations the justice they 
deserve. That is, explanations are treated as if they are 
free-floating, disengaged from any concrete context of 
use. Where that use has been considered, its historical 
and situational specificity has hardly been taken into 
account. Rather, a vague 9 need to control 9 is placed at 
the motivational centre of the generation and use of 
explanations; the social constitution of that need is not 
properly analysed. I have argued that to better 
comprehend the variety of needs and the spectrum of uses, 
it is necessary to situate explanations in the relevant 
discursive/practical matrix. 
Chapter 1. 
This was the main thrust of 
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In doing this it was necessary to outline the relation of 
explanation to cognitive processes, especially those that 
are conventionally seen as underlying explanation. It is 
important, in turn, to link these to the 
discursive/practical matrices in which explanations are 
embedded. This was also partly motivated by the desire to 
moderate the social psychological emphasis on cognition 
with its implications, invested with the truth/power of 
science, that such explanations and behaviours were 
inevitable. To undermine this fatalism, two types of 
critique were utilized. Firstly I tried to show the 
disparate ways in which the relevant cognitive processes 
were 9 mediated 9 by social processes; that is, I tried to 
reassert the importance 
explanation, in particular, 
of contextual factors in 
the relation of cognition to 
practice and power. Instead of positing an underlying 
cognitive process to account for these various instances, 
I opted for a packaging approach which connected a given 
cognitive process with a given explanations that is 
9 impelled 9 by a specific social context. As such. an 
explanation, rather than being 9 pushed from behind or 
within° by internal cognitive processes, is 0 drawn 
towards 0 the 0 external demands 0 of a given social 
situation. Naturally, this contrast is a false one, for 
each must entail the other. The second strategy was to 
speculate on the origins of cognitive processes, and 
suggest that they might be partially rooted in the social 
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infrastructure (say in the contradiction between the means 
and relations of' production), not simply in the 
biological constitution of' the individual. 
Figure 1. 
Simplified Model of Role 
/ 
(a) / 
(Identity) 
Personal 
" " (b) 
" 
/ 
Practical ----- ROLE ----- Expressive 
" 
/ 
(d) " / (c) 
" 
/ 
Institutional 
(Behaviour) 
(a) Self-related behaviour: (b) Group Processes; (c) Role 
Differentiation; (d) Institution-related behaviour. 
Chapter 3 looked in more detail at what form the 
vexternal demaridsv we mentioned above might take. This 
settled into an examination of' the vpoint of articulationv 
at which those processes acted: that point was conceived 
in terms of' the role. In Chapter 3 I effectively focused 
on the point at which the discursive/practical matrix 
worked on the individual, that is, through the role. The 
role was conceived as incorporating both practical and 
expressive, personal and social moments. This conception 
was developed against the more popular backdrop of' 
research into group-related explanation research. 
Regarding the latter it was maintained that the role 
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theoretically preceded the group, though in their actual 
interactions, role 
interdependent. Figure 1 
conception of the role. 
and group were complexly 
diagrammatically summarizes our 
Thus the role embodies and accesses the social identity 
of the individual, the behaviour of the individual in 
relation to both self and context, and the practical and 
expressive components of those behaviours. It goes without 
saying that such a diagram is a gross oversimplification, 
abstracting and isolating elements which are tightly 
entwined. Thus, for example, the institutional can lay 
the foundations of an identity, while that identity can 
mediate the day-to-day functioning of the institution. (In 
this relation the role of a practically grounded 
memory is pivotal - see below). 
So, a role is multi-facetted: it contains elements that 
are derived from other matrices which impinge on both the 
general individual and the particular institution. Putting 
this a different way: the individual and institution 
interact with other individuals and institutions which 
partially remould the (target) role. The role is not 
static therefore, though we treat it as such in our case 
study. (Even so we do admit its malleability in noting that 
the police are attempting to reform their treatment of the 
victims of sexual offences by injecting and 
sensi ti vi ty 99 p27,Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary, 
I 
198lt). In placing 
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individuals and 
institutions in wider contexts, we also took into account 
their broader function; to characterize such a function it 
was necessary to characterize the nature of the those 
broader social structures. To this end, I adopted an 
essentially Marxist (Frankfurt School) view that also 
involved feminist social analysis (Chs.4,6). 
The analysis of social structure must consider its 
relation to power and oppression. Consequently it is 
important to locate the role of ideology in this analysis. 
There are various problems with the concept, not least of 
which is the plethora of definitions, but I have continued 
to use it because of its theoretical links with 
oppression, power and resistance. In Chapter lt I 
considered how explanations and their respective matrices 
could be related to ideology and power and argued that 
roles and explanations could be labelled ideological where 
it could · be demonstrated (and this was always a 
historically contingent demonstration) that they played 
some part in the obstruction of critical (self-) 
reflection and promoted oppression of some sort. In the 
same chapter I explored some of the ways that explanations 
could be ideological tools in the hands of both lay 
persons (eg Republicans, role-holders) and experts (eg 
social psychologists/ text book writers); these tools, it 
was suggested were complexly conditioned by the role 
situation of the explainer. It was also suggested that 
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particular roles have particular ideological functions, 
obfuscating cr~ticism in both others (target roles) and in 
the home ~ole (through a process or recursive 
conditioning). Power, a necessary component in such an 
analysis, had been more fully considered at the end or 
Chapter 1. 
Chapter 5 drew various connections between the preceding 
chapters and elaborated on the methodology, ror want or a 
better term, ~hat was deployed in the second part or the 
thesis. By virtue or its holism, our preferred 
theoretical framework was bound to have a speculative 
moment in the sense that it is more theory- than 
data-driven. It was proposed that the ideal type could, at 
once, admit the speculative aspect or the theory (the 
one-sided extension of some characteristics over others, 
eg feminist over Marxist) and ensure that this speculation 
was grounded in data and theory that were credible 
(police, feminist and academic statistics of rape; 
interviews; socialist-feminist theories of rape and 
gender relations). The construction of an ideal type 
assumed that explanations were tools with a dual cutting 
edge: on· the one hand servicing institutional 
role-demands, on the other supporting identity needs. In 
the terms of Figure 1, EXPLANATION could be substituted 
ror ROLE. · The former edge could readily encompass the 
social and ideological functions of explanations, while 
the latter could deal with the group, identity and 
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cognitive aspects of explanations. To re-iterate, this 
division is by no means as clear-cut as it is here 
presented. The precise configuration o~ the interaction 
between these will depend on the speci~ic example chosen. 
The ~oregoing discussions should have hinted at the 
broader significance of our approach. The analytic and 
empirical contextualization that has characterized this 
thesis can be applied to most, if not all, forms of social 
behaviour. Within what has been a multidisciplinary 
framework, we have attempted to counter the individualism 
o~ much social psychology by speci~ying the concrete 
environment in which behaviour is mani~ested and stressing 
its influenc~ on both the ~orm and content of 
psychological processes. In effect, we have been engaged 
in examining the interaction between psychological 
mechanism and function. Whereas social psychology has 
specialized in mechanism to the detriment o~ ~unction, we 
have rehabilitated function in its explicit, social 
guises. By detailing the personal and social functions of 
explanations (expressive, practical, role, institutional, 
historical)~ we have been better able to understand the 
complexity and contingency of this interaction. Given 
that our approach generalizes across social behaviours, it 
~ollows that many areas within social psychology would be 
enhanced by adopting a broader based view such as that 
which has been developed here. Over and above the areas 
that have already been addressed (intergroup theory, role 
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theory, attribution theory, stereotyping, etc), the 
following might also benefit: those disciplines with a 
heavy cognitive bent such as person perception, equity 
theory, social' influence, and even those with an 
ostensibly greater social and multidisciplinary 
orientation such as personal relationships research and 
ethogenics. 
We now come to Part II, the case study of men 9 s and 
policemen 9 s explanation of rape. Because of the importance 
of background factors, Chapters 6 and 7 were given over to 
detailing the broad, non-institutional 
discursive/practical matrix which ground these 
explanations. 
ideological 
Chapter 
relation 
6 examined the material and 
between men and women. Most 
important, we tried to show how stereotypes thus far 
accessed through questionnaires studies missed more 
fundamental, embedded representations whichare integral to 
the practical relation between the genders. These we tried 
to bring out by applying a feminist analysis of gender 
relations. In doing this we did no more than set out the 
range of practices and discourses that are, on a feminist 
reading, 
male 9 • 
likely to be associated with the 9 traditional 
As such, we did not go beyond feminist 
generalities. It was in Chapter 7, in our analyses of 
men 9 s rape explanations, that we saw how these 
generalities mapped onto men 9 s actual explanations. In 
that chapter we developed three ideal types of rape 
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explanation: the dimensional with its stress on the 
continuity between rape and normality, and its practice 
geared toward fundamental social and self change; the 
typological with its emphasis on the criteria of 
differentiation of rape from non-rape and its practical 
orientation towards the identification of rape in specific 
cases: and the schismatic a form of typological which 
further attempts to deny the dimensional, and thereby 
stands to preserve male power. The dimensional was related 
to feminist and anti-sexist explanations and drew on the 
critical analysis presented in Chapter 6 to support that 
continuity. The typological was evidenced in in legal, 
clinical, psychological and lay explanations. Whether the 
typological could be classed schismatic was always 
difficult to judge. Context was all-important; the more 
information as regards the general practices of the 
explainer, the more secure our assessment of the 
schismatic ~ndex of a typological explanation was likely 
to be. We attempted to illustrate, as opposed to survey, 
the use of these types and their relation to other 
discourse/practices in a small number of interviews. 
Contrary to expectations based on the feminist focus on 
rape myths. schismatic explanations relatively rarely 
resorted to.the open use of rape myths. More subtle means, 
such balance-as-counterpoint, were deployed. However, it 
also became apparent that our distinction between the 
ideal types was more problematic than envisaged. 
Page 437 
Figure 2. 
Simplified Model of Policeman Role 
(Unofficial) 
(a) 
---- Police Practice 
(d) 
(Official) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
'\ 
'\ 
'\ 
Masculinity 
Policeman 
'\ 
'\ (b) 
'\ 
Macho Posturing ----
/ 
/ (c) 
/ 
Maximize Arrests 
(a) Dismiss or ignore women 9 s 
Behaviour ( Denigration of women); 
differentiation from other roles; 
the alleged rapist. 
rape claims; (b) Group 
(c) Loyalty to the force; 
(d) Attributions to the 
This then is the general backdrop against which the more 
specialized ~eployment of rape explanations by policemen 
is considered. In Chapter 8 I tried to place these ideal 
types in the more concrete context of the policeman role. 
Figure 2 represents a highly simplified version of our 
findings. In embedding the police role in the framework 
outlined in Fig.2 we emphasize the masculine component of 
personal and 
institution-driven 
arrests. However, 
i 
social identity and reduce the 
behaviour to the maximization of 
as we saw, this latter is affected by 
other factors such as the prosecutability of individual 
cases. In turn This is conditioned by the precedents of 
the juridica:l system. The merging of official legal 
procedure and informal cultural tradition suggest that our 
division between official and unofficial is somewhat 
artificial. This merging is an outcome of the fact that it 
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is the frontline officers who ultimately mediate and shape 
organizational directives. We might thus expect to 
find and in Chapter 8 we provided some evidence in support 
of a tendency toward schismatic explanation that is 
grounded in the traditional masculinity of 9 cop culture 9 
and juridical practice, but simultaneously constrained by 
the requirement~ of law enforcement (even if that is 
itself conditioned by judgements of 9 good arrest 9 , 
9 rubbish 9 , etc), and shielded by notions of 
prosecutability (credibility in the courts). Thus we tie 
explanation of rape to a complex of influences each of 
which implicates its own set of discourses and, 
importantly, practices. Finally, we introduced cognitive 
factors into our analysis, attempting to show how they 
both were 9 engendered 9 by and mediated the intersection of 
social practices and discourses connected with the 
policeman role. 
2. Practical Implications. 
There are a considerable number of more or less directly 
implied 
thesis. 
practical projects that can be derived from this 
At the more ramatic end these might include the 
overthrow of patriarchal and capitalist social structure 
to the thorough overhaul of the social psychological and 
university establishment. 
can look at two 
of explanations. 
practical 
At a more manageable level we 
implications regarding the use 
Page U39 
Firstl¥, at the broad level, there are those implications 
that apply to the current polarization within the 
gendered social field. In particular, we can examine the 
consolidation and extension or the orthodox masculine role 
and the way that explanations (discourses, 
representations 1 etc) have mediated this. As an anecdotal 
example, it is possible to detect this polarization in the 
cinematic reawakening of the macho, individualist hero. 
The pessimism of the mid-70s which spawned such films as 
the Parallax View and Executive Action (in which 
organizations overwhelmed the efforts of individuals), is 
replaced by films, perhaps buoyed up by the optimism of 
Reaganism, like Turk 182 and Rambo which re-assert the 
primacy of the macho individual who takes on the 
establishment against overwhelming odds and wins. The main 
point is that this polarization is proceeding on a variety 
of levels, both practical and discursive (eg enterprise 
schemes and the rhetoric of self-reliance respectively). 
The production of counter explanations may or may not have 
an effect on this process. It will depend on the 
circumstances whether such explanations diffuse this 
polarization or exacerbate it. That such explanations may 
take effect can be seen in the possible influence of 
feminist thought on the police treatment of rape victims. 
Regarding the latter, in Britain there seem to be changes 
in the treatment of rape victims by the police (Guardian, 
1/11/BU), with policewomen assigned to the task or calming 
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and taking seriously the claims of these alleged 
victims. 
officers 
In America, both men and women police 
are being trained to deal with rape victims 
( 0 9 Reilly, 198LJ.) .: However, suspicions arise when, in 
we are faced with an extraodinary 
exchange between him and a policewoman who has broken down 
after attempting to comfort a victim. In this, 
quite savagely demands that the policewoman pull herself' 
together and recognize his expertise in the field. This 
suggested that, if we looked beyond 0 9 Reilly 9 s optimism, 
we might regard the entrenchment and necessity of' 
masculinity in policing as not so easily overcome. There 
are two ways in which it might retain its foothold. 
Firstly there can be specialization across police 
officers, with some assigned to rape-related duties and 
others having litle or nothing to do with it, treating it 
as an unworthy, low status duty. Secondly, and more 
insidiously, there may be specialization within police 
officers. Thus, the appropriate interpersonal skills 
reserved for dealing with victims are produced at a 
fairly super~icial level (almost as an~ther aspect of' the 
pro:f'essionalization of' the police - putting the women at 
her ease yields more cogent information); there is still 
relatively little respect for the women herself. And 
anyway, tact. does not preclude the tactful dismissal of' a 
women 9 s allegations. A difficulty which such officers 
might face is possibly reflected in a study of the rape 
attitudes of' police surgeons (Geis,Wright and Geis,198LJ.). 
Page lJ.LU 
This found that the ma.j ori t;y were torn between 
role-lo;yalties to the police and medicine respectivel;y, 
with man;y succumbing to the police role and all its 
biases. So, there is ever;y possibilit;y that this 
specialization within police officers might be swamped b;y 
the demands of the more powerful role/specialism. 
If the above argument holds, it follows that the 
masculinit;y s;yndrome of policemen must first be tackled 
before the treatment of rape victims becomes genuinel;y 
improved. This is because part of such a treatment must 
entail the admi~sion that orthodox masculinit;y generall;y 
provides 
against 
the necessar;y conditions for rape. Working 
this is the tendenc;y to portra;y rapists as fiends 
and deviants, 
masculinit;y. 
a species outside the bounds of normal 
In order to undermine this, it is also 
necessar;y to erode the individualism that attaches to both 
lawful bla~e (guilt) and to masculinit;y - that is, to see 
both in the complex social context. Yet to do this would 
be tantamount to changing the ver;y function of the police 
to something quite revolutionar;y. However, this 
pessimistic view should not detract from the few gains 
that have been made b;y women. Our anal;ysis suggests that, 
under the right conditions, continued pressure (through 
the re/production of alternative explanations) ma;y lead to 
a more pervasive liberalization of the police treatment of 
alleged rape victims. 
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3. Shortcomings and Avenues. 
In this section I will consider three broad problems 
with this thesis that I see as being particularly 
important, especially insofar as they point to avenues 
for future research. 
It is clear that my work falls into the hermeneutic 
tradition withln psychology (Taylor,1973). As such it is 
open to the problems that face all interpretive 
disciplines - namely, that of validation. To what extent, 
then, is our interpretation of policemen 9 s explanations of 
rape more plausible than others? This problem has been 
considered in some detail by Hirsch (1967,1976) as it 
applies to literary criticism. Given that human behavior 
can be considered a text (Ricoeur,1971), and 
notwithstanding our previous reservations ( Ch. 5), for 
present purposes, we can consider our interpretation in 
the light of Hi~sch 9 s principles of validation. 
For Hirsch, the production and evaluation of 
interpretations is necessarily probabilistic. The initial 
interpretation is something of a guess and there are no 
systematic rules for making good guesses. However, he 
seems to miss the point that there are nevertheless 
historical rules, which for given times and places, carry 
more weight than do others. Thus in Paris, the Derridean 
mode of analysis may currently be the preferred one. In 
our case, our interpretations have derived from a 
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generative intent that turns on feminist and socialist 
perceptions of the world (hermeneutic circles). 
Hirsch(1976) feels that one criterion for the validation 
of an interpretation that is immune from these local fads, 
is that an interpretation should be true (or coherent 
with) the author 9 s intention. Thus, ~ ... in ethical terms, 
the original meaning is the 9 best meaning 9 ••• 99 (p92). This 
is something that ethogenics also incorporates. In the 
Marsh et al(i978) study this getting at the actor 9 s 
intention is , conducted through negotiation. While the 
interpretations are theoretically always open to revision, 
intended meaning is more often than not a constituent. In 
contrast, I would suggest that the meaning of a 
text/action cari be accessed through its use and effects 
(which might or might not include intention). In doing 
this we must ~herefore demarcate the constraints that are 
imposed on the use and effects; this requires historical 
and social analysis. Thus, the meaning of an action/text 
is historically variable. In the case of policemen 9 s 
explanations of rape, their meaning can be appropriated 
with particular:reference to the effects that they have on 
women, men, the police themselves and so on. Such an 
historical 
criterion depends on the validation of the 
anq social analysis which embraces those 
actions/texts. The corollary to this is that an 
interpretation also has a use. Hirsch 9 s priveleging of the 
author has an individualizing effect; its ethical 
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stance serves. to present Hirsch as a gentleman (whatever 
Hirsch 9 s intentions in this respect). In short, the 
conflict over interpretations is often a conflict over 
cosmologies. 
But we are also presented with other types of criteria. 
The accumulation of favourable evidence is, because of the 
nature of the hermeneutic circle, inadequate. Rather, 
Hirsch(1967) suggests a number of statistically modelled 
parameters: All relevant evidence should be considered; 
the relevance is conditioned by the degree to which it can 
be assimilated to the class which embodies the 
interpretation: Evidence which helps narrow a class will 
have particular relevance when we come to interpret a 
possible representative of that class. 
that 9 macho 9 men tend to denigrate women, 
Thus, in noting 
the additional 
evidence that policemen are especially 9 macho 9 will serve 
to further support our interpretation of their rape 
explanations a~ generally derogatory of women. Other 
criteria are: the greater the number of instances that 
fall into that class, and the higher the frequency of the 
relevant traits amongst members of that class, then the 
greater the reliability of that class and hence 
interpretation. In all, I think that I have managed to 
sketch the context and practices that attach to the 
policeman 9 s rape explanantion in sufficient detail to 
warrant the interpretation that is placed on them. 
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As regard .our ideal type of' policemen 9 s rape 
explanations, :it suf'f'ers from an exclusive dependence on 
secondary sources, however reliable they might be. It 
would certainly be valuable to directly witness and more 
precisely analyze the distribution of these explanatory 
forms within the police institution. So, future research 
might take on a more empirical cast. This would also have 
to incorporate action (in the sense of' Lewinian action 
research, Chein,Cook and Harding,19ll.8). The problem here 
is that we would be dealing with an event that occurs 
relatively :~;'&rely but whose discursive/practical 
manifestation (endemic sexism, etc) is a regular feature 
of police life; While we can trace out the links between 
masculinity and rape explanations (and the treatment of' 
rape victims), to make such links seem credible and, 
vitally, alterable, to police officers seems a difficult 
task, especialJ.y in the light of the subtle and 
institutionally viable explanatory devices they use in 
severing those links. However, this pessimism might be 
modified by a sensitivity to the problems experienced by 
police of'f'icers themselves; f'or examples the stress of' 
policing violent areas or the alienation of' an extreme 
masculinity. With respect to this latter point, I have 
painted too funqtional a picture: a study of' individual 
police of'f'icers, as opposed to the construction of' an 
ideal type, would doubtless reveal problems that would 
otherwise go untapped 
policeman). 
(cf Ch.B for the various types of 
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A second problem is that we have to more convincingly 
substantiate our feminist analysis of masculinity for 
which we derived our embedded stereotypes. This is not 
helped by the variety of feminisms available, with all 
their different accents and dynamics. This aside, the 
embedded stereotype of masculinity as one in which, 
historically mediated, the desire to control is uppermost, 
has to be f~eshed out in a more comprehensive way than 
so here. The way that this motivation 
impregnates: (or fails to impregnate) the various aspects 
of the masculine self and its behavioural repertoire needs 
to be traced out. For example, my assertion that these 
control needs are fulfilled in the greater tendency of men 
to engage in intergroup processes (thereby controlling 
both self and other images) needs to be investigated in 
i 
somewhat more detail. To this end we might look at how the 
generation of control/certainty through the formulation of 
the Other can drift apart from the 9 actual nature 9 of the 
Other (a global example of this might be the ecological 
disasters we now face); we might examine how the inherent 
limits of t~e Other come to constrain the processes of 
control/certainty. In a sense this is what is happening 
with the resistance that women/feminists put up in 
defining themselves - they are setting the limits of 
themselves as Other. A different research strategy would 
be to recount alternative modes of control and interaction 
from the anthropological literature (eg of Pygmies, 
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Barclay,1982; the Bushmen, Van der Post,196a. As regards 
the latter, we can point out that, though perhaps 
over-idealistically portrayed as perfectly attuned to 
their environment, they are loathed to engage in what are 
considered to be conventional intergroup processes), or 
else seek them out in contemporary Western societies. 
Nevertheless, the problem that remains is still one of 
interpretation rather than falsification or proof. 
The, apparently empirical, counterclaim that women also 
form groups whose operation is as, if not more, extreme 
than male groups, can be explained in terms of masculine 
hegemony. But this explanation means that masculinity and 
control/certainty needs take on the form of a mutually 
defining couple. This is indicative of the fact that we 
are presenting an alternative interpretative framework 
(though 
material); 
polemical 
it is duly relativized by our use of interview 
a framework that is meant to have both 
and generative impact. Under these 
circumstances, another channel for research would be the 
elaboration and clarification of this alternative feminist 
schema in its application to various social psychological 
phenomena. I think this would be a fruitful enterprise, 
especially given the often assumed 9 control needs 9 that 
lie at the affective heart of many of the processes social 
psychology attempts to understand. 
Two corollary problems: Firstly, Potter et al(198a) have 
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pointed out that with regard to ~eminist novels there is a 
construction o~ ~eminine experience that, despite its 
di~~erences with other ~orms o~ the novel, still manages 
to homogenize, albeit radically, ~emale experience. They 
suggest that the ~ull range o~ ~eminine (and masculine) 
experience (perception and interaction with sel~ and 
others) needs to be explored. This criticism can 
certainly be applied to my work. I have indulged in such 
homogenization, though I have so~tened it by ~raming it as 
an ideal type and throuh the use o~ interviews. But more 
importantly, this criticism is too stringent. In setting 
up a universally applicable dichotomy, we can access broad 
historical processes, especially mediated through the 
family and work, that provide the (historically bound) 
'baserate' o~ masculine and feminine differences. Over and 
above this, there are undoubtedly more re~ined 
di~~erences and similarities. An exploration o~ the range 
of these and of their interaction (perhaps mutual 
shaping) with the baserates is another research area that 
could be developed. Secondly, in looking at masculinity's 
links with control, we have reworked the issue of 
aggression, situating it in the context of long-term 
historical processes, interpreting it as a latent aspect 
of masculinity, rather than a physiological or 
psychological phenomenon. As a means to more securely 
grounding this approach, it could be used examine the 
assumptions of orthodox aggression research and the 
possible ideological function of that research. 
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The final set of shortcomings I will tackle include 
issues surrounding memory, scripts, textual analysis and 
the relation of these to discursive/practical matrices. 
Schank(1982), extending Schank and Abelson 9 s (1977) script 
theory, has argued that scripts play a major part in the 
organization of episodic memory and that memory plays a 
reciprocal part in understanding. In the same way that our 
critique of Schank and Abelson focused on their neglect of 
power, we can point to a similar void in Schank 9 s 
formulations. The simple point is that what can be 
remembered is influenced by power as mediated through the 
role in which the remembering individual is situated. 
Further, the repertoire that is available to a role is 
accessed via memory. Thus power and memory are 
intrinsically linked. It is no wonder that the struggle 
for power also entails a struggle over historical memory: 
feminists attempt to recover women 9 s history, Orwell 9 s 
fictional and Kundera 9 s Czech states rewrite history 
moment to moment, and social psychology textbooks attempt 
to convey a coherent history (cf Ch.ll). At the 
individual level, we can suggest that two types of memory 
operate based on practical and discursive forms of 
consciousness (Giddens,1979). At both levels, through 
these possibly distinct (cerebellar and cerebral?) modes 
of memory, power comes to be mediated. This can be 
described in Foucauldian terms. Power, in the form of 
microtechnologies (eg surveillance, measurement, the 
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semiotics of institutional layout, etc), inscribe the 
individual, shaping him/her accordingly. That inscription 
is likely to be stored in these two types of memory. We 
might naively propose that practical consciousness, being 
less open to critical reflection, plays the major part in 
this process. 
Running parallel with this, and dealing directly with the 
problems of interpretation at both personal and academic 
levels can be a view of scripts, roles and situations that 
can accommo.date recent developments in literary criticism 
(cf Ch.1; Potter et al,198l!). For these may all be 
treated as texts; their meanings are always negotiable -
never singularly determined by the text or the reader. The 
power/role ~f the actor/observer can determine how s/he 
will interpret the situation in which s/he finds 
him/herself that is, s/he effectively deciphers the 
text/situation. Yet s/he is also constrained by the text. 
Similarly, the individual agent can be viewed as a text 
which the psychologist/investigator interprets. In both 
cases, the meaning of the text reverberates between the 
psychologist/agent/reader 
experiment)/situation/text. 
from literary criticism 
and the subject(or 
The use of various techniques 
in the analysis of these 
interactions, especially as they relate to the wider 
social/representational field, seems worth pursuing. 
To end: This chapter has pointed to a number of possible 
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research pro~rammes that lead off in various directions. 
At the heart of each are the dual concerns of this 
thesis: to adequate!¥ embed the individual in his/her 
context - indeed to blur the divide between them; and, 
thereb¥, to do justice to the potentialit¥ of both. 
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APPENDIX 
THE GLASGOW RAPE CASE 
The 99Glasgow Rape Case 99 by Harper and MacWhinnie ( 1983) 
will be used as a case study illustration of the 
deployment of rape myths, and their links with S, T and D 
explanatory types. 
This book is about two things: the rape and assault on 
Carol X, and Scottish legal history. The accounts of the 
incident (both within and outside the court), and Carol 9 s 
physical and emotional trauma are woven, within the 
narrative, into accounts of the workings of the Scottish 
legal system and the dramas surrounding its partial 
breakdown in the course of this case. Essentially, this is 
a piece of journalism the main ingredient of which, the 
personalization of events, runs throughout the text. 
Nevertheless, there are marked differences between this 
book and the usual press reports. The social backdrop to 
the rape is sketched, and the broader implications, 
especially regarding the law, are outlined. Moreover, and 
perhaps most strikingly, both the rapists, Carol X and 
those involved with her and the case are presented in an 
ostensibly sympathetic light. 
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Given this detailing, which should at least partially 
undermine the use of myths and stereotypes, it is 
important to see how these have been re-instated. That 
this book was going to incorporate them was always likely 
given the backgrounds of the authors (solicitor and crime 
journalist respectively). A hint of this comes in the last 
page but two when the Potiphar 9 s wife myth is cited as a 
warning against too cavalier a condemnation of the alleged 
rapist. The warning of course rightly serves a typological 
function, but its overstatement, or rather the uncritical 
adherence to· it, suggests a tendency toward the 
schismatic. 
In this analysis we will concentrate on the rape myth of 
the Rape-Fiend - that we considered above. After a precis 
of the book, I will show the ways that the fiend is 
constructed. It should be reiterated that these discursive 
elements exist in tension with the sympathy that is 
extensive throughout the book. While the sympathy is quite 
explicit; the myth hangs back, buried amongst sections and 
themes. In attempting to work this out into the open, the 
problem of validity comes to the fore. Given the arguments 
presented in this and the preceding chapter, and also 
various comments regarding the interpretation of texts, it 
should be ~lear that my validity claims are not absolute, 
but historically and contextually bound. 
( 1) . Precis. 
background. At 
Carol X 
18 she 
came from a 
was raped 
poor 
by 
working class 
a boyfriend and 
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got pregnant. She left work to have the baby. At 21 she 
was married. Her husband was in 
left him; during this time 
Three years later she met Billy 
with him. 
and out of prison and she 
she had two more children. 
and, for a year, was happy 
Barrowfield i~ a rough district in Glasgow 9 s East-end. 
Crowding, unemployment and poverty bred violence. Gangs 
were again commonplace in the 9 80s. On 31st October,1981, 
Carol, instead of making Billy 9 s dinner, goes to her 
friend 9 s (Babs) house to chat and drink. Billy arrives and 
takes her back home. Babs later turns up at Billy 9 s home 
because she doesn 9 t want to stay with her boyfriend who is 
getting violent. Billy accompanies Babs back to the 
bus-stop. Meantime Carol slips out, frightened that Billy 
will beat her. She meets Babs at the bus-stop and they go 
for a drink. Billy, finding Carol gone, goes out and gets 
roaring drunk. Later, leaving the pub for her mother 9 s, 
Carol decides to return to Billy 9 s. No buses are running, 
so she walks. On her way, she is attacked. 
Gordon Sweeny(lll) and John Thompson(15), after going to a 
disco with Joe Sweeny and Steven Cameron (both 17), are 
hanging around. They have been drinking. They follow Carol 
after realizing she is probably tipsy. She is 
either, knocked out and dragged, or led towards a hut in a 
scrap metal yard. There the two youths have intercourse 
with her. Gordon goes off and gets Joe and Steven. Joe 
Sweeny after having intercourse with her, slashes her with 
a knife. As he comes out of the hut he cries, "I 9 ve ripped 
the lassie Y 99 • 
Carol wakes up and eventually crawls to a neighbour 9 s. 
From there she is rushed to hospital and treated. The 
police have meanwhile chased Joe and stopped Gordon and 
John, but not for any particular reason. Later, 
information received names them as the attackers and they 
are arrested. 
Over the following days, Carol is devastated. She cannot 
sleep or get the rape out of her mind. She feels useless 
and attempts suicide. Billy saves her. At the Procurator 
Fiscal 9 s office, she is subjected to a barrage of abuse 
as a taster of what to expect in court. Her ex-husband 
contacts her and she decides to go with him to Newcastle. 
Only days ·before the trial she cannot be traced. 
Eventually she is found and returns to Billy. She attempts 
suicide a second time. 
On the trial day, the trial is 
following week. The second time, 
court cafeteria. She is taken to 
miscarries at the hospital. An 
part-time .officer at the Public 
reviews the psychiatric reports on 
abandon the case for the time being. 
postponed till the 
she breaks down in the 
a psychiatrist. She 
Advocate Depute (a 
Prosecutor 9 s office) 
Carol and decides to 
In the last months of 
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1981, a different Advocate Depute decides to drop the case 
altogether. The four defendants are told; Carol is not. 
McWhinnie, crime reporter on the Daily Record, is 
contacted about these events. The contact considers this 
state of affairs to be a 9 bloody scandal 9 • The argument 
runs thus: to prove rape it must be shown that penetration 
took place and consent was withheld. But Carol is too 
disturbed to testify. However, had she died of her 
injuries, a murder trial would have gone ahead. Why then 
has the assault not been tried? McWhinnie contacts the 
local MP; later he informs the MP that confessions were 
given by the defendants and that Cameron had turned 
Queen 9 s evidence. A Parliamentary storm brews up. This is 
exacerbated when Nicholas Fairburn, representing the 
Public Prosecutor 9 s office, insults the House by 
prematurely suggesting to the press that the prosecution 
had insufficient evidence to proceed. He eventually 
resigns. 
Meanwhile, Carol is being hunted down by the press. The 
locals are overtly hostile to the reporters. She finally 
decides on a private prosecution after being looked after 
by men of the Scottish Daily Express. She meets Ross 
Harper who agrees to organize a private prosecution. A 
team is assembled and a presentation is constructed. All 
services are provided free. The application to prosecute 
privately is made on 16/3/82. Finally it is accepted and 
the trial is scheduled for 28/5/82. 
Billy and Carol get married on 11/2/82. But after weeks 
of being cooped up with Billy, who has left his job to 
look after her, the marriage begins to founder. Carol 
leaves and stays with her aunt. McWhinnie eventually 
tracks her dowm. She has no intention of pulling out now. 
The trial begins. The defences take the following forms. 
Joseph Sweeny is blamed for the assault by Gordon Sweeny 
and John Thompson. Joseph Sweeny blames John Thompson for 
it. Evidence is presented. Carol is nervous when she gives 
her evidence. In the cross-examination, the fact that rape 
ever occurred is questioned. The defence suggests 
that, given that she was unconscious, she cannot be sure 
of having been raped. They put it that, being drunk, she 
voluntarily went with the two boys. It emerges that Joe 
Sweeny may have been beaten by the police. Cameron 
eventuallY admits that Carol was frightened throughout the 
event. The doctor who examined her at the hospital cannot 
confirm that she had a wound at the back of her head 
through being knocked unconscious. The implication here 
was that she went voluntarily. More evidence is given and 
analyzed. The verdicts are that Joe Sweeny is guilty on 
counts of rape and assault, while Gordon Sweeny and John 
Thompson are guilty of indecent assault. 
Carol tries to get back to normal. After a holiday, a 
false preganc¥ and rows with Bill¥, 
and is doing better. 
Page 4.56 
she settles with him 
(2). Rape-Fiends. As we have alread¥ noted, in contrast 
to t¥Pical press coverage of rapist-fiends, details of the 
background of the bO¥S are given. The appalling conditions 
of Barrowfield are stressed, but at the same time the four 
¥OUths are distanced from them. On page 15, the following 
quote is given: 99 ••• 99 We do a lot of bad things but we 
don 9 t attack lassies- even in Barrowfield" ... " (This bo¥ 
was a member of a rival gang). The outline of social and 
economic factors of Barrowfield is not directl¥ used to 
explai.n the rise of the gangs; rather, s¥mpath¥ is 
reserved for the law-abiding population. The gang members 
are essentiall¥ seen as thugs, especiall¥ in their 
relation to the police. Thus we are presented with an 
account of the gangs uniting to attack the police which 
the authors see as 99 amazing 99 ( p19). A more genuinel¥ 
S¥mpathetic treatment might have considered the attack in 
terms of the internal cohesion of the gang, or the 
negative sense of occasion in response to boredom (Robins 
and Cohen,1978); or it might have attempted to bring 
together the accounts of masculinit¥, hard drinking and 
economic hardship in a more meaningful wa¥ (Patrick,1973). 
The accent on masculinit¥, hard drinking, and economic 
hardship are never brought together in an¥ meaningful Wa¥. 
So the contrasts that are initiall¥ established are 
between the gangs and law-abiding citizens. 
The fact that the social conditions are shared is simpl¥ 
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used to di~~erentiate gangs and citizens; it is implied 
that there is something intrinsically deviant about the 
gang members. It is a means by which to more strongly 
assert typological criteria. It is easily achieved, as we 
saw above, by neglecting the history of Glasgow gangs and 
working class masculinity. The gangs represent the 
irrational. With the groundwork ~or the extraordinariness 
o~ the attack laid, more powerful symbols can be brought 
into play. 
And these come in the form of the legal system. Where the 
group of defendants fell into dissolution, wracked my 
mutual recrimination, the Scottish legal system, itsel~ 
under close scrutiny a~ter its various misjudgements, 
pulled together. Throughout the text, its coherence and 
adaptability, as well as its compassion, is emphasized. 
The charge ~hat the private prosecution that was 
eventually brought simply served to deflect attention from 
the internal failings o~ the public system is mentioned 
only fleetingly. What seems to be occurring is a contrast 
between two 
defendants 9 was 
dif~erent strategies for survival: 
individualistic and internercine; 
the 
the 
legal system 9 s cooperative and rational. 0~ course, this 
is not surprising given the respective interests of the 
two groups; nevertheless, the contrast exists and under 
prevailing conditions serves to denigrate the former. On a 
di~ferent level, this class contrast is reflected in the 
statements and court evidence given by the de~endants. 
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Inevitably, the boys are made fools of; in the case of Joe 
Sweeny, he ends up adhering to an implausible conspiracy 
between the police, the witnesses and the other 
defendants. The often mentioned brilliance of the counsel 
and the judges forms a luminous backdrop to the dimness or 
the defendants. 
Thus we have a series or contrasts: between the 
defendants and the legal system, lawful locals, and 
members of other gangs. Each contrast, while overtly 
typological, serves to schismatically distance the 
defendants and their actions from 9 normality 9 • This is the 
point being made here. We are not denying that these 
actions are out of the ordinary, but their connections to 
everyday practices, sexuality, attitudes, etc, should not 
be severed as they seem to have been here. 
Also, the representations of both the 
rapist-fiend and the temporary (lid-flipped) 
intrinsic 
rapist are 
present here. In the defence submissions, Joe Sweeny 9 s 
actions are presented as a "Moment of madness" (p2l12). The 
consumption of alcohol and the defence 9 s depiction of 
Carol 9 s beha~iour as provocative likewise fit in with the 
conception of the triggered rapist. This is in comparison 
to the apparently intrinsically irrational character of 
the boys tha.t the above contrasts signify. On closer 
reading, we can see that these two types of rapist can be 
demarcated in a way which relates to differing interests. 
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The inherent, long-term irrationality which culminates in 
rape is primarily equated with a class and a subculture 
(working-class gangs). The momentary, loss-of>-control 
rapist is largely equated with a masculinity that has been 
mismanaged by the victim. This division is not absolute, 
there is crossover. Still, it serves to evoke the 
9 interests 9 or practices that bind these myths and 
discourses. It points to their schismatic !'unction to 
obscure the continuity between rape and 9 normality 9 , here 
characterized by the practice/discourses in which the 
authors themselves are engaged (or else aspire to). That 
is, normality' is itself> open to multiple interpretations, 
and can be cast in class and sub-cultural terms, as 
opposed to simply individualist ones (eg in the way that 
the rapist is normally marginalized through the atribution 
of individual, internally driven deviance). So, as a 
further complication to our analysis, the use of> 
schismatic explanations not only serves a unif>orm 
masculinity, but also a narrower masculinity that is 
allied to a class, ie middle-class, prof>essional. 
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